9.2.11 Évaluation de caractéristiques relatives à des algorithmes mathématiques

Catchword:  see reasons 4.7 for exceptional cases in the sense of points 98 and 128 of G 1/19

Catchword: 

A neural network defines a class of mathematical functions which, as such, is excluded matter. As for other "nontechnical" matter, it can therefore only be considered for the assessment of inventive step when used to solve a technical problem, e.g. when trained with specific data for a specific technical task.

Catchwords: 

No technical effect of the distinguishing features over the disclosure of document D1 can be derived over the whole scope of claim 1 (see decision G 1/19 of 10 March 2021, sections 82 and 95).

Catchwords: 

A similarity [of the claimed subject-matter] to a business or administrative solution is not a sufficient reason for denyinCatchwords:  A similarity [of the claimed subject-matter] to a business or administrative solution is not a sufficient reason for denying a technical contribution of a claim feature applied in a technical context and involving technical considerations. Put another way, technical considerations in the technical context cannot be negated merely on the basis of a non-technical analogy. ... The analogy to a post office, essentially invoked by the contested decision, is used in technical literature in order to describe functionality of the transport layer (layer 4) of the OSI model. However, in the Board's view, it would not be sound to assert, only based on this analogy, that communication protocols implementing this layer's functionality lack technical character. (See points 3.2.7 and 3.2.8 of the reasons).

Résumé

In T 1594/20 bezweifelte die Kammer, dass überhaupt eine Simulation eines technischen Gegenstands vorlag. Eine mathematisch rechnerische Optimierung bewirke nicht zwangsläufig auch eine Simulation des zugrunde liegenden physikalischen Vorgangs (hier Warentransport), sondern es seien vom hier vorliegenden Anspruchsgegenstand auch rein deterministische mathematische Optimierungen umfasst. Die optimierte Aufteilung eines Kommissionierauftrags nach rein kaufmännischen Kostenbetrachtungen (z.B. break-even-point) sei ebenso umfasst wie mathematische Optimierungsalgorithmen analog zum bekannten travelling-salesman-problem. Dabei werden kognitive geschäftsbezogene Daten verarbeitet und es liegen keine technischen Überlegungen zugrunde, die zu einer erfinderischen Tätigkeit nach Art. 56 EPÜ beitragen könnten.

Die Beschwerdeführerin argumentierte, dass mit dem beanspruchten Gegenstand eine Reduktion der Anzahl von Fahrten erreicht werde und damit eine Energieeinsparung verbunden sei. Die Kammer war davon nicht überzeugt. Eine geltend gemachte Energieeinsparung sei rein spekulativ und könne nicht ohne weiteres zur Annahme eines technischen Effekts führen. Dazu wäre erforderlich, dass ein solcher Effekt mit technischen Mitteln erreicht werde. Beim beanspruchten Gegenstand wäre eine Energieeinsparung (sofern tatsächlich erzielt) aber Folge einer rein organisatorischen oder algorithmischen Optimierung, die im Wesentlichen auf einer gedanklichen Tätigkeit basiere. Daraus könne kein technischer Effekt zur Berücksichtigung einer erfinderischen Tätigkeit abgeleitet werden. Die Kammer stimmte daher der angefochtenen Entscheidung zu, dass die objektive technische Aufgabe darin bestand, das mathematische Verfahren zur Warenkommissionierung, welches vom Geschäftsmann der Logistik als Spezifikation vorgegeben wurde, auf einem Computersystem zu implementieren. Bei der Implementierung sah die Kammer keinen technischen Effekt, welcher über die reine Automatisierung hinausging.

Résumé

In T 1741/22 the board referred to G 1/19 to show that it is generally acknowledged that measurements have technical character, since they are based on an interaction with physical reality, such as the human or animal body (see also G 1/04). However, the board went on to find that in the case at hand, features (c) and (d) did not involve the actual measurement of the respective glucose level in a bodily fluid. Instead, they processed already measured and received continuous glucose monitoring data to generate and display further "new data", namely a plurality of minimum/maximum glucose values, in order to support a physician in their purely intellectual deductive decision phases of diagnosis and therapy. Such subsequent processing of certain measurement data collected from the human or animal body is predominantly of a non-technical nature. Thus, it could not contribute to the technical character of the invention. The board also referred to its earlier decisions T 1091/17, T 1910/20, T 335/21.

At the oral proceedings before the board, the appellants referred to T 2681/16 and to the Guidelines for Examination in the EPO in support of their view. In particular, the appellants considered the case in T 2681/16 to be analogous to the case at hand. The competent board in that case had dealt with distinguishing features related to an algorithm to process already acquired, i.e. measured, blood glucose data points. The board had acknowledged that these features, when taken in isolation, were non-technical, and could support the presence of an inventive step only if they credibly contributed to producing a technical effect serving a technical purpose. However, the board had then accepted the technical effect alleged by the appellant, namely "providing an overall measure of the glucose variability (i.e. equally sensitive to both hypo- and hyperglycemic events) and a prediction of glycemic events that were better than, or at least alternative to, those used in [the closest prior art]".

This board was not in agreement with and therefore deviated from the interpretation of the Convention given in T 2681/16. In particular, the board disagreed with the finding in T 2681/16 that providing an overall "measure" of the glucose variability and a prediction of glycemic events amounted to a technical effect. The board was well aware of the tendency of applicants to use the word "measure(ment)" liberally in order to give inventions the veneer of technicality. This was mainly because it is generally acknowledged in the jurisprudence of the Boards of Appeal that "measurements" have technical character. Admittedly, the applicants' use might well correspond to the meaning of the word in common parlance. However, a prerequisite for a "measurement" with technical character, within the meaning of the jurisprudence of the Boards of Appeal, is an interaction with "physical reality" for the calculation of the physical state of an object, even if the measurement could be carried out indirectly, e.g. by means of measurements of another physical entity (G 1/19). In the present case and in the case underlying T 2681/16, where the "physical reality" was typically the "patient's blood", the interaction with the physical reality ended once blood glucose measurements were carried out, either directly on the relevant physical entity "blood", or indirectly e.g. on another bodily fluid. The provision of overall glucose variability and a prediction of glycemic events were mathematical steps or intellectual activities which took place in the absence of this interaction with the physical reality and were therefore not "measurements" in this sense. In other words, the taking of a sample from the patient is an interaction with "physical reality". Generating new data as a consequence of this interaction may result in "measurements" of a technical nature. But generating (and displaying) further data by an evaluation or interpretation of these measurements (as done according to features (c) and (d) here) amounts to "measurements" generated merely by a cognitive or mathematical exercise that is inherently non-technical.

As to the Guidelines for Examination in the EPO (in its applicable version of March 2022 and also in its current version of March 2024), section G-II, 3.3, which relates to the technical contribution of mathematical methods, lists "providing a medical diagnosis by an automated system processing physiological measurements" among "examples of technical contributions of a mathematical method". As providing a "medical diagnosis" – whether done by a physician or by an automated system – is devoid of any technical character (G 1/04), the board found this example to be erroneous. As there was no further explanation, let alone a reference to any case law, the board saw no reason to speculate on how the Guidelines had come up with this example. In view of the above, the board held that the subject-matter of claim 1 of auxiliary request 10 did not involve an inventive step (Art. 56 EPC).