European Patent Office

T 0042/19 of 19.01.2023

European Case Law Identifier
ECLI:EP:BA:2023:T004219.20230119
Date of decision
19 January 2023
Case number
T 0042/19
Petition for review of
-
Application number
13723906.7
Language of proceedings
English
Distribution
Distributed to board chairmen and members (B)
OJ versions
No OJ links found
Other decisions for this case
-
Abstracts for this decision
Abstract on EPC2000 Art 117
Application title
INJECTION DEVICES USING A RESILIENTLY COMPRESSIBLE TORSION SPRING AS DRIVING FORCE
Applicant name
Owen Mumford Limited
Opponent name
Novo Nordisk A/S
Board
3.2.01
Headnote
-
Relevant legal provisions
European Patent Convention Art 52(1)European Patent Convention Art 54European Patent Convention Art 56European Patent Convention Art 83Rules of procedure of the Boards of Appeal 2020 Art 025Rules of procedure of the Boards of Appeal Art 12(4)
Keywords
Public prior use (no) - insufficient evidence (yes)
Late-filed request to hear witness
Late-filed request - admitted (no)
Sufficiency of disclosure - main request (yes)
Novelty - main request (yes)
Inventive step - main request (yes)
Late-filed facts - submitted with the statement of grounds of appeal
Late-filed facts - admitted (no)
Free evaluation of evidence
Catchword
1. A boards' power to review appealed decisions is not limited to points of law but extends to points of facts (in agreement with T 1604/16).
2. However, it is settled case law that a board is not obliged to take all the evidence anew and that parties do not have the right to have the taking of evidence repeated at their request before the board.
3. The principle of free evaluation of evidence, meaning that there are no firm rules on the probative value of the various types of evidence but that the deciding body is entrusted with weighing up all the evidence and basing its decision on what it is then satisfied has been established, implies a degree of freedom comparable to the one referred to by the Enlarged Board of Appeal in decision G 7/93, Reasons 2.6.
4. Thus, it is wise to similarly respect this freedom, especially when taking into account that a board, except when only reviewing documentary evidence, does not have the same first-hand impression of the probative value of a means of evidence as a department of first instance that has itself heard a witness or expert or inspected an object.
5. Although the Board is not limited in its decision, it normally seems useful to apply the test set out in decision T 1418/17, Reasons 1.3: Unless the law has been misapplied (e.g. application of the wrong standard of proof), a board of appeal should overrule a department of first instance's evaluation of evidence and replace it with its own only if it is apparent from that department's evaluation that it: (i) disregarded essential points, (ii) also considered irrelevant matters or (iii) violated the laws of thought, for instance in the form of logical errors and contradictions in its reasoning.
6. The evaluation of evidence only refers to establishing whether an alleged fact has been proven to the satisfaction of the deciding body. The discretion-like freedom is restricted to this question and does not extend to the further question of how the established facts are to be interpreted and what the legal consequences are (see Reasons 3.2 to 3.6).

Order

For these reasons it is decided that:

The appeal is dismissed