4. Motifs de la requête en révision
4.1. Article 112bis(2)a) CBE – violation alléguée de l'article 24 CBE
Pour des informations générales relatives à l'art. 24 CBE, voir le chapitre III.J. "Soupçon de partialité". Le présent chapitre traite des décisions rendues par la Grande Chambre de recours en application de l'art. 112bis(2)a) CBE.
Dans l'affaire R 16/10, la Grande Chambre de recours a rejeté l'argument du requérant selon lequel l'art. 24(1) CBE, concernant l'exclusion des membres d'une chambre dans certaines circonstances, englobait non seulement la situation spécifique où un des membres a représenté une partie dans l'affaire en cause, mais aussi la situation générale où un membre est antérieurement intervenu en qualité de représentant de cette partie pour toute question. Dans l'affaire R 20/09, la Grande Chambre de recours a confirmé que si un membre d'une chambre de recours est soupçonné de partialité, l'art. 112bis(2)a) CBE exige le rendu d'une décision sur ce soupçon (art. 24(4) CBE).
Dans l'affaire R 3/16, la Grande Chambre de recours a confirmé que l'art. 112bis(2)a) CBE vise notamment la situation où un membre a participé à la décision en violation de l'art. 24(1) CBE ou malgré son exclusion en vertu d'une décision prise conformément à l'art. 24(4) CBE. L'auteur de la requête en révision a fait valoir que selon un principe établi, une partie n'est nullement tenue de comparaître devant une juridiction irrégulière et que cela peut même lui porter préjudice car le droit d'être entendu ne saurait être dûment garanti devant une telle instance. S'est alors posée la question de savoir si une procédure de recours tenue par une chambre siégeant dans une composition irrégulière peut en soi constituer une violation du droit d'être entendu. Cette question est toutefois restée en suspens, la Grande Chambre de recours n'étant pas parvenue à la conclusion que la chambre avait effectivement fait abstraction de la procédure prévue à l'art. 24(4) CBE.
Dans l'affaire R 17/09, la Grande Chambre de recours a estimé qu'en anglais, le terme "man of the street" (homme de la rue) n'avait aucune connotation négative et désignait dans la langue courante le citoyen moyen.
Dans l'affaire R 12/22, la Grande Chambre de recours a estimé qu'un droit à toujours obtenir par avance des informations sur un membre à partir de sources publiques librement accessibles ne pouvait être reconnu. Vérifier si les exigences de l'art. 24 CBE étaient satisfaites pouvait encore s'effectuer lors de la procédure orale en posant des questions à ce sujet au membre de la chambre concerné.
- T 1899/23
In T 1899/23 the appellant raised an objection under R. 106 EPC. It argued that a panel composition that was not in accordance with the business distribution scheme (BDS) had violated the right to have the case considered by the lawfully designated judges, the right to have fair proceedings and the right to be heard. It further submitted that these deficiencies were to be regarded as "severe defects" pursuant to Art. 112a EPC.
The board recalled that, according to the case law (see R 4/08, R 8/08), the reference in R. 106 EPC to the specific procedural defects as set out in Art. 112a(2)(a) to (d) EPC not only implied that the objection should be based on one of these grounds, but also that the party must explicitly indicate which of them was considered to apply.
The board held that while the party's interest in having the case considered and decided by the lawfully designated judges had been acknowledged also for proceedings before the boards of appeal (see e.g. G 1/21 of 16 July 2021, G 1/05, G 2/08, G 3/08, J 15/04), this did not imply that this principle was also covered by the procedural defects as exhaustively enumerated in Art. 112a(2) EPC. The defects set out in Art. 112a(2)(a), (b) and (d) EPC at least did not encompass a violation of the right to have the case decided by the lawfully designated judges in accordance with the BDS.
The board specified that the appellant's objection with respect to the composition of the panel could not be based on Art.112a(2)(a) EPC, as this provision explicitly concerned the allocation of members in breach of Art. 24(1) or (4) EPC. The same applied to Art. 112a(2)(b) EPC, as this provision referred to the appointment of a member to the Boards of Appeal as a whole (see R 21/22). Moreover, the appellant's objection could not be based on Art. 112a(2)(d) EPC, since this exclusively covered the defects set out in R. 104 EPC (see e.g. R 6/11) which were not related to the right to be heard by lawfully designated judges..
Hence, there would only be a basis for an objection under R. 106 EPC if an (allegedly) incorrect composition of the panel could be regarded as a fundamental violation of the right to be heard according to Art. 112a(2)(c) and 113(1) EPC. However, for the purposes of the present case, there was no need to decide whether a fundamental defect in the composition of the responsible panel could have indeed been regarded as a violation of the right to be heard under particular circumstances (e.g. if the defect were so severe that the composition was entirely arbitrary) and what consequences this might have had for the continuation of the proceedings. This was because the parties' interest to be heard by the lawfully designated judges (and, accordingly, the right to have fair proceedings) was not affected in the present case. According to the board, the composition of the panel in the case at hand was in accordance with the relevant provisions of the applicable BDS, the RPBA and the EPC..
The board concluded that the composition of the board could not be considered arbitrary, but rather was based on the provisions of the BDS of the Technical Boards of Appeal respectively in force at the relevant points in time. For this reason, the parties' rights to be heard by lawfully designated judges and to have fair proceedings were not impaired..
In the absence of any procedural defect with respect to the composition of the panel, the objection under R. 106 EPC was dismissed.