2.3.3 Teleological interpretation

The Enlarged Board applies the method of teleological interpretation in the construction of legislative provisions, which means interpreting the relevant provisions in the light of their purpose, values, and the legal, social and economic goals they aim to achieve. When doing this, the Enlarged Board examines the objective sense and purpose of a legislative provision (e.g. G 1/88, point 5 of the Reasons; G 1/03, OJ 2004, 413, point 2.1.1 of the Reasons). The starting point was marked by determining the general object of the relevant provision (ratio legis) because the interpretation could not contradict the provision's spirit (G 6/91, point 8 of the Reasons). In point IV.3, G 1/18 endorsed this approach, set out in point VII.3 of G 2/12. In its interim conclusion on this point, G 1/18 found that the teleological interpretation of Art. 108 EPC, first and second sentences, EPC, led to the same interim conclusions as those reached by way of literal and systematic interpretation.

In interpreting Art. 116 EPC, the Enlarged Board in G 1/21 noted that the object and purpose of the EPC was to provide a system for the grant of European patents with the aim of supporting innovation and technological progress. In the Enlarged Board’s view, it would be at odds with this object and purpose if the intention of the legislator was to exclude future formats for oral proceedings that might be made possible by technological progress. In more specific terms, since the object and purpose of oral proceedings was to give parties an opportunity to plead their case orally, it was improbable that the legislator wished to rule out potential future formats which would allow them to do so. There was thus no basis to conclude that the term "oral proceedings" was to be understood in a more limited sense than its ordinary meaning, or that oral proceedings held in a particular format that only became available after the conclusion of the legislative process did not fall within the terms of Art. 116 EPC. The Enlarged Board therefore concluded that oral proceedings in the form of a videoconference were oral proceedings within the meaning of Art. 116 EPC. See also chapter III.C.

According to the Legal Board in J 7/21, the intention of R. 22 EPC on the registration of transfers was to ensure the informational role of the European Patent Register and to avoid any ambiguity as to who owned a patent application during proceedings before the EPO. More specifically, the intention of R. 22(3) EPC was to determine the effective date vis-à-vis the EPO of the ownership transfer of a patent application. These requirements were justified when transferring a patent application by assignment, since only a specifically designated right was transferred to a third party and the former patent proprietor, i.e. the assignor, continued to exist. However, in the case of universal succession, the entirety of the assets was transferred automatically as a result of the disappearance of the legal personality of the patent application's owner. Consequently, there was no risk of confusion between two legal entities that could be considered owners of the patent application, nor regarding the extent of the rights transferred since all assets remained united. Therefore, the Legal Board found no justification for delaying the effect of the transfer of assets vis-à-vis the EPO until the date and time at which the evidence was provided proving the disappearance of the legal personality of the patent application's previous owner and the identity of its universal successor.

In T 844/18, since the ordinary meaning of the term "any person" in Art. 87(1) EPC was ambiguous, the board had to turn to the object and purpose of the Paris Convention and, more broadly, public policy considerations. This was also in line with Art. 31(1) and 33(4) Vienna Convention.