3. Klarheit der Ansprüche
3.3. Deutlichkeit von breiten Ansprüchen
In T 238/88 (ABl. 1992, 709) wurde festgestellt, dass die Klarheit eines Anspruchs nicht schon durch die Breite eines darin enthaltenen Fachbegriffs (z. B. "Alkyl") beeinträchtigt ist, wenn die Bedeutung dieses Begriffs – an sich oder anhand der Beschreibung – für den Fachmann eindeutig ist (s. auch T 950/97, T 103/00, T 1173/03, T 2068/10, T 745/11; s. auch dieses Kapitel II.A.6).
In T 935/14 wies die Kammer jedoch auch darauf hin, dass breite Merkmale nur dann als klar gelten können, wenn der Fachmann die Grenzen des – breiten – Schutzumfangs eindeutig ableiten kann. Dies macht den Unterschied zwischen breit, aber klar und breit und vage.
In T 523/91 führten die Formulierungen "Kunststoffen in Verbindung mit Einlagen" sowie "diese Einlage gewickelt oder gefaltet mit dem Kunststoffgranulat verbunden" nach Meinung der Kammer nicht zu einem unklaren Anspruchsgegenstand im Sinne von Art. 84 EPÜ 1973, da die Art der Verbindung zwar mehrere Möglichkeiten umfasse, daraus aber wohl ein breiter, nicht aber ein unklarer Anspruchsgegenstand resultiere. Die Anspruchsbreite könne jedoch nicht als solche, sondern nur im Zusammenhang mit anderen Kriterien, wie z. B. Neuheit, erfinderische Tätigkeit oder Ausführbarkeit, angegriffen werden.
Auch in T 688/91 präzisierte die Kammer, dass die Breite eines Anspruchs nicht mit Mangel an Klarheit gleichzusetzen ist. Der Anspruch lautete: "Integrierte mikroprogrammierte Vorrichtung [...] mit einer Vorrichtung zur Erzeugung der T-States [...] dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass [...] die Erzeugung der T-States [...] jeweils in Abhängigkeit von vorhergehenden T-States und von Zustandsparametern wie den Momentanwerten von Zustands- bzw. Modussignalen [...] erfolgt und [...]". Selbst wenn das Wort "wie" als "beispielsweise" verstanden wird, sodass die anschließenden Angaben als nicht einschränkend zu interpretieren sind, ist nach Auffassung der Kammer das Wort "Zustandsparameter" insofern klar, als es besagt, dass die T-State-Erzeugung in Abhängigkeit von irgendwelchen Größen erfolgen soll, welche einen Zustand der Vorrichtung repräsentieren. Zwar ist der Anspruch wegen der allgemeinen Interpretierbarkeit der verwendeten Begriffe als breit anzusehen; Breite ist jedoch nicht mit Mangel an Klarheit gleichzusetzen.
In T 630/93 stellte die Kammer fest, dass nach der impliziten Aussage des Art. 84 Satz 1 EPÜ 1973 in einem Anspruch technische Merkmale oder Schritte nicht immer in allen Einzelheiten angegeben werden müssten. Die wesentlichen Merkmale hätten, auch wenn sie in der Regel technisch ausgedrückt seien, häufig eine Abgrenzung der Erfindung nach außen zum Zweck und nicht die detaillierte Definition der innerhalb dieser Grenzen liegenden Erfindung. Daher seien wesentliche Merkmale oft sehr allgemeiner Natur und könnten sich in Extremfällen auf bloße Prinzipien oder einen neuen Gedanken beschränken (s. auch unter Kapitel II.C. "Ausreichende Offenbarung").
In T 29/05 wurde festgestellt, dass die Behauptung, die fraglichen Ansprüche beinhalteten einen mit dem Anmeldungsgegenstand nicht zusammenhängenden Gegenstand, rein hypothetisch war und dass die Prüfungsabteilung auch keinen Beleg für sein mögliches Vorhandensein im Stand der Technik vorgelegt hatte. Mangels eines derartigen Belegs musste davon ausgegangen werden, dass jedes einzelne anspruchsgemäße Nukleinsäuremolekül zu dem in der Anmeldung offenbarten Gegenstand in Beziehung stand. Dass eine große Zahl möglicher Nukleinsäuresequenzen unter den Anspruch fallen konnte, rechtfertigte keinen Einwand der mangelnden Klarheit.
In T 2154/11 befand die Kammer, die Einwände der Prüfungsabteilung, dass die Begriffe "metadata describing an event", "taking" und "connecting" breit seien und wohlbekannte Tätigkeiten umfassten, seien per se keine stichhaltigen Gründe für mangelnde Klarheit. Die Tatsache, dass einige dieser Verfahrensschritte so verstanden werden könnten, dass sie sich auf "gedankliche Tätigkeiten" oder "normale menschliche Tätigkeiten" beziehen, sei ebenfalls kein triftiger Grund für die Feststellung mangelnder Klarheit, solange diese Schritte wie im vorliegenden Fall keine Mehrdeutigkeit bewirkten. Wenn ein Verfahrensschritt so ausgelegt werden könne, dass er sich auf eine normale menschliche Tätigkeit beziehe, dann müsse diese Auslegung bei der Beurteilung von Neuheit und erfinderischer Tätigkeit berücksichtigt werden.
Der Grundsatz, wonach ein breiter Anspruch nicht per se undeutlich ist, wurde auch in z. B. T 456/91, T 393/91, T 530/94, T 950/97, T 1345/08, T 2220/09, T 125/15, T 2676/16, T 901/16 bestätigt.
- T 147/22
Zusammenfassung
In T 147/22 the respondent (opponent) raised several clarity objections, which were mainly directed to the expression "consisting essentially of" and to the fact that the ingredients cited in claim 1 were associated with a function.
On the first aspect, the board noted that the expression "consisting essentially of" limited the ingredients in the composition of claim 1 to those defined in components (a) to (d), although further non-active ingredients could be present provided they did not materially affect the chemical stability of TAS-102. The respondent had argued that the expression "consisting essentially of" rendered claim 1 unclear because the skilled person would not know which were the compounds that did not impair the stability of TAS-102 in the composition, and the patent did not contain any information in that respect. According to the board, however, the nature and amount of those additional ingredients was strongly limited by the condition that they must not impair TAS-102 stability. Furthermore, the skilled person confronted with a composition containing components (a) to (d) and additional ingredients could easily determine whether or not the additional ingredients impair TAS-102 stability. Testing the chemical stability of active compounds in a composition was standard practice in the field of pharmaceutical formulations. Such tests were illustrated in Test Examples 1 to 5 of the patent for the particular case of TAS-102. Therefore, the skilled person could easily determine by standard comparative tests whether or not a given composition consisted essentially of components (a) to (d).
With regard to the functional definition of the ingredients in claim 1, the board held that the criterion for assessing whether a compound had the function assigned to it was the function (or functions) that the skilled person would assign to that compound in the context of a given formulation. Contrary to the respondent's view, the formulator's intention was irrelevant in that respect. It was undisputed that the functional features "excipient", "disintegrating agent", "binder", "lubricant", "flavouring agent", "colourant" and "taste-masking agent" were standard in the technical field of pharmaceutical formulations. The skilled person would have no difficulty in determining whether a given formulation ingredient fulfils one or more of these functions on the basis of common general knowledge. These were functional features which were generally allowed if the invention could not be defined more precisely without unduly restricting the scope of the invention. Furthermore, in the present case, the main ingredients were not solely defined by functional features. They were further limited by structural features: for instance, the excipient according to component (b) was selected from lactose, sucrose, mannitol and erythritol. In view of common general knowledge and the structural limitations of the functional features, the board considered that the definition of the ingredients in claim 1 was not unclear.
The respondent's objection was based on the possibility that an ingredient fulfilled more than one function and, depending on its function, the amount of the compound in the composition could vary. For instance, polyvinyl alcohol was generally known to be a binder and a lubricant. If it was considered a binder, it could be present in an amount of 0.001 to 5% by mass while it could not be present if it was considered a lubricant.
The board disagreed. The fact that polyvinyl alcohol was known to be a binder and a lubricant did not render the claim unclear. If polyvinyl alcohol was present in the composition, it necessarily played the role of a binder, even if it also fulfilled the function of a lubricant. Therefore, it should be counted as a binder that may be present in an amount of 0.001 to 5% by mass in the composition. Considering arbitrarily that polyvinyl alcohol could function exclusively as a lubricant and that therefore its presence would render the composition different from the one in claim 1 would be unrealistic. Certainly this was not how the skilled person would read the claim.
Moreover, the board stated that the fact that "excipient" was a very broad term did not mean that it was unclear. "Excipient" was a standard term in pharmaceutical formulations.
- T 1526/22
Zusammenfassung
In T 1526/22 the application related to a method (and a corresponding apparatus) for estimating a "state" of an ego vehicle, for use in a motor vehicle driver assistance system for the ego vehicle. The examining division had objected that claims 1 and 12 failed to meet the requirements of Art. 84 EPC for two reasons:
(1) the wording "the first state and the second state each include at least one local object attribute describing a local object located in the vicinity of the ego vehicle, wherein the local object is a local vehicle" did not allow to unambiguously derive the meaning of an attribute describing a local object, for example whether it was limited or not to a colour of said local vehicle; and
(2) the wording "for a motor vehicle driver assistance for an ego vehicle" suggested that an effect supporting motor vehicle assistance was to be produced, which was however not apparent from the wording of the claim.
In both cases, it was said that claims 1 and 12 had to be limited in order for the claimed subject-matter to be in agreement with the effect and problem argued by the appellant. Reference was made in that respect to the Guidelines F-IV, 4.5.1.
As regards (1) the board considered the recited feature to be broad but not unclear: "at least one local object attribute" could be any attribute of the local vehicle that was suitable for use by a driver assistance system. It could be, for instance, the local vehicle's position or velocity or even its colour (e.g. as it could be relevant for a classification of that vehicle).
As regards (2) the board interpreted the wording of claim 1 "an apparatus for a motor vehicle driver assistance system for an ego vehicle" as meaning an apparatus suitable for a motor vehicle driver assistance system for an ego vehicle, as is usual for a purpose feature in an apparatus claim in the form "apparatus for ...". Claim 1 did not require the claimed apparatus to be configured to provide the output of the state estimator as input to a driver assistance system.
Claim 12 was directed to "a method for estimating a state of an ego vehicle, the method being implemented on a compute module, the state being for use in a motor vehicle driver assistance system for the ego vehicle". The board noted that last statement appeared to define an intended use of the calculated state obtained by the claimed method. This was not a purpose feature of the kind "method for...", which could in certain circumstances be considered to imply a corresponding method step, but rather of the kind "data for...". The claim did not specify any method step in which the calculated state would be actually used for that purpose, nor did the claim comprise any other feature that would establish that said use was part of the claimed method, be it explicitly or implicitly. The board understood this feature as merely requiring the calculated state to be suitable for use in a motor vehicle driver assistance system for the ego vehicle, in which case there would be no clarity problem. However, in view of the other objections, this issue was left open.
Moreover, the board observed that the examining division had not referred to any specific passage of the description in support of its objections. Hence, the passage of the Guidelines F-IV, 4.5.1 "Objections arising from missing essential features", cited by the examining division, did not support the raised objections.
However, the board raised further objections and concluded that claims 1 and 12 lacked clarity under Art. 84 EPC. In particular, the board noted that according to the third and fourth embodiments, reflected in dependent claim 5, the prediction model and the update model were "combined into a combined ANN". In these embodiments, the combined ANN carried out an estimation of the second state taking as input the first state and the measurements of the second state but without necessarily performing separate prediction and update calculations, as suggested by claim 1. This cast doubt as to how the features of claim 1 related to the prediction and update elements were to be interpreted, rendering claim 1 unclear. Similar considerations applied to claim 12.