Zusammenfassung von Article 111(2) EPC für die Entscheidung T1285/23 vom 19.09.2025
Bibliographische Daten
- Entscheidung
- T 1285/23 vom 19. September 2025
- Beschwerdekammer
- 3.2.02
- Inter partes/ex parte
- Ex parte
- Sprache des Verfahrens
- Englisch
- Verteilungsschlüssel
- An die Kammervorsitzenden verteilt (C)
- EPC-Artikel
- Art 111(2)
- EPC-Regeln
- -
- RPBA:
- -
- Andere rechtliche Bestimmungen
- -
- Schlagwörter
- remittal – binding effect – res judicata – substantial procedural violation (yes)
- Rechtsprechungsbuch
- V.A.10.1.1a), 11th edition
Zusammenfassung
In T 1285/23 the proceedings initially started with the Receiving Section's refusal to add GB as a designated state. In J 13/18 the Legal Board dismissed an appeal against that decision. It interpreted Art. 76(2) EPC and concluded that adding GB as a designated contracting state would contravene it, because GB had been withdrawn as a designated contracting state in the parent application at the time of filing the application at issue. The Legal Board also decided to admit neither the submissions under R. 139 EPC filed with the statement setting out the grounds of appeal nor the new submissions (made during the oral proceedings before it) based on the principle of good faith. Before the examining division, the appellant then requested that the application be updated such that GB be included as a designated state, basing this on the principle of good faith, arguing that this reasoning had not been admitted by the Legal Board in J 13/18 and requesting that it now be admitted. In a communication the examining division not only gave a preliminary opinion on the request to add GB as a designated state under the principle of good faith, but also on a request for correction. The examining division explained that: "For the sake of completeness, and taking duly account of the decision of the Legal Board of Appeal not to admit the request under Rule 139 EPC (see point 2 of J 13/18), the Examining Division will also examine whether the requirements for a correction under Rule 139 EPC are met." In its subsequent submissions before the examining division the appellant based its request both on the principle of good faith and on the correction of an error. In the decision under appeal the examining division decided that neither the principle of good faith could be applied nor could the request for correction under R. 139 EPC be granted. The request to include GB as a validly designated state for the present application was thus refused. In the present appeal, the board explained that by dismissing the appeal the Legal Board in J 13/18 had issued a conclusive decision on the request of the appellant to include GB as a validly designated state in the application, rather than admitting the late-filed lines of argument (including that of the principle of good faith) and remitting the case to the department of first instance for further prosecution. The appellant argued that res judicata applied to the reasoning of a decision, rather than to its order. Given that its request was based on the principle of good faith and the Legal Board had not considered this line of argument in substance, it argued that decision J 13/18 had no effect of res judicata on its current request. As long as the proceedings were still pending, any new line of argument in support of the same request could be brought and be considered by the competent department provided it did not contradict the earlier decision. The board disagreed and held that the effect of "res judicata" emanating from J 13/18 could not be limited by the board's reasoning on which the decision was based. If a party were allowed to pursue the request decided upon in that decision again, this time on the basis of new facts, it would open the possibility to render the legal effect of that decision null and void, a legal consequence specifically not foreseen for decision J 13/18, which cannot be appealed. During the oral proceedings, the appellant relied on numerous passages of decision T 2194/22. The board distinguished T 2194/22 from the case in hand in two respects. First, T 2194/22 was not concerned with a case where the board had finally settled a request. The discussion in T 2194/22 concerned the binding effect, under Art. 111(2) EPC, of the first board of appeal decision T 2371/18 on the opposition division, and in particular whether a claim request, which had not been admitted by the competent board, could be considered in substance by the opposition division in subsequent proceedings. Secondly, the facts underlying the competent board's decision in T 2371/18 (the first appeal in the proceedings leading up to T 2194/22) for not admitting the claim request in question were not the same as the facts before the opposition division after remittal, because a new objection had been introduced in the post-remittal proceedings. In the case in hand, no such change in the factual situation had occurred. In conclusion, the board held that the examining division was not competent to decide in substance on the appellant's request to add GB as a validly designated state in the application. The decision was void and formally to be set aside. By issuing a decision on a matter in respect of which it was not competent, the examining division had committed a substantial procedural violation.