Objective review of the marks awarded 

In accordance with the DBA's consistent case law (in particular D 1/92, OJ 1993, 357, D 6/92, OJ 1993, 361, and D 7/05, OJ 2007, 378), decisions of the Examination Board may in principle only be reviewed for the purposes of establishing that they do not infringe the REE, the provisions relating to its application or higher-ranking law. In D 1/92 and D 6/92, the DBA therefore concluded that its functions did not include reconsidering the examination procedure on its merits. Accordingly, the Examination Board's value judgment concerning the number of marks that an examination paper deserved was not subject to review by the board. Only if the appellant could show that the contested decision was based on serious and obvious mistakes could the board take this into account. The alleged mistake must be so obvious that it could be established without re-opening the entire marking procedure, for instance if an examiner was alleged to have based his evaluation on a technically or legally incorrect premise on which the contested decision rested. Any further claims regarding alleged defects in the assessment of candidates' work fell outside the DBA’s jurisdiction, since value judgments were not subject to judicial review. These findings were confirmed in D 7/05 (OJ 2007, 378). See also, for example, D 9/00, D 7/01, D 11/01, D 16/02, D 6/04, D 14/08, D 23/08, D 1/13 and D 5/13.

In D 6/98, the DBA added that these conditions were in line with those for correcting errors under R. 89 EPC 1973 (cf. now R. 140 EPC), particularly in the case of errors of transcription or calculation in the marking. Under Art. 27(1) REE 1994 (cf. Art. 24(1) REE), the DBA was not empowered to reopen the assessment procedure (D 15/97). The DBA was not intended to be a department of second instance empowered to examine whether the marks awarded for a candidate's examination were justified on their merits or correct, and thus to superimpose its own value judgment on that of the Examination Board (D 20/96 and D 6/02).

In D 13/02 the board stated that obvious mistakes as referred to above were those which could be identified without a re-evaluation of the examination paper. That would be the case, for instance, if one and the same paper had been marked very differently by the two examiners, since the marking discrepancy alone would indicate an infringement of the principle of uniform marking, irrespective of the level of the marks awarded. Another example of an obvious mistake would be a question whose wording was ambiguous or incomprehensible. That would be clear straight away, without any reference to marks awarded, from the meaning that common sense would ascribe to the wording of the question concerned.

D 17/05 cited D 13/02 to point out that the existence of a mistake within the meaning of D 1/92 could not be deduced from a comparison of the candidate's answer with another answer. The board also cited the statement that the disclosure of marking instructions which may have been used by the examiner was not required for a decision on an appeal and that under the established case law no other entitlement existed to any such disclosure.

In D 3/00 (OJ 2003, 365) the appellant claimed that for each question in paper D, parts 1 and 2, he should have been awarded the highest number of marks awarded by one of the two examiners who had marked his paper. In D 12/00, too, the appellant claimed that the higher number of marks should count. Any discrepancy between the markings of each examiner showed gross disregard for the principle of uniformity within the meaning of Art. 16 REE 1994 (Art. 6(2)(c) REE, English text, now provides for consistency of marking). The board confirmed its established case law, adding that differences of opinion over the number of marks to be awarded for a given answer were a reflection of value judgments which were not, in principle, subject to judicial review. It had also already been explained in D 4/99 (see point 2.3 above) that the marking of examination papers was an individual assessment and that, within the general instructions to the examiners for marking the papers (IPREE 1994), more or less strict standards were possible and different aspects might be considered essential or less important. Hence it was consistent with the ratio legis of Art. 8(b) REE 1994 (cf. Art. 8(1)(e) REE) that the examiners had some (limited) latitude of evaluation when awarding marks and might therefore arrive at different marks, both results being justifiable (D 5/94 and D 6/98). The fact that two independent examiners had arrived at different marks was not per se a violation of the applicable provisions (D 12/00). In D 3/00 the board drew attention to the fact that, with regard to the evaluation of the merits of a candidate's answer in an examination paper, a candidate was not per se entitled to claim the highest mark awarded by one of the examiners for each answer to a sub-question or sub-element whenever the two examiners who marked the paper in accordance with Art. 8(b) REE 1994 differed in their marking.

D 6/07 and D 7/07 were among a number of appeal decisions concerning the marking of paper C of the 2007 examination. A large number of candidates had taken as the starting point for their attack on the claims a document which the examination committee did not consider to represent the closest prior art and had been awarded no points in this regard. The Examination Board took the view that, in keeping with long-standing practice, some credit should be given for properly drafted problem and solution approaches even where the wrong starting document for assessing inventive step had been used. Given the lateness of the proceedings and the impossibility of re-marking all the papers, it decided, as an exceptional measure, that the fairest option would be to award ten additional points (being the maximum number possible) to all candidates having sat the paper. The DBA held first that the awarding of no points by the examination committee infringed the requirements of R. 4(2) and (3) IPREE 1994: the "fit to practise" criterion required the examiners in marking the individual parts of a candidate's answers not to disregard their merit in the context of the whole answer paper (D 3/00, OJ 2003, 365) and the need to allow for the fair marking of answers which, although deviating from the marking scheme, were nonetheless reasonable and competently substantiated (D 7/05, OJ 2007, 378). The board further ruled that, under Art. 7(3) REE 1994, it fell to the Examination Board to award the grades "pass", "fail", or "compensable fail" and formally to decide whether the whole examination had been passed or not. Its powers did not extend to the preceding marking of candidates' individual papers on a scale of zero to 100, and therefore the alteration of the marks awarded by the examination committee (in accordance with Art. 8(b) REE 1994 and R. 4(1) IPREE 1994) by the blanket addition of ten marks per paper had been ultra vires. The abstract awarding of marks without regard to the "fit to practise" criterion of R. 4 IPREE 1994 in the individual candidates' examination papers infringed the principle of objectivity as well as Art. 8(b) REE 1994 and R. 4 IPREE 1994. In conclusion the DBA ordered a new marking of paper C of each appellant in accordance with R. 4 IPREE 1994, with the ten additional points already awarded to be retained by the appellant.

In D 3/14 the appellant had obtained the grade "fail" (with 68 marks) in the 2014 pre-examination for the European qualifying examination. She argued that the answer to statement 10.4 in the question paper should have been "false", rather than "true", as given in the Examiner's Report, and requested that the decision of the Examination Board be set aside and that she be awarded a "pass".

In accordance with the settled case law (e.g. D 1/92, see above), the board examined whether the alleged mistake was so obvious that it could be established without reopening the entire marking procedure. It found that statement 10.4 should have been formulated differently in order to express the aim intended. Candidates could not be expected to make an assumption in this respect (cf. R. 22(3) IPREE, providing that candidates must limit themselves to the facts given). The appellant's understanding of statement 10.4 was justified from an objective point of view. The answer to it was "false" and not "true" as indicated in the examiner's report. The examiners had based their evaluation on an incorrect premise and therefore the contested decision was based on serious and obvious mistakes which could be established without reopening the entire marking procedure. The decision had to be set aside and the appeal fee reimbursed (Art. 24(4) REE). Concerning the requested award of a "pass", the appeal board was not empowered by Art. 24(4), second sentence, REE to correct the decision, i.e. to review the marks and grade of an examination paper. It therefore considered whether special reasons provided a legal basis for not remitting the case to the Examination Board (cf. Art. 12 Additional Rules of Procedure of the DBA, Supplementary publication 1, OJ 2014, 54). Only in a few exceptional cases had the DBA found such special reasons (D 5/86, D 11/91, D 8/08 and D 9/08), but in appeals against decisions of the Examination Board it had not made use of this power to review the contested decision on its merits (on the limits of the board’s power see D 7/05). However, the pre-examination was a multiple choice paper. The marks were awarded according to a strict scheme not involving any discretion and the award of a "pass" or "fail" was merely the arithmetical outcome of the marks achieved. From a limited review, the board was able to establish the correct marks on the basis of the appellant's answer paper without interfering with any value judgment of the Examination Committee or Examination Board. Also taken into account were the matter's urgency, since a "pass" in the pre-examination was a precondition for the main examination, and the fact that the Examining Board, by not rectifying its decision, even though the discrepancy had been comprehensively substantiated, had burdened the appellant with appeal proceedings. With the correction, the total marks rose from 68 to 70 and a "pass" was therefore awarded.

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