In D 3/00
(OJ 2003, 365) the appellant claimed that for each question in paper D, parts 1 and 2, he should have been awarded the highest number of marks awarded by one of the two examiners who had marked his paper. In D 12/00
, too, the appellant claimed among other things that the higher number of marks should count. Also, any discrepancy between the markings of each examiner showed gross disregard for the principle of uniformity within the meaning of Art. 16 REE 1994 (Art. 6(2)(c) REE, English text, now provides for consistency of marking). The board confirmed its established case law, adding that differences of opinion over the number of marks to be awarded for a given answer were a reflection of value judgments which were not, in principle, subject to judicial review. It had also already been explained in D 4/99
that the marking of examination papers was an individual assessment and that, within the general instructions to the examiners for marking the papers (see the REE 1994 Implementing provisions), more or less strict standards were possible and different aspects might be considered essential or less important. Hence it was consistent with the ratio legis of Art. 8(b) REE 1994 (cf. Art. 8(1)(e) REE) that the examiners had some (limited) latitude of evaluation when awarding marks and might therefore arrive at different marks, both results being justifiable (D 5/94
and D 6/98
). The fact that two independent examiners had arrived at different marks was not per se a violation of the applicable provisions (D 12/00
). In D 3/00
the board drew attention to the fact that, with regard to the evaluation of the merits of a candidate's answer in an examination paper, a candidate was not per se entitled to claim the highest mark awarded by one of the examiners for each answer to a sub-question or sub-element whenever the two examiners who marked the paper in accordance with Art. 8(b) REE 1994 differed in their marking.