1.3.9 Interprétation d'une revendication pour apprécier s'il est satisfait à l'article 123(2) CBE
La chambre a déclaré dans la décision T 1018/02 que, bien qu'une revendication ne doive pas être interprétée d'une manière illogique ou qui n'a pas de sens, la description ne saurait être utilisée pour donner un sens différent à une caractéristique d'une revendication qui transmet, en tant que telle, un enseignement technique vraisemblable au lecteur averti. Ceci s'applique également lorsque la caractéristique n'a pas été divulguée à l'origine sous la forme qui apparaît dans la revendication (voir aussi par ex. T 1195/01, T 474/15). Dans l'affaire en cause, la caractéristique revendiquée en question aurait dû être supprimée afin de rendre la revendication compatible avec la divulgation initiale ; toutefois, cela n'était pas possible conformément à l'art. 123(3) CBE 1973. Voir également l'affaire T 197/10, qui a confirmé (dans le contexte de l'examen de la nouveauté) l'approche selon laquelle, en cas de divergence entre des revendications clairement définies et la description, les éléments de la description qui ne sont pas repris dans les revendications ne doivent pas, en principe, être pris en considération.
Dans l'affaire T 30/17, la chambre (se penchant sur l'ajout d'éléments) a fait observer que les éléments couverts sur le plan littéral par les termes des revendications ne peuvent être exclus sur le fondement de l'art. 69 CBE et du protocole interprétatif qui s'y rapporte, puisque ces dispositions portent sur l'"étendue de la protection" conférée par le brevet (ou la demande de brevet), question qui se pose principalement dans les actions en contrefaçon. La chambre a souligné que dans les procédures d'examen et d'opposition, la sécurité juridique future est primordiale. Dans l'affaire instruite, l'intimé (titulaire du brevet) avait fait valoir que l'expression en cause dans la revendication 1 du brevet délivré était, sur le plan linguistique, dénuée de sens et que sa signification ne pouvait être établie qu'à la lumière du contexte de cette revendication, de la description et des connaissances générales de l'homme du métier. La chambre a toutefois estimé que l'expression était en soi dépourvue d'ambiguïté, et elle a souligné qu'une discordance (prétendue) entre les revendications et la description n'est pas un motif valable pour faire abstraction de la structure linguistique claire d'une revendication et pour l'interpréter différemment (cf. par exemple T 431/03 et T 197/10), ou encore pour attribuer une signification différente à une caractéristique d'une revendication qui, en tant que telle, transmet un enseignement technique vraisemblable à l'homme du métier (cf. par exemple T 1018/02 et T 1395/07). Voir toutefois également l'affaire T 195/20 (dans laquelle la chambre a souligné que l'homme du métier ne se bornerait pas à déterminer le rôle sémantique des mots dans une phrase).
- T 2103/22
Résumé
In T 2103/22 the board, in order to assess compliance with the requirements of Art. 123(2) EPC, had to first determine the subject-matter effectively defined by claim 1 of the main request. In particular, the board interpreted the meaning of the following terms as well as the meaning of their combination:
a) "said polyester resin is a blended polyester resin which is a blend of a lowly crystalline polyester resin and a highly crystalline polyester resin at a weight ratio of 90:10 to 10:90 (…)"
b) "a layer of a polyester resin which comprises an ethylene terephthalate unit formed on at least one surface of the metal sheet".
The respondent (opponent) adhered to the conclusion of the opposition division which had been reached considering that "is" in term a) was to be read as "comprises", which meant that any other component different from the ones specifically mentioned in said claim 1 could be present in the blended polyester resin. The board disagreed and stated that, although it was correct that the normal rule of claim construction was that the terms used in a claim should be given their broadest technically sensible meaning, the literal reading of this passage defined that "said polyester resin" consisted of the lowly crystalline and highly crystalline polyester resins further defined in claim 1 of the main request, in the given weight ratio. In that regard, the board noted that, according to established case law (Case Law of the Boards of Appeal, 10th ed. 2022, II.A.6.2), the term "consists of" meant that the definition of "said polyester resin" was given in a "closed" manner, i.e. it excluded the presence of any other components other than the ones specifically defined (in the case at issue the lowly and highly crystalline polyester resins).
On b), the board found that the term "a layer of a polyester resin" defined, according to its literal reading, that the polyester therein mentioned, i.e. "which comprises an ethylene terephthalate unit", was the main component of the layer. However, this wording neither imposed that the polyester resin was the sole component of the layer, nor that it was the sole resin possibly present in the layer. The board further held that the reference to "unit" in that passage made it clear that the term "which" made reference to the polyester resin and not to the layer. This, in the board's view, would also be the logical reading of the claim made by the skilled person, considering that the term "which" usually makes reference to the word directly preceding it.
As the subject-matter of claim 1 of the main request was defined by the combination of terms a) and b), the board also determined the meaning of the combination of these two terms. It held that the polyester resin specified in the term "a layer of a polyester resin" was identical to the "said polyester resin" further defined in claim 1, i.e. it consisted of a blend of only the lowly and highly crystalline polyester resins.
Taking into account the further definitions of the lowly and highly crystalline polyester resins in claim 1, the board concluded that both of them were "a polyester resin that comprises an ethylene terephthalate unit". Therefore, the term "which comprises an ethylene terephthalate unit" of claim 1 of the main request was in fact redundant (i.e. not further limiting). Contrary to the view of the opposition division, the definitions of the highly and the lowly crystalline polyester resins further imposed that said terephthalate unit had to be present in majority since, otherwise, the resin would not be a "polyethylene terephthalate" anymore.
To determine whether the requirements of Art. 123(2) EPC were met, the board assessed if the deletion of the term "chiefly" from claim 1 of the application as filed resulted in added-matter. It saw no reason to deviate from the literal sense of the term "chiefly", which was that the polyester resin of the layer so defined should principally comprise an ethylene terephthalate unit not as the sole component but as the most important component of the polyester.
According to the board, adopting for the relevant passages of the application as filed the same reading as the one outlined for the corresponding passages of claim 1 of the main request, the term "which chiefly comprises an ethylene terephthalate unit" could only be held to be redundant (i.e. not further limiting) in view of the other features defining the valid support in the application as filed for the claimed subject-matter. Therefore, the presence or not in claim 1 of the main request of the terms "which chiefly comprises an ethylene terephthalate unit" or "chiefly" contained therein, did not lead to added-matter pursuant to Art. 123(2) EPC.