4.4. Reformulation du problème technique
Vue d'ensemble
4.4. Reformulation du problème technique
Conformément à la jurisprudence des chambres, le problème technique peut être reformulé, et dans certaines circonstances, doit même l'être, puisque le seul facteur important pour déterminer le problème objectivement est le résultat effectivement obtenu par rapport à l'état de la technique le plus proche (voir p. ex. T 1397/08, T 2406/18). Le problème tel que formulé initialement peut être modifié même au stade du recours (voir p. ex. T 162/86, JO 1988, 452, T 1397/08 ; T 2371/13 ; T 659/15) dès lors que l'esprit de l'exposé initial de l'invention est respecté. Voir aussi T 2371/13, T 659/15. En revanche, la reformulation du problème technique est soumise à certaines limites (voir dans le présent chapitre I.D.4.4.3).
- T 1465/23
In case T 1465/23, the opposed patent addressed the problem of securing wireless communications for hearing devices. The board was not satisfied that the technical effects mentioned by the respondent (proprietor) were credibly achieved by the claimed features over the whole scope of claim 1 as granted.
Given that the alleged technical effect was not credibly achieved and the board could not identify an effect either, it was not possible for the board to formulate an objective technical problem that was directly and causally related to the claimed invention, in particular to the alleged distinguishing features (b) to (h). The board recalled the principles established in G 1/19, that the problem-solution approach may be "terminated" at this stage if the distinguishing features do not credibly achieve any technical effect over the whole scope claimed. The introduction of a distinguishing feature having no credible technical effect may then be considered to be no more than an arbitrary modification of the design of a known subject-matter which, being arbitrary, cannot involve an inventive step.
The respondent argued that the principles of G 1/19 were limited to computer-implemented simulations and that the board should instead have applied the "ab initio implausibility" standard addressed in the referral case underlying G 2/21. This line of argument was not persuasive. Recalling the purpose of Art. 112(1) EPC, the board observed that the Enlarged Board in G 1/19 itself designated its findings in point 82 of the Reasons as a "general principle" and this confirmed that a technical effect must be achieved over the whole scope of a claim to be considered as the basis for the objective technical problem. The respondent further argued that the expressions "substantially all embodiments" in G 1/19 and "substantially the whole scope of the claims" in T 814/20 allowed for a more lenient application of the test "credibly achieved over the whole scope claimed". However, the board noted the concept of "substantially over the whole scope claimed" appeared to provide merely a "narrow safe harbour" for well-defined inventions that may have isolated, peripheral flaws; it could not rescue a claim that was fundamentally deficient such that the distinguishing features were considered to have no effect at all.
The respondent also raised specific doubts in view of the board "terminating" the problem-solution approach after the conclusion that there was no credible technical effect over the whole scope claimed. Reflecting on the two paths provided for in the established practice to overcome such an objection: amendment of the claim to a narrower scope by the patentee, or reformulation of the objective technical problem to a less ambitious one by the board, the board noted that in some instances there may be no credible technical effect whatsoever that could be attributed to the distinguishing features. In such a case, the board considered these distinguishing features to be an arbitrary or non-functional modification of the prior art, which cannot support an inventive step. Consequently, this particular way of applying the problem-solution approach did not represent a "failure" or an "incomplete application" of the problem-solution approach, rather it was its logical endpoint: the demonstration that the claimed differences provided no technical effect at all, i.e. no contribution over the prior art, constituted the very proof of their "obviousness". Overall, the board stated that if there was no technical effect that was credibly derivable from the wording of a claim on the basis of its distinguishing features, it was usually unnecessary to – artificially – formulate an (unsolved) objective technical problem, such as finding an "alternative way to achieve a (non-existent) technical effect". In such cases, the distinguishing features simply constituted arbitrary or non-functional modifications of the available prior art which could not involve an inventive step within the meaning of Art. 56 EPC.