1. Article 123(2) CBE – extension de l'objet de la demande
1.1. Principes généraux
Selon l'art. 123(2) CBE, la demande de brevet européen ou le brevet européen ne peut être modifié de manière que son objet s'étende au-delà du contenu de la demande telle qu'elle a été déposée. Dans le cadre de la révision de la CBE, le texte de l'art. 123(2) CBE a été modifié.
La notion de "contenu de la demande telle que deposée" se rapporte aux parties d'une demande de brevet européen qui sont déterminantes pour la divulgation de l'invention, à savoir la description, les revendications et les dessins (décisions G 3/89, JO 1993, 117, et G 11/91, JO 1993, 125). Voir le présent chapitre II.E.1.2. "Contenu de la demande telle que déposée : parties d'une demande déterminantes pour la divulgation de l'invention" ci-dessous.
L'idée sous-jacente de l'art. 123(2) CBE est "d'interdire au demandeur de conforter sa position par l'ajout d'un élément non divulgué dans la demande telle qu'elle a été déposée, ce qui lui procurerait un avantage injustifié et pourrait porter préjudice à la sécurité juridique des tiers se fondant sur le contenu de la demande initiale" (cf. G 1/93, JO 1994, 541) ; s'il en allait autrement, le public pourrait devoir faire face à des revendications qui s'étendent au-delà de ce qui a été divulgué dans la demande telle qu'elle a été déposée et publiée (T 740/91 et T 1227/10). Le public ne doit pas être confronté à une étendue de la protection qui ne pourrait avoir été établie par un homme du métier ayant étudié l'ensemble du contenu de l'exposé technique de la demande de brevet initialement déposée (décision T 157/90, voir également l'affaire T 187/91 et l'affaire T 2327/18, qui cite la décision G 2/10, JO 2012, 376, point 4.5.5 des motifs).
Conformément à la "norme de référence" ("gold standard") (G 2/10, JO 2012, 376), utilisée pour apprécier s'il est satisfait à l'art. 123(2) CBE, toute modification apportée aux parties d'une demande de brevet européen ou d'un brevet européen relatives à la divulgation (description, revendications et dessins) est soumise à l'interdiction impérative d'extension de l'objet énoncée à l'art. 123(2) CBE et ne pourra donc être effectuée, quel que soit son contexte, que dans les limites de ce que l'homme du métier est objectivement en mesure, à la date de dépôt, de déduire directement et sans équivoque de l'ensemble de ces documents tels qu'ils ont été déposés, en se fondant sur les connaissances générales dans le domaine considéré (G 3/89, JO 1993,117 ; G 11/91, JO 1993, 125). Après la modification, aucune nouvelle information technique ne peut être présentée à l'homme du métier (décision G 2/10 ; voir toutefois la décision G 1/16 pour des "disclaimers" non divulgués). Pour plus de détails, voir également le chapitre II.E.1.3. ci-dessous, intitulé "Norme utilisée pour apprécier s'il est satisfait à l'art. 123(2) CBE" ; pour plus de détails sur la décision G 1/16, JO 2018, A70, voir chapitre II.E.1.7 "Disclaimer" ci-dessous.
L'art. 123(2) CBE s'applique à toutes les modifications de la demande de brevet ou du brevet, ce qui comprend les rectifications de la description, des revendications ou des dessins conformément à la règle 139 CBE, deuxième phrase (pour plus de détails, voir le présent chapitre II.E.4. "Correction d'erreurs dans la description, les revendications et les dessins").
La Grande Chambre de recours a souligné à quel point il est important d'appliquer de manière uniforme la notion de divulgation (en se référant aux art. 54, 87 et 123 CBE ; cf. G 2/10, JO 2012, 376, point 4.6 des motifs, citant la décision G 1/03, JO 2004, 413 ; voir aussi G 1/15, JO 2017, A82, se référant à la décision G 2/98, JO 2001, 413). Voir aussi par ex. T 330/14.
Dans le cas des demandes divisionnaires, il convient d'appliquer les mêmes principes pour déterminer si l'objet s'étend au-delà du contenu de la demande antérieure telle qu'elle a été déposée (G 1/05 date: 2007-06-28, JO 2008, 271, point 5.1 des motifs). Les décisions qui traitent de ce type de cas sont donc également examinées dans le présent chapitre.
Les mêmes principes sont également applicables au motif d'opposition prévu à l'art. 100c) CBE.
Le motif d'opposition prévu à l'art. 100c) CBE et les dispositions correspondantes de l'art. 123(2) CBE concernant toute modification apportée au brevet dans le cadre d'une procédure d'opposition ou d'une procédure de recours faisant suite à une opposition, ont la même importance fondamentale que d'autres dispositions, telles que, par exemple, l'exigence de nouveauté, l'activité inventive ou la suffisance de l'exposé, pour décider si un brevet peut être maintenu ; de plus, l'étendue de l'objet revendiqué aux termes de l'art. 123(2) CBE n'est pas une question de "forme" du brevet qui pourrait relever d'un titre "exigence de forme", mais une question de fond (décision T 2171/14).
- T 1054/22
Résumé
In T 1054/22 the examining division had concluded that claim 1 of the main request did not fulfil requirements of Art. 123(2) or 76(1) EPC, among other things, and it refused the patent application.
In its submissions on appeal, the applicant had argued that applying the criteria of G 1/93 (point 16 of the Reasons), the amendments did not result in an unwarranted advantage. Amended claim 1 of the main request was based on the earlier application as filed. This applied in particular to the amendments concerning the omega-6 to omega-3 ratio of 4:1 or greater and the concentration of omega-6 fatty acids (4-75% by weight of total lipids) and omega-3 fatty acids (0.1-30% by weight of total lipids).
The board dismissed the appeal. It explained that determining whether an amendment complied with the requirements of Art. 123(2) and 76(1) EPC was assessed using the "gold standard". This term was coined in G 2/10, in which the jurisprudence developed by the Enlarged Board in opinion G 3/89 and decision G 11/91 was confirmed.
The board explained that G 1/93 primarily concerned a case in which a granted claim could not be maintained unamended in opposition proceedings because the claim was found to contravene Art. 123(2) EPC. The examining division had allowed an amendment that should not have been allowed. As explained in G 2/10 (point 4.3 of the Reasons, last paragraph), G 1/93 was not intended to modify the "gold standard".
According to G 1/93, the purpose of Art. 123(2) EPC (and Art. 76(1) EPC) was to prevent an applicant from gaining an unwarranted advantage by obtaining patent protection for something it had not properly disclosed on the date of filing of the application. An added feature limiting the scope of the claim may still contravene Art. 123(2) EPC. An example of this, explicitly mentioned in G 1/93, is a limiting feature that creates an inventive selection not disclosed in the application as filed or otherwise derivable therefrom.
In the case in hand, value ranges had been added to claim 1 of the main request, in features a), (i) and (ii). The question was whether the skilled person would have derived these amendments directly and unambiguously, using common general knowledge, from the entirety of the earlier application as filed. What had to be examined was not only whether there was a basis for each of the features added by the amendments but also whether the skilled person would have derived the combination of features a), (i) and (ii), and that combination of features alone, from the earlier application as filed.
The board concluded that no basis could be found in the earlier application as filed for the combination of the concentration of omega-6 fatty acids of 4-75% by weight of total lipids and omega-3 fatty acids of 0.1-30% by weight of total lipids (feature (i) of claim 1 of the main request). As to the ratio (feature a) of claim 1 of the main request), there was no basis in the earlier application as filed for an open-ended ratio of omega-6 to omega-3 fatty acids of 4:1 or greater. Thus, claim 1 of the main request contravened Art. 76(1) EPC.
- T 2103/22
Résumé
In T 2103/22 the board, in order to assess compliance with the requirements of Art. 123(2) EPC, had to first determine the subject-matter effectively defined by claim 1 of the main request. In particular, the board interpreted the meaning of the following terms as well as the meaning of their combination:
a) "said polyester resin is a blended polyester resin which is a blend of a lowly crystalline polyester resin and a highly crystalline polyester resin at a weight ratio of 90:10 to 10:90 (…)"
b) "a layer of a polyester resin which comprises an ethylene terephthalate unit formed on at least one surface of the metal sheet".
The respondent (opponent) adhered to the conclusion of the opposition division which had been reached considering that "is" in term a) was to be read as "comprises", which meant that any other component different from the ones specifically mentioned in said claim 1 could be present in the blended polyester resin. The board disagreed and stated that, although it was correct that the normal rule of claim construction was that the terms used in a claim should be given their broadest technically sensible meaning, the literal reading of this passage defined that "said polyester resin" consisted of the lowly crystalline and highly crystalline polyester resins further defined in claim 1 of the main request, in the given weight ratio. In that regard, the board noted that, according to established case law (Case Law of the Boards of Appeal, 10th ed. 2022, II.A.6.2), the term "consists of" meant that the definition of "said polyester resin" was given in a "closed" manner, i.e. it excluded the presence of any other components other than the ones specifically defined (in the case at issue the lowly and highly crystalline polyester resins).
On b), the board found that the term "a layer of a polyester resin" defined, according to its literal reading, that the polyester therein mentioned, i.e. "which comprises an ethylene terephthalate unit", was the main component of the layer. However, this wording neither imposed that the polyester resin was the sole component of the layer, nor that it was the sole resin possibly present in the layer. The board further held that the reference to "unit" in that passage made it clear that the term "which" made reference to the polyester resin and not to the layer. This, in the board's view, would also be the logical reading of the claim made by the skilled person, considering that the term "which" usually makes reference to the word directly preceding it.
As the subject-matter of claim 1 of the main request was defined by the combination of terms a) and b), the board also determined the meaning of the combination of these two terms. It held that the polyester resin specified in the term "a layer of a polyester resin" was identical to the "said polyester resin" further defined in claim 1, i.e. it consisted of a blend of only the lowly and highly crystalline polyester resins.
Taking into account the further definitions of the lowly and highly crystalline polyester resins in claim 1, the board concluded that both of them were "a polyester resin that comprises an ethylene terephthalate unit". Therefore, the term "which comprises an ethylene terephthalate unit" of claim 1 of the main request was in fact redundant (i.e. not further limiting). Contrary to the view of the opposition division, the definitions of the highly and the lowly crystalline polyester resins further imposed that said terephthalate unit had to be present in majority since, otherwise, the resin would not be a "polyethylene terephthalate" anymore.
To determine whether the requirements of Art. 123(2) EPC were met, the board assessed if the deletion of the term "chiefly" from claim 1 of the application as filed resulted in added-matter. It saw no reason to deviate from the literal sense of the term "chiefly", which was that the polyester resin of the layer so defined should principally comprise an ethylene terephthalate unit not as the sole component but as the most important component of the polyester.
According to the board, adopting for the relevant passages of the application as filed the same reading as the one outlined for the corresponding passages of claim 1 of the main request, the term "which chiefly comprises an ethylene terephthalate unit" could only be held to be redundant (i.e. not further limiting) in view of the other features defining the valid support in the application as filed for the claimed subject-matter. Therefore, the presence or not in claim 1 of the main request of the terms "which chiefly comprises an ethylene terephthalate unit" or "chiefly" contained therein, did not lead to added-matter pursuant to Art. 123(2) EPC.