J 0006/22 (Limits to oral proceedings on request) 26-07-2023

Re-establishment into the time limit for the statement of grounds of appeal

1. A party can be reinstated with regard to a time limit to be observed vis-à-vis the EPO (here: the time limits for filing a statement of grounds of appeal and paying a renewal fee plus the additional fee before the Examining Division) if they were unable to ob­serve the time limit despite all due care requi­red by the circumstances having been ta­ken (Article 122(1) EPC).

2. The request for re-establishment must be filed wit­hin two months of the remo­val of the cause of non-compliance with the time li­mit (Rule 136(1) EPC), i.e. normally from the date on which the person res­ponsible for the application be­comes aware of the omis­sion (Case Law of the Boards of Appeal, 10**(th) edn. 2022 (Case Law), III.E.4, see J 27/90 OJ EPO 1993, 422). Pursuant to Article 122(2) and Rule 136(2) EPC, the request for re-establishment must set out - in a sufficiently substantiated fashion to make a conclusive case (see J 15/10, Reasons 3.2) - the grounds on which it is based, the facts on which it relies and the precise cause of non-compliance with the time limit concerned, and it must specify at what time and under which circumstances the cause occurred and when it was removed. A request which relies on general statements only and contains no specific facts does not satisfy the requirements for due substantiation (Case Law, III.E.4.4, e.g. J 19/05, Reasons 4). However, it may suffice if such facts are only given in a document submitted alongside the request where both can be read together (see T 287/84, OJ EPO 1985, 333; T 585/08, Reasons 9).

3. Exercising all due care required by the circumstances rests not only with an applicant but with all persons acting on their behalf (Ca­se Law, III.E.5.5). An applicant's profes­si­onal repre­sen­ta­tive is likewise under the obligation to exercise all due care, as is any intermediary (agent) bet­ween an ap­plicant and a repre­sentative (Case Law, III.E.5.5.2. et seq., see e.g. J 3/08, Reasons 4; T 742/11, Reasons 12 f). The acts of all these per­sons are ultimately attributed to the applicant (Case Law, III.E.5.5; see e.g. T 1897/17, Reasons 2).

4. In assessing whether all due care required was taken, the circumstances of each case must be considered as a whole (see e.g. T 287/84, OJ EPO 1985, 333, Reasons 2; J 14/16, Reasons 3.2; T 1214/20, Reasons 2; J 14/21, Reasons 24). All due care is considered to have been exercised if non-compliance with a time limit results either from exceptional circumstances or from an isolated mistake within a normally satisfactory monitoring system (Case Law, III.E.5.2. and 5.4.).

5. Sudden, serious illness and severe psychological distress may, under certain circumstances, count for exceptional circumstances (Case Law, III.E.5.3.5). However, it also requires all due care in making provisions for cases of such illnesses and other staff absences (Case Law, III.E.5.4.5; J 14/21, Reasons 26). J 41/92, OJ EPO 1995, 93, Reasons 4.4, for example, held that if there was no substitute or assistant at a representative's office, observance of time limits might, for example, be sought through co-operation with colleagues. In T 387/11, the representative, who ran a one-person office, had taken precautions to ensure that another representative could cover for absences owing to illness so that deadlines would normally be met. In T 677/02, a large enterprise was found to have not exercised all due care required by the circumstances because no deputy had been designated to cross-check the input of time limits into the system for monitoring time limits when the representative actually responsible was on short-time working.

6. In the case at hand, the appellant merely brought forward that "the all due care ground for the non-timely filing of the grounds of appeal is as follows: "[medical condition] of K", his professional European representative. This was complemented by K's declaration, essentially outlining that "in the period from April 27, 2022 to end of June 2022 [they] began to suffer from a [medical condition] which grew weeks after weeks and [they were] the sole attorney in [their] office in W empowered to act before the EPO. ... [they] failed to inform the applicant about the obligation to file grounds of appeal and [they] involuntarily disregarded the automatic reminders that [they] received concerning the deadline of June 26, 2022 for filing the grounds of appeal". Sick leave certificates for K were also submitted, merely stating their inability to work from 24 August to 28 September 2022, without giving any further details.

7. In line with the jurisprudence of the boards, as cited above (see, in particular, T 287/84, OJ EPO 1985, 333), the reference to a declaration like K's might suffice for the request for re-establishment to be properly substantiated if the necessary facts and reasons are given in that declaration. However, in the current declaration - as well as in the request for re-establishment itself - no reasons can be found as to why K would not have been in a position throughout the whole two-month time limit for the subsequent filing of the grounds of appeal to take any action, despite their own submission that their medical condition was growing (only) "weeks after weeks". No reasons are further given on how far-reaching this condition was or what actions might have become impossible for K and when. The medical certificates also lay out no conclusive details as to what had become impossible for K and when. Moreover, they cover a period completely different (August to September 2022) from the one in question (April to June 2022).

8. Lastly and most importantly, nothing is said about a system of staff substitution that should have kicked in in case of K's inability to act. If K was the only European patent attorney in the W office entitled to act on the appellant's behalf, provisions would have had to be made to provide for substitution from outside the office. Notably, the W office where K was based is part of a large IP consulting group operating worldwide, and they should have provided a backup for their W office. The current request for re-establishment now being pursued by their colleagues in the sister office in M at least shows that such a substitution would have been feasible, and no reasons to the contrary are given.

9. Thus, on the basis of the appellant's own sub­missions and factual assertions alone, it cannot be said that all due care had been taken as required by the circum­stances.

10. Absent any kind of provisions for K's substitution, the request for re-establishment into the time limit for the grounds of appeal must fail for this reason alone. Thus, there is neither room nor need to look further into the appellant's behaviour, while also no reasons have been given as to why his illness had prevented him from taking action to compensate for the lack of due care taken by his representative.

Appeal against the impugned decision of the Examining Division

11. As a consequence, the grounds of appeal were late filed on 12 September 2022. In accor­dance with Rule 127(2) EPC in the currently applicable version (with the "10-day notification rule" still in place), the Examining Division's decision was deemed to be delivered on 26 February 2022, and the four-month time limit for the grounds of appeal (Article 108 EPC) expired on 27 June 2022, a Monday and regular working day of the EPO.

Thus, the appeal is to be rejected as inadmissible (Rule 101(1) EPC in conjunction with Article 108 EPC).

12. For the sake of completeness, the appeal - as directed against the Examining Division's decision to reject, inter alia, the request for re-establishment into the time limit for the seventh renewal fee plus the additional fee - would also not have been successful on the merits. In his argument, the appellant, in some detail, only deals with his own and his European professional representatives' behaviour, claiming that all parties had exercised all due care for the payment of the fees in question. Thus, he overlooks that all acts of his "US agent" F, as an intermediary between him and the European professional representatives, tasked "to supervise the procedure and communicate with the agent empowered to act before the EPO", are also fully attributed to him (see again T 742/11, Reasons 12 f). No reasons have been given to conclude that F had exercised all due care. To the contrary, from the appellant's own arguments, it is apparent that F - by not monitoring the time limits properly, not proactively reaching out to the appellant, not responding to a large number of emails and not making provisions for staff losses - did not exercise all due care. For these reasons alone, there would also have been no need to look further into the appellant's own or his European professional repre­sentatives' behaviour.

Decision in written procedure

13. The decision that the request for re-establishment and the appeal be rejected as inadmissible is handed down without the oral proceedings re­ques­ted by the appellant in his 2**(nd) request for re-establishment.

14. As outlined above, a request for re-establishment must sub­stantiate the grounds and facts within the time limit of Rule 136(1) EPC (see also Article 114(2) EPC). Thus, the factual basis for the requested decision is not altered after the expiry of the time limit for the request (Case Law, III.E.4.4, see J 19/05, Reasons 4, 5; T 585/08, Reasons 9; T 479/10, Reasons 2.1; J 15/10, Reasons 3.2).

15. This requirement for immediate and complete substantiation of the request corresponds to the principle of "Eventu­almaxime" or "Häufungs­grundsatz" in contracting states with a Ger­­man law tradition ("le principe de la con­centration des moyens" in France), under which the request must state all grounds for re-establishment and means of evidence without the possibility of submitting these at a later stage (see e.g. Anders/Gehle, ZPO, 81**(st) edn. 2023, Grdz. II vor § 253 4.; Deixler-Hübner in Fasching/Konecny, Zivilprozessgesetze, 3**(rd) edn. 2017, II/2 § 149 ZPO; Gitschthaler in Rechberger, ZPO, 5**(th) edn., §§ 148 f 2; Article 1355 du code civil, Cass. ass. plén., 7 juillet 2006, n° 04-10.672).

16. On­ly if this requirement for immediate and complete substantiation within the time limit has been fulfilled might it be per­missible to complement the facts and evidence in later sub­­­mis­sions, provided that they do not extend be­yond the framework of the previous submissions (see J 5/94, Reasons 2.3; J 19/05, Reasons 5; T 585/08, Reasons 9; J 15/10, Reasons 3.1; see also J 8/95, Reasons 3; T 324/90, Reasons 5).

17. As outlined above, this is not the case here for either of the two requests for re-establish­ment in these proceedings. In particular, in the 2**(nd) request for re-establishment into the time limit for the grounds of appeal, no factual assertions were made at least on the provision of staff-substitution measures in the case of illnesses such as K's.

There was thus, within the time limit of Rule 136(1) EPC, no immediate and complete substantiation of the grounds and facts that would have been necessary for re-establishment. From the outset, the request for re-establish­ment into the time limit for the grounds of appeal thus had to fail. The appellant could also not complement his fac­tual assertions before the Board at a later point.

There is also no evidence that would have to be looked into and no (further) facts that would have to be established on the basis of the appellant's factual assertions. Even assuming all factual assertions are true, they do not suffice for re-establishment.

18. As a consequence, no further procedural steps are permissible, notably no further communication by the Board and no appointment of oral proceedings. Neither would serve any legitimate purpose.

19. It is not the purpose of oral proceedings in the context of proceedings for re-establishment to give the ap­pel­lant a (further) chance to sub­stan­tiate their factual asser­tions or to provide evidence despite the absence of factual assertions (see J 11/09, J 12/09, J 13/09 and J 14/09, Reasons 3.2.3 and 3.2.6 in each). Given the inherent restric­tions for factual assertions out­side the time li­­mit for the request of re-establishment in these pro­cee­dings (the principle of the "Eventu­al­maxime", see above), the appellant is even pre­vented from validly submitting new factual assertions at this stage, including in oral pro­ceedings.

20. It is undisputed that the right to oral proceedings as guaranteed by Article 116(1) EPC is a cornerstone of pro­ceedings before the EPO. The jurisprudence of the boards generally even follows the assumption of an "ab­so­lute" right to oral proceedings upon request, as a rule, without room for discussion by the board, and without considering the speedy conduct of the proceedings, equity or procedural economy (Case Law, III.C.2.1, e.g. T 777/06, Reasons 2). The right to oral proceedings even stands if no new arguments are to be presented (Case Law, III.C.2.1.2, see T 383/87, Reasons 9; T 125/89, Reasons 7).

21. However, even this "absolute" right to oral proceedings upon a party's request is subject to inherent restrictions by the EPC and pro­cedural principles gene­­rally re­cognised in the con­tracting states of the EPO (see Article 125 EPC).

22. For example, in appeal proceedings against decisions of a Receiving Section, oral proceedings are generally only op­ti­onal, and boards may refuse re­quests (Article 116(2) in conjunction with Article 111(1) EPC; see J 20/87 OJ 1989, 67, Reasons 2; J 15/89, Reasons 5).

23. Moreover and in addition to the jurisprudence outlined above for re-establishment proceedings, further limits to the "absolute" right to oral proceedings upon a party's request have been re­cog­nised in the jurisprudence of the boards.

24. Under this jurisprudence, a statement of an intention not to attend oral proceedings is normally con­sidered equivalent to a withdrawal of the request for oral proceedings, even if such a withdrawal had not been declared expressis verbis (Case Law, III.C.4.3.2; e.g. T 849/18, Reasons 1).

25. Furthermore, an appellant not responding to a board's communication which points to a missing state­ment of grounds of appeal and the resulting inadmissibility of the appeal renders "the initial conditional request for oral procee­dings to have become obsolete ... equivalent to an aban­don­ment of the request" (Case Law, III.C.4.3.3, e.g. T 1042/07, Reasons 3; T 234/10, Reasons 2; T 1575/16, Reasons 2; T 2575/16, Reasons 2; T 95/17, Reasons 2; see also T 1573/20, Reasons 5 and T 2377/19, Reasons 2.2).

26. Likewise, in cases of a further, inadmissible appeal fi­­led against the decision of a board, "... oral proceedings would prolong the proceedings in a way that would be difficult to reconcile with the requirement for le­gal certainty ...", and decisions to reject those ap­peals can be handed down "... immediately and without fur­ther formalities ..." (see e.g. G 1/97, Reasons 6, OJ EPO 2000, 322; T 431/04, Reasons 4; T 883/06, Reasons 3; T 1573/20, Reasons 2 to 5).

27. Furthermore, filing an appeal by a non-entitled third party within the meaning of Article 115 EPC is also a clearly inad­missible means of redress, and no oral proceedings are thus to be appointed (see G 2/19, Reasons B.II.2).

28. Furthermore, if an unconditional request for oral proceedings is made and the board reaches a positive conclusion in the requester's favour, oral proceedings would likewise serve no purpose. Thus, the request is treated as merely conditional and does not prevent an immediate decision (Case Law, III.C.4.6 and T 494/92, Reasons 2; T 2445/11, Reasons 2; T 1050/09, Reasons 2).

29. In the same vein, a party requesting oral proceedings is not to be considered adversely affected by the decision to remit the case for further prosecution, meaning no oral pro­cee­dings need to be appointed (Case Law, III.C.4.5; e.g. T 42/90, Reasons 5; T 1367/12, Reasons 3; T 1727/12, Reasons 3).

30. In G 2/19, OJ EPO 2020, A87, Reasons B.II.2 and B.II.5, limits to the right to oral proceedings have been recog­nised even in a more general fashion: "Given the variety in the scope of application of Article 116(1), first sentence, EPC, its nature cannot be considered to be, as it were, absolute. The legislator clearly intended it to serve as a basic rule governing the typical cases facing the departments of the European Patent Office in their everyday practice. However, it cannot be ruled out that exceptions to this basic rule may be made where - as in the case underlying this referral - its application would make no sense in the specific cir­cumstances of an individual case."

31. T 1573/20, Reasons 5 (on the non-submission of grounds of appeal, see above) add: "The situation is there­fore comparable to the 'clearly inadmissible ap­peals' considered in decisions G 1/97 and G 2/19. These decisions are concerned with appeals by a non-party or based on non-existing remedies only. Nevertheless, the board is convinced that the Enlarged Board of Appeal did not consider these examples to be exhaustive. Rather, it acknowledged as a matter of principle that there are exceptions to the right to oral proceedings under Article 116 EPC (G 1/97, reasons, point 6, last paragraph; G 2/19, reasons, B II 2 and 8, C I). It follows from the rationale of the above decisions that the present case falls in the category of clearly inadmissible appeals and can be rejected without holding oral proceedings" (see also Case Law, III.C.4.3.3 and T 2377/19, Reasons 2.2).

32. Lastly, inherent li­mi­tations to Article 116(1) EPC have also been acknowledged in a general fashion in T 383/87, Reasons 9 and T 318/91, Reasons 12, stating that the basic right to re­quest oral proceedings could be refu­sed under exceptional circumstances amounting to an abuse of law.

33. In all these examples identified by the jurisprudence of the boards, oral procee­dings would unduly prolong the procee­dings, instead of bringing them to an end as quickly as possible. Thus, they would run counter to the requirement of legal certainty in due time while ser­ving no legitimate purpose.

34. With the due account of the jurisprudence set out above, under which the re­quirement of legal certainty in due time cannot gene­rally take pre­cedence over the right to oral pro­cee­dings, meaning that oral proceedings are not to be denied grosso modo by the mere refe­rence to the time they consume (see again Case Law, III.C.2.1, e.g. T 777/06, Reasons 2), the jurisprudence of the boards repeatedly also underlines that the requirement of legal certainty in due time, notably as regards intel­lec­tual property rights, is likewise recognised as a fundamental principle enshrined in the EPC (Case Law, IV.D.2, e.g. T 757/17, Reasons 4; see also J 25/03, OJ EPO 2006, 395; T 679/14, Reasons 13; J 16/05, Reasons 2.2; J 6/90, OJ EPO 1993, 714, Reasons 2.4; J 6/08 Reasons 9.2; see again G 1/97, Reasons 6; see also G 3/97, Reasons 2.5 on balancing an applicant's interest in obtaining a legally valid patent and the EPO's interest in bringing the examination procedure to a close by a decision to grant the patent).

35. This fundamental principle has also been re­flected in the Rules of Procedure of the Boards of Appeal currently in force (e.g. see Articles 12(4), 13(1) and (2), 15(4) and 16(1)(c) RPBA 2020).

36. Of relevance in this context is also T 732/21, Reasons 14: "At last, the board notes that the purpose of the rules of procedure before the Boards is not, in itself, the refusal to consider late requests, but rather the defence of the parties rights to a fair hearing within a reasonable time, and that, in view of the above, in the present case, consideration of this particular request does not impair these basic rights of either party (cf. T 339/19, reasons 1.3.4 and 1.5; T 2920/18 rea­sons 3.14; T 2295/19, reasons 3.4.13)."

37. In summary, if oral procee­dings do not serve any legitimate purpose, as in the current case, the requirement of legal certainty in due time trumps and even pre­vents a board from appointing oral proceedings.

38. The examples identified by the jurisprudence of the boards demonstrate that the language of Article 116(1) EPC is too broad as it literally covers also cases where the appointment of oral procee­dings cannot be justified (see again G 2/19, Reasons B.II.2).

39. Such a conclusion on the scope of Article 116(1) EPC is also well in line with the established jurisprudence of the boards, which applies the rules of inter­pre­ta­tion of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea­ties (1969), namely its Article 31 and 32 (see Case Law, III.H.1 to a large extent developed in G 5/83, OJ EPO 1985, 64; recently, G 1/21, OJ EPO 2022, A 49).

40. Under Article 31(1) Vienna Convention, the starting point for the interpretation of the terms used in a trea­­­­ty provision like Article 116(1) EPC is their ordinary meaning in their context in light of the provision's object and purpose (Case Law, III.H.1.1.1). However, it is necessary to go beyond the mere grammatical (literal) interpretation when a wording only superficially has a clear meaning. At any rate, a literal interpretation must not contra­dict the purpose of a provision (Case Law, III.H.1.2.1, G 1/90, OJ EPO 1991, 275, Reasons 4 et seq.; G 6/91, OJ EPO 1992, 491, Reasons 15; see also G 2/12 and G 2/13, with fur­ther references, OJ EPO 2016, A27 and A28).

41. The jurisprudence of the boards has also reiterated the im­portance of a "dynamic" or "evo­lutive" interpretation of the EPC in light of its object and purpose, as de­rived from Article 31(1), in connection with Article 31(3) Vienna Convention. Article 31(3) (a) and (b) refer to subsequent developments, namely subsequent agreements and practice among the parties to a treaty, thus presupposing a forward-looking approach. Article 31(3)(c) adds: "There shall be taken into account, together with the context: any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties."

These "relevant rules of international law" are commonly understood in the legal literature as referring to the law applicable at the time of interpretation (Linder­falk, On the Interpretation of Treaties (2007), 179 et seq., including references to the travaux prépa­ratoires to Article 31 Vienna Convention; Polgári, The Role of the Vienna Rules in the Interpretation of the ECHR, 82 et seq.; Thimm-Braun, Evolutionary Inter­pretation and Other Developments of the Vienna Conven­tion on the Law of Treaties; on the dynamic/evolutive interpretation in general, see also, in­ter alia, International Law Commission, Conclusions of the Work of the Study Group on the Frag­mentation of Inter­national Law: Difficulties arising from the Diver­sification and Expansion of In­ter­national Law, pa­ragraph 478; Arato, Subsequent Practice and Evolutive Inter­pretation: Techniques of Treaty In­terpretation over Time and their Diverse Conse­quences, The Law and Prac­­tice of International Courts and Tribunals 9 (2010), 443 et seq.).

42. This dynamic inter­pretation comes into play "where conside­rations have arisen since the Con­ven­tion [the EPC] was signed which might give reason to believe that a literal inter­pre­tation of the wording of the relevant provision would conflict with the legis­lator's aims, which might thus lead to a result which diverges from the wording of the law" (see G 2/12, G 2/13, G 3/19, OJ EPO 2020, A119, Reasons XXII; see also G 3/98, OJ EPO 2001, 62, Reasons 2.5). Such consi­derations may concern legal or factual circum­stances, in particular the subsequent development of law (see, albeit in a wider context, Arato, cited above, 467, with further references; Inter­national Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971 on Legal Consequences for States of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia, Reasons 53 on the Charter of the United Nations and development by way of customary law). Or, as has been reiterated in the legal literature in the context of the European Conven­tion on Human Rights (ECHR), on the basis of consi­derations which are equally valid in the context of the EPC, "... the provisions of the Convention must be interpreted in accordance with the primary aims as defined in the Preamble, taking account of recent developments in society in science" (Polgári, cited above, 89, with further references).

43. In the current context, several such considerations have arisen since the signing of the EPC.

44. Firstly, the instrument of re-establishment of rights an­chored in Article 122 and Rule 136 EPC has evol­ved over the years and has seen gradual refinement by the evolving jurisprudence of the boards. Notably, the prin­ciple of the "Even­tu­almaxime", as outlined above, has been gradually deve­loped and refined to effectively balance the right to be heard with procedural economy and with the interest of (all) other parties in the fair conduct of (appeal) procee­dings.

45. Secondly, the circumstances under which the boards operate have been subject to far-reaching chan­ges over the years, with the rising importance of the Eu­ropean pa­tent system, this being particularly apparent at the time of the introduction of the Unitary Patent and when the Unified Patent Court recent­ly opened its doors, and which has also translated into a substantial yearly number of appeals being filed and a considerable workload for the boards. Furthermore, the timely adjudication of cases has become a matter of increased interest to the stakeholders in the system, while it remains a challenge for the boards to carry out their function of effec­tively brin­ging justice to all parties within a reaso­nable time frame.

46. Thirdly and arguably most importantly, the concepts and principles of national and international procedural law have themselves seen tremendous evolution over the years, in parti­cular in international and European human rights law, notably on the guarantees of a fair trial before a tribunal of law.

47. A pivotal factor is the deve­lopment of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights on Article 6(1) ECHR and Article 47(2) Char­ter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, recog­nised as bin­ding standards and general yardsticks for fair proceedings before the boards and as both expressing fair trial principles of proce­dural law gene­rally recognised in the contracting sta­tes of the EPO (see Article 125 EPC and Case Law, III.H.3, e.g. D 11/91 of 14 September 1994, Reasons 3.3; G 2/08 of 15 June 2009, Reasons 3; R 19/12 of 25 April 2014, Reasons 8 to 10; R 8/13 of 20 March 2015, Reasons 2; T 1824/15, Reasons 2.3.5; T 1787/16, Reasons 18).

In the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, the (routine) holding of court hearings/oral proceedings in public is, as is the case with the system of the EPC (see above), recognised as a fundamental prin­ciple of procedural law which protects litigants against the admini­stra­tion of justice in secret and without public scrutiny and which is therefore an essential means by which confidence in the courts can be maintained. By rendering the admi­nistration of justice transparent, publicity contri­butes to the achievement of the aim of a fair trial, the guarantee of which is a fundamental prin­ciple of any democratic society (see e.g. Axen v. Germany, no. 8273/78, paragraph 26; Speil v. Austria, no. 42057/98, paragraph 2).

However, over the years, the European Court of Human Rights has also identified occasions where oral proceedings could or even should be dispensed with in pursuit of a party's right to a fair trial, while thus taking account of the entirety of procee­dings (Axen v. Germany, paragraph 27, 29). When a case has been heard in public in a first-instance tribunal that fully meets the requirements of Article 6 ECHR (for these requirements see, e.g. Axen v. Germany, paragraph 28; Jussila v. Finland, no. 73053/01, paragraph 41; Helmers v. Sweden, no. 11826/85, paragraph 32; Lundevall v. Sweden, no. 38629/97, paragraph 36), a further hearing at a second or third level of judicial proceedings might not be appropriate or even required. The same goes for the absence of issues of credibility or contested facts, which might otherwise have necessitated a hearing, where a court - even if being the only tribunal in the course of the procee­dings (see Schuler-Zgraggen v. Switzerland, no. 14518/89, paragraph 8 to 23; Döry v. Sweden, no. 28394/95, paragraph 8 to 16; Speil v. Austria; Koottummel v. Austria, no. 49616/06, paragraph 6 to 11; Jussila v. Finland, paragraph 10 to 13) - may also fairly and reasonably decide the case on the basis of the parties' submissions and other written materials (see, for example, Döry v. Sweden, paragraph 37; Jussila v. Finland, paragraph 41, 47; see also Lun­devall v. Sweden, paragraph 39; Salomonsson v. Sweden, no. 38978/97, paragraph 39; Göç v. Turkey, no. 36590/97, paragraph 51). Furthermore, no oral proceedings are required if a party has been given ample opportunity to put their case forward in writing (Jussila v. Finland, paragraph 48); where the issue at stake is of a minor nature (Jussila v. Finland, paragraph 48); where the dispute does not raise issues of public interest (Döry v. Sweden, paragraph 37; Lundevall v. Swe­den, paragraph 34; Schuler-Zgraggen v. Switzerland, paragraph 58; Varela Assa­lino v. Portugal, no. 64336/01); where only questions of admissibility or other points of law are at issue (Axen v. Germany, paragraph 28; Schuler-Zgraggen v. Swit­zer­land, paragraph 58), no­tably, points of procedural law (Kremzow v. Austria, no. 12350/86, paragraph 63) and ques­tions of law of no par­ti­cular complexity (Varela Assa­lino v. Portugal, Valová and others v. Slovakia, no. 44925/98, paragraph 64; Speil v. Austria, paragraph 2); or where the proceedings concern high­ly technical ques­tions (Koottummel v. Austria, paragraph 20; Schuler-Zgrag­gen v. Switzerland, paragraph 58; Döry v. Sweden, paragraph 37; Salomonsson v. Swe­den, no. 38978/97, paragraph 38; Varela Assalino v. Portu­gal; Speil v. Austria, paragraph 2).The more recent case law of the European Court of Human Rights also increasingly emphasises the demands of pro­ce­dural efficiency and economy, against the backdrop of an increasing recurrence to courts, national or international; tight resources in many jus­tice systems; and increasing demand for the timely adjudication of cases. In the court's more recent view - in explicitly departing from its earlier case law favouring a rather "absolute" obligation to hold oral pro­cee­­dings (see Jussila v. Finland, paragraph 42) - the routine holding of hearings is perceived as a likely obstacle to the compliance with the reasonable-time re­quirement of Article 6(1) ECHR and the related need for the expeditious handling of a court's case load, even where - as is the case with the boards - a court of appeal has jurisdiction to review the case both as to facts and as to law (Varela Assalino v. Por­tugal, Mutu and Pechstein v. Switzerland, nos. 40575/10 and 67474/10, paragraph 177; Fejde v. Sweden, no. 12631/87, paragraph 9; Jus­sila v. Finland, paragraph 41; Lundevall v. Sweden, paragraph 38; Salomonsson v. Sweden, paragraph 38; Schu­ler-Zgraggen v. Switzerland, paragraph 58 and the cases cited there). The European Court of Human Rights further under­lines that proceedings at the appeal stage may often be more efficiently dealt with in wri­ting than in oral argument (Jussila v. Fin­land, paragraph 47; Lundevall v. Sweden, paragraph 38).

48. In this context, the European Court of Human Rights reiterates the principle of dynamic in­ter­pretation in their own case law in referring to the ECHR as "a living instrument which ... must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions and of the ideas prevailing in democra­tic States today" (Kress v. France, no. 39594/98, paragraph 70; Marckx v. Belgium, no. 6833/74, paragraph 41; Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, no. 5856/72, paragraph 31).

In Micallef v. Malta, no. 17056/06, paragraphs 78 to 81, the court conceded that "... many Contracting States face con­siderable backlogs in their overburdened justice systems leading to excessively long proceedings", concluding that in view of these circumstances, having evolved over time, "... a change in the case-law is necessary. While it is in the interests of legal cer­tainty, foreseeability and equality before the law that the Court should not depart, without good reason, from precedents laid down in previous cases, a failure by the Court to maintain a dynamic and evolutive approach would risk rendering it a bar to reform or improvement..." (see also Cossey v. the United Kingdom, no. 10843/84, paragraph 35).

49. The same can be said for the EPC as the backbone of the European patent system, which, due to its very nature and purpose, operates in a highly dynamic and innovative area, and which requires a correspondingly dynamic and evolutive approach. The boards must guarantee that the EPC is applied in a way that lives up to these standards to best deal with the dynamic and evolutive environment in the fairest fashion.

50. All these considerations support the con­clusion that a literal interpretation of Article 116(1) EPC con­flicts with the legislature's aims (see again G 2/12; G 2/13; G 3/19, Reasons XXII; G 3/98, Reasons 2.5) when oral proceedings serve no purpose and would thus only prolong pro­ceedings to no one's avail. A narrow interpretation of Article 116(1) EPC thus has to make way for a dynamic and evolutive understanding instead, in light of the provision's object and purpose.

51. The very purpose of Article 116(1) EPC, with a view to the procedural principles outlined above, can be seen as providing for the essential right to be heard in oral proceedings only in so far as these serve a legitimate purpose and thus do not run counter to the requi­rement of legal certainty in due time as a further es­sential element of a fair trial for all parties.

52. In a case like the current one, legal certainty in due time, just as pro­cedural economy, as a further essential cornerstone of a fair trial, has to prevail.

53. In light of the principles of a fair trial and legal cer­tainty in due time, there is no absolute right to oral proceedings under all circumstances.

54. No oral procee­dings have to be appointed in re-establishment procee­dings where the "Even­tual­ma­xime" principle may - like in the current case - deprive oral proceedings of its very function as a fur­ther cornerstone of a fair trial and might even run counter to it.

55. It is not the purpose of oral procee­dings in re-establishment proceedings to give a party a (further) chance to sub­stan­tiate or amend their factual assertions or to provide evidence where there is an absence of factual asser­tions or where the request for re-establishment was not sufficiently substantiated (see J 11/09, J 12/09, J 13/09 and J 14/09, Reasons 3.2.3 and 3.2.6 in each; see also T 1913/19, Reasons 16). On the contrary, in view of the restric­tions for factual assertions out­side the time li­­mit for such a request, a party would even be pre­vented from validly submitting new factual asser­tions at this stage, in particular in oral pro­ceedings.

56. This conclusion can be seen as a logical step in the development of the jurisprudence on the "Eventualmaxime" principle in re-establishment proceedings.

57. The boards are, as the judicial body under the EPC, a public service provider with limited resources. They are obliged to carefully and fairly allocate these resources to where they can be used most appro­pri­ately, in line with the procedural prin­ciples enshrined in the EPC and beyond and their duty to serve parties in an equal and non-discriminatory manner. Any pro­­ce­dural step undertaken in appeal pro­ceedings that is not required by the applicable rules is to the de­triment of other parties as their cases are postponed, and this thus runs coun­ter to the boards' duty and function to equally bring jus­tice to all.

58. Also against this backdrop, oral proceedings could not be appointed.

59. The request for re-establishment of rights is to be refused. The same goes for the appeal which is thus likewise to be rejected as inadmissible. The initial request for oral proceedings in the notice of appeal has thus become obsolete (see again Case Law, III.C.4.3.3, e.g. T 1042/07, Reasons 3; T 234/10, Reasons 2; T 1575/16, Reasons 2; T 2575/16, Reasons 2; T 95/17, Reasons 2; see also T 1573/20, Reasons 5)