2. Filing and admissibility requirements

In T 1469/24, the appellant-proprietor contested the admissibility of the opposition, arguing that the opponent had not been correctly identified, so that the requirements of Art. 99(1) and R. 76(2) EPC were not met. They argued that the opponent, Mr N.N., was the representative of one of the subsidiaries of the group of companies against which the proprietor had initiated infringement proceedings before the UPC, and which, in turn, had initiated a central revocation action against the contested patent at the UPC in reaction to the infringement proceedings. Mr N.N. had therefore not been the real opponent, but had acted as a straw man for the group. The real opponent thus avoided being identified as the party challenging the patent. This was a misuse of the opposition procedure, which was intended to allow genuine opponents to challenge patents in a transparent manner. Consequently, the use of a straw man in this case was a clear attempt to circumvent the law by abuse of due process. In addition, according to the proprietor, the straw man, being a patent attorney, did not have a legitimate interest in the outcome of the opposition proceedings.

The board observed that, in an opposition in which the person named as opponent is acting on behalf of a third party, decision G 3/97 identifies two cases where the law is circumvented by abuse of process: 1) if the opponent is acting on behalf of the proprietor, 2) if the opponent is acting on behalf of a client in the context of activities which, taken as a whole, are typically associated with professional representatives, without possessing the relevant qualifications required by Art. 134 EPC. The board found that neither of these cases applied here..

The board indicated it was aware that these two cases did not constitute an exhaustive list. Nevertheless, G 3/97 sets out some further considerations as to what is not considered a circumvention of the law by abuse of process. For instance, in point 3.2.1 of the Reasons, the Enlarged Board stated that "Though the patent proprietor may have an economic interest in finding out who is trying to attack his patent, such an interest is not legally protected by the legislative arrangements for the opposition procedure". In the present case, even if the group of companies involved in the infringement action had actually avoided being identified, this would not have constituted an attempt to circumvent the law by abuse of due process within the meaning of decision G 3/97..

Moreover, the board recalled the Enlarged Board’s observation in G 3/97 that since the EPC legislator explicitly designed the opposition procedure as a legal remedy in the public interest, which is open to any person, it cannot be required that the opponent has an interest in the revocation of the patent. Consequently, the board held that it was irrelevant in the present case whether the opponent Mr N.N. had a genuine personal interest in the outcome of the opposition proceedings.

The board found that, while G 3/97 and G 4/97 may not explicitly state that any opposition by a straw man is admissible, they essentially conclude that an opposition filed by a straw man on behalf of an anonymous party is not objectionable merely because the opponent is acting as a straw man. In particular, the Enlarged Board held that an abuse of process needs not be assumed in those cases where the third party instructing the presumed straw man could have filed an opposition itself. The board recalled that G 3/97 and G 4/97 do not state that the opposition division would be required to investigate ex officio whether any of the identified situations that could be considered an abuse of process might be present and concealed by the formally named opponent. On the contrary, the burden of proof is borne by the person alleging that the opposition is inadmissible. The board did not see any such evidence in the file.

The board concluded that the requirements of Art. 99(1) and R. 76(2) EPC were met and that the appeal must be dismissed.

In T 1403/24 the appellant (patent proprietor) contested the admissibility of the opposition filed by opponent 2. It argued that opponent 2 was acting on behalf of opponent 1 or opponent 3. In the appellant’s view, this followed from the citation of document D24 in the notice of opposition by opponent 2, because D24 concerned the non-public infringement complaint by the patent proprietor against opponent 1 and opponent 3 in Germany. Moreover, opponent 2 had previously represented a member of the same company group to which opponent 1 belonged in the opposition against the parent patent. Furthermore, the notices of opposition filed on the same day by opponent 2 and opponent 3 included large sections of identical language. As explained in T 9/00, it would be an abuse of procedure for one opponent to file two oppositions. Therefore, according to the appellant, the filing of the opposition by opponent 2 on behalf of opponent 1 or opponent 3 represented an attempt to circumvent the law, which was in view of the considerations in G 3/97 and G 4/97 not admissible.

The board observed that in contrast to the situation in T 9/00, opponent 2 was a distinct legal person from opponent 1 and opponent 3. According to decisions G 3/97 and G 4/97, an opposition filed on behalf of a third party was inadmissible if the involvement of the opponent was to be regarded as circumventing the law by abuse of process, in particular if the opponent was acting on behalf of the patent proprietor or on behalf of a client without possessing the relevant qualifications required by Art. 134 EPC. The decisions G 3/97 and G 4/97 explicitly concluded that a circumvention of the law by abuse of process did not arise purely because a professional representative was acting in its own name on behalf of a client and that the burden of proof regarding the circumvention of the law by abuse of process was to be borne by the party alleging that the opposition was inadmissible.

The board held that, given the shared interest among opponents in revoking the patent, it was not uncommon for them to exchange documents and coordinate their submissions during opposition proceedings. Therefore, the citation of document D24 by opponent 2, and the presence of similar or identical passages in the notices of opposition filed by opponents 2 and 3, did not establish that opponent 2 acted on behalf of opponent 1 or opponent 3. The appellant had thus not provided convincing evidence that the opposition filed in the name of opponent 2 was filed on behalf of opponent 1 or opponent 3 to circumvent the law by abuse of process. Accordingly, the board confirmed the admissibility of the opposition filed by opponent 2.

In T 412/24 the appellant (patent proprietor) had contested the admissibility of the (first) opposition relying on the following points concerning the (first) opponent: (i) the opponent's professional representative could not represent the company since he was simultaneously managing the legal entity he represented; (ii) the identity of the opponent could not be unequivocally determined; (iii) the opponent could not act as such because carrying out activities reserved to professional representatives without the necessary qualifications circumvented the principles of representation; and (iv) the opponent's change of name affected the admissibility of the opposition.

Concerning the representation, Mr N, the representative of the (first) opponent, a French company in the form initially of a société simplifiée unipersonnelle (SASU) then of a société à responsabilité limitée (SARL), was the president of the SASU and also a professional representative.

The board stated that – contrary to the proprietor’s allegations – Art. 133 and 134 EPC together with R. 152 EPC and the Decision of the President of the EPO of 12 July 2007 on the filing of authorisations (OJ SE 3/2007, 128) constituted a complete and self-contained set of rules on representation in proceedings established by the EPC. A legal person having its seat in an EPC contracting state is not obliged to be represented by a professional representative (Art. 133(1) EPC). Furthermore, persons whose names appear on the list of professional representatives are entitled to act in all proceedings established by the EPC (Art. 134 EPC). A legal person having its seat in an EPC contracting state can act in proceedings before the EPO through its legal representatives. At the time the opposition was filed, Mr N in his capacity as president of the SASU was entitled to represent the SASU since under French law (Art. L. 227 Commercial Code) he was entitled to act on behalf of the legal person in all circumstances. As a professional representative, Mr N would have been entitled to act not only as the president of the SASU, but also as a professional representative appointed by that legal person.

For the sake of completeness, the board explained why neither the references to French and German law, nor the reference to general principles under Art. 125 EPC could lead to the conclusion that the company was prevented from appointing Mr N as its professional representative before the EPO. At the oral proceedings before the board, the appellant referred to the order of UPC_CoA_563/2024. The board noted that the conclusion in that case rested on the specific provisions of the UPCA, in particular Art. 48(1) UPCA (mirroring Art. 19 of the Statute of the CJEU) and R. 8(1) UPCA, which require that both natural and legal persons be represented. The CJEU had identified as one of the objectives of mandatory representation in CJEU proceedings ensuring that the representative of a legal person is sufficiently distant from the party represented (C-515/17 P and C-561/17 P). According to the board, however, even if this were regarded as a general principle of the EPC contracting states, it could not be transposed to the EPC framework. Principles of procedural law under Art. 125 EPC may be invoked to fill gaps, but not to modify the EPC framework. Introducing a corollary of the prohibition of self-representation into a system that expressly allows it would however amount to such a modification.

On the identity of the opponent, the board held that the opposition was clearly filed on behalf of SARL Cabinet NÜ. The only uncertainty, based on the submissions of the proprietor itself, concerned whether Mr N was representing the opponent as a European patent attorney or in his capacity as the president of that company. Nonetheless, this alleged ambiguity could not raise any doubt about the identity of the opponent. As regards the change of the opponent’s name, the board observed that there had been no change of the identity of the opponent.

The alleged circumvention of the law was also rejected. The board noted that this would occur if a person not entitled to act as a professional representative performed all the activities typically carried out by professional representatives while assuming the role of a party, in order to circumvent the prohibition on unqualified representation, but Mr N was a qualified professional representative.

In line with T 1893/22, which related to the earlier application, the board concluded that the (first) opposition was admissible. The appeal was dismissed.

In T 1065/23, claim 10 of the first auxiliary request, which became the main request, defined a pea protein extract obtainable by the method of claims 1 to 9..

The board noted that the method of claim 1 was characterised by a step in which a precipitated pea protein contained in a slurry having a pH of 4.0 to 5.8 was subjected to a specific heat treatment. As shown in Examples 2 and 3 of the opposed patent, pea protein extracts subjected to this step had a significantly lower nitrogen solubility index, gel strength and viscosity than those which were heated at a different pH or were kept at the claimed pH but were not subjected to the claimed heating step. Moreover, Examples 4 and 5 showed that protein extracts obtained by the claimed method, which had these physicochemical properties, had better wine-fining and baking properties. For example, they allowed a reduction of the water content in the dough used to prepare biscuits, while preserving or even improving sensory properties.

Opponent 2 argued among other things that claim 10 had to be rejected because its product-by-process format was, as such, not allowable. The claimed product could be described by specific features defining e.g. its properties. Citing decision T 150/82 and section F-IV, 4.12 of the Guidelines, opponent 2 submitted that the product-by-process format could only be used if it was impossible to claim/define the product other than in terms of a process of manufacture. It argued that, assuming that the product obtainable by the method of claim 1 had low solubility, gel strength and viscosity, these parameters could and should have been used to define that product. Hence, the criteria for drafting a product-by-process claim were not fulfilled, and claim 10 should not be allowed.

The board did not agree with these conclusions. It held that the mere fact that claim 10 was drafted as a product-by-process, despite the fact that the claimed product could be satisfactorily defined by reference to its composition, structure or other testable parameter, is not a ground for opposition set out in Art. 100 EPC. The issue could be, at most, one of a lack of clarity. Section F-IV, 4.12 of the Guidelines mentioned by opponent 2 indeed related to the requirement of clarity. Furthermore, decision T 150/82 related to an appeal against the refusal of a patent application and not to an appeal concerning an opposition filed against a granted patent. Consequently, this decision was not applicable.

For these reasons, the board held that considering that claim 10 was a granted claim, its format could not be objected to on the ground that it was drafted in the product-by-process format or that it lacked clarity (G 3/14).