3. Substantive examination of the appeal
3.3. Facts under examination – applying Article 114 EPC in appeal proceedings
Art. 114(1) EPC, which also applies in appeal proceedings, requires the board to establish the facts of its own motion. See J 4/85, OJ 1986, 205; T 1800/07; T 1574/11. The obligation of ex officio examination as laid down in Art. 114(1) EPC is explicitly limited in particular by Art. 114(2) EPC, i.e. the possibility of disregarding facts and evidence not submitted in due time, which is further specified by Art. 12 and 13 RPBA. Although Art. 114(1) EPC formally also covers the appeal procedure, this provision generally applies in a more restrictive manner in inter partes appeal proceedings than in opposition proceedings (see G 9/91, OJ 1993, 408 and G 10/91, OJ 1993, 420). In T 1370/15 the board noted that this meant that a board was not excluded outright from introducing new facts and evidence in inter partes proceedings. The explanatory remarks on Art. 13(1) RPBA state: "Where the Board raises an issue of its own motion under Art. 114(1) EPC, the party's right to be heard under Art. 113(1) EPC must be respected." The board stated that this sentence made it clear that, under the RPBA, a board is not prohibited from raising issues of its own motion.
As the Enlarged Board made clear in G 8/93 (OJ 1994, 887), the board's obligation under Art. 114(1) EPC 1973 existed only once proceedings were pending (see also T 690/98). Earlier, T 328/87 (OJ 1992, 701) had already ruled that the facts could be investigated only if the appeal was admissible. There were, however, limits to this obligation, for example under Art. 114(2) EPC 1973, where facts and evidence are submitted late. The same applied if an opponent (respondent) withdraws his opposition: in T 34/94 the board found that, "if in the event of withdrawal of the opposition the opponent is the respondent, the board may take into account evidence which was submitted by the opponent prior to withdrawal of the opposition. However, for reasons of procedural economy, the duty of the EPO to examine the facts of its own motion does not extend to its having to examine the submission of the opponent that a previous oral disclosure took place if the crucial facts were difficult to ascertain without his co-operation" (this confirmed the case law in T 129/88, OJ 1993, 598; T 830/90, OJ 1994, 713; T 887/90, T 420/91 and T 634/91; see also T 252/93 and T 1047/03).
In T 1574/11 the board observed that it was not restricted to the facts, evidence or arguments provided by the parties. As the primary purpose of the appeal procedure was to check that the contested decision was correct, the board was in principle entitled to consider the evidence provided therein if it deemed it to be relevant to its own decision.
T 182/89 (OJ 1991, 391) sets out what the obligation to investigate involves; Art. 114(1) EPC 1973 should not be interpreted as requiring the opposition division or board of appeal to ascertain whether there was support for grounds for opposition not properly substantiated by an opponent, but as enabling the EPO to investigate fully the grounds for opposition which were both alleged and properly substantiated pursuant to R. 55(c) EPC 1973 (see also T 441/91 and T 327/92).
The board in T 2501/11 stated in its Catchword: where prior publication of a citation has been admissibly disputed and the party bearing the burden of making the case for and proving it fails to provide a substantiated response, the board cannot treat that citation as prior art because opposition appeal proceedings are adversarial and so conducted in accordance with the adversary system of procedure, in which it is for the parties to make their cases and the boards' power to examine the facts of their own motion (Art. 114(1) EPC) is limited.
In T 862/16 the board raised, ex officio, a further objection under Art. 76(1) EPC. The appellant objected to the board's raising new issues in the appeal proceedings, arguing that new Art. 12(2) RPBA establishes the character of the appeal proceedings as a judicial review in which the parties have only very limited room for amending their case with respect to the first-instance proceedings. The board therefore should be similarly constrained from introducing new objections of its own motion. The board stated that Art. 12(2) RPBA framed the "primary object of the appeal proceedings [as being] to review the decision under appeal in a judicial manner", but mainly concerned, if at all, obligations on the parties and not the board. The board saw here no provision, or any other provision of the RPBA, which could and would restrict its power conferred by Art. 111(1) and 114(1) EPC to raise new objections of its own motion. This would, moreover, be incompatible with the spirit and purpose of the Convention (Art. 23 RPBA). Thus, provisions of the RPBA as secondary legislation according to Art. 23(4) EPC and R. 12c EPC could never take precedence over the provisions of the EPC itself. The board noted in passing that in ex parte appeal proceedings any new ground, i.e. one not examined by the first-instance department, could be invoked by a board of appeal under Art. 114(1) EPC during the appeal proceedings (cf. G 10/93, OJ 1995, 172). That the board might raise new objections, such as even a new inventive-step objection, had furthermore been confirmed by the Enlarged Board (see e.g. R 16/13). See also T 174/21.
In T 1370/15 the board stated in its Catchword that not only in ex parte, but also in inter partes appeal proceedings, a board is allowed to introduce new ex officio common general knowledge without evidence of such knowledge which prejudices maintenance of the patent, to the extent that the board is knowledgeable in the respective technical field from the experience of its members working on cases in this field.
In T 1138/20, the board recalled that the boards of appeal constitute the first and final judicial instance and thus the only judicial body to establish both facts and law in proceedings before the EPO. As such, the boards have the power, at any stage of the appeal proceedings, to establish the relevant facts of the case before them and thereby substitute the findings of fact of the departments of first instance. However, the boards have no obligation to establish de novo, facts already established by the departments of first instance (see also T 42/19). The board underlined that review of a fact-finding process should not be conflated with the review of discretionary decisions within the meaning of G 7/93. The review of findings of fact is distinct from the review of discretionary decisions, which can only be reviewed for a particular type of errors (see G 7/93, point 2.6 of the Reasons), while a review of findings of fact has no such limitation.
- T 1088/23
Dans l’affaire T 1088/23 l’intimée (titulaire du brevet) a fait valoir que la requérante (l’opposante) n'aurait, à tort, pas motivé ses attaques à l'encontre de la plupart des requêtes subsidiaires. En conséquence, les requêtes subsidiaires 5, 13 et 15 sortiraient du cadre juridique de la procédure de recours et devraient donc être acceptées sans examen dans la procédure de recours.
La chambre a observé que l'intimée n'avait pas précisé la base juridique de son argument selon lequel la chambre n'aurait pas le pouvoir de statuer sur les requêtes subsidiaires. La chambre a déclaré ne pas avoir non plus connaissance d'une telle base juridique. La chambre a ainsi rejeté l'argument selon lequel elle devrait ordonner le maintien du brevet sur la base d'une requête subsidiaire pour la simple raison que l'opposante n'avait pas formulé d'arguments. La chambre a souligné qu’au contraire, l'art. 111(1) CBE prévoit explicitement qu’elle dispose de toutes les compétences de la division d'opposition. Le fait qu'elle dispose également du pouvoir de renvoyer l'affaire à la division d'opposition n'y changeait rien. Les exigences de l'art. 101(3) CBE ne pouvaient être remplacées par une simple référence à l'absence d'objections de la part de la requérante à l'encontre de la version modifiée en question..
La chambre n’était en outre convaincue par aucune autre considération qui la priverait du pouvoir d’examiner les requêtes subsidiaires. Cet examen pourrait également être effectué d'office par elle si les circonstances le justifiaient. La chambre a expliqué que son obligation de neutralité à l'égard des parties n'était pas différente de celle qui incombe à la division d'opposition. Le rôle judiciaire de la chambre en tant que juridiction de deuxième instance ne l'empêchait pas de statuer sur des requêtes qui n'avaient pas encore été tranchées par la division d'opposition. Il était de jurisprudence constante que les parties ne pouvaient bénéficier de deux instances pour toutes les questions. Il semblait en outre incontestable que les chambres de recours statuaient régulièrement sur des requêtes subsidiaires qui n'avaient pas été tranchées par les divisions d'opposition. Si les chambres étaient tenues de renvoyer l'affaire pour toute question non tranchée, cela ouvrirait en théorie la possibilité d'un nombre pratiquement illimité de renvois aux divisions d'opposition. Selon la chambre, cela constituerait un résultat manifestement absurde, même indépendamment des dispositions de l'art. 11 RPCR, qui ne prévoient un renvoi que si des raisons particulières le justifient. Il s'ensuivait qu'une chambre de recours pourrait très bien être amenée à examiner certaines questions, agissant ainsi dans un rôle comparable à celui de l'instance de première instance de l'OEB, puisqu'elle était la première à examiner certains objets, qui n'avaient pas encore été examinés auparavant. Il n’existait donc dans ce cas pas de raison apparente pour considérer que la chambre ne disposait pas des mêmes compétences qu'une division d'opposition, y compris celle de soulever des objections d'office (art. 114(1) CBE). En outre, le comportement de la requérante ne pouvait pas non plus la contraindre à renvoyer l'affaire à la division d'opposition. La décision de renvoi relevait entièrement du pouvoir discrétionnaire des chambres de recours. La chambre a donc jugé qu'elle disposait du pouvoir d'examiner toutes les requêtes subsidiaires et que le silence de l'opposante ne pouvait à lui seul justifier le renvoi de l'affaire à la division d'opposition.
En ce qui concerne la portée de l'examen d'office des requêtes subsidiaires 2, 3, 7, 8 et 11, la chambre a rappelé que, dans sa décision G 10/91, la Grande Chambre a estimé qu'une division d'opposition était habilitée à soulever un nouveau motif d'opposition lorsqu'il existait, de prime abord, de solides raisons de croire que ces motifs étaient pertinents et qu'ils s'opposeraient en totalité ou en partie au maintien du brevet européen. La division devait, pour soulever de nouveaux motifs d'opposition, disposer d'éléments de fait dont elle avait connaissance, soit dans le cadre de la procédure, soit par les connaissances propres de ses membres. A fortiori, la division d'opposition devait également être compétente pour soulever d'office des objections sur la base de motifs d'opposition déjà invoqués dans l'acte d'opposition, en se fondant sur des faits dont elle avait connaissance au vu du dossier et de la procédure en général. La chambre a considéré qu’elle devait disposer des mêmes compétences lorsqu'elle exerçait les compétences de la division d'opposition en vertu de l'art. 111(1) CBE en tant que juridiction de première instance examinant des éléments qui n'avaient pas été examinés auparavant. En conséquence, la chambre a conclu qu'elle était compétente pour examiner la question de l'activité inventive dans le cadre des requêtes subsidiaires, du moins sur la base des faits dont elle avait connaissance à partir du dossier ou de ses propres connaissances générales. A cet égard, la chambre a renvoyé à l'affaire T 1370/15.
- T 0246/23
In T 246/23 of 11 March 2026 the board rejected the objection under Art. 24(3) EPC and refused the opponent's request for cost apportionment.
During the oral proceedings in T 246/23 of 7 August 2025, when the debate on auxiliary request 5 was opened, the board in its original composition (the "original board") had informed the parties of its preliminary view that the request contravened the principle of no reformatio in peius. The patent proprietor (respondent) had then raised an objection of suspected partiality against all board members, arguing that an objection based on this principle could only be raised by another party, not by the board. It submitted that, since the board had raised the objection ex officio, it was "on the side" of the opponent (appellant) and thus suspected to be partial. The original board had found the objection admissible and the composition of the board was changed for the purposes of a decision on the objection under Art. 24(3) EPC (the board in its new composition in the following referred to as "the board").
The board noted that, on the substance of the objection, the respondent relied on two core arguments, neither of which was convincing: (1) that the specific nature of the prohibition of reformatio in peius prevented the board from raising it ex officio, and (2) that established case law supported this view.
On (1), the board stated that the prohibition of reformatio in peius is not so exceptional as to completely escape the board's powers under Art. 114 EPC. It noted that any objection raised by the board ex officio in an inter-partes procedure can be perceived as being in a certain contradiction with the board's obligation to remain neutral towards the parties. However, if the parties were free to raise the objection of suspicion of partiality in all cases where a board exercises its powers under Art. 114 EPC, such powers would be effectively eliminated. The board also rejected the argument that raising the prohibition ex officio contradicts the principle of party disposition. This principle concerned the substantive outcome of proceedings, i.e. the scope of the legal effects sought, and did not extend to the legal arguments raised by either the parties or the court for achieving the requested legal effects. In the present case, the opponent requested the revocation of the patent, and the original board's finding that auxiliary request 5 was not allowable, for whatever reason, was clearly within the scope of the appellant's appeal request for revocation.
On (2), the board pointed out that there was no settled case law forbidding the board from raising the objection ex officio. It added that this could not even be derived from cited decision T 1544/07. In its view, T 1544/07 only found that the deciding board had no obligation to raise the objection under the special circumstances of that case, where the opponent itself had explicitly waived the right to raise it. The decision did not state that a board is prevented from raising the objection ex officio as a question of principle. Rather, it appeared to suggest that a board may, but need not, raise it where the affected party renounces this defence. A far stricter position was taken in T 882/17, cited by the opponent, where the deciding board disagreed with T 1544/07 and unambiguously stated that the board not just may, but must take the prohibition into account, and also ex officio. This decision was followed by other decisions (T 1773/22, T 1472/21).
The board explained that, to decide the issue before it (i.e. the objection of suspected partiality) it was sufficient to establish that, contrary to the proprietor's argument, case law was far from settled. The mere existence of another line of case law, T 882/17, recognising the board's entitlement to raise the prohibition objection, was sufficient to establish that the original board could not be considered partial solely for raising the objection. According to the board, a board of appeal is always entitled and in fact obliged to examine the boundaries of its own powers to raise an ex officio objection. If necessary, it is also entitled to question findings of previous decisions on the same issue. The original board was under no obligation to seek the proprietor's permission or to maintain the objection only contingent on the opponent's intention to pursue it.
The board concluded that the objection under Art. 24(3) EPC was unsubstantiated. It also refused the opponent's request for cost apportionment, noting that it could not qualify the procedural conduct of the proprietor as an abuse of procedure.