IV. VERFAHREN VOR DER ERSTEN INSTANZ

Catchword: see point 1.2.2 of the reasons.

Catchword: 

In a case where the patent is not opposed in its entirety, the opposition being directed at certain claims only, and where the Opposition Division decides that all of the proprietor's requests in relation to the opposed claims must fail, only the unopposed claims, which are not part of any opposition proceedings, are left standing.  Hence, provided the requirements of Rule 82(1) EPC are met (either during oral proceedings or, in a written procedure, by means of a separate communication), the patent may be maintained on the basis of the unopposed claims, irrespective of whether the proprietor has filed an explicit request for this during the proceedings. Such a request would, in fact, be superfluous, since the unopposed claims have been granted and are not the subject of any opposition. The unopposed claims of the granted patent are therefore always available to the proprietor as the minimum basis on which the patent may be maintained (Reasons, point 5.2).

Catchword:

Prima facie allowability under Article 123(2) EPC of a late filed amended claim request may be a valid criterion to be used by the opposition division when deciding on the admittance of this claim request. However, using this criterion, to object for the first time at oral proceedings to a feature of the late-filed claim request that was already present in higher ranking claim requests and had never been objected to before, not even when deciding on the allowability or admittance of those higher-ranking claim requests, goes against the principles of fairness and good faith (see point 2.6.11 of the reasons).

Catchword: 

On the application of Rule 80 EPC and the findings of the Enlarged Board of Appeal in G 3/14 in case of an alleged discrepancy between the description and a feature stemming from a granted claim, see point 4.

Catchword:

1. An opposition division's rejection of a request for extension of the time limit indicated in its communication under Rule 79(1) EPC does not terminate the opposition proceedings. Therefore, a patent proprietor is in a position to respond to the notice of opposition beyond the expired time limit or, at least, request the rejection of the opposition as well as oral proceedings. The patent proprietor must anticipate that an opposition division may issue its decision after expiration of the time limit (see Reasons 4.5, 4.6 and 4.9).

2. There is no legal basis for a duty on the part of the opposition division to notify the patent proprietor in advance of its intention to reach a decision, even if that decision concerns the revocation of the patent (see Reasons 4.8, 4.10 and 4.11).

3. If a patent proprietor chooses not to file any submissions during the opposition proceedings but to present them only with its statement of grounds of appeal, this amounts to bringing an entirely fresh case in appeal proceedings. This is at odds with the primary object of the appeal proceedings to review the decision under appeal in a judicial manner. Consequently, a board has the discretion under Article 12(4) RPBA 2007 not to admit the patent proprietor's defence submissions into the appeal proceedings. This does, however, not necessarily lead to revocation of the patent. The decision under appeal is still to be reviewed by the board, which might overturn the impugned decision, for example if it is not convinced by the reasons given by the opposition division or in the event of a substantial procedural violation (see Reasons 5.5 and 5.6).

Catchword:

1.) Article 114(2) EPC provides a legal basis for disregarding claim requests which are not submitted in due time (Reasons 4.5.1-4.5.11). 2.) A claim request which is filed in opposition proceedings after the date set under Rule 116(1) EPC is not submitted in due time within the meaning of Article 114(2) EPC (Reasons 4.6.1-4.6.10). 3.) Rule 116(2) EPC does not limit the Opposition Division's discretionary power under Article 114(2) EPC and Rule 116(1) EPC. As a rule, this discretionary power does not depend on the contents of the Opposition Division's communication under Rule 116(1) EPC. However, if the Opposition Division invites the patent proprietor to file an amended claim request to address a specific objection and the patent proprietor complies with this invitation by filing the required amendments by the date set under Rule 116(1) EPC, the Opposition Division's discretion not to admit that claim request may effectively be reduced to zero (Reasons 4.7.1-4.7.8).

Catchword:
The Boards of Appeal may review discretionary decisions. There are, however, limits on the extent of review that reflect the discretion accorded to the deciding body. In the present case, the Opposition Division decided to consider document D8 and the review of this decision is a primary object of the appeal proceedings (Article 12(2) RPBA 2020) - see Reasons 1 - 9.

Catchword:

The provision of Article 81, 2nd sentence, EPC does not apply to cases where a final sovereign decision of a national court has determined that a person other than the applicant is entitled to the grant of the European patent under Article 61(1) EPC (see reasons point 2.5.2).

Catchword: 

Once the public is officially informed by an EPO publication of an explicit declaration of withdrawal and without any indication that this declaration might have been erroneous, there is no room for a further balancing of the interests of the general public and the applicant (confirming the settled case law of the boards of appeal, see Reasons 2.2 to 2.13).

Catchword: 

A machine is not an inventor within the meaning of the EPC.

Catchword:

A machine is not an inventor within the meaning of the EPC

Zusammenfassung

In T 431/22 war die Beschwerdeführerin (Einsprechende) der Ansicht, der Hauptantrag erfülle nicht die Erfordernisse der R. 80 EPÜ, da der erteilte unabhängige Anspruch 1 im Einspruchsverfahren durch mehrere unabhängige Ansprüche ersetzt worden sei.

Nach R. 80 EPÜ können die Beschreibung, die Ansprüche und die Zeichnungen geändert werden, soweit die Änderungen durch einen Einspruchsgrund nach Art. 100 EPÜ veranlasst sind.

Die Kammer folgte im Wesentlichen den Erwägungen der Entscheidung T 263/05, insbesondere dem Ansatz, dass die Vereinbarkeit mit R. 80 EPÜ einer Beurteilung im konkreten Einzelfall bedarf und nicht pauschal zu beantworten ist.

Die Kammer vermochte aus R. 80 EPÜ keine Vorgaben dafür ableiten, auf welche Art und Weise bzw. mittels welcher Änderungen ein Patentinhaber einen Einspruchsgrund zu überwinden habe. Als "veranlasst" im Sinne von R. 80 EPÜ könnten Änderungen angesehen werden, die notwendig und zweckmäßig seien, einen Einspruchsgrund auszuräumen. Betreffe der Einspruchsgrund einen unabhängigen Anspruch, so stehe R. 80 EPÜ Änderungen nicht entgegen, wodurch dieser Anspruch durch zwei oder mehrere unabhängige Ansprüche ersetzt werde, sofern deren Gegenstand im Vergleich zum erteilten Anspruch eingeschränkt oder geändert sei. Es erschien der Kammer legitim, dass ein Patentinhaber zum Überwinden eines Einspruchsgrunds versucht, Teilbereiche des erteilten unabhängigen Anspruchs gegebenenfalls mittels zweier oder mehrerer unabhängiger Ansprüche abzudecken. Nach Auffassung der Kammer dürfte eine Grenze allerdings dann zu ziehen sein, wenn ein solches Vorgehen des Ersetzens eines unabhängigen Anspruchs als Versuch der Fortführung des Erteilungsverfahrens oder sonst verfahrensmissbräuchlich erscheine.

Vorliegend war der gegen das Streitpatent eingelegte Einspruch mit mangelnder Neuheit und mangelnder erfinderischer Tätigkeit insbesondere der jeweiligen Gegenstände der unabhängigen Ansprüche 1 und 14 begründet worden. Die Beschwerdegegnerin hatte auf diese Einspruchsgründe, sowie auf weitere zwischenzeitlich erhobene Einwände, mit dem Anspruchssatz des Hauptantrags reagiert, in dem der erteilte unabhängige Anspruch 1 durch die unabhängigen Ansprüche 1, 2, 3 und 4 ersetzt und der erteilte unabhängige Anspruch 14 gestrichen wurde. Die Kammer hielt fest, dass jeder dieser vier unabhängigen Ansprüche im Vergleich zum erteilten Anspruch 1 weitere beschränkende Merkmale enthielt. Diese vier Ansprüche stellten im Wesentlichen Kombinationen aus dem erteilten unabhängigen Anspruch 1 mit von diesem abhängigen Ansprüchen dar, wobei der aus der Beschreibung stammende Zusatz in Anspruch 3 das aus dem erteilten Anspruch 8 stammende Merkmal näher definierte. Einen Verfahrensmissbrauch hatte die Beschwerdeführerin nicht geltend gemacht und vermochte die Kammer nicht zu erkennen.

Damit waren die Änderungen gemäß R. 80 EPÜ aus Sicht der Kammer nicht zu beanstanden.

Zusammenfassung

In T 2274/22 war ein Mitglied der Öffentlichkeit von Einsprechenden-Seite (Herr T.) vor Eröffnung der mündlichen Verhandlung unbeabsichtigt dem virtuellen Dolmetscher-Besprechungsraum zugeordnet worden, wo er mehr als 10 Minuten mithörte, bevor er die anderen Besprechungsteilnehmer darüber in Kenntnis setzte und ausgeschlossen wurde. Während dieser Zeit kommunizierte Herr T. dem zugelassenen Vertreter der Einsprechenden und seinem Kollegen Details aus dem mitgehörten Inhalt der Vorbesprechung. Kurz nach Eröffnung der mündlichen Verhandlung legte der Vertreter der Einsprechenden den obigen Vorfall offen. Die Patentinhaberin befürchtete eine Benachteiligung und sprach dabei eine Neubesetzung der Einspruchsabteilung an. Die Einsprechende stellte daraufhin mit einem Kurzprotokoll die erhaltenen Informationen schriftlich zur Verfügung. Die Patentinhaberin war der Auffassung, diese gingen entgegen der Aussage des Vorsitzenden über den Inhalt des Ladungszusatzes hinaus, und beantragte schriftlich die Ablehnung der Einspruchsabteilung wegen Besorgnis der Befangenheit.

Zur Frage, ob ein schwerwiegender Verfahrensfehler im Vorfeld der mündlichen Verhandlung begangen wurde, erläuterte die Kammer, die Anwesenheit einer Partei in einer Vorbesprechung zwischen einem oder mehreren Mitgliedern einer Einspruchsabteilung und den Dolmetschern stelle grundsätzlich einen Verfahrensfehler dar, unabhängig davon, ob dieser durch einen technischen oder menschlichen Fehler verursacht geworden sei. Ein solcher Verfahrensfehler müsse aber nicht zwangsläufig in einen schwerwiegenden münden. Vielmehr könne er dadurch geheilt werden, dass die abwesende Partei vor Eröffnung der sachlichen Debatte auf den gleichen Kenntnisstand wie die anwesende gebracht werde.

Nach Ansicht der Kammer konnte allein die Anwesenheit von Herrn T. beim Dolmetscher-Briefing auch keine Besorgnis der Befangenheit der Einspruchsabteilung begründen. Denn, da die Zuschaltung eines Parteivertreters in den virtuellen Besprechungsraum vorliegend unstreitig versehentlich erfolgt sei, und die Einspruchsabteilung sie umgehend beendet habe, sobald sie ihrer gewahr wurde, bestehe objektiv kein Verdacht, die Einspruchsabteilung habe hier willentlich für eine Bevorzugung der Einsprechenden gesorgt oder diese billigend in Kauf genommen. Jedoch sei die Tatsache, dass die Einspruchsabteilung den Vorfall nicht von sich aus angesprochen und der Patentinhaberin mitgeteilt habe, dazu geeignet, bei der Patentinhaberin den Eindruck einer Parteilichkeit zu erwecken. Dass die Einspruchsabteilung sich zudem auch nach Intervention der Einsprechenden, die ausdrücklich auf einen möglichen Verfahrensfehler hingewiesen hatte, nicht aktiv an der Aufklärung des Vorfalls beteiligte, sondern den Vorschlag der Einsprechenden, eine schriftliche Zusammenfassung einzureichen, abwartete und diesem lediglich zustimmte, könne einen solchen Eindruck noch verstärken. Dass eine inhaltliche Auseinandersetzung der Einspruchsabteilung mit dem Kurzprotokoll ausgeblieben sei, stelle aus Sicht eines objektiven Beobachters einen weiteren Umstand dar, der zum Anschein ihrer Befangenheit beitrage.

Die Kammer rief in Erinnerung, dass Besorgnis der Befangenheit bereits dann gegeben ist, wenn objektive Anhaltspunkte dafür vorliegen, auch wenn andere Tatsachen dagegensprechen mögen. Vorliegend war nach Ansicht der Kammer eine Befangenheit der Einspruchsabteilung objektiv zu besorgen, da diese keine der aufgetretenen Gelegenheiten ergriffen hatte, die Patentinhaberin selbst über den Vorfall zu informieren und selbst zu dessen Aufklärung beizutragen. Daher hätte dem Antrag der Patentinhaberin auf Ablehnung ihrer Mitglieder analog zu Art. 24(3) EPÜ stattgegeben und die Einspruchsabteilung neu besetzt werden müssen.

Die Kammer kam zu dem Schluss, dass die angefochtene Entscheidung nicht von der Einspruchsabteilung in ihrer ursprünglichen Besetzung hätte getroffen werden dürfen. Dass dies dennoch geschah, stelle einen schwerwiegenden Verfahrensmangel dar, der zur Aufhebung der angefochtenen Entscheidung und zur Zurückverweisung des Falls an eine neu zu besetzende Einspruchsabteilung führe. Darauf wie groß der ursprüngliche Fehler war, komme es in der Regel nicht an, wenn er letztlich ursächlich für einen wesentlichen Verfahrensmangel gewesen sei. Entscheidend sei allein, dass der aus ihm resultierende Verfahrensmangel als so schwerwiegend eingestuft wird, dass er zu einer Zurückverweisung führt. Dies sei vorliegend der Fall. Die Kammer wies zuletzt darauf hin, dass wegen der räumlichen Distanz und nur mittelbaren Präsenz in einer Videokonferenz, hier ein "schlechter Eindruck" zudem schneller entstehen könne und somit auch die Schwelle sinke, ab der eine Befangenheit befürchtet werden könne. Daher seien an eine ordnungsgemäße Verhandlungsführung und insbesondere den Umgang mit technischen Pannen hohe Maßstäbe anzulegen.

Zusammenfassung

In T 1529/20 the appellant (proprietor) submitted that they had never received the decision of the opposition division revoking their patent and that they had only become aware of it and, more generally, of the opposition proceedings, through an email from a formalities officer of the EPO.

The board explained that with the abolition of advices of delivery for notification of decisions by registered letter (see OJ 2019, A31), it was the practice of the EPO at the time to enclose an acknowledgement of receipt (Form 2936) with notifications by registered letter of decisions incurring a period for appeal and summonses. Addressees were requested to date and sign the form and return it immediately, as evidence of receipt (see OJ 2019, A57).

The board established that the present file did not contain a confirmation of receipt of the decision of the opposition division from the appellant. Since the EPO could not prove whether the registered letter had reached the appellant, as required by the provisions of R. 126(2) EPC in force at the relevant time, it had to be accepted that the legal fiction of deemed notification did not apply and the appellant became aware of the appealed decision for the first time with the email from the formalities officer. This date was therefore the date of notification of the decision. Thus, the appeal was timely filed.

With regard to the right to be heard, the board held that, as argued by the appellant, the missing opportunity to present their arguments during the opposition proceedings amounted to a substantial procedural violation (Art. 113(1) EPC).

The board observed that, even in view of the notice of the EPO concerning implementation of amended R. 126(1) EPC (OJ 2019, A57) – which did not require to enclose an acknowledgement of receipt (Form 2936) with the communication of the notice of opposition – the requirements of Art. 113 EPC had to be complied with. Before a negative decision revoking a patent was issued, it had to be established that the patent proprietor had been duly informed about the initiation of opposition proceedings. The board explained that the notice of the EPO merely determined the format of notifications. However, the provisions of R. 126(2) EPC remained unaffected. R. 126(2) EPC defined a rebuttable fiction of notification, which, in case of dispute, had to be verified. The burden of proof lied with the EPO.

The board agreed with the appellant that a party submitting that something had not happened, i.e. that a communication had not been received, was in difficulties in trying to prove a negative (negativa non sunt probanda, see also T 2037/18, R 15/11, R 4/17). The filing of cogent evidence showing that a letter was not received was hardly ever possible (see also J 9/05). Therefore, the respondent's arguments that the appellant allegedly had the duty to register mail incoming at their premises but failed to provide an excerpt of such register was not pertinent, since there was no trace in the file that the EPO discharged its burden of proving delivery. Under such circumstances, the appellant did not have to bear the risks normally falling in their sphere of responsibility (T 1535/10), so that they have to be given the benefit of the doubt (J 9/05).

According to the board, in the present case legal certainty and the protection of the right to be heard would have required that the opposition division had established, by any available means, the fact and date of delivery of the communication of the notice of opposition.

The patent proprietor could decide not to react to the notice of opposition. Nevertheless, the communication under R. 79(1) EPC was not a mere formality. Rather, it had the function of allowing the patent proprietor to both contribute to the opposition division's appreciation of the facts and to defend their interests. Since the initial act of (non-)notification of the notice of opposition was flawed, the entire opposition proceedings including the decision of the opposition division was flawed.

Thus, the board set aside the appealed decision and remitted the case to the opposition division for further prosecution. The appeal fee was reimbursed.

Zusammenfassung

In J 11/20 the applicant appealed a decision of the Receiving Section refusing their application under Art. 90(5) EPC in conjunction with R. 58 EPC. The sole reason for the refusal was that the four amended drawings filed by the applicant to remedy formal deficiencies in the application documents were not in agreement with the application documents as originally filed and, despite the invitation by the Receiving Section, the applicant had not corrected this deficiency in due time.

In the statement of grounds of appeal, the appellant had objected that the Receiving Section had committed a substantial procedural violation by exceeding its competence when issuing the communication concerning the formal requirements of the application documents by addressing substantive matters that belonged to the competence of the examining division. Thus, the first question addressed by the Legal Board concerned the competence of the Receiving Section and, in particular, whether the Receiving Section had acted ultra vires.

The Legal Board recalled that the Receiving Section was responsible for the examination on filing and the examination as to formal requirements of the application (Art. 16 EPC). It was established case law that the responsibilities of the Receiving Section did not involve any technical examination of the application (J 5/12, J 7/97, J 33/89 and J 4/85).

Within this framework, the Legal Board explained that the Receiving Section was competent under R. 58 EPC to identify inconsistencies in the application documents which were immediately apparent from the face of the documents, including whether formal discrepancies were present between amended documents and the documents as originally filed, provided no technical knowledge was required.

In the case in hand, the deficiency noted by the Receiving Section was of a purely formal nature and did not involve any assessment in terms of disclosure. Hence, no procedural violation was committed in this respect.

The Legal Board also assessed whether the Receiving Section should have granted interlocutory revision of the appealed decision. The Legal Board referred to J 18/08 and explained that a deficiency on which a decision under Art. 90(5) EPC is based could be corrected at the appeal stage. Such a case was different from the situation where the non-observance of a time limit automatically led to the application being deemed to be withdrawn, i.e. where the legal consequence automatically ensued when an act required within a specific time limit was not performed.

In the case in hand, the Legal Board observed that, when the appeal was filed, the deficiency had already been remedied, albeit late, with the filing of the correct drawings. Considering that the ground for refusal of the application under Art. 90(5) EPC had been remedied, the Legal Board established that the Receiving Section should have granted interlocutory revision in accordance with Art. 109 EPC.

Zusammenfassung

In T 21/22 document D20 was filed by the appellant (opponent) on the day of the oral proceedings before the opposition division but was not admitted into the proceedings because of its late filing and the fact that it was not prima facie relevant for novelty and inventive step.

Although the respondent had initially endorsed the arguments of the opposition division, they stated during the oral proceedings before the board that they withdrew their objection to the admittance of D20 into the proceedings.

The board observed that the opposition division had in fact conducted a comprehensive examination of late-filed D20 in respect of novelty and inventive step prior to concluding that it should not be admitted on the basis of its late filing and the fact that it was not prima facie relevant. The opposition division had therefore not only carried out a mere prima facie assessment but had fully considered D20 and the objections based upon it. Thus, the board held that there was no discretion left for the opposition division not to admit D20 into the proceedings (cf. T 1525/17, T 847/20, T 2026/15, T 2324/14), since it was de facto fully considered (and therefore implicitly admitted) by the opposition division.

Zusammenfassung

In T 1445/22 the appellant requested the admittance into the appeal proceedings of late-filed documents D10 to D12, D14, D15 and D20, which had not been admitted into the opposition proceedings for being prima facie not relevant with respect to the sufficiency of disclosure objection, as well as D26 and D27 filed with the statement of grounds of appeal.

The board first examined Art. 12(6), first sentence, RPBA and noted that evidence submitted by an opponent after the expiry of the nine-month period according to Art. 99(1) EPC was generally to be regarded as late-filed. Exceptions to this rule were where such evidence could not have been filed earlier, for example where the subject of the proceedings had changed. This was typically the case where new claim requests were filed such that there was no reason to file the evidence in response thereto any earlier or where the opposition division had raised a new issue.

In the case in hand the opposition division had not raised any new aspects in its preliminary opinion, but rather reiterated the position, given by the respondent (patent proprietor) in its reply to the notice of opposition. The board found therefore that there had been no change in the subject of the proceedings before the opposition division which would have led to new evidence being considered to be timely filed.

The board also did not consider the circumstances leading to the obtainment of the evidence by the party filing it as relevant for the issue of whether a document was filed in due time. These circumstances were external to the proceedings and it would run counter to the concept of discretionary power if that discretion were denied to a deciding body by circumstances external to the proceedings. Were such discretion to be denied, then all documents created or coming to light at any stage of the proceedings that were filed by a party would automatically be part of the proceedings. However, this would undermine the nine-month period under Art. 99(1) EPC which aims to establish the factual and legal framework within which the substantive examination of the opposition is, in principle, conducted, allowing the patent proprietor a fair chance to consider its position at an early stage of the proceedings (see G 10/91, point 6 of the Reasons, and T 1002/92). Therefore, documents D10 to D12, D14, D15 and D20 had not been filed in due time and the opposition division had the discretion, under Art. 114(2) EPC, not to admit them.

The appellant (opponent) argued that it had not been given the opportunity to present detailed arguments based on documents D10 to D12, D14, D15 and D20, as only prima facie relevance had been discussed before the opposition division. The board found, however, that the appellant had in fact had the opportunity to present its arguments relating to the admittance and prima facie relevance of those documents during the opposition proceedings. It also noted it was established case law that a board of appeal should only overrule the way an opposition division exercised its discretion if it did so according to the wrong principles, not taking into account the right principles or in an unreasonable way. It was, therefore, not the function of a board of appeal to review all the facts and circumstances of the case to decide whether it would have exercised its discretion in the same way or not. In the case in hand the opposition division had regarded D10 to D12 as representing common general knowledge which did not need to be supported, and it could not see the relevance of D14, D15 or D20 for supporting the objection to insufficiency of disclosure. Thus, the opposition division had considered these documents as prima facie not relevant and had exercised its discretion reasonably, according to the right principles, after hearing both parties.

In its statement of grounds of appeal, the appellant had further requested that documents D10 to D12, D14, D15 and D20 be admitted into the appeal proceedings with respect to the appellant's lack of inventive step objections. The board decided to exercise its discretion under Art. 114(2) EPC and Art. 12(4) RPBA and not admit these documents into the appeal proceedings as none of the documents were suitable to address the issues which led to the decision under appeal.

In addition, the board found that there was no change in the opposition proceedings or particular circumstances in the present case which necessitated the filing of documents D26 and D27 for the first time in the appeal proceedings. D26 and D27 could and should have been filed during the opposition period. Therefore, the board did not admit them into the appeal proceedings (Art. 12(6), second sentence, RPBA and Art. 12(4) RPBA).

Zusammenfassung

In T 846/22 the respondent (patent proprietor) questioned the status of the appellant as a legal person in the context of Art. 99(1) EPC, according to which "any person may give notice to the European Patent Office of opposition [ ... ] in accordance with the Implementing Regulations". "Any person" is to be interpreted in line with Art. 58 EPC as "any natural or legal person, or any body equivalent to a legal person by virtue of the law governing it" (G 3/99, OJ 2002, 347; G 1/13, OJ 2015, 42).

The respondent had submitted that the appellant, a UK company, had been a "dormant company" under UK law at the time of filing the opposition and had never changed this status. The respondent argued that this meant that the appellant was not entitled to conduct any business and could not be equated to a legal person.

The board noted that the status of a legal person as such, i.e. the question as to whether they had the capacity to sue or be sued, was a matter of national law. The right to bring opposition proceedings, to take part in such proceedings, to file an appeal and to take part in appeal proceedings was, by contrast, a matter of procedural law governed by the EPC (G 1/13, point 5.3 of the Reasons with reference to G 3/97, OJ 1999, 245, point 2.1 of the Reasons). Hence, it had to be established whether the appellant, in particular at the time of filing the notice of opposition and the notice of appeal, had the status of a legal person.

The board referred to Section 1169 of the (UK) Companies Act 2006, according to which a company is dormant during any period in which it has no significant accounting transactions. Although inactive, a dormant company was not struck off, but remained on the Companies House register. This meant that a dormant company maintained the status of a legal person. The board thus agreed with the conclusion drawn to this effect in T 184/11.

It followed therefore that the appellant had the status of a legal person at the time of filing the notice of opposition and throughout the opposition and appeal proceedings. The respondent's argument in this respect was therefore not convincing.

Whether the appellant had engaged in transactions which could have led to the loss of its dormant status went beyond the assessment of its status as a legal person. The assessment of potential financial relationships between a dormant company and an appointed representative was of no relevance to establishing the legal status of the company as a legal person either. Moreover, the opponent's representative was appointed in accordance with the requirements of the EPC. Hence, there was no reason for the board to doubt that the representative was duly authorised. The remaining provisions under the EPC for the admissibility of the opposition and appeal, including the payment of the relevant fees, were also complied with.

As regards the contention that the appellant had been acting on behalf of a third party with the intention of avoiding any liability for possible costs apportioned to the appellant under Art. 104 EPC, the board noted that acting on behalf of a third party could not be seen as a circumvention of the law unless further circumstances were involved and there was no requirement under the EPC that a party be equipped with sufficient financial means to comply with a merely hypothetical costs order. Moreover, the EPC did not offer the patent proprietor any kind of guarantee that an opponent would be able in fact to reimburse costs awarded against them (G 3/97, point 3.2.6 of the Reasons).

For these reasons, the board did not see any abuse of procedure by the appellant which might render the opposition and/or the appeal inadmissible.

The board thus refused the respondent's requests that the decision under appeal be set aside and the opposition be held inadmissible or that the appeal be held inadmissible.

Zusammenfassung

In T 1893/22, the proprietor-appellant had requested an enlargement of the board due to the case potentially setting a precedent regarding proper representation in proceedings established by the EPC. The board held that the case did not go beyond what might be handled by a board with an ordinary composition. Mr N, the representative of the opponent, a French company in the form initially of a SASU (société simplifiée unipersonnelle), was the President of the SASU and also a professional representative.

The proprietor had contested the admissibility of the opposition relying on the following points: (i) the opponent's professional representative could not represent the company since he was simultaneously managing the legal entity he represented; (ii) the identity of the opponent was not unequivocally determined; (iii) the opponent carrying out activities reserved to professional representatives without the necessary qualifications circumvented the principles of representation; (iv) the opponent's change of name; (v) the reference in the notice of opposition to the German translation of the claims.

Concerning the representation, the board stated that – contrary to the proprietor's allegations – Art. 133 and 134 EPC together with R. 152 EPC and the Decision of the President of the EPO of 12 July 2007 on the filing of authorisations (OJ SE 3/2007, 128) indeed constituted a complete and self-contained set of rules on representation in proceedings established by the EPC (a request in this respect to refer the question to the Enlarged Board was also submitted by the proprietor). A legal person having its seat in an EPC contracting state is not obliged to be represented by a professional representative (Art. 133(1) EPC). Furthermore, persons whose names appear on the list of professional representatives are entitled to act in all proceedings established by the EPC (Art. 134 EPC). A legal person having its seat in an EPC contracting state can act in proceedings before the EPO through its legal representatives. At the time the opposition was filed, Mr N in his capacity as President of the SASU was entitled to represent the SASU since under French law (Art. L. 227 Commercial Code) he was entitled to act on behalf of the legal person in all circumstances. Mr N as a professional representative would have been entitled to act not only as the president of the SASU, but also as a professional representative appointed by that legal person.

For the sake of completeness, the board detailed why neither the references to French law (Civil Code) nor German law, nor the reference to general principles under Art. 125 EPC could, in its view, prevent the company from appointing Mr N as its professional representative before the EPO.

Regarding the identity of the opponent, the board held that the opposition was clearly filed on behalf of SARL Cabinet NÜ (see the notice of opposition which mentioned the initial legal form of the company "SASU Cabinet NÜ"). The only uncertainty, based on the submissions of the proprietor itself, concerned whether Mr N was representing the opponent as a European patent attorney or in his capacity as the president of that company. Nonetheless, this alleged ambiguity could not raise any doubt about the identity of the opponent.

The alleged circumvention of the law was also rejected by the board, which observed first that this would occur if a person not entitled to act as a professional representative performed all the activities typically carried out by professional representatives while assuming the role of a party, in order to circumvent the prohibition on unqualified representation, but Mr N was a qualified professional representative.

As regards the change of the opponent's name, the board endorsed the analysis set out in the contested decision (Art. 15(8) RPBA). A change of legal form of the company (SASU to SARL) had taken place, which indicated a change of name and not a transfer of assets to a different entity. The use of the old legal form on the company stationery in a submission filed close to the date of change of the legal form did not undermine this. The reference to the German version of the claims did not make the respective attacks incomprehensible. In conclusion, the opposition was admissible and the request for a referral was rejected. The appeal was also dismissed.

Zusammenfassung

In T 123/22 wurde ein Einwand gegen Anspruch 1 des erteilten Patents auf Grundlage des Einspruchsgrundes nach Art. 100(a) EPÜ in Verbindung mit Art. 54 EPÜ erhoben. Als Reaktion auf diesen Einwand ersetzte die Beschwerdeführerin (Patentinhaberin) diesen unabhängigen Anspruch durch drei andere unabhängige Ansprüche. Die Beschwerdegegnerin war der Meinung, dass diese Vorgehensweise nicht von R. 80 EPÜ gedeckt sei.

Nach Ansicht der Beschwerdegegnerin erfordert R. 80 EPÜ, dass der Patentinhaber auf einen Einwand gegen einen unabhängigen Anspruch grundsätzlich lediglich mit einer Änderung dieses einen unabhängigen Anspruchs reagiert. Sie verwies auf mehrere Entscheidungen, die Einschränkungen bei der Ersetzung eines einzigen erteilen Anspruchs durch mehrere unabhängige Ansprüche aufzeigen würden, wie z. B. T 181/02 (wonach die Ersetzung eines einzigen erteilten unabhängigen Anspruchs durch zwei oder mehr unabhängige Ansprüche nur in Ausnahmefällen eine durch einen Einspruchsgrund veranlasste Änderung darstellen könne) und T 453/19. Sie führte zudem T 2063/15 an, wonach sich auf die Beschreibung stützende Änderungen grundsätzlich gegen R. 80 EPÜ verstießen.

Die Kammer folgte dieser Argumentation jedoch nicht und war der Ansicht, dass aus R. 80 EPÜ keine allgemeinen Vorgaben ableitbar seien, in welcher Form ein Patentinhaber Ansprüche ändern darf, damit diese Änderung als durch einen Einspruchsgrund veranlasst angesehen werden können (s. auch T 2982/18 und T 359/13). Für die Beurteilung des Erfordernisses von R. 80 EPÜ sei alleine maßgeblich, ob die vorgenommene Änderung durch einen Einspruchsgrund veranlasst ist. Hierbei sei zu prüfen, ob die Änderung als ernsthafter Versuch zu werten sei, einem Einspruchsgrund zu begegnen (s. T 750/11).

Für die Beurteilung, ob eine Änderung von Ansprüchen im Sinne der R. 80 EPÜ durch einen Einspruchsgrund veranlasst wurde, sei es daher unerheblich, ob die in einen angegriffenen Anspruch zusätzlich aufgenommenen Merkmale aus abhängigen Ansprüchen oder aus der Beschreibung stammen.

Bezüglich des Ersetzens eines von einem Einspruchsgrund betroffenen unabhängigen Anspruchs durch mehrere unabhängige Ansprüche stimmte die Kammer der Entscheidung T 431/22 zu, wonach R. 80 EPÜ einer solchen Änderung nicht entgegensteht, sofern der Gegenstand der neuen unabhängigen Ansprüche im Vergleich zum Gegenstand des angegriffenen Anspruchs eingeschränkt oder geändert ist. Wie in T 431/22 dargelegt, sei es grundsätzlich legitim, dass ein Patentinhaber versucht, Teilbereiche des angegriffenen unabhängigen Anspruchs zum Überwinden eines Einspruchsgrunds gegebenenfalls mittels zweier oder mehrerer unabhängiger Ansprüche abzudecken (s. auch T 2290/12). Wie in T 99/04 aufgeführt, bestehe der Zweck von R. 80 EPÜ nicht darin, einen Patentinhaber daran zu hindern, das Patent unter Berücksichtigung der Einspruchsgründe so breit wie möglich aufrechtzuerhalten.

Zusammenfassend könne die Frage, ob das Ersetzen eines unabhängigen Anspruchs durch mehrere andere unabhängige Ansprüche im Sinne der R. 80 EPÜ durch einen Einspruchsgrund veranlasst wurde, nicht grundsätzlich verneint oder auf die von der Beschwerdeführerin sowie in T 181/02 genannten Kategorien von Ausnahmekonstellationen beschränkt werden. Vielmehr bedürfe es diesbezüglich regelmäßig einer Beurteilung im Einzelfall (T 263/05).

Vorliegend stellte die Kammer fest, dass die Patentinhaberin mit dem Ersetzen des angegriffenen unabhängigen Anspruchs das legitime Ziel verfolgte, durch drei andere unabhängige Ansprüche Teilbereiche des angegriffenen Anspruchs aufrechtzuerhalten, welche ihrer Meinung nach nicht vom geltend gemachten Einspruchsgrund betroffen waren. Alle drei neu hinzugekommenen Ansprüche wurden im Verhältnis zum angegriffenen und nicht weiter verfolgten Anspruch eingeschränkt. Diese Einschränkungen dienten im jeweiligen Anspruch – und somit auch insgesamt – augenscheinlich der Überwindung des erhobenen Einspruchsgrundes. Im vorliegenden Fall erfüllte der Hauptantrag daher das Erfordernis der R. 80 EPÜ.