5.1.2 Amendments occasioned by a ground for opposition – Rule 80 EPC
Pursuant to R. 80 EPC (R. 57a EPC 1973) the claims of a granted patent may be amended, provided that the amendments are occasioned by a ground for opposition under Art. 100 EPC, even if that ground has not been invoked by the opponent. Prior to the introduction of R. 57a EPC 1973 (entry into force on 1 June 1995, see decision of the Administrative Council, OJ 1995, 9), it had already been clarified in the case law that the EPC did not guarantee a patent proprietor the right to have proposed amendments admitted in opposition (appeal) proceedings. Whether to allow such amendments was to be decided by the department concerned exercising due discretion. Amendments could be refused if they were neither appropriate nor necessary (see e.g. T 406/86, OJ 1989, 302). For later decisions referring to these criteria within the framework of R. 57a EPC 1973 (R. 80 EPC), see e.g. T 17/97, T 313/98, T 994/03, T 263/05, OJ 2008, 329, T 323/05, T 340/10, T 2063/15.
As underlined in T 256/19 with reference to the notes on the introduction of R. 57a EPC 1973 (notice dated 1 June 1995, OJ 1995, 409), R. 80 EPC addresses the purely substantive aspects of the proprietor's entitlement to amend the patent, and does not specify the point in time up to which amendment is allowed (on "Late submission of amendments" and in particular discretion regarding their admittance, see chapter IV.C.5.1.4 below). In the board's view, the wording of R. 80 EPC (in particular "may be amended, provided that") meant that claims may be amended if the amendments are occasioned by an opposition ground; they may not be amended otherwise. The requirement of R. 80 EPC was therefore similar to that of Art. 123(2) EPC (see in particular "may not be amended in such a way that"). Accordingly, the board considered R. 80 EPC to be a non-discretionary provision with a substantive requirement that relates to the allowability of a patent as amended rather than to admissibility (see also T 123/22).
According to T 323/05, which concerned a request to adapt the description, R. 57a EPC 1973 (R. 80 EPC) established a limit to the amendments which can be made to the patent in suit. Art. 84 EPC 1973 and R. 57a EPC 1973 were the two provisions which have to guide the patent proprietor when invited by the opposition division to adapt the description. In other words, the amendments have to be appropriate and necessary, and nothing more.
In T 750/11 the board observed that amendments under R. 80 EPC were formally admissible so long as they could be regarded as a serious attempt to overcome a ground for opposition (see also T 123/22). So an amendment further limiting the subject-matter of an independent claim complied with R. 80 EPC in formal terms. Whether it actually overcame any ground for opposition was a separate matter to be settled as part of the ensuing substantive examination. A serious attempt was acknowledged in e.g. T 1175/11 and T 1797/16. For a counter-example, see T 1833/15 (in which the amendment did not change the claimed subject-matter and so did not amount to a serious attempt). The board in T 276/20 interpreted R. 80 EPC as requiring at least a bona fide attempt to overcome a ground of opposition, i.e. where it appeared at least plausible that the amendment may well change the claim scope and thus may potentially address objections under one or more grounds for opposition.
In T 993/07 the board recalled that R. 80 EPC is lex specialis for amendments during opposition proceedings, analogous to R. 137 EPC for amendments during examination proceedings. The board interpreted the rule to mean that in opposition proceedings the proprietor's right to amend the patent, e.g. the claims as granted, is limited to making amendments in order to overcome an objection based on a ground for opposition as specified in Art. 100 EPC, thereby possibly avoiding revocation of the patent (confirmed in T 21/16 and referred to as established case law). In line with this interpretation, the board stated that opposition proceedings were not to be understood as an opportunity for the proprietor to fix any, from their perspective, shortcomings in the patent, such as an insufficient number of independent and/or dependent claims in order to define all commercially valuable embodiments. The fact that the addition of one or more independent and/or dependent claims may improve the fall-back positions in any future revocation proceedings before a national court was clearly not the scope and purpose of either R. 80 EPC or the opposition procedure (confirmed in T 1764/17). The board also observed that a limitation procedure pursuant to Art. 105a EPC was not subject to the same requirement as set out in R. 80 EPC. In T 2444/18 the board held that the adaptation to the reduced number of preceding claims resulting from other amendments was however normal practice and could not infringe R. 80 EPC since this adaptation did not result in a change of content but merely preserved the still applicable back-references. Moreover, the board noted R. 80 EPC concerns amendment(s) of a European patent, i.e. a comparison of an amended version to the granted version rather than a comparison between different amended versions.
In T 359/13 the board stated that R. 80 EPC did not place any restriction on the form of amendments a patent proprietor could (seek to) make to address objections raised (here: reformulating the product claim as a use claim). On the contrary, a proprietor was free to draft proposed amendments to the specification in any manner considered appropriate. Even in the situation considered in G 1/99 where the requirements of the principle of no reformatio in peius imposed restrictions on the manner in which the claims may be amended, an opponent as appellant had no right to prescribe the form of the amendments which the patent proprietor as respondent may make (see T 23/04). In T 123/22 the board reaffirmed the view of the board in T 359/13, adding with reference to T 750/11 that the sole basis for assessing the R. 80 EPC requirement was whether the amendment was occasioned by a ground for opposition. In assessing whether an amendment of claims within the meaning of R. 80 EPC was occasioned by a ground for opposition, it was therefore irrelevant whether the features added to an opposed claim were derived from dependent claims or from the description.
In T 1285/15 the board underlined that the very language of R. 80 EPC ("... occasioned by a ground for opposition ...") made clear that the situation at the time of the amendment needed to be considered when compliance with this provision was examined. The fact that, as in the case in hand, the claims were amended again at a later stage and that, as a consequence, the deletion of the sentence was no longer required, did not lead to the conclusion that the amendment of the description retroactively contravened R. 80 EPC. The original amendment could still be said to have been occasioned by a ground for opposition.
In T 946/16 the board found that the opponents' objection was based on a misinterpretation of R. 80 EPC. The amendments referred to in this rule were not ones made to an earlier version differing from the patent as granted. The result of interpreting R. 80 EPC that way would be incompatible with the spirit and purpose of the EPC. Among other things, it would make it impossible for the patent proprietor ever to overcome a clarity objection to an amendment which was itself in line with R. 80 EPC.
- T 1398/23
In T 1398/23 entschied die Kammer, dass die Nichtzulassung des Hilfsantrags 2 durch die Einspruchsabteilung fehlerhaft war..
Die Einspruchsabteilung hatte den Antrag als verspätet angesehen, da er nach Ablauf der Frist nach R. 116 (1) EPÜ eingereicht worden war. "Um die Fairness des Verfahrens zu garantieren", prüfte sie daher, ob die Patentinhaberin den Antrag früher hätte einreichen können. Die Einspruchsabteilung stellte ferner fest, dass Hilfsantrag 14 rechtzeitig vor der Frist gemäß R. 116 (1) EPÜ eingereicht worden war, und dass der neu eingereichte Hilfsantrag 2 fast identisch zu Hilfsantrag 14 war, mit dem Unterschied, dass die Ansprüche 6 bis 10 aufrechterhalten wurden..
Aufgrund dieser Konstellation, kam die Einspruchsabteilung zu dem Schluss, dass die Patentinhaberin keinen Grund gehabt hatte, einen neuen Antrag mit zusätzlichen Ansprüchen einzureichen. Eine Änderung der Strategie einer Partei, die unabhängig vom Verfahrensverlauf ist, sei keine gültige Begründung für ein spätes Vorbringen. Der Hilfsantrag 2 hätte spätestens kurz vor Ablauf der Frist gemäß R. 116 (1) EPÜ eingereicht werden müssen und wurde daher von der Einspruchsabteilung gemäß Art. 114 (2) EPÜ nicht ins Verfahren zugelassen.
Die Kammer kam jedoch zu dem Schluss, dass die Einspruchsabteilung die Ausgangslage unzutreffend ermittelt hatte. Maßgeblich war der Kammer zufolge, dass die Einsprechende am letzten Tag der Frist gemäß R. 116 (1) EPÜ erstmals einen Einwand unter Art. 54 (1) EPÜ in Bezug auf das Dokument D2 erhoben hatte und die Einspruchsabteilung in der mündlichen Verhandlung von ihrem Ermessen Gebrauch machte, diesen neuen Einwand zum Verfahren zuzulassen, auf dessen Basis der beanspruchte Gegenstand des Hauptantrags und des Hilfsantrags 1 dann als nicht neu angesehen wurden. Hilfsantrag 14 war hingegen eingereicht worden, bevor der Einspruchsabteilung der Einwand fehlender Neuheit im Hinblick auf D2 überhaupt bekannt war. Hilfsantrag 14 war ersichtlich ein Versuch, die davor erhobenen Einwände der Einsprechenden zu beheben bzw. der vorläufigen Meinung der Einspruchsabteilung Rechnung zu tragen. Dies bedeutet, dass Hilfsantrag 14 nicht als Reaktion auf den neuen Einwand unter Art. 54 (1) EPÜ im Hinblick auf D2 angesehen werden durfte. Entgegen der Auffassung der Einspruchsabteilung war Hilfsantrag 14 daher nicht Teil der Ausgangslage, die bei der Bestimmung der durch die Einreichung von Hilfsantrag 2 bewirkten Änderung zu berücksichtigen war.
Ausgehend davon, dass ein neuer Einwand unter Art. 54 (1) EPÜ erst am letzten Tag der Frist nach R. 116 (1) EPÜ erhoben worden war, dieser erst in der mündlichen Verhandlung durch die Einspruchsabteilung zum Verfahren zugelassen worden war und dann zur Ablehnung der Neuheit des beanspruchten Gegenstands führte, war die Einreichung eines neuen Hilfsantrags in der mündlichen Verhandlung als rechtzeitige und angemessene Reaktion zu bewerten. In diesem Falle lag die Zulassung des neuen Hilfsantrags 2 nicht im Ermessen der Einspruchsabteilung, sondern der Hilfsantrag 2 musste zugelassen werden.
Auch wenn Hilfsantrag 2 im Vergleich zu Hilfsantrag 14 nur zusätzliche Ansprüche aufweist, kann das Recht der Patentinhaberin, auf einen neuen Einwand mit einem neuen Anspruchssatz (Hilfsantrag 2) zu reagieren, nicht durch einen Anspruchssatz (Hilfsantrag 14) erschöpft werden, der sich bereits vor Einreichung des Einwands im Verfahren befand.
Da die Entscheidung der Einspruchsabteilung, den Hilfsantrag 2 nicht zuzulassen, fehlerhaft war, war die angefochtene Entscheidung aufzuheben. Die Kammer hob die angefochtene Entscheidung auf und verwies die Angelegenheit zur weiteren Entscheidung an die Einspruchsabteilung zurück (Art. 111 (1) EPC, Art. 11 VOBK).