B. Right to be heard

Die mündliche Verhandlung vor der Kammer in T 77/23 fand in Abwesenheit der Beschwerdegegnerin (Patentinhaberin) statt. Vor der mündlichen Verhandlung hatte sie schriftlich hilfsweise beantragt, die Angelegenheit zur Behandlung der Hilfsanträge 2, 4 und 6 bis 8 an die Einspruchsabteilung zurückzuverweisen. Weiter hilfsweise hatte sie beantragt, das Patent in geänderter Fassung auf der Grundlage der Ansprüche eines der Hilfsanträge 1 bis 8 aufrechtzuerhalten.

Die Kammer beschloss, die Angelegenheit aus verfahrensökonomischen Gründen nicht an die erste Instanz zurückzuverweisen. Sie hatte zwar in ihrer Mitteilung gemäß Art. 15 (1) VOBK zur Zurückverweisung der Angelegenheit auf Basis der Hilfsanträge 2, 4 und 6 bis 8 an die erste Instanz nicht explizit Stellung genommen. Dennoch sah sie trotz Abwesenheit der Beschwerdegegnerin in der mündlichen Verhandlung das rechtliche Gehör der Beschwerdegegnerin aus den im Folgenden dargelegten Gründen hierzu für gewahrt an.

Die Kammer hatte in ihrer Mitteilung zu allen Hilfsanträgen Stellung genommen. Der Kammer zufolge wäre es unangemessen, zu den Hilfsanträgen Stellung zu nehmen, und dann die Angelegenheit zurückzuverweisen, da die Kammer mit ihrer vorläufigen Meinung die Einspruchsabteilung beeinflussen würde. Somit musste die Beschwerdegegnerin davon ausgehen, dass die Kammer ihrem Antrag auf Zurückverweisung an die erste Instanz nicht nachkommen würde..

Darüber hinaus hatte die Beschwerdegegnerin durch das Fernbleiben von der mündlichen Verhandlung von sich aus auf ihr rechtliches Gehör in dieser Hinsicht verzichtet. Der Kammer zufolge sollte somit die Beschwerdegegnerin von der getroffenen Entscheidung (keine Zurückverweisung) weder überrascht sein, noch ist ihr rechtliches Gehör diesbezüglich verletzt.

Zum weiteren hilfsweise gestellten Antrag der Beschwerdegegnerin, das Patent in geänderter Fassung aufrechtzuerhalten, stellte die Kammer fest, dass jeweils Anspruch 1 der Hilfsanträge 1-8 nicht neu gegenüber der Lehre des Dokuments E1 ist. Der Kammer war bewusst, dass der Einwand mangelnder Neuheit des Anspruchs 1 des Hilfsantrags 8 gegenüber dem Dokument E1 erstmalig in der mündlichen Verhandlung vor der Kammer erhoben wurde. Die Kammer konnte jedoch aus den im Folgenden erläuterten Gründen keine Verletzung des rechtlichen Gehörs der in der mündlichen Verhandlung abwesenden Beschwerdegegnerin erkennen.

Der schriftliche Vortrag beider Parteien zum Hilfsantrag 8 war im schriftlichen Beschwerdeverfahren kurz gehalten worden. Folglich musste die Beschwerdegegnerin damit rechnen, dass eine bis dato nicht erfolgte ausführliche Diskussion zur Neuheit und erfinderischen Tätigkeit erstmalig in der mündlichen Verhandlung geführt werden würde. Darüber hinaus hatte die Kammer in der Mitteilung gemäß Art. 15 (1) VOBK vorgetragen, dass sie die höherrangigen Hilfsanträge 1 bis 7 wegen mangelnder Neuheit gegenüber dem Dokument E1 für nicht gewährbar erachtet. Da Anspruch 1 des Hilfsantrags 8 auf Anspruch 1 des Hilfsantrags 6 basiert, musste die Beschwerdegegnerin der Kammer zufolge damit rechnen, dass, falls Hilfsantrag 8 in der mündlichen Verhandlung behandelt wird, bei der Neuheitsprüfung auch der Unterschied zum Dokument E1 herausgearbeitet werden würde. Somit kann es für die Beschwerdegegnerin nicht überraschend sein, dass der entsprechende Angriff erstmalig in der mündlichen Verhandlung vor der Kammer diskutiert wurde. Nach Ansicht der Kammer ergab sich dies aus einer logischen Fortführung der Prüfung geänderter Ansprüche auf ihre Gewährbarkeit.

Die Kammer betonte, dass eine erstmalige Beurteilung in der mündlichen Verhandlung der Neuheit oder erfinderischen Tätigkeit des beanspruchten Gegenstands gegenüber den im Verfahren diskutierten Druckschriften, welche allerdings nur zu höherrangigen Anträgen diskutiert worden waren, somit eine der mündlichen Verhandlung fernbleibende Partei nicht überraschen kann.

Darüber hinaus kam die Kammer zum Schluss, dass es nicht möglich sein sollte, dass die Beschwerdegegnerin durch ihre Abwesenheit den Umfang möglicher Einwände wesentlich vorgibt und durch ihr Fernbleiben mögliche Einwände exklusiv auf die des schriftlichen Verfahrens beschränkt. Wäre dies zutreffend, könnte die abwesende Partei wesentlich den Verlauf der mündlichen Verhandlung mitbestimmen, sodass der eigentliche Sinn einer mündlichen Verhandlung durch die Abwesenheit einer Partei ad absurdum geführt werden könnte.

In R 11/23 the petition was based on Art. 112a(2)(c) EPC, i.e. the fundamental violation of Art. 113(1) EPC. It was alleged that the clarity objection against auxiliary request 8, which had led to the board's finding that said request had been unallowable, had never been discussed, neither in the written nor in the oral proceedings, but had been brought forward only in the board's written decision..

Specifically, the petitioner argued that there had been two distinct clarity objections against claim 1 of auxiliary request 8: the alleged lack of clarity regarding what "maintaining currents in an allowable range" meant (the "allowable current range objection") and the alleged lack of information on which components were to be protected by the protective circuit (the "unspecified components objection"). The petitioner acknowledged that it had been heard in the context of the "allowable current range objection" but it asserted that it had been confronted with the "unspecified components objection" only when reading the written decision.

The Enlarged Board held that it did not see any clear indication that the "unspecified components objection" had been raised implicitly, for example as an aspect of an overarching clarity objection..

The Enlarged Board agreed with the petitioner in that it was not sufficient for a relevant specific aspect such as the "unspecified components" to be covered or encompassed by a broader clarity objection that had been discussed if the parties had not been aware of the specific aspect during the discussion. In this context, opponent 2 had referred to paragraph [0018] of the patent which had been mentioned in point 7.4 of the decision under review. The Enlarged Board could not see that such a reference implied that the "unspecified components objection" had been discussed. Furthermore, it did not regard the wording of point 7.5 of said decision as evidence that the "unspecified components objection" had been discussed, because it was not clear whether the phrase "as the appellants and the infringer [sic] correctly argue" was linked to the "unspecified components objection".

According to the Enlarged Board, since it had no power or ability to investigate further whether other facts or indications might suggest that the petitioner could be aware that the board had had doubts about the specific aspect of clarity (namely, the "unspecified component" issue), it had to rely on the parties' submissions in this respect. In the absence of any such indication, it was not for the party alleging a breach of its right to be heard to prove that there had been no such facts or indications (see R 15/11). Any doubts remaining on whether a decision under review was based upon facts and considerations on which the parties had had an opportunity to comment must be solved to the affected party's benefit (see R 2/14).

For these reasons, the Enlarged Board concluded that the "unspecified components objection" had not been discussed during appeal proceedings and its use in the written decision had therefore come as a surprise to the petitioner.

As in the appeal case underlying R 2/14, a broader objection had been discussed during appeal proceedings in the present case but not the specific aspect encompassed by the broader objection that turned out to be decisive for the case. In such cases, the "grounds" as referred to in Art. 113(1) EPC may have a more specific meaning than a broader objection like "lack of clarity" or "insufficiency of disclosure". In the present case, it was irrelevant that the broader clarity objection had been discussed. The critical aspect, namely the question of which components needed to be protected, had not been discussed during the appeal proceedings and the board's conclusion on this aspect had come as a surprise to the petitioner.

The "unspecified components objection" which had not been discussed during the appeal proceedings eventually was the reason for the board's finding that the patent was invalid. The Enlarged Board concluded that a fundamental violation of Art. 113(1) EPC had occurred. The decision under review was thus set aside and the proceedings before a board reopened..

On the latter, the Enlarged Board, referring to Art. 112a(5) and R. 108(3) EPC, explained that the board responsible for the reopened proceedings was not automatically the board which had issued the decision underlying the review proceedings. Rather, the allocation of the reopened proceedings had to be determined in accordance with the business distribution scheme as applicable when the proceedings were reopened.

In the proceedings leading to the decision under appeal in T 1588/22, the examining division had issued a communication on 27 July 2021. The last paragraph of the communication had read as follows: "The applicant may choose to amend the claim set as previously proposed by the examining division (see the text intended for grant dated 01.06.2021) and thereby lead to the grant of the present application. They may also choose to submit further arguments along with a new claim set satisfying the requirements of EPC. In the latter case the applicant is kindly reminded that the examination procedure would continue with oral proceedings for the sake of efficiency and better communication." On 6 November 2021 the applicant (appellant) had filed a reply to the communication and a new set of claims. On 24 November 2021, the applicant had filed a new set of claims identical to the set of claims filed on 6 November 2021. Upon an enquiry by the applicant as to when the EPO would deliver the next communication, the examining division had issued on 7 December 2021 a communication and stated that it would issue a communication within two months. On 5 January 2022, the examining division issued a decision refusing the application based on the claims filed on 24 November 2021.

The board recalled that in line with the established case law of the boards, the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations applied in proceedings pursuant to the EPC. Its application to procedures before the EPO implied that measures taken by the EPO should not violate the reasonable expectations of parties to such proceedings (G 2/97). It required that communications addressed to applicants be clear and unambiguous, i.e. drafted in such a way as to rule out misunderstandings on the part of a reasonable addressee (J 3/24).

According to the board the examining division's announcement in its communication of 27 July 2021, that the appellant "may also choose to submit further arguments along with a new claim set satisfying the requirements of EPC. In the latter case the applicant is kindly reminded that the examination procedure would continue with oral proceedings for the sake of efficiency and better communication" appeared nonsensical or at least misleading in the given circumstances. The only way for the appellant to make sense of this statement was to assume that it referred to a situation where a new claim set was filed that would not meet the requirements of the EPC, in which case the proceedings would be continued with the holding of oral proceedings. This created the legitimate expectation on the appellant's part that, after having filed a new set of claims on 6 November 2021 (refiled on 24 November 2021), these would either be found allowable or oral proceedings would be held and that, in the latter case, the appellant would have the opportunity to provide, during the oral proceedings, submissions on the allowability of this set of claims. The appellant could not have expected as the next action of the examining division that a decision refusing the patent application would be issued. According to the board, this was exacerbated by the communication of 7 December 2021 informing that the examining division would "supply a communication within 2 months".

The board inferred from these events that instant issuance of the decision refusing the application had been a surprise for the appellant. Thus, the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations had not been observed in the case at hand.

The board concluded that in view of the legitimate expectations created by the examining division, the appellant had had to assume that she would be given a further opportunity to provide counterarguments or submit amendments prior to any decision to refuse her application. The board held that the issuance of the decision refusing the patent application without holding oral proceedings or issuing a further communication as announced had thus had the effect of depriving the appellant of any such further possibility to provide comments. Consequently, the appellant's right to be heard had been violated (Art. 113(1) EPC). The examining division's decision to refuse the application thus constituted a substantial procedural violation.

The board decided to set aside the appealed decision and to remit the case to the examining division for further prosecution. Furthermore, it considered reimbursement of the appeal fee under R. 103(1)(a) EPC equitable.