1. Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités
Vue d'ensemble
1. Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités
Dans la décision G 6/83 (JO 1985, 67), la Grande Chambre de recours a constaté que du fait qu'elles ne sont pas rétroactives, les dispositions de la Convention de Vienne ne peuvent être appliquées directement à la CBE (art. 4 de la Convention de Vienne). Au moment de la conclusion de la CBE, la Convention de Vienne n'était pas encore entrée en vigueur. Il existe cependant des précédents faisant autorité en faveur d'une application des règles d'interprétation de la Convention de Vienne à des traités qui n'en relevaient pas directement (voir aussi G 2/12, G 2/13). Ainsi, la Cour Internationale de Justice s'est-elle référée aux principes de la Convention de Vienne relativement à des situations où, étroitement parlant, cette Convention ne pouvait être invoquée. De leur côté, la Cour Européenne des Droits de l'Homme, la Cour Fédérale Constitutionnelle allemande (Bundesverfassungsgericht) et la Chambre des Lords (House of Lords Angleterre) ont appliqué à des traités en dehors de leur domaine strict les art. 31 et 32 de la Convention de Vienne. Après avoir envisagé tous les aspects du problème, la Grande Chambre de recours estime qu'il est justifié que l'Office Européen des Brevets se réfère à la Convention de Vienne, pour l'interprétation de la CBE.
Dans la décision J 10/98 (JO 2003, 184), la chambre de recours juridique a considéré que bien que la Convention de Vienne ne s'applique pas expressément à l'interprétation de la CBE, du PCT ou de la Convention de Paris du fait qu'elle est entrée en vigueur après ces traités, elle contient néanmoins, ainsi que l'a reconnu la Grande Chambre de recours dans la décision G 6/83, de précieux principes d'interprétation pour tous les traités, et ce qu'ils soient entrés en vigueur avant ou après cette convention. Dans la décision T 1173/97 (JO 1999, 609), la chambre a constaté que bien que la Convention de Vienne ne soit pas applicable dans le cas de la CBE, elle a une autorité considérable et a souvent été citée par les chambres de recours lorsqu'elles appliquaient les principes qui y sont énoncés.
- T 1553/22
Résumé
In T 1553/22, the application concerned the generation of pig-human chimeric animals with the aim of using them as a source of human vasculature and blood. The appellant's arguments could be summarised as follows:
The examining division's approach to chimeras was unduly restrictive and was not in line with the requirements of Art. 53(a) EPC or R. 26(1) EPC, which provided that Directive 98/44/EC of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions be used as supplementary means of interpretation for patent applications concerning biotechnological inventions. While Recital 38 of the Directive 98/44/EC referred to the exclusion of chimeras involving human totipotent cells or germ cells from patentability, the claims in suit were directed to blastocysts and methods which involved pluripotent cells. Moreover, the purpose of the invention was to provide humanised vasculature in swine, suitable for transplantation, rather than providing chimeric animals in which human cells would be found in multiple organs. Art. 53(a) EPC was to be construed narrowly. It was the intended exploitation of the invention that was to be taken into account when analysing compliance with the requirements of Art. 53(a) EPC (see T 356/93, T 866/01 and T 315/03).
The examining division had refused the application for ethical reasons pursuant to Art. 53(a) in conjunction with R. 26(1) EPC and Recital 38 of the Directive 98/44/EC. It had also concluded that, although the invention was directed to the genetic modification of animals, the exclusion under R. 28(1)(d) EPC was not applicable because the outcome of the so-called "balancing test" developed in the jurisprudence for an objection under this provision was in favour of the invention.
The board held that if an invention corresponds to one of the examples set out in the non-exhaustive list of R. 28(1) EPC, there is no room for tests aimed at balancing possible risks associated with the implementation of the invention and its benefit for mankind. Without disregarding the principle of narrow interpretation of exceptions, the board took the view that the exclusion of Art. 53(a) in conjunction with R. 28(1) EPC may extend to other chimeras, where the rationale underlying the examples identified in Recital 38 is also applicable to the chimeras concerned. Thus, by means of R. 26(1) EPC a further special case is added to the non-exhaustive list of R. 28(1) EPC.
When considering the possible rationale underlying the specific exclusions of Recital 38, the board found that the reason why the chimeras identified in Recital 38 are regarded as offensive against human dignity is due to concerns that, in chimeras including human germ cells or totipotent cells, these human cells may integrate into the brain and/or develop into germ cells and result in a chimera with human or human-like capabilities.
This reason is straightforward for chimeras including totipotent cells, which in view of their developmental capability to form an entire organism may form a brain with human-like cognitive abilities or human germ cells. However the same reason applies to the application at hand, which concerned pluripotent cells, which despite lacking the ability to differentiate into totipotent cells or cells of the placenta, nevertheless have the ability to differentiate into neural cells or germ cells. Thus, if an invention relates to a situation where human cells might integrate into the chimera's brain, potentially giving the chimera human-like cognitive or behavioural capabilities, or into its germ line, potentially giving it the ability to pass on humanised traits, the board considers that the underlying rationale of Recital 38 of the Directive would be relevant and shall be taken into account in examining compliance with Art. 53(a) in conjunction with R. 28(1) EPC.
The board stated in its catchword that human-animal chimeras and processes to produce them are excluded from patentability in accordance with Art. 53(a) EPC if the invention offends against human dignity. This is the case for instance if it is not excluded that the human cells involved in the chimera integrate into the brain and/or develop into germ cells of the chimera, and result in a chimera with human or human-like capabilities.
- Compilation 2023 “Abstracts of decisions”