III. RULES COMMON TO ALL PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE EPO

Catchword:

Hearing a witness in first instance proceedings by videoconference allowed sufficient interaction between the deciding body, the parties and the witness. Albeit a part of the witness' body language was not visible to the participants, this did not amount to an infringement of the parties' right to be heard since the judgement on the witness' credibility was mainly based on the conclusiveness of his/her testimony and the absence of contradictions within the witness' own testimony, between the testimonies of several witnesses and/or contradictions between the witness' testimony and information derivable from supporting documents (reasons, point 2).

Catchword:

No competence for the Board to correct or amend under Rule 140 EPC the reasons given by a first-instance department in the written decision, or to order such a correction or amendment (see point 2.2.1). No competence for the Board to confirm that an "obvious mistake" within the meaning of Rule 140 EPC was made in the reasons given by a first-instance department in the written decision (see point 2.3). No competence for the Board to correct or amend the content of the minutes of oral proceedings before a first-instance department, or to order such a correction or amendment (see point 3.3).

Catchword: 

The Board is within its discretion in refusing a party time to formulate questions to the Enlarged Board whose only purpose it could be to reopen a debate on issues that had already been closed, and based on which the Board had reached its conclusions, Reasons 5.

Catchword: see point 1.2.2 of the reasons.

Catchword: 

Examining division's continual refusal to appoint oral proceedings rendered the appellant's request for oral proceedings futile. Withdrawal of the request for oral proceedings under these circumstances does not absolve the examining division from its duty to hold oral proceedings (Reasons 1.5).

Catchword:

1. For the question of whether the applicant is "successor in title" within the meaning of Article 87(1) EPC, it is sufficient for the applicant or patent proprietor to demonstrate that the assignment of the priority right was effective before the subsequent application was filed. The law does not set forth any other condition. In particular, the assignment need not be effective before the filing date of the subsequent application. (see point 2.3). 2. In the context of in-person oral proceedings, a request of a party for a hybrid format to allow the representatives to attend the hearing in person and other attendees to attend remotely should normally be granted only if the participation of the person for whom the access by means of videoconferencing technology has been requested is related to a person whose participation in the oral proceedings is relevant to the case, in particular to the decision to be taken at the oral proceedings (see point 1.).

Catchword:

1. From the company name of an appellant alone it can generally not be derived that the appellant does not meet the conditions of Rule 6(4,5) EPC in conjunction with European Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 for payment of the reduced appeal fee. This applies even where a company name is well-known. 2. Where it is not clear from the file at the end of the appeal period whether or not an appellant at the point in time of payment of the reduced fee meets the conditions of Rule 6(4,5) EPC, no clear intention to pay the regular appeal fee can be detected that under the principles of T 152/82 would entitle the EPO to ex officio debit the amount of the regular fee. 3. An appellant who gives a debit order for payment of the reduced appeal fee even though it clearly does not meet the conditions of Rule 6(4,5) EPC commits an obvious mistake in the meaning of J 8/80 and G 1/12. Such an appellant is imputed to have had the clear intention to pay the regular fee, reason why no evidence to prove this intention is required. 4. The exhaustive criteria to assess Rule 139 EPC are "principles" (a) to (c) of G 1/12, i.e. essentially those of J 8/80, points 4 and 6: (a) The correction must introduce what was originally intended. (b) Where the original intention is not immediately apparent, the requester bears the burden of proof, which must be a heavy one. The same applies, pursuant to J 8/80, point 6, where the making of the mistake is not self-evident. (c) The error to be remedied may be an incorrect statement or an omission. complemented by criterion (d) balancing of the public interest in legal certainty with the interest of the party requesting correction, with the factors (i.e. sub-criteria of this criterion) relevant to the specific case.

Catchword:

1. Entspricht der Antrag, der der Entscheidung der Einspruchsabteilung zugrunde liegt, zum Zeitpunkt der Entscheidung nicht dem Willen einer Partei, so ist diese Partei beschwert und ihre Beschwerde gegen die Entscheidung zulässig (Punkt 1.1 der Entscheidungsgründe).  2. Die Kammer sieht es als erwiesen an, dass die Entscheidung der Einspruchsabteilung nicht auf der beabsichtigten Fassung des Hilfsantrags beruht, die in der mündlichen Verhandlung erörtert wurde. Im vorliegenden Fall hat die Einspruchsabteilung entweder über den falschen Antrag entschieden, der nicht dem Tenor der Entscheidung entspricht, oder aber über einen Antrag, zu dem die Parteien nicht gehört wurden. Beides stellt einen schwerwiegenden Verfahrensmangel dar, und daher ist die Entscheidung aufzuheben (Punkte 3.4 - 3.6 der Entscheidungsgründe).  3. Ein Fehler in einem während der mündlichen Verhandlung eingereichten Anspruchssatz, der Teil einer in der mündlichen Verhandlung verkündeten Entscheidung geworden ist, ist weder einer späteren Korrektur über Regel 140 EPÜ zugänglich, noch über Regel 139 EPÜ, sofern es ihm an der Offensichtlichkeit mangelt (Punkte 5.1 - 5.5 der Entscheidungsgründe).

Catchword:

The burden of proof regarding the facts, arguments and evidence on the substance (which initially lies with the opponent) does not shift to the proprietor just because the patent has been revoked due to an alleged insufficient disclosure. It is down to the patent proprietor to substantiate on appeal why that decision is wrong. The burden of proof on the substance (and in consequence the benefit of the doubt), however, is only shifted when the opposition division's assessment that the presented facts, arguments and evidence were sufficient to discharge the opponent's burden of proof turns out to be correct. (See item 1. of the grounds)

Orientierungssatz: Gründe 5.1, 6, 7

Catchword:

As ruled in decision G 1/10, Rule 140 EPC is not available to correct patents. G 1/10 does not restrict the scope of the exclusion of the applicability of the rule in any way.

Catchword:

1. Artikel 15a VOBK 2020 gibt der Kammer ein Ermessen bei der Entscheidung, die mündliche Verhandlung von Amts wegen, gegebenenfalls auch gegen den Willen der Parteien, als Videokonferenz durchzuführen. Maßgebliches Kriterium ist die Zweckmäßigkeit.  2. Der Begriff "zweckmäßig" impliziert, dass das Format der Videokonferenz zur Erreichung des mit der mündlichen Verhandlung angestrebten Zwecks grundsätzlich geeignet und darüber hinaus auch sinnvoll (sachdienlich) erscheint.  a. Das Kriterium der Eignung bildet eine absolute Schranke und schließt für die konkret vorgesehene Verhandlung ungeeignete Verhandlungsformate aus, diese sind immer unzweckmäßig.  b. Das Kriterium der Sachdienlichkeit erfordert eine abwägende Gesamtbetrachtung aller Aspekte, die im Zusammenhang mit der Planung und Durchführung einer mündlichen Verhandlung vor einer Beschwerdekammer eine Rolle spielen und das hierfür gewählte Format als mehr oder weniger sachdienlich für die Erreichung des Zwecks der Verhandlung erscheinen lassen. Die Abwägung sollte vorrangig auf objektiven Erwägungen beruhen. Die subjektiven Einschätzungen der Parteien können eine ergänzende Rolle spielen; sie fallen umso stärker ins Gewicht, je mehr die Empfindungen durch von den Parteien vorgetragene objektivierbare Argumente gestützt sind.  Es ist nicht auszuschließen, dass es mehrere zweckmäßige Formate nebeneinander geben kann. 3. Die Regelungen des Artikels 15a VOBK widersprechen weder höherrangigem Recht, noch den wesentlichen Schlussfolgerungen der Großen Beschwerdekammer in der Entscheidung G1/21.  4. Aufgrund der zwischenzeitlich eingetretenen technischen Weiterentwicklung und größeren Erfahrung aller Beteiligten können Videokonferenzen in den meisten Fällen inzwischen als nahezu gleichwertige Alternative zu einer Präsenzverhandlung angesehen werden. Konkrete Umstände des Einzelfalls können allerdings dazu führen, dass das Format der Videokonferenz entweder schon nicht geeignet oder bei einer Gesamtabwägung zumindest so wenig sachdienlich erscheint, dass die nach Artikel 15a VOBK erforderliche Zweckmäßigkeit fehlt.

Catchword:

Berichtigung der Erklärung betreffend die Methode für die Entrichtung der Beschwerdegebühr im Formblatt 1038 - Ermittelung der ursprünglichen Absicht bei der Auswahl der Zahlungsmethode, siehe Entscheidungsgründe 6.4

Catchword:

If a party considers that the "essentials of the oral proceedings" or "relevant statements" within the meaning of Rule 124(1) EPC are incorrect or missing in the minutes of oral proceedings, they must file a request for correction of the minutes in the shortest time possible after their receipt. This ensures that the relevant facts and submissions are still fresh in the minds of the members of the deciding body and, if applicable, the other party or parties (Reasons 9.2). Waiting for the written decision before submitting a request for correction of the minutes is incompatible with a party's obligation to request correction of the minutes in the shortest time possible after their receipt (Reasons 9.3).

Catchword:

Artikel 15a (1) VOBK 2020 bietet keine rechtliche Grundlage, um die mündliche Verhandlung in Form einer Videokonferenz gegen den Willen einer der Verfahrensbeteiligten durchzuführen, sofern kein allgemeiner Notfall besteht, der die Möglichkeit der Beteiligten einschränkt, persönlich an einer mündlichen Verhandlung in den Räumlichkeiten des EPA teilzunehmen (Gründe Nr. 1.4).  

Orientierungssatz: Siehe Gründe 2

Catchword: 

1. Pursuant to Article 15a(1) RPBA 2021 the boards have a discretionary power to hold oral proceedings by videoconference without the consent of all parties. When exercising this discretion, the board must primarily assess whether the case is suitable to be dealt with by videoconference and/or whether there are reasons that require holding oral proceedings in person. Such reasons may be seen in the complexity of the case or a need to inspect models.  2. Holding oral proceedings by videoconference can meanwhile be often considered an equivalent alternative to oral proceedings in person because the boards and the parties have gained such extensive experience with videoconferencing and using the tools involved since G1/21. Holding oral proceedings by videoconference is hence no longer that disadvantageous as it was when the decision G1/21 was issued.

Catchword:

1. There is only one standard of proof in the proceedings before the EPO: the deciding body, taking into account the circumstances of the case and the relevant evidence before it, must be convinced that the alleged fact has occurred (see point 1.2.1 of the Reasons). 2. The boards have the power, at any stage of the appeal proceedings, to establish the relevant facts of the case before them and thereby substitute the findings of fact of the departments of first instance. However, the boards have no obligation to establish facts de novo already established by the departments of first instance (see point 1.2.4 of the Reasons). 3. The board's review of a fact-finding process should not be conflated with the review of discretionary decisions within the meaning of the obiter dictum in G 7/93, Reasons 2.6 (see point 1.2.4 (a) of the Reasons).

Catchword: 

Decision G 1/21 cannot be read as restricting the possibility of summoning for oral proceedings by videoconference contrary to the will of one of the parties only in the case of a general emergency. G 1/21 does not exclude that there are other circumstances specific to a case that justify the decision not to hold the oral proceedings in person.

Catchword: 

Right to be heard: see points 16 and 17 of the Reasons.

Catchword: Reasons 3

Catchword:

When a video retrieved from the internet is used as prior-art evidence for refusing a patent application, its content, in a form suitable for reviewing the decision, and metadata evidence demonstrating when and how it was made available to the public should be preserved and made accessible over time to interested parties and judicial bodies.

Catchword:

1. Although the order of G 1/21 refers to an emergency situation, it follows from the ratio decidendi of this decision that in-person oral proceedings can only be denied under very limited conditions, even in a situation of general emergency such as a pandemic. 2. Due to the fact that videoconferences, at least with current technology, can only provide a suboptimal form of communication, parties have a right to the optimum format for oral proceedings, i.e. in-person oral proceedings, that can only be denied under very limited conditions. 3. Further, e contrario it also follows from the reasons underlying the Enlarged Board's decision, that parties cannot force Boards to conduct videoconferences instead of in-person oral proceedings.

Catchword: Reasons 7

Catchword:
I. A debit order has to be interpreted on its substance, according to the (objectively) clear intention of the appellant expressed therein to pay a fee in the applicable amount.

II. Under the Arrangements for deposit accounts valid as from 1 December 2017 (ADA 2017), a debit order having the clear purpose of paying a particular fee (here: the appeal fee) authorises the EPO to debit that fee in the applicable amount.

Catchword:

1. The Guidelines, Part E, Chapter XI, set out the procedure whereby the reasons of a responsible superior's decision rejecting a challenge to the impartiality of a division can be appealed. This procedure does not make the responsible superior's decision formally appealable (Reasons 2.3 and 2.4).

2. The unexplained omission of the reasons of the responsible superior's decision from the final decision of the division justifies the suspicion of partiality and constitutes a substantial procedural violation (Reasons 2.9 and 2.15).

3. The principle of the prohibition of "reformatio in peius" is not applicable where a case is to be remitted to a division in a new composition because of a suspicion of partiality (Reasons 5.5 and 5.6).

Catchword:

L'impossibilité d'utiliser un tableau blanc ou un « flip chart » physiques lors d'une procédure orale tenue par visioconférence ne viole pas le droit d'une partie d'être entendue selon l'article 113 CBE (point 9.5.8 des motifs). La conformité d'une procédure orale sous forme de visioconférence avec le droit d'une partie d'être entendue selon l'article 113 CBE ne dépend pas de l'accord de cette partie à ce que la procédure orale se tienne par visioconférence mais uniquement du fait si cette partie a suffisamment la possibilité de prendre position et de présenter son cas (point 10.8 des motifs).

Catchword: 

Oral proceedings may be dispensed with if a party has given notice of non-appearance, even if the request for oral proceedings is expressly maintained (see point 1 of the reasons).

Catchword: 

1. A boards' power to review appealed decisions is not limited to points of law but extends to points of facts (in agreement with T 1604/16).  2. However, it is settled case law that a board is not obliged to take all the evidence anew and that parties do not have the right to have the taking of evidence repeated at their request before the board. 3. The principle of free evaluation of evidence, meaning that there are no firm rules on the probative value of the various types of evidence but that the deciding body is entrusted with weighing up all the evidence and basing its decision on what it is then satisfied has been established, implies a degree of freedom comparable to the one referred to by the Enlarged Board of Appeal in decision G 7/93, Reasons 2.6.  4. Thus, it is wise to similarly respect this freedom, especially when taking into account that a board, except when only reviewing documentary evidence, does not have the same first-hand impression of the probative value of a means of evidence as a department of first instance that has itself heard a witness or expert or inspected an object.  5. Although the Board is not limited in its decision, it normally seems useful to apply the test set out in decision T 1418/17, Reasons 1.3: Unless the law has been misapplied (e.g. application of the wrong standard of proof), a board of appeal should overrule a department of first instance's evaluation of evidence and replace it with its own only if it is apparent from that department's evaluation that it: (i) disregarded essential points, (ii) also considered irrelevant matters or (iii) violated the laws of thought, for instance in the form of logical errors and contradictions in its reasoning.  6. The evaluation of evidence only refers to establishing whether an alleged fact has been proven to the satisfaction of the deciding body. The discretion-like freedom is restricted to this question and does not extend to the further question of how the established facts are to be interpreted and what the legal consequences are.  (see Reasons 3.2 to 3.6).

Catchword:

1. The issue of which standard of disclosure applies when assessing the legal question of novelty and the issue of which standard of proof applies when assessing evidence and factual questions are distinct and unrelated. The fact that the standard of disclosure required for a finding of lack of novelty (or for allowing an amendment to the application  under Article 123(2) EPC) is the standard of a direct and unambiguous disclosure is immaterial for the question of what standard of proof applies when considering evidence and factual issues in the context of novelty (or inventive step) (see point 16).  2. The standard of proof generally applied at the EPO for deciding on an issue of fact is the balance of probabilities. According to this standard, the EPO must base its decisions on statements of fact which, based on the available evidence, are more likely than not to be true. This standard also applies when examining factual issues in the context of novelty (see point 14).

Catchword:
Since neither the annex to the summons nor any of the previous communications of the examining division contained the essential legal and factual reasons leading to the finding in the appealed decision that claim 1 of the main request lacked novelty over the prior-art device considered for the first time in the novelty assessment of the refusal, and since no reason was given why the amendments made in advance of the oral proceedings held in absentia justified the change to this new closest prior art, the decision was issued in violation of the right to be heard even though the prior-art device on which the refusal was based was disclosed in the same document as a closest prior art considered previously in the examination procedure.

Catchword:

Where opposition proceedings have been interrupted under Rule 142(1)(b) EPC, acts done by the parties or the competent body of the EPO during the period of interruption are considered invalid. An appeal against a decision taken during the interruption is inadmissible, because it has no valid subject eligible for a judicial review. The RPBA also apply to requests for apportionment of costs under Article 104(1) EPC. A negligent behaviour may also justify apportionment of costs. However, the negligence must be serious enough to be considered equivalent to wilful misconduct.

Catchword: 

If the only feature that distinguishes a claim from the closest prior art is a range of an unusual parameter and it is concluded that it would be obvious for the skilled person to solve the underlying technical problem in ways that can be presumed to inherently lead to values within or close to the claimed range, it is the proprietor who should bear the burden of proof to demonstrate that implementing such solutions would not lead to the claimed parametrical range.

Catchword:

Ablehnung wegen Besorgnis der Befangenheit

- Zum notwendigen Inhalt einer dienstlichen Äußerung gemäß Artikel 3 (2) VOBK 2020 (Ziffer 1.4.3).

- Die Stellung eines Antrags und die Einlassung zur Sache sind Verfahrenshandlungen im Sinne von Artikel 24 (3) Satz 2 EPÜ (Ziffer 1.5.2).

- Ein Spruchkörper ist nicht generell verpflichtet, in der mündlichen Verhandlung Erklärungen oder Begründungen für die Auffassung der Kammer zu geben. Das Fehlen einer solchen Begründung rechtfertigt in der Regel nicht die Besorgnis der Befangenheit (Ziffer 2.3.1).

- Die Einleitung der durch ein Beratungsergebnis bedingten notwendigen weiteren Verfahrensschritte rechtfertigt nicht die Besorgnis der Befangenheit (Ziffer 2.3.2).

Catchword: 

1. The requirement for immediate and complete substantiation of a request for re-establishment corresponds to the principle of "Eventualmaxime/Häufungsgrundsatz/le principe de la concentration des moyens", according to which the request must state all grounds for re-establishment and means of evidence without the possibility of submitting these at a later stage.  2. Dynamic interpretation of the EPC, as derived from Articles 31(1) and 31(3) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, must take account of developments in national and international procedural law, notably as regards the guarantees of fair trial before a tribunal of law (Article 6(1) ECHR).  3. There is no "absolute" right to oral proceedings upon a party's request, but it is subject to inherent restrictions by the EPC, and due to procedural principles generally recognised in the Contracting States of the EPO.  4. If oral proceedings do not serve any legitimate purpose, the requirement of legal certainty in due time prevents the Board from appointing them.  5. It is not the purpose of oral proceedings in the context of proceedings for re-establishment to give the appellant a further chance to substantiate their factual assertions or to provide evidence despite the absence of factual assertions in the request for re-establishment.

Headnote: 

I. Evidence submitted by a patent applicant or proprietor to prove a technical effect relied upon for acknowledgement of inventive step of the claimed subject-matter may not be disregarded solely on the ground that such evidence, on which the effect rests, had not been public before the filing date of the patent in suit and was filed after that date. 

II. A patent applicant or proprietor may rely upon a technical effect for inventive step if the skilled person, having the common general knowledge in mind, and based on the application as originally filed, would derive said effect as being encompassed by the technical teaching and embodied by the same originally disclosed invention.

Abstract

In R 12/22 machte die Antragstellerin in ihrem Antrag auf Überprüfung mehrere schwerwiegende Verfahrensmängel geltend, unter anderem, dass die kurzfristige Ersetzung des juristischen Mitglieds im vorliegenden Fall ihr Recht auf rechtliches Gehör unter folgenden Aspekten verletze: (a) mangels Möglichkeit, das Vorliegen der Voraussetzungen von Art. 24 EPÜ im Hinblick auf das neue Mitglied zu untersuchen, (b) wegen fehlender ausreichender Vorbereitungsmöglichkeit des umfangreichen Falles für das neue Mitglied, (c) wegen fehlender Möglichkeit der Stellungnahme der Antragstellerin zur kurzfristigen Ersetzung vor der mündlichen Verhandlung.

Zu (a) stellte die Große Beschwerdekammer (GBK) fest, dass der Anspruch auf rechtliches Gehör auch das Recht umfassen kann, Informationen zu erhalten, um das Recht zu wahren, das neue Kammermitglied gegebenenfalls nach Art. 24 EPÜ abzulehnen. Das Vorbringen der Antragstellerin, sie hätte das Vorliegen der Voraussetzungen von Art. 24 EPÜ wegen der Kürze der Zeit nicht überprüfen können, überzeugte die GBK jedoch nicht, da die Antragstellerin diese Überprüfung in der mündlichen Verhandlung durch Fragen zu der Thematik an das betroffene Kammermitglied hätte nachholen können. Zudem hatte die Antragstellerin in ihrem Überprüfungsantrag auf keinen denkbaren Verstoß gegen Art. 24 EPÜ hingewiesen, so dass die GBK auch keinen derartigen Sachvortrag auf einen denkbaren Gehörsverstoß überprüfen konnte. Die Antragstellerin hatte zudem argumentiert, dass – auch wenn auf freiwilliger Basis eine Auskunft über ein Kammermitglied erteilt worden wäre – diese in der Kürze der Zeit nicht objektiv nachprüfbar gewesen wäre. Die GBK war von diesem Vortrag nicht überzeugt. Ein Auskunftsrecht bestand nach ihrer Auffassung nur über Umstände, die geeignet sein könnten, eine Ablehnung zu begründen, nicht aber über die Vorbereitung eines Mitglieds auf die mündliche Verhandlung in einem konkreten Fall, da dies mit seiner Unabhängigkeit nicht vereinbar wäre. Ferner müsse es zur Vermeidung der Verzögerung von Verfahren möglich sein, auch kurzfristig eine Kammer im Einklang mit Art. 2 VOBK umzubesetzen. Es reiche aus, dass den Beteiligten die Möglichkeit der Ablehnung eines Mitglieds nach Art. 24 (3) EPÜ wegen eines Ausschließungsgrundes oder wegen Besorgnis der Befangenheit zustehe.

Zu (b), stellte die GBK fest, dass aus dem Recht auf rechtliches Gehör kein Recht eines Beteiligten auf einen Nachweis folgt, dass ein Kammermitglied ausreichend vorbereitet ist, weder im Falle einer kurzfristigen Einwechslung noch generell. Denn die Ausübung eines solchen Rechts würde gegen die Unabhängigkeit des betroffenen Beschwerdekammermitglieds verstoßen. Insbesondere müsse das Mitglied seine Pflichten nach eigenem Gutdünken erledigen können. Die GBK stimmte der folgenden Passage aus R 5/19 zu: "bis zum Beweis des Gegenteils in einem konkreten Fall [kann] davon ausgegangen werden [...], dass Mitglieder von Beschwerdekammern generell ihre Amtspflichten korrekt ausüben [...]."

Auch hinsichtlich (c), d.h. der fehlenden Möglichkeit sich vor der mündlichen Verhandlung zur kurzfristigen Ersetzung zu äußern, sah die GBK keine Bedenken hinsichtlich der Wahrung des rechtlichen Gehörs in einer solchen Situation.

In der mündlichen Verhandlung vor der GBK, machte die Antragstellerin die kurzfristige Ersetzung des juristischen Mitglieds erstmals auch als Gehörsverstoß unter einem weiteren Gesichtspunkt, nämlich demjenigen eines Verstoßes gegen ein "Recht auf den gesetzlichen Richter" geltend. Die GBK stellte fest, dass ein solches Recht im EPÜ und den dieses ergänzenden Vorschriften, insbesondere denjenigen der VOBK, nicht geregelt ist. Art. 2 VOBK regelt Ausnahmen vom Geschäftsverteilungsplan, nämlich die Ersetzung von Mitgliedern bei Verhinderung an der Mitwirkung. Ähnlich wie im Fall des geltend gemachten Informationsrechts betreffend Art. 24 EPÜ hatte die Antragstellerin in der mündlichen Verhandlung vor der Beschwerdekammer ein Recht auf den gesetzlichen Richter nicht geltend gemacht. Sie hatte explizit lediglich die Kurzfristigkeit der Umbesetzung und die damit angeblich verbundene zu knappe Vorbereitungszeit für das neue Mitglied sowie das Fehlen einer Möglichkeit zur Stellungnahme zur Ersetzung vor der mündlichen Verhandlung beanstandet. Das Nichtvorliegen einer Ausnahme nach Art. 2 VOBK hatte die Antragstellerin in der mündlichen Verhandlung nicht geltend gemacht. Daher entschied die GBK, diesen neu geltend gemachten Gehörsverstoß durch Verletzung eines Rechts auf den gesetzlichen Richter als offensichtlich unbegründet zurückzuweisen.

Der Antrag auf Überprüfung in R 12/22 wurde darauf gestützt, dass die angefochtene Entscheidung in mehrfacher Hinsicht mit einem schwerwiegenden Verfahrensmangel behaftet sei, und – ebenfalls in mehrfacher Hinsicht – ein schwerwiegender Verstoß gegen Art. 113 EPÜ vorliege.

Die Große Beschwerdekammer (GBK) erörterte zunächst, dass ein Verstoß gegen die Begründungspflicht nach R. 102 g) EPÜ nicht von Art. 112a (2) d) EPÜ erfasst sei. Sie verwies auf die in R 10/18 und R 10/20 dargelegten Grundsätze zum Umfang der Begründungspflicht. Die von der Antragstellerin zitierte Aussage aus der Kommentarliteratur, das Korrelat zum Äußerungsrecht nach Art. 113 (1) EPÜ bilde die Pflicht, die Entscheidungen zu begründen, müsse im Einklang mit diesen Grundsätzen stehen. Eine Behandlung des Geäußerten in den Entscheidungsgründen sei nur unter den in R 10/18 und R 10/20 dargelegten Voraussetzungen vom Recht auf rechtliches Gehör gefordert. Hingegen beinhalte das Recht auf rechtliches Gehör neben dem Äußerungsrecht das Recht auf Berücksichtigung des Geäußerten. Wenn ein Schlagwort zur Charakterisierung dieser Beziehung als nützlich empfunden werden sollte, dann würde sich der Kammer zufolge der Begriff "Korrelat" hier eignen.

Zu den geltend gemachten Verfahrensmängeln gemäß Art. 112a (2) d) EPÜ, stellte die GBK fest, dass die Antragstellerin sich weder auf das Übergehen eines Antrags auf mündliche Verhandlung (R. 104 a) EPÜ) noch eines sonstigen relevanten Antrags im Verfahren (R. 104 b) EPÜ) berufen hatte, weshalb der Überprüfungsantrag diesbezüglich für unbegründet befunden wurde.

Zu den geltend gemachten Verfahrensmängeln gemäß Art. 112a (2) c) EPÜ, befand die GBK unter anderem Folgendes:

G 1/21 habe klargestellt, dass die Durchführung einer mündlichen Verhandlung in Form einer Videokonferenz grundsätzlich keinen Verstoß gegen das Recht auf rechtliches Gehör bedeute. Die Auffassung der Antragstellerin, eine nur theoretische Möglichkeit verschlechterter Kommunikation und Austauschmöglichkeit stelle bereits einen Verstoß gegen Art. 113 (1) EPÜ dar, stehe in diametralem Gegensatz zu G 1/21. In Bezug auf Art. 15a VOBK betonte die GBK, dass eine unzutreffende Ermessensausübung zugunsten der Durchführung einer mündlichen Verhandlung als Videokonferenz mangels Einfluss auf das Recht auf rechtliches Gehör keinen Verstoß gegen dieses Recht begründen könne, wenn ein konkreter praktischer Mangel weder behauptet noch ersichtlich sei.

In Bezug auf die beanstandete Zulassung des Vortrags einer Begleitperson stellte die GBK klar, dass es auf einen abstrakten Verstoß gegen die in G 4/95 aufgestellten Zulassungsvoraussetzungen bei der Prüfung eines Verstoßes gegen das Recht auf rechtliches Gehör nicht ankommen könne. Denn letzteres Recht beziehe sich auf die Möglichkeit, auf den Inhalt konkreter Äußerungen angemessen reagieren zu können, nicht auf das Recht, diesen Inhalt durch eine zum umfassenden Vortrag berechtigte und von einem zugelassenen Vertreter hierbei beaufsichtigte Begleitperson präsentiert zu bekommen.

In Bezug auf den geltend gemachten Verstoß gegen Art. 113 EPÜ infolge der kurzfristigen Umbesetzung der zuständigen Beschwerdekammer stellte die GBK unter anderem fest, dass aus dem Recht auf rechtliches Gehör kein Recht eines Beteiligten auf einen Nachweis folge, dass ein Kammermitglied ausreichend vorbereitet ist, weder im Falle einer kurzfristigen Einwechslung noch generell. Denn die Ausübung eines solchen Rechts würde gegen die Unabhängigkeit des betroffenen Beschwerdekammermitglieds verstoßen.

Zu dem geltend gemachten Verstoß gegen Art. 113 EPÜ infolge einer "fehlerhaften und widersprüchlichen Beurteilung" des streitpatentgemäßen Gegenstands, stellte die GBK klar, dass dies nur dann beanstandet werden könnte, wenn die Widersprüche gleichbedeutend damit wären, dass die Kammer das Vorbingen in den Entscheidungsgründen nicht behandelt hätte und dieses objektiv betrachtet entscheidend für den Ausgang des Falles gewesen wäre. Dass die widersprüchliche Begründung gleichbedeutend mit einer Nicht-Begründung ist, müsse sich aufdrängen.

Der Antrag auf Überprüfung wurde folglich als offensichtlich unbegründet verworfen.

Abstract

In T 1690/22 wendete sich die Beschwerdegegnerin (Patentinhaberin) mit ihrer ersten Rüge gemäß R. 106 EPÜ gegen die Nichtzulassung der Hilfsanträge 1 bis 3 als schweren Verfahrensfehler in Gestalt einer Verletzung des rechtlichen Gehörs. Sie sei in ihren grundlegenden Rechten beschnitten worden, sich gegen die Einspruchsgründe zur Wehr zu setzen. Sie gab auch an, dass die Nichtzulassung der Hilfsanträge nicht durch das Übereinkommen oder die Verfahrensordnung gestützt sei.

Die Beschwerdekammer stellte zunächst klar, dass die Nichtzulassung als solche keinen wesentlichen Verfahrensfehler darstelle. Sie erklärte sodann, dass ein Verfahrensfehler im Sinne von Art. 112a (2) c) EPÜ in Gestalt einer Verletzung des rechtlichen Gehörs nach Art. 113 (1) EPÜ, wie von der Beschwerdegegnerin gerügt, nicht ersichtlich sei. Die Entscheidung über die Nichtzulassung sei auf das Übereinkommen und die geltende Verfahrensordnung gestützt und folge einer langjährigen als gefestigt zu erachtenden Rechtsprechung. Allein der Umstand, dass die Beschwerdegegnerin zu dieser Rechtsanwendung "ausdrücklich" eine gegenteilige Auffassung vertritt, könne jedenfalls keinen schwerwiegenden Verfahrensfehler, respektive keine Gehörsverletzung, begründen.

Zu dem strittigen Punkt der Substantiierung und der Zulassung der Hilfsanträge 1 bis 3 habe die Beschwerdegegnerin von den ihr jeweils gebotenen Möglichkeiten, sich zu äußern, ausgiebig Gebrauch gemacht. Die Kammer sei unter Berücksichtigung der von der Beschwerdegegnerin vorgebrachten Argumente zu der Beurteilung der Sach- und Rechtslage zu Art. 12 (3) VOBK und zu der nachfolgenden Ermessensbeurteilung im Rahmen des Art. 12 (5) VOBK gelangt. Das rechtliche Gehör der Beschwerdegegnerin sei insoweit gewahrt worden. Ein schwerwiegender Verstoß gegen Art. 113 (1) EPÜ im Sinne von Art. 112a (2) c) EPÜ war daher für die Kammer nicht ersichtlich.

Mit einer zweiten Rüge hatte die Beschwerdegegnerin vorgebracht, dass sie ihre erste Rüge zur Nichtzulassung der Hilfsanträge 1 bis 3 nicht schriftlich vorzulegen brauche und die Aufforderung der Kammer zur Vorlage einer schriftlichen Rüge daher einen wesentlichen Verfahrensmangel darstelle. Die Kammer stellte fest, dass die Beschwerdegegnerin nicht erklärt hatte, welcher der in Art. 112a (2) a) bis d) und R. 104 EPÜ abschließend normierten Gründe für einen Überprüfungsantrag geltend gemacht werden sollte. Der Kammer zufolge war es ebenso wenig ersichtlich, dass einer dieser Gründe hier einschlägig sein könnte.

Die Kammer erinnerte daran, dass es der Sinn und Zweck der Rügeobliegenheit nach R. 106 EPÜ ist, der Kammer die Möglichkeit zu geben, unmittelbar und angemessen zu reagieren. Daher muss eine Rüge nach R. 106 EPÜ eindeutig erkennen lassen, welche der in Art. 112a (2) a) bis d) und R. 104 EPÜ aufgeführten Mängel geltend gemacht werden sollen (ständige Rechtsprechung der Beschwerdekammern, siehe z.B. R 4/08).

Gerade vor dem Hintergrund dieses Zwecks der Rügeobliegenheit war die Kammer der Auffassung, dass die schriftliche Einreichung einer Rüge einer Praxis entspreche, die es ermögliche, den Umfang dieser Rüge klar zu bestimmen. Es schriftlich oder nur mündlich zu tun, ändere nichts an der Substanz der erhobenen Rüge. Die schriftliche Vorlage des Gegenstands einer Rüge ermögliche es jedoch, für die Kammer und die Beteiligten nachvollziehbar festzuhalten, worüber die Kammer zu entscheiden hatte, und sicherzustellen, dass in einem möglichen Überprüfungsverfahren keine Unsicherheiten über die von der rügenden Beteiligten beabsichtigte Formulierung der Rüge bestehen.

Die Kammer ergänzte hierzu, dass zum wesentlichen Gang der mündlichen Verhandlung, der nach R. 124 (1) EPÜ in die Sitzungsniederschrift aufzunehmen ist, der Umstand als solcher gehören könne, dass eine Rüge nach R. 106 EPÜ erhoben wurde, nicht aber die dazu von der jeweiligen Beteiligten vorgebrachten und für die Zulässigkeit der Rüge erforderlichen Gründe und Argumente. Vielmehr sei es Sache der Beteiligten, Erklärungen und Begründungen zu ihren Anträgen schriftlich einzureichen.

Es war für die Kammer vorliegend nicht erkennbar, worin in der Aufforderung zur schriftlichen Formulierung der Rüge ein möglicher Verstoß gegen Art. 113 (1) EPÜ liegen sollte. Die erste und zweite Rüge der Beschwerdegegnerin wurden folglich zurückgewiesen.

Abstract

In T 2274/22 war ein Mitglied der Öffentlichkeit von Einsprechenden-Seite (Herr T.) vor Eröffnung der mündlichen Verhandlung unbeabsichtigt dem virtuellen Dolmetscher-Besprechungsraum zugeordnet worden, wo er mehr als 10 Minuten mithörte, bevor er die anderen Besprechungsteilnehmer darüber in Kenntnis setzte und ausgeschlossen wurde. Während dieser Zeit kommunizierte Herr T. dem zugelassenen Vertreter der Einsprechenden und seinem Kollegen Details aus dem mitgehörten Inhalt der Vorbesprechung. Kurz nach Eröffnung der mündlichen Verhandlung legte der Vertreter der Einsprechenden den obigen Vorfall offen. Die Patentinhaberin befürchtete eine Benachteiligung und sprach dabei eine Neubesetzung der Einspruchsabteilung an. Die Einsprechende stellte daraufhin mit einem Kurzprotokoll die erhaltenen Informationen schriftlich zur Verfügung. Die Patentinhaberin war der Auffassung, diese gingen entgegen der Aussage des Vorsitzenden über den Inhalt des Ladungszusatzes hinaus, und beantragte schriftlich die Ablehnung der Einspruchsabteilung wegen Besorgnis der Befangenheit.

Zur Frage, ob ein schwerwiegender Verfahrensfehler im Vorfeld der mündlichen Verhandlung begangen wurde, erläuterte die Kammer, die Anwesenheit einer Partei in einer Vorbesprechung zwischen einem oder mehreren Mitgliedern einer Einspruchsabteilung und den Dolmetschern stelle grundsätzlich einen Verfahrensfehler dar, unabhängig davon, ob dieser durch einen technischen oder menschlichen Fehler verursacht geworden sei. Ein solcher Verfahrensfehler müsse aber nicht zwangsläufig in einen schwerwiegenden münden. Vielmehr könne er dadurch geheilt werden, dass die abwesende Partei vor Eröffnung der sachlichen Debatte auf den gleichen Kenntnisstand wie die anwesende gebracht werde.

Nach Ansicht der Kammer konnte allein die Anwesenheit von Herrn T. beim Dolmetscher-Briefing auch keine Besorgnis der Befangenheit der Einspruchsabteilung begründen. Denn, da die Zuschaltung eines Parteivertreters in den virtuellen Besprechungsraum vorliegend unstreitig versehentlich erfolgt sei, und die Einspruchsabteilung sie umgehend beendet habe, sobald sie ihrer gewahr wurde, bestehe objektiv kein Verdacht, die Einspruchsabteilung habe hier willentlich für eine Bevorzugung der Einsprechenden gesorgt oder diese billigend in Kauf genommen. Jedoch sei die Tatsache, dass die Einspruchsabteilung den Vorfall nicht von sich aus angesprochen und der Patentinhaberin mitgeteilt habe, dazu geeignet, bei der Patentinhaberin den Eindruck einer Parteilichkeit zu erwecken. Dass die Einspruchsabteilung sich zudem auch nach Intervention der Einsprechenden, die ausdrücklich auf einen möglichen Verfahrensfehler hingewiesen hatte, nicht aktiv an der Aufklärung des Vorfalls beteiligte, sondern den Vorschlag der Einsprechenden, eine schriftliche Zusammenfassung einzureichen, abwartete und diesem lediglich zustimmte, könne einen solchen Eindruck noch verstärken. Dass eine inhaltliche Auseinandersetzung der Einspruchsabteilung mit dem Kurzprotokoll ausgeblieben sei, stelle aus Sicht eines objektiven Beobachters einen weiteren Umstand dar, der zum Anschein ihrer Befangenheit beitrage.

Die Kammer rief in Erinnerung, dass Besorgnis der Befangenheit bereits dann gegeben ist, wenn objektive Anhaltspunkte dafür vorliegen, auch wenn andere Tatsachen dagegensprechen mögen. Vorliegend war nach Ansicht der Kammer eine Befangenheit der Einspruchsabteilung objektiv zu besorgen, da diese keine der aufgetretenen Gelegenheiten ergriffen hatte, die Patentinhaberin selbst über den Vorfall zu informieren und selbst zu dessen Aufklärung beizutragen. Daher hätte dem Antrag der Patentinhaberin auf Ablehnung ihrer Mitglieder analog zu Art. 24(3) EPÜ stattgegeben und die Einspruchsabteilung neu besetzt werden müssen.

Die Kammer kam zu dem Schluss, dass die angefochtene Entscheidung nicht von der Einspruchsabteilung in ihrer ursprünglichen Besetzung hätte getroffen werden dürfen. Dass dies dennoch geschah, stelle einen schwerwiegenden Verfahrensmangel dar, der zur Aufhebung der angefochtenen Entscheidung und zur Zurückverweisung des Falls an eine neu zu besetzende Einspruchsabteilung führe. Darauf wie groß der ursprüngliche Fehler war, komme es in der Regel nicht an, wenn er letztlich ursächlich für einen wesentlichen Verfahrensmangel gewesen sei. Entscheidend sei allein, dass der aus ihm resultierende Verfahrensmangel als so schwerwiegend eingestuft wird, dass er zu einer Zurückverweisung führt. Dies sei vorliegend der Fall. Die Kammer wies zuletzt darauf hin, dass wegen der räumlichen Distanz und nur mittelbaren Präsenz in einer Videokonferenz, hier ein "schlechter Eindruck" zudem schneller entstehen könne und somit auch die Schwelle sinke, ab der eine Befangenheit befürchtet werden könne. Daher seien an eine ordnungsgemäße Verhandlungsführung und insbesondere den Umgang mit technischen Pannen hohe Maßstäbe anzulegen.

Abstract

In T 124/22 the parties had been summoned to oral proceedings before the board and a communication had been issued under Art. 15(1) RPBA. By letter of reply, received one day before the scheduled oral proceedings, the respondent had stated that it would not be attending the arranged oral proceedings. No substantive submissions had been made. Subsequently, the oral proceedings had been cancelled.

The board noted that the respondent's representative had provided his videoconferencing details eight days before the scheduled oral proceedings, indicating an intention to participate. However, he had notified the board of his non-participation only one day before the scheduled proceedings. Typically, such notifications were given well in advance (see also T 930/92). According to the board, given that the board's preliminary opinion had been issued ten months ahead of the scheduled hearing, the respondent had had ample time to inform the board of its non-attendance well ahead of the hearing.

In the board's opinion, while it was not uncommon for representatives to receive late instructions, they should seek timely directions from their clients, particularly when arranged oral proceedings approach. In this instance, the representative had failed to communicate promptly with the board's registry. The board pointed out that it (and presumably the opposing party's representative) had already invested some time in preparing for the oral proceedings. It recalled that according to Art. 6 of the epi Code of Conduct, members are required to act courteously in their dealings with the EPO. The same principle applied to behaviour towards other representatives (Art. 5(a) of the epi Code of Conduct).

The board also took the view that the respondent had effectively withdrawn its request for oral proceedings by declaring its intent not to attend them. In turn, the board did not consider the conduct of oral proceedings to be expedient (Art. 116(1) EPC). As a consequence, the decision was handed down in written proceedings (Art. 12(8) RPBA).

Abstract

In J 2/22 the Legal Board dealt with the legal (in-)capacity of the appellant, since the notification of the Receiving's Section communication of 21 November 2019 was null and void if the appellant – who was not properly represented – was legally incapable.

The Legal Board recalled that legal incapacity of a person meant that such a person is suffering from a disturbance of their mind which makes them unable to form the necessary voluntary intention to carry out legal transactions binding upon them. In the context of the procedural system of the EPC, this also means that they cannot act on their own in proceedings before the EPO. Moreover, the Legal Board held that the standards for assessing legal capacity regarding natural persons should be the same as those regarding professional representatives, as only unified standards according to the autonomous law of the EPC could guarantee equal treatment of the parties, as an essential element of fair trial.

According to the Legal Board, legal (in-)capacity was to be assessed ex officio, at any time during the proceedings, and it required a reliable medical opinion. There was a general presumption in favour of legal capacity of a natural person appearing as party or representative before the EPO. However, this presumption no longer held if there were indications to the contrary, in particular from this person's conduct in the proceedings. In such a case, a person could not simply be further treated as legally capable, despite indications to the contrary, by putting the burden (only) on them to provide evidence to prove their own legal incapacity.

The Legal Board further stated that in the event of legal incapacity of an applicant or proprietor, proceedings before the EPO were to be interrupted, and were to be resumed with the person authorised to continue. The interruption occurred ex lege, when the conditions for it were met. The decision on and the registration of such interruption were only declaratory.

The Legal Board then turned to the issue of competence to declare an interruption. It held that the competence of the boards under Art. 21(1) EPC for appeal proceedings, including decisions on the merits and ancillary procedural matters, was not affected by the competence of the Legal Division for decisions as to entries in the European Patent Register under Art. 20 EPC. The Decision of the President of the EPO concerning the responsibilities of the Legal Division of 21 November 2013, OJ 2013, 600, did not transfer any powers and competences from the Boards of Appeal to the Legal Division on the basis of R. 11 EPC, but only concerned the allocation of functions between the first-instance departments. From the mere fact that the Legal Division was responsible for entries in the European Patent Register regarding the dates of interruption or resumption of proceedings pursuant to R. 142 EPC, it could not be derived that the Legal Division would also be responsible for the decision to interrupt.

Regarding the continued/renewed proceedings, the Legal Board stated that when proceedings were declared null and void (and interrupted) by a board, because of legal incapacity of an appellant, the case was to be remitted to the department of first instance, for the first-instance proceedings to be resumed and continued/renewed with a representative to (be appointed and) act on the appellant's behalf, and with further notifications also to be made to that representative. The concept of the appointment of a representative for legal proceedings was inherent in the system of the EPC, and could, as a matter of principle, be applied to any case such as the present one, where a representative was essential to guarantee the participation of a legally incapable person as party and thus a fair trial. Such an appointment by the administrative or judicial authority in the proceedings is also in accordance with the principles of procedural law generally recognised in the contracting states to the EPC.

Abstract

In T 2517/22, in support of their argument of lack of inventive step, appellant 2 (opponent) had submitted documents D2 (operating manual) and D2a, which was the affidavit of an employee of appellant 2, Mr R.

Already in the notice of opposition and again in their reply, after the patentee had put into question the probative value of the affidavit D2a, appellant 2 had offered Mr R as a witness. In the annex to the first summons, the opposition division considered D2a to be sufficient evidence for public availability of D2 and did not summon Mr R as witness. In the annex to the second summons, discussion of novelty over D2 was envisaged for the oral proceedings. The opposition division changed its mind however and announced, after discussion of public availability of D2 during the second oral proceedings, that D2 was not part of the prior art albeit without taking into account the previous offer to hear a witness on the topic.

In the board's view, the statements in the affidavit D2a represented facts which were a priori of high relevance for the establishment of whether or not D2 was part of the prior art in the sense of Art. 54(2) EPC, and therefore of high relevance for the outcome of the opposition proceedings. An offer to hear the undersigned of the affidavit D2a as a witness represented a further relevant and appropriate offer of evidence for the facts. The board stated it was a party's choice to present whatever means of evidence it considered to be suitable and it was an opposition division's duty to take its decision on the basis of all the relevant evidence actually available rather than to expect the presentation of more preferred pieces of documentary evidence, and to speculate on the reasons for and draw conclusions from their absence. The opposition division was of course free to evaluate any evidence provided by a party, but this freedom could not be used to disregard evidence that had been offered, and which might turn out to be decisive for a case, in particular not with the argument that some better evidence would have been expected.

Instead of accepting the evidence offered by appellant 2, the opposition division appeared to have based its decision on general assumptions made on the capability of persons to recollect events after a certain time period (15 years) and specific assumptions made on the witness's personal capability, knowledge and experience, thus implicitly on assumptions made on the veracity of his statements and on his credibility. By making these assumptions without hearing the offered witness person, the opposition division had in fact assessed evidence without examining it.

According to the respondent (patent proprietor), the offer of Mr R as a witness was not substantiated. For the board, affidavit D2a appeared to contain the factual information relevant for the outcome of the case. Before the oral proceedings, the opposition division had not shared the respondent's concerns about the veracity of D2a. The board stated that appellant 2 did not have to address these concerns and had no obligation to announce in their offer how exactly the witness would be able to corroborate his own statements, e.g. by answering in advance hypothetical questions that might possibly arise. Such questions would normally be asked during witness hearings in order to assess the credibility of the witness and the exactness of their memory, which is one of the main purposes of the hearing. A sufficiently exact recollection of various events 15 years later should not have been denied beforehand.

Appellant 2 requested that the decision be set aside due to a violation of their right to be heard and to remit the case. The board concluded that the failure to consider appellant's 2 offer to hear a witness on the public availability of D2 constituted a substantial procedural violation of the right to be heard. The decision of the opposition division to reject both oppositions was set aside in order to allow re-examination of the public availability of D2 taking into account all the evidence admissibly submitted by appellant 2.

Abstract

In J 3/24 the examination and designation fees (due on Friday, 10 February 2023) had been paid too late (on Monday, 13 February 2023). By letter of 12 February 2023, the appellant's representative had requested that the payment be considered as made on time, as he had wrongly assumed that he had given an automatic debit order. On 21 February 2023, a notification of loss of rights had been sent undated, and had been sent again on 7 March 2023 (together, the "Notification") informing the appellant that the application had been deemed to be withdrawn due to the late payment. The Notification indicated as available means of redress a request for further processing under Art. 121 EPC and a request to consider the fee to have been paid on time under Art. 7(3), 7(4) RFees, each within a two-month time limit for filing. No valid request for further processing had been filed during that time.

The appellant argued that the fact that the Receiving Section had not replied to his letter of 12 February 2023 and had wrongly stated that a reply had been given with the Notification constituted a substantial procedural violation. He requested reimbursement of the appeal fee.

The Legal Board did not consider that the requirements in R. 103(1)(a) EPC were met in the present case. It recalled that according to the established case law of the Boards of Appeal, the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations (also referred to as the principle of good faith) requires communications addressed to applicants to be clear and unambiguous, i.e. drafted in such a way as to rule out misunderstandings on the part of a reasonable addressee. An applicant must not suffer a disadvantage as a result of having relied on a misleading communication (see G 2/97, J 2/87, J 3/87, J 4/23, T 2092/13). If a communication is not as clear and unambiguous as it should be and misleads a reasonable recipient, this may constitute a substantial procedural violation and entitle the appellant to reimbursement of the appeal fee (see J 3/87). On the other hand, both the EPO and users of the European patent system who are parties to proceedings before it are obliged to act in good faith. The principle of the protection of legitimate expectations does not give carte blanche to the person relying on it (J 4/23). It is the responsibility of users of the European patent system to take all necessary procedural actions to avoid a loss of rights (see G 2/97, R 4/09). It is also inherent in the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations that a person can only successfully invoke an expectation on which they could, on an objective basis, legitimately rely. The erroneous information from the EPO must objectively justify their conduct (see J 4/23; G 2/97). Thus it must be established that, on an objective basis and in the circumstances of the case, it was reasonable for the appellant to have been misled by the information on which they relied (see J 4/23, J 27/92, G 2/97).

The Legal Board acknowledged that the Notification made reference to the late payment but did not expressly address the request of 12 February 2023 for the late payment to be considered as having been made on time. It was therefore not clearly apparent whether the Receiving Section had taken this request into account in the Notification. However, it was not reasonable for the appellant to completely disregard the Notification. Even if the appellant's representative had considered the Notification as having been generated automatically without taking into account the request of 12 February 2023, it was expected that communications from the EPO would be observed. The Notification pointed out the legal remedies available to overcome the loss of rights caused by the late payment and indicated the time limit for filing a request for further processing. Such an official communication could not simply be ignored and set aside. Rather, it was the appellant's own responsibility to enquire about the situation regarding his request before expiry of the triggered time limits to ensure that he did not suffer any loss of rights. The fact that he only contacted the Receiving Section on 1 June 2023 had to be attributed solely to him. The Legal Board reiterated that it was the responsibility of users of the European patent system to take all necessary procedural actions to avoid a loss of rights. This applied all the more in the case at hand as the matter was initially set in motion by an error on the part of the appellant's representative. Moreover, even if a substantial procedural error were to be assumed – which could not be recognised here – reimbursement of the appeal fee would not be equitable within the meaning of R. 103(1)(a) EPC, since the behaviour of the appellant had contributed to the situation.

The request for reimbursement of the appeal fee was refused.

Abstract

In T 1529/20 the appellant (proprietor) submitted that they had never received the decision of the opposition division revoking their patent and that they had only become aware of it and, more generally, of the opposition proceedings, through an email from a formalities officer of the EPO.

The board explained that with the abolition of advices of delivery for notification of decisions by registered letter (see OJ 2019, A31), it was the practice of the EPO at the time to enclose an acknowledgement of receipt (Form 2936) with notifications by registered letter of decisions incurring a period for appeal and summonses. Addressees were requested to date and sign the form and return it immediately, as evidence of receipt (see OJ 2019, A57).

The board established that the present file did not contain a confirmation of receipt of the decision of the opposition division from the appellant. Since the EPO could not prove whether the registered letter had reached the appellant, as required by the provisions of R. 126(2) EPC in force at the relevant time, it had to be accepted that the legal fiction of deemed notification did not apply and the appellant became aware of the appealed decision for the first time with the email from the formalities officer. This date was therefore the date of notification of the decision. Thus, the appeal was timely filed.

With regard to the right to be heard, the board held that, as argued by the appellant, the missing opportunity to present their arguments during the opposition proceedings amounted to a substantial procedural violation (Art. 113(1) EPC).

The board observed that, even in view of the notice of the EPO concerning implementation of amended R. 126(1) EPC (OJ 2019, A57) – which did not require to enclose an acknowledgement of receipt (Form 2936) with the communication of the notice of opposition – the requirements of Art. 113 EPC had to be complied with. Before a negative decision revoking a patent was issued, it had to be established that the patent proprietor had been duly informed about the initiation of opposition proceedings. The board explained that the notice of the EPO merely determined the format of notifications. However, the provisions of R. 126(2) EPC remained unaffected. R. 126(2) EPC defined a rebuttable fiction of notification, which, in case of dispute, had to be verified. The burden of proof lied with the EPO.

The board agreed with the appellant that a party submitting that something had not happened, i.e. that a communication had not been received, was in difficulties in trying to prove a negative (negativa non sunt probanda, see also T 2037/18, R 15/11, R 4/17). The filing of cogent evidence showing that a letter was not received was hardly ever possible (see also J 9/05). Therefore, the respondent's arguments that the appellant allegedly had the duty to register mail incoming at their premises but failed to provide an excerpt of such register was not pertinent, since there was no trace in the file that the EPO discharged its burden of proving delivery. Under such circumstances, the appellant did not have to bear the risks normally falling in their sphere of responsibility (T 1535/10), so that they have to be given the benefit of the doubt (J 9/05).

According to the board, in the present case legal certainty and the protection of the right to be heard would have required that the opposition division had established, by any available means, the fact and date of delivery of the communication of the notice of opposition.

The patent proprietor could decide not to react to the notice of opposition. Nevertheless, the communication under R. 79(1) EPC was not a mere formality. Rather, it had the function of allowing the patent proprietor to both contribute to the opposition division's appreciation of the facts and to defend their interests. Since the initial act of (non-)notification of the notice of opposition was flawed, the entire opposition proceedings including the decision of the opposition division was flawed.

Thus, the board set aside the appealed decision and remitted the case to the opposition division for further prosecution. The appeal fee was reimbursed.

Abstract

In J 11/20 the applicant appealed a decision of the Receiving Section refusing their application for the reason that the amended drawings filed by the applicant to remedy formal deficiencies in the application documents were not in agreement with the application documents as originally filed and, despite the invitation by the Receiving Section dated 14 March 2019, the applicant had not corrected this deficiency in due time.

In the statement of grounds of appeal, the appellant submitted that the Receiving Section's communication dated 14 March 2019 had appeared not to have been received by them. They also objected that the EPO had committed a substantial procedural violation by providing information on a procedural non-compliance leading to a severe loss of rights to an assistant by means of an informal telephone call, rather than to the duly appointed representative with an official communication. Informing, in an informal manner, the assistant instead of the duly appointed professional representative, prevented the latter from the possibility to correctly react. The appellant furthermore indicated that these arguments had already been brought to the attention of the Receiving Section with the letter dated 24 October 2019, in reply to the communication under Art. 113(1) EPC. However, they had remained disregarded and the Receiving Section had issued the appealed decision.

In the context of the reimbursement of the appeal fee under R. 103(1)(a) EPC, the Legal Board saw at least a substantial procedural violation in the fact that the Receiving Section had disregarded the objection of lack of receipt of the communication dated 14 March 2019, and had given no consideration to the request for re-establishment of rights. The lack of receipt of this communication had been disputed by the appellant – in addition to the statement of grounds of appeal – before the appealed decision was issued, both in the request for re-establishment of rights and in reply to the communication under Art. 113(1) EPC.

The Legal Board remarked that in the Receiving Section's communication under Art. 113(1) EPC, by reference to the telephone conversation with the assistant of the appellant's representative, the assumption that the communication dated 14 March 2019 had actually been received by the professional representative was taken as a fact. However, there was no trace in the file that the respective telephone note had also been formally notified to the professional representative, giving him the chance to take position on this fact before it being taken into account in the communication under Art. 113(1) EPC.

The Legal Board held that, by simply disregarding the appellant's submissions, the Receiving Section had violated the right to be heard under Art. 113(1) EPC. It is a well-established principle that this right requires not only that an opportunity to present comments is given, but also that these comments are actually taken into due consideration in the decision. The Legal Board concluded that this violation was of a substantial nature since it had affected the reasons on which the appealed decision had been taken, namely the assumption that the communication dated 14 March 2019 had been received by the appellant and thus the deficiencies under R. 58 EPC had not been corrected in due time. The appellant had been given no other choice than filing the appeal. In view of these circumstances, the Legal Board considered that reimbursement of the appeal fee was equitable.

Abstract

In T 572/19 the proprietor appealed the opposition division's decision, issued in writing on 17 December 2018, to revoke the patent ("the appealed decision"). By communication under R. 100(2) EPC, the parties were informed of the board's observation that EPO Form 2339, dated 10 December 2018, bore the name, but not the signature, of the legally qualified member who had participated in the decision-making process. The board's preliminary view was that this amounted to a substantial procedural violation.

By the opposition division's communication dated 26 June 2023, to which an altered EPO Form 2339 ("the post-signed Form 2339") and an explanatory note on EPO Form 2906 ("the division's explanation") were annexed, the parties and the board were informed that the missing signature had been corrected under R. 140 EPC, with the chair belatedly signing the form on behalf of the legally qualified member. The missing signature was deemed to concern "a formal error being an obvious mistake", made when the paper file circulated between EPO sites. It was assured that the grounds attached to the appealed decision, when issued, had previously been circulated by email to all members of the opposition division; also the grounds had thus reflected the opinion of all the members of the opposition division, including the legally qualified member, who had confirmed her agreement in an email at the time.

The first question addressed by the board was the scope of signature requirement under R. 113(1) EPC since the parties disagreed thereon. The disagreement lay in whether the term "decisions" means simply the outcome of the proceedings (e.g. "The patent is revoked"), which is what opponent 1 argued, or extends to the substantiation in the written decision, which was the proprietor's view. Referring to T 2076/11, J 16/17 and T 390/86, the board held that the jurisprudence of the boards of appeal indicated that the written decision, including the substantiation, was the object of the signature requirement. There was, then, no doubt that the signature requirement under R. 113(1) EPC applied to the written decision, including the substantiation, and not only to the outcome that might be announced during oral proceedings.

Secondly, the board examined the purpose of the signature requirement under R. 113(1) EPC. Referring inter alia to J 16/17, it emphasised that the purpose of the signature requirement under R. 113(1) EPC was only achieved if there was an unbroken chain of manifest personal responsibility, taken by each member of the decision-making body who was assigned to the case, throughout the decision-making process, including for the written decision.

Finally, due to the cases presented by the opponents, the board addressed three potential remedies: a) "the pragmatic approach" according to which another member signs on behalf of one who is not in a position to sign, and provides a written explanation; b) recognition of a possibility for the opposition division, after remittal, to heal the deficiency without entering into the merits and extent of the appealed decision; and c) correction of the appealed decision under R. 140 EPC. The board held that none of these remedies was applicable in the current case. In particular, it was of the view that while issuing a decision without the legally qualified member's signature had been a mistake, it had not been an obvious one within the meaning of R. 140 EPC. It followed that the appealed decision had not been corrected under R. 140 EPC by the post-signed Form 2339 and the division's explanation.

The board concluded that since none of the potential remedies was applicable, the chain of manifest personal responsibility was broken, the missing signature was a substantial procedural violation, and the appealed decision was invalid. The appealed decision was set aside, and the case remitted to the opposition division for further prosecution. The board found reimbursement of the appeal fee under R. 103(1)(a) EPC equitable, for the reason that no substantial progress had been made in the appeal since it had been filed (T 3071/19).

Abstract

In the decision under appeal in T 1882/23, the examining division had rejected the applicant's request for re-establishment of rights in respect of the time limit for paying the renewal fee for the fourth year and the additional fee, and deemed the patent application to be withdrawn. The examining division considered the request to be inadmissible because it was not filed within two months of the removal of the cause of non-compliance within the meaning of R. 136(1), first sentence, EPC.

The board recalled that the removal of the cause of non-compliance is to be established on a purely factual basis. It occurred, as a rule, on the date on which the person responsible for the application vis-à-vis the EPO became aware of the fact that a time limit had not been observed. This awareness was typically the result of the actual receipt of a communication of loss of rights under R. 112(1) EPC (see T 231/23, J 1/20). This had not been disputed by the appellant.

The appellant argued that, in the present case, the person responsible for the application vis-à-vis the EPO should be the person employed by the appellant to manage its patent portfolio (the "IP person"). It argued that this person's awareness had to be decisive, and not that of the professional representative. According to the appellant, the present circumstances illustrated the problems associated with a "hybrid" system, where the representative was not fully responsible for all actions relating to the application, but where other persons, in this case the in-house IP person, were responsible for the patent portfolio and for managing the payment of renewal fees. The appellant stressed that the authorised firm of representatives had been specifically told that they were not responsible for paying the renewal fees.

The board did not find these arguments convincing. The question of who was responsible for which task within the appellant's sphere of responsibility could not be decisive for the issue of determining the point in time when the cause of non-compliance with the period was removed. Legal certainty required that the starting point be clearly and objectively determined. This could not depend on the circumstances of how the appellant had organised its tasks and representation, whether internally or with the help of external providers.

The board referred to the current case law on this matter and observed that, where a professional representative was appointed, it was that representative who was the "person responsible for the application vis-à-vis the EPO" (cf. J 1/20). The professional representative remained the person whose awareness was relevant for assessing when the cause of non-compliance with the period was removed, irrespective of whether a third party other than the representative was responsible for the payment of fees (J 27/90). As such, regardless of the contractual arrangements made by the appellant for the payment of fees, the appointed professional representative remained the EPO's single point of contact (T 231/23). If the appointed professional representative received a communication of loss of rights due to the non-payment of fees, the cause of non-compliance with the period was removed pursuant to R. 136(1), first sentence, EPC on the date of that actual receipt. This was also true where, as in the present case, that representative had been instructed by their client that all renewal matters would be handled by others. According to the board, such an instruction alone was not a reason for the cause of non-compliance to persist despite the appointed professional representative's actual awareness of the non-compliance (T 231/23). Thus, in the case in hand, it was irrelevant whether, and on which date, the appellant's "IP person" received the notice of loss of rights.

The appellant also sought to rely on T 942/12. However, the board did not find this decision relevant to the question at hand. According to the board, the findings in T 942/12 concerned solely the question of whether the representative had exercised "all due care", i.e. the merits of the request for re-establishment of rights. In contrast, the question in the case at hand related to the person whose awareness was relevant for the removal of the cause of non-compliance. This question was independent of the question of whether all due care was taken.

The professional representative had received the notice of loss of rights on 4 June 2019. The removal of the cause of non-compliance with the period thus occurred on that date. The request for re-establishment of rights was filed on 10 September 2019, i.e. it was not filed within the two-month time limit laid down in R. 136(1), first sentence, EPC. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.

Abstract

Interlocutory decision R 4/24 of 19 August 2024 concerned a petition for review against decision T 116/18 of Board 3.3.02 of 28 July 2023. In T 116/18 of 11 October 2021, a referral had been made under Art. 112 EPC to the Enlarged Board, resulting in decision G 2/21, which was then applied in T 116/18 of 28 July 2023.

The petitioner raised an objection of suspected partiality under Art. 24 EPC against the Chair in the petition for review case R 4/24, on the basis that he had also been the Chair of the Enlarged Board in G 2/21. The petitioner acknowledged that the Chair in both G 2/21 and R 4/24 did not participate in decision T 116/18 and was not Chair of Board 3.3.02.

Nevertheless, the petitioner argued that G 2/21 and T 116/18 were: "[...] inextricably related by virtue of Art. 112(3) EPC and well-known by the European patent community to be so…". It further submitted that "it would be unfortunate, if not undesirable, for a member of the Enlarged Board who participated in the Enlarged Board decision now to participate in deciding whether or not that decision was implemented with fundamental procedural fairness in the decision under review."

The petitioner further argued that the present case might fall under the "or for any other reason" clause of Art. 24(2) EPC.

The objection was found to be admissible by the original composition of the Enlarged Board, an alternate Chair was appointed, and the Enlarged Board decided upon the objection of suspected partiality in this altered composition.

The Enlarged Board summarised the principles developed by the Enlarged Board and the Boards of Appeal for the application of Art. 24 EPC (see point 1 of the Reasons and as referred to by the Enlarged Board, G 1/21 of 17 May 2021 and also Case Law of the Boards of Appeal, 10th ed. 2022, III.J.1. "General principles").

The Enlarged Board in its alternate composition found that the Chair of the Enlarged Board in R 4/24 in its original composition had not participated in the decision that was the subject of the petition for review (T 116/18 of 23 July 2023) and was therefore not excluded under Art. 2(6), second sentence, RPEBA, from acting as Chair in case R 4/24. It acknowledged that G 2/21 was binding for the decision under review, but pointed out that a decision by the Enlarged Board under Art. 112 EPC and the following final decision by the referring board were separate decisions. Further, under Art. 112 EPC, the Enlarged Board in "G"-cases answers questions of law, and the application of the law in question to the facts of the appeal case rests exclusively with the competent board of appeal. Against this background, the Enlarged Board was of the view that participating in decision G 2/21 did not exclude the objected to Chair from taking part in R 4/24. Moreover, it saw no other reasons, whether or not mentioned in Art. 24(1) EPC, for excluding the Chair from R 4/24.

As to the petitioner's argument that the present case might fall under the "or for any other reason" clause of Art. 24(2) EPC, the Enlarged Board was also not convinced. Art. 24(2) EPC provides for a member themselves to put forward a reason for their exclusion, which had not happened in the case in hand. Rather the Chair was of the view that there was no such reason, as submitted in comments under Art. 24(4) EPC.

In conclusion, the Enlarged Board found that the objection against the Chair in R 4/24 in its original composition to be unfounded and that he could continue to participate in case R 4/24 as Chair.

Abstract

In T 964/21 the patent proprietor (appellant) requested, among other things, that the opposition division's decision as to the apportionment of costs be set aside. The formulation of that decision was set out in the Reasons of the impugned decision as follows: "... the Opposition Division apportions to the Proprietor the costs of the remuneration of the representatives of the parties in respect to oral proceedings and for the undue delaying of the procedure in respect of late filing".

The board emphasised that an order for the apportionment of costs under Art. 104 EPC must clearly state (at least) the kind of costs to be borne by the burdened party. According to the board, the order referred to above did not comply with this requirement. The order was so vague that it was not possible to clearly determine (a) whether the representatives' costs of preparing for the oral proceedings were included, and (b) whether the representatives' costs for both oral proceedings (i.e. for the one of 8 October 2019 and also for the later one of 26 April 2021) were included.

In this regard the board noted that according to the minutes of the oral proceedings of 8 October 2019 before the opposition division, the costs for both oral proceedings should be borne by the patent proprietor. This however was not properly reflected in the order and could not be assumed to be covered by it. Furthermore, in view of the fact that parties to opposition proceedings have a right to oral proceedings, such a ruling – without any limitations of the specific costs to be borne in relation to the oral proceedings and without providing sound reasons for such a decision – would not comply with the right to be heard in oral proceedings as enshrined in the EPC.

The board found that, even on the basis of the foregoing alone, the decision on the apportionment of costs was to be set aside.

Furthermore, the board held that the opposition division's decision also failed in terms of substance. According to established case law, a board should overrule a discretionary decision only if they conclude that it was taken in accordance with the wrong principles, without taking the right principles into account or in an arbitrary or unreasonable way, thereby exceeding the proper limits of its discretion (see Case Law of the Boards of Appeal, 10th ed. 2022, V.A.3.4.1b); emphasis by the board). A substantive review of a discretionary decision was therefore not excluded in the present case.

According to the board, the fact that the patent proprietor did not contest the earliest priority claimed for D22 in view of the embodiment of Figures B34A and B34B until the first oral proceedings before the opposition division could not justify a different apportionment of costs. In this regard it had to be taken into account that a novelty objection based on the embodiment of Figures B34A and B34B of D22 was raised for the first time in said oral proceedings. Even if a novelty objection based on the embodiment of Figure 1B of D22 was already in the proceedings, this did not mean that the patent proprietor would have been obliged to consider the validity of the priorities of D22 in relation to that objection.

With regard to the late filing of amended requests, the board did not see any procedurally abusive behaviour on the part of the patent proprietor, nor did the effort of the opponents caused by the late filing of the requests – which was partly due to the late submission of the objections based on D22 – appeared to be unduly high. The efforts for the preparation of the issue of admittance of the newly filed requests did not appear to the board to have caused unreasonable expense to the opponents. Moreover, such preparatory work could in no way justify the award of the entire costs of the oral proceedings.

Thus, the board found it appropriate for each party to bear its own costs. The decision of the opposition division as to the apportionment of costs was set aside.

Abstract

In T 846/22 the respondent (patent proprietor) had requested that its costs from the first and second instance proceedings should be charged to the appellant (opponent). The respondent argued that these costs were incurred through an abuse of procedure by the appellant, namely acting throughout the opposition and appeal proceedings whilst being a dormant company with the aim of circumventing possible remedies given to the parties by Art. 104 EPC. The board noted that acting on behalf of a third party could not be seen as a circumvention of the law unless further circumstances were involved (G 3/97, OJ 1999, 245, point 3.2 of the Reasons) and there was no requirement under the EPC that a party be equipped with sufficient financial means to comply with a merely hypothetical costs order. Moreover, the EPC did not offer the patent proprietor any kind of guarantee that an opponent would be able in fact to reimburse costs awarded against him (G 3/97, point 3.2.6 of the Reasons). Hence, the board concluded that there was no abuse of procedure in this respect and refused this request for apportionment of costs.

The respondent had further requested that its costs incurred for the preparation of the oral proceedings be charged to the appellant, who had only informed the board the day before the oral proceedings that it would not attend them. In particular, the respondent argued that, had it been informed, the costs for the preparation of at least part of the oral proceedings would not have been incurred, in view of the board's preliminary opinion, which was favourable to the respondent in respect of a number of issues. The board stated that the oral proceedings would have had to have taken place anyway. This was because of the respondent's auxiliary request for oral proceedings. Hence, in contrast to the case underlying T 475/07, the appellant's conduct had had no impact on the necessity of holding oral proceedings. The board noted that even when all parties attended oral proceedings, it was possible that not all the issues addressed in the preliminary opinion would be discussed, since for some of them the parties could refer to their written submissions. The board also pointed out that the respondent could not be sure that the preliminary opinion would be maintained in the oral proceedings. Deciding not to be prepared for an issue which could potentially be discussed at the oral proceedings, irrespective of the board's preliminary view on the issue, always involves some risk and it is the parties' responsibility to decide what to prepare for. In any case, it could not be asserted beforehand that the board's preliminary opinion would have rendered the oral proceedings unnecessary. For these reasons, the board did not consider it equitable to order the apportionment of costs in favour of the respondent. Hence, this request was refused too.

Abstract

In T 778/21 (laundry appliance), the opposition division concluded inter alia that the subject-matter of claim 1 of the patent as granted was not new in view of both document E2 and the prior use (PU) relating to a washing machine. Both parties appealed. The opponent alleged that the sale of the prior use PU washing machine as detailed on the invoice PU1 and the related affidavits of Mr N. (PU3) and Mr E. (PU2) sufficed for proving that the machine was publicly available. Serial numbers were unique, so the indication of the serial number of the prior use machine allowed a definitive identification of the machine. Thus, in the opponent's view, the inspection of the machine or the hearing of witnesses as requested by the proprietor was not necessary. The errors in the opponent's grounds of appeal associated with the model number for the prior use PU were to be seen as clerical errors. The proprietor inter alia submitted that in view of the doubts presented already in the opposition proceedings, an inspection of the machine with serial number C21850524 and the hearing of witnesses would have been necessary for verification.

The board first dealt in detail with several issues in relation to RPBA and late filed submissions at different stages, eventually most not admitted. On a particular late submission, the board did not accept the opponent's argument that documents filed during the written stage of the opposition proceedings should generally be included in the appeal by default. Regarding the opponent's reaction to the preliminary opinion of the board, in which the opponent explained that the incorrect association of model number WFW97HEXW2 with serial number C21850524 was a clerical mistake, the board found that exceptional circumstances existed that in its view justified admitting the opponent's explanation.

Concerning the general principles for assessing an alleged prior use, the board set out four steps that should generally be made (detailed in the Reasons). Steps 1 to 3 consisted in the examination of the substantiation of the prior use, establishing the evidence offered by the opponent as bearing the burden of proof and the evaluation of the entire evidence offered by the opponent. Depending on the outcome of this evaluation, step 4 could vary (three variants) depending on whether or not the opponent's evidence on file confirmed the alleged facts, or if doubts remained, and whether the opponent did (first variant) or did not (second variant) request an inspection or hearing of witnesses (see the detailed Reasons as to the consequences). If, in the third variant, the opponent's evidence confirmed the prior use, the (counter) evidence offered by the patent proprietor would become relevant and would need to be considered. If assertions made in an affidavit or in any other witness declaration remained contested, a request from a party to hear the (available) witness would have to be granted. The board made reference to G 2/21 (points 41, 42, 44 of the Reasons) and to T 474/04.

In case T 778/21, the board applied these general principles for assessing the alleged prior use. Steps 1 to 3 of the assessment were fulfilled. Step 4 concerned the third variant, therefore the proprietor's request for an inspection of the washing machine and for hearing the authors of the affidavits as witnesses needed to be granted. Since the alleged instance of prior use concerned a specific machine to which the proprietor had no access, the applicable standard of proof was either "beyond all reasonable doubt" (T 97/94) or that the deciding body had to be convinced with a sufficient degree of certainty (T 1138/20, T 545/08). Thus, based on the submissions and evidence on file, the board found that the opponent had substantiated that the machine of the prior use was made available to the public and had provided evidence confirming the related facts. Based on the evidence on file, all features of claim 1 were seen to be known from the prior use. Therefore, the patent proprietor's request for taking (counter) evidence (step 4, third variant) needed to be considered. A final conclusion on whether all relevant aspects of the prior use, including public availability, were proven beyond reasonable doubt, could only be drawn after considering the evidence requested to be considered by the proprietor, i.e. after inspecting the machine and hearing the witnesses. The case was remitted to first instance for further prosecution.

Abstract

In T 1311/21, concerning the public availability of the user manual E7, written by the company Sensors, Inc., the board addressed in detail the question of standard of proof.

The board noted that neither of the two standards of proof "balance of probabilities" and "beyond reasonable doubt" was to be applied exclusively and without further reflection. The board also referred to the applicable standards when both parties have access to the evidence relating to the alleged prior use (balance of probabilities) compared to cases where evidence lies within the sphere of the opponent in the sense that the proprietor has barely any or no access to the evidence (up to the hilt).

However, in certain cases, such as the present one, the board stated this binary approach to proof standards could turn out to be overly formalistic and simplistic. On the one hand, since E7 originated not from the opponent but from a third party, it could not simply be said that the evidence "lies within the sphere of the opponent". On the other hand, the arguments put forward by the patentee showed that there was an imbalance between the parties in the access to E7 and thus the possibility to establish whether E7 was part of the prior art, so that it could also not simply be said that both parties had access to this evidence.

Actually, while the board concurred with the patentee that the evidence on the question of whether E7 was part of the prior art was not in a neutral sphere of control, inter alia due to the undisputed business relationship between the opponent and Sensors, Inc., the board was of the opinion that the patentee had had opportunities to search for counter-evidence.

Since the user manual E7, whose public availability prior to the priority date of the patent was at issue, was neither within the sphere of control of the opponent nor within a neutral sphere of control to which both parties had access, the board was of the opinion that neither standard of proof was applicable. In fact, the present board agreed with the conclusions reached in the decisions T 1138/20 and T 1634/17. It therefore considered that, while the two standards of proof appearing in the jurisprudence of the boards of appeal may well be used as a yardstick in straightforward cases, what mattered, in plain language and as concluded in T 1138/20, was the deciding body's conviction on the occurrence of an alleged fact, taking into account the particular circumstances of the case and the relevant evidence before it (see Catchword 2.).

The dispute between the parties about which exact standard of proof was to be applied to the present situation could be left undecided, and the board came to the conclusion after assessment of the evidence that it was sufficiently proven that E7 had actually been made available to the public prior to the priority date of the patent. The subject-matter of claim 1 was not novel in view of document E7 (Art. 54(1) EPC).

Abstract

In T 1893/22, the proprietor-appellant had requested an enlargement of the board due to the case potentially setting a precedent regarding proper representation in proceedings established by the EPC. The board held that the case did not go beyond what might be handled by a board with an ordinary composition. Mr N, the representative of the opponent, a French company in the form initially of a SASU (société simplifiée unipersonnelle), was the President of the SASU and also a professional representative.

The proprietor had contested the admissibility of the opposition relying on the following points: (i) the opponent's professional representative could not represent the company since he was simultaneously managing the legal entity he represented; (ii) the identity of the opponent was not unequivocally determined; (iii) the opponent carrying out activities reserved to professional representatives without the necessary qualifications circumvented the principles of representation; (iv) the opponent's change of name; (v) the reference in the notice of opposition to the German translation of the claims.

Concerning the representation, the board stated that – contrary to the proprietor's allegations – Art. 133 and 134 EPC together with R. 152 EPC and the Decision of the President of the EPO of 12 July 2007 on the filing of authorisations (OJ SE 3/2007, 128) indeed constituted a complete and self-contained set of rules on representation in proceedings established by the EPC (a request in this respect to refer the question to the Enlarged Board was also submitted by the proprietor). A legal person having its seat in an EPC contracting state is not obliged to be represented by a professional representative (Art. 133(1) EPC). Furthermore, persons whose names appear on the list of professional representatives are entitled to act in all proceedings established by the EPC (Art. 134 EPC). A legal person having its seat in an EPC contracting state can act in proceedings before the EPO through its legal representatives. At the time the opposition was filed, Mr N in his capacity as President of the SASU was entitled to represent the SASU since under French law (Art. L. 227 Commercial Code) he was entitled to act on behalf of the legal person in all circumstances. Mr N as a professional representative would have been entitled to act not only as the president of the SASU, but also as a professional representative appointed by that legal person.

For the sake of completeness, the board detailed why neither the references to French law (Civil Code) nor German law, nor the reference to general principles under Art. 125 EPC could, in its view, prevent the company from appointing Mr N as its professional representative before the EPO.

Regarding the identity of the opponent, the board held that the opposition was clearly filed on behalf of SARL Cabinet NÜ (see the notice of opposition which mentioned the initial legal form of the company "SASU Cabinet NÜ"). The only uncertainty, based on the submissions of the proprietor itself, concerned whether Mr N was representing the opponent as a European patent attorney or in his capacity as the president of that company. Nonetheless, this alleged ambiguity could not raise any doubt about the identity of the opponent.

The alleged circumvention of the law was also rejected by the board, which observed first that this would occur if a person not entitled to act as a professional representative performed all the activities typically carried out by professional representatives while assuming the role of a party, in order to circumvent the prohibition on unqualified representation, but Mr N was a qualified professional representative.

As regards the change of the opponent's name, the board endorsed the analysis set out in the contested decision (Art. 15(8) RPBA). A change of legal form of the company (SASU to SARL) had taken place, which indicated a change of name and not a transfer of assets to a different entity. The use of the old legal form on the company stationery in a submission filed close to the date of change of the legal form did not undermine this. The reference to the German version of the claims did not make the respective attacks incomprehensible. In conclusion, the opposition was admissible and the request for a referral was rejected. The appeal was also dismissed.

Abstract

In T 1553/22, the application concerned the generation of pig-human chimeric animals with the aim of using them as a source of human vasculature and blood. The appellant's arguments could be summarised as follows:

The examining division's approach to chimeras was unduly restrictive and was not in line with the requirements of Art. 53(a) EPC or R. 26(1) EPC, which provided that Directive 98/44/EC of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions be used as supplementary means of interpretation for patent applications concerning biotechnological inventions. While Recital 38 of the Directive 98/44/EC referred to the exclusion of chimeras involving human totipotent cells or germ cells from patentability, the claims in suit were directed to blastocysts and methods which involved pluripotent cells. Moreover, the purpose of the invention was to provide humanised vasculature in swine, suitable for transplantation, rather than providing chimeric animals in which human cells would be found in multiple organs. Art. 53(a) EPC was to be construed narrowly. It was the intended exploitation of the invention that was to be taken into account when analysing compliance with the requirements of Art. 53(a) EPC (see T 356/93, T 866/01 and T 315/03).

The examining division had refused the application for ethical reasons pursuant to Art. 53(a) in conjunction with R. 26(1) EPC and Recital 38 of the Directive 98/44/EC. It had also concluded that, although the invention was directed to the genetic modification of animals, the exclusion under R. 28(1)(d) EPC was not applicable because the outcome of the so-called "balancing test" developed in the jurisprudence for an objection under this provision was in favour of the invention.

The board held that if an invention corresponds to one of the examples set out in the non-exhaustive list of R. 28(1) EPC, there is no room for tests aimed at balancing possible risks associated with the implementation of the invention and its benefit for mankind. Without disregarding the principle of narrow interpretation of exceptions, the board took the view that the exclusion of Art. 53(a) in conjunction with R. 28(1) EPC may extend to other chimeras, where the rationale underlying the examples identified in Recital 38 is also applicable to the chimeras concerned. Thus, by means of R. 26(1) EPC a further special case is added to the non-exhaustive list of R. 28(1) EPC.

When considering the possible rationale underlying the specific exclusions of Recital 38, the board found that the reason why the chimeras identified in Recital 38 are regarded as offensive against human dignity is due to concerns that, in chimeras including human germ cells or totipotent cells, these human cells may integrate into the brain and/or develop into germ cells and result in a chimera with human or human-like capabilities.

This reason is straightforward for chimeras including totipotent cells, which in view of their developmental capability to form an entire organism may form a brain with human-like cognitive abilities or human germ cells. However the same reason applies to the application at hand, which concerned pluripotent cells, which despite lacking the ability to differentiate into totipotent cells or cells of the placenta, nevertheless have the ability to differentiate into neural cells or germ cells. Thus, if an invention relates to a situation where human cells might integrate into the chimera's brain, potentially giving the chimera human-like cognitive or behavioural capabilities, or into its germ line, potentially giving it the ability to pass on humanised traits, the board considers that the underlying rationale of Recital 38 of the Directive would be relevant and shall be taken into account in examining compliance with Art. 53(a) in conjunction with R. 28(1) EPC.

The board stated in its catchword that human-animal chimeras and processes to produce them are excluded from patentability in accordance with Art. 53(a) EPC if the invention offends against human dignity. This is the case for instance if it is not excluded that the human cells involved in the chimera integrate into the brain and/or develop into germ cells of the chimera, and result in a chimera with human or human-like capabilities.

Abstract

In T 178/23 the appellant requested re-establishment of rights under Art. 122 EPC in relation to the non-observance of the time limits under Art. 108 EPC for filing the notice of appeal and paying the appeal fee, and for filing the statement of grounds of appeal.

As regards the admissibility of the request for re-establishment of rights, the board observed that, since the appellant had missed two different time limits, it could be argued that each of the two time limits, which expired independently of one another, had to be considered separately, notwithstanding the fact that they were triggered by the same event (see J 26/95, T 2017/12). In this case, the appellant's request for re-establishment would be inadmissible because it paid only one re-establishment fee within the two-month time limit under R. 136(1) EPC. However, there was also case law in which one fee was considered sufficient because re-establishment in respect of both periods had to be examined together and the result would inevitably be the same (see T 315/87, J 7/16, T 1823/16). In the board's view, the question of whether one or two re-establishment fees were required could be left undecided in the case in hand.

Regarding the substantiation of the request for re-establishment of rights, the board found that in the letter requesting re-establishment of rights, the appellant had not presented any core facts to make it possible for the board to consider whether the appellant had taken all due care required by the circumstances in order to comply with the time limits under Art. 108 EPC. Rather, the appellant had merely stated that it had failed to observe the time limits despite exercising all due care, without setting out any concrete facts demonstrating that it had taken all the due care required by the circumstances. The mere statement that it "could not be reasonably expected" that the drawings would be missing in the examining division's communication under R. 71(3) EPC was not sufficient in this regard. It was only with the letter of reply to the board's communication that the appellant went into more detail for the first time on possible facts regarding whether the appellant had taken all due care required by the circumstances. According to the board, the appellant had not merely adduced further evidence clarifying the facts which had already been set out in due time, but had (belatedly) attempted to make a conclusive case. Therefore, the new submissions in the letter of reply were not to be taken into account. Consequently, the request for re-establishment of rights was found inadmissible for lack of substantiation.

The board then moved on to the issue of inability to observe a time limit vis-à-vis the EPO. It noted that according to established case law the word "unable" in Art. 122(1) EPC implied an objective fact or obstacle preventing the required action, e.g. a wrong date inadvertently being entered into a monitoring system.

In the case in hand, the board could not see any objective fact or obstacle that prevented the appellant from observing the time limits under Art. 108 EPC. The facts relied on by the appellant did not relate to an error in the carrying out of a party's actual intention to meet a specific time limit, but only to an error in relation to the intention to use a legal remedy entailing a time limit. The appellant was able to file an appeal in due time but failed to do so because of a previous error as to motive, i.e. because it was unaware of the need to file an appeal to rectify the absence of the drawings in the patent specification. According to the board, this situation differed from those governed by Art. 122 EPC where a party did intend to observe a time limit but failed to do so due to objective obstacles.

Consequently, the board found that the appellant's request for re-establishment of rights was also inadmissible on the ground that the appellant was not unable to observe the time limits under Art. 108 EPC. In view of the considerations above, whether the appellant had complied with the "all due care" criterion under Art. 122(1) EPC was irrelevant. The request for re-establishment of rights was thus refused as inadmissible and the appeal was deemed not to have been filed.

Abstract

In T 2053/20 war unstreitig, dass die Beschwerdeführerin (Einsprechende) in der Beschwerdeschrift vom 18. Dezember 2020 und dem entsprechenden Begleitschreiben ihre Absicht zum Ausdruck gebracht hatte, die Beschwerdegebühr zu bezahlen. Die dafür eingeschlagenen Wege, nämlich der automatische Abbuchungsauftrag einerseits und die nicht im korrekten elektronischen Format erteilte Einzugsermächtigung vom laufenden Konto andererseits, waren unter den Bestimmungen der ab dem 1. Oktober 2019 gültigen Vorschriften über das laufende Konto (VLK 2019) und deren Anhängen zur Zahlung der Beschwerdegebühr nicht zulässig. Das automatische Abbuchungsverfahren steht nur Anmeldern, Patentinhabern und ihren Vertretern offen, nicht aber Einsprechenden (s. Nummer 1.3 der Regeln über das automatische Abbuchungsverfahren). Siehe auch Nummer 5.1.2 VLK 2019 zu zulässigen Wegen der Einreichung eines Abbuchungsauftrags. Im Ergebnis erfolgte keine Abbuchung der Beschwerdegebühr innerhalb der in Art. 108 EPÜ vorgeschriebenen Frist von zwei Monaten. Allerdings unterblieb die entsprechende in den VLK eigentlich vorgesehene Mitteilung des EPA über die Nichtausführung der Zahlungsaufforderung (Nummer 5.1.3 VLK 2019).

Nach Ansicht der Kammer, hätte eine solche Mitteilung möglicherweise zur rechtzeitigen Zahlung der Beschwerdegebühr geführt, da die entsprechende Zweimonatsfrist erst am 7. Januar 2021 endete.

Die Kammer stellte fest, dass das EPA in früheren Fällen der Beschwerdeführerin eine Zahlung von Gebühren unter Berufung auf das automatische Abbuchungsverfahren auch in Situationen kommentarlos akzeptiert und die Beschwerdegebühr vom laufenden Konto der Beschwerdeführerin abgebucht hatte, in denen diese als Einsprechende auftrat, obwohl dies nicht den geltenden Regularien entsprach. Eine entsprechende Änderung der Praxis des EPA wurde der Beschwerdeführerin auch nicht zur Kenntnis gebracht.

Die Kammer gewährte daher der Einsprechenden Vertrauensschutz. In Ermangelung einer entsprechenden Mitteilung des EPA konnte die Beschwerdeführerin unter den gegebenen Umständen davon ausgehen, dass ihre am 18. Dezember 2020 getätigten Zahlungsanweisungen zur Abbuchung der Beschwerdegebühr akzeptiert und ausgeführt worden waren. Dass dem nicht so war, erfuhr sie erst durch den Bescheid der Kammer vom 21. September 2023. Die Zahlung der Beschwerdegebühr erfolgte daraufhin innerhalb der von der Kammer gesetzten Frist.

Die Kammer kam zu dem Schluss, dass die am 18. Januar 2024 vorgenommene Zahlung der Beschwerdegebühr mit Wirkung zum 18. Dezember 2020 erfolgt war. Daher wurde die Beschwerdegebühr in der von Art. 108 EPÜ vorgesehenen Zweimonatsfrist nach Zustellung der angefochtenen Entscheidung bezahlt.

Die Beschwerde wurde daher gemäß Art. 108 EPÜ form- und fristgerecht eingelegt.