European Patent Office

Zusammenfassung von Article 099 EPC für die Entscheidung T1469/24 vom 06.11.2025

Bibliographische Daten

Beschwerdekammer
3.4.03
Inter partes/ex parte
Inter partes
Sprache des Verfahrens
Englisch
Verteilungsschlüssel
Nicht verteilt (D)
EPC-Artikel
Art 99(1)
EPC-Regeln
R 76(2)
RPBA:
-
Andere rechtliche Bestimmungen
-
Schlagwörter
admissibility of opposition (yes) – acting on behalf of a third party (no) – circumvention of the law by abuse of process (no) – straw man
Zitierte Akten
G 0003/97G 0004/97
Rechtsprechungsbuch
IV.C.2.1.5, 11th edition

Zusammenfassung

In T 1469/24, the appellant-proprietor contested the admissibility of the opposition, arguing that the opponent had not been correctly identified, so that the requirements of Art. 99(1) and R. 76(2) EPC were not met. They argued that the opponent, Mr N.N., was the representative of one of the subsidiaries of the group of companies against which the proprietor had initiated infringement proceedings before the UPC, and which, in turn, had initiated a central revocation action against the contested patent at the UPC in reaction to the infringement proceedings. Mr N.N. had therefore not been the real opponent, but had acted as a straw man for the group. The real opponent thus avoided being identified as the party challenging the patent. This was a misuse of the opposition procedure, which was intended to allow genuine opponents to challenge patents in a transparent manner. Consequently, the use of a straw man in this case was a clear attempt to circumvent the law by abuse of due process. In addition, according to the proprietor, the straw man, being a patent attorney, did not have a legitimate interest in the outcome of the opposition proceedings. The board observed that, in an opposition in which the person named as opponent is acting on behalf of a third party, decision G 3/97 identifies two cases where the law is circumvented by abuse of process: 1) if the opponent is acting on behalf of the proprietor, 2) if the opponent is acting on behalf of a client in the context of activities which, taken as a whole, are typically associated with professional representatives, without possessing the relevant qualifications required by Art. 134 EPC. The board found that neither of these cases applied here. The board indicated it was aware that these two cases did not constitute an exhaustive list. Nevertheless, G 3/97 sets out some further considerations as to what is not considered a circumvention of the law by abuse of process. For instance, in point 3.2.1 of the Reasons, the Enlarged Board stated that "Though the patent proprietor may have an economic interest in finding out who is trying to attack his patent, such an interest is not legally protected by the legislative arrangements for the opposition procedure". In the present case, even if the group of companies involved in the infringement action had actually avoided being identified, this would not have constituted an attempt to circumvent the law by abuse of due process within the meaning of decision G 3/97. Moreover, the board recalled the Enlarged Board’s observation in G 3/97 that since the EPC legislator explicitly designed the opposition procedure as a legal remedy in the public interest, which is open to any person, it cannot be required that the opponent has an interest in the revocation of the patent. Consequently, the board held that it was irrelevant in the present case whether the opponent Mr N.N. had a genuine personal interest in the outcome of the opposition proceedings. The board found that, while G 3/97 and G 4/97 may not explicitly state that any opposition by a straw man is admissible, they essentially conclude that an opposition filed by a straw man on behalf of an anonymous party is not objectionable merely because the opponent is acting as a straw man. In particular, the Enlarged Board held that an abuse of process needs not be assumed in those cases where the third party instructing the presumed straw man could have filed an opposition itself. The board recalled that G 3/97 and G 4/97 do not state that the opposition division would be required to investigate ex officio whether any of the identified situations that could be considered an abuse of process might be present and concealed by the formally named opponent. On the contrary, the burden of proof is borne by the person alleging that the opposition is inadmissible. The board did not see any such evidence in the file. The board concluded that the requirements of Art. 99(1) and R. 76(2) EPC were met and that the appeal must be dismissed.