P. Beitritt

In G 2/24 the Enlarged Board ("EBA") answered the referred questions as follows: "After withdrawal of all appeals, appeal proceedings may not be continued with a third party who intervened during the appeal proceedings in accordance with Article 105 EPC.

The intervening third party does not acquire an appellant status corresponding to the status of a person entitled to appeal within the meaning of Article 107, first sentence, EPC..

The EBA found the referral admissible. It held that the referral concerned an aspect of fundamental importance and the final decision on the appeal hinged on the answer to the referred questions. It explained that while Art. 21 RPBA allows for the further development of the case law and grants boards ample discretion for referral, in view of the legislative intent of Art. 112 EPC to ensure a uniform application of the law, a board was expected to substantiate why it considers an earlier ruling to have been superseded by a subsequent change in the law, there to be potential gaps in its reasoning or the existence of a new factual or procedural situation. The EBA took note of the referring board’s criticism of G 3/04.

The EBA concluded that the findings of G 3/04 continue to apply. None of the provisions relevant to the referral (i.e. Art. 99(1), 105 and 107 EPC) had been amended in a substantive manner after G 3/04 had been issued.

The EBA reaffirmed that appeal proceedings are of a judicial nature and the appeal is designed as a remedy on facts and law for parties to proceedings before the administrative departments of the EPO with the aim of eliminating an "adverse effect" of the impugned decision. The scope of the appeal proceedings is primarily determined by the decision under appeal, the appellant’s requests submitted with the notice of appeal and the statement of grounds of appeal, and, in inter partes proceedings, the submissions of the other party or parties in reply to the appellant’s statement of grounds of appeal. The appeal is not an ex officio procedure but depends on the appellant to initiate, determine the scope of, and conclude it within that party’s power of disposal, in accordance with the principle of party disposition.

The EBA further held that a party entitled to appeal within the meaning of Art. 107, first sentence, EPC is only the person who formally participated in the proceedings before the administrative department that issued the impugned decision, unless a third party’s entitlement to participate in those proceedings had been ignored due to procedural error or incorrect application of law. An adverse effect within the meaning of this provision only exists if a decision falls short of the request of a party to the proceedings or deviates from it without their consent. Any other "negative " or "disadvantageous " impact or effect on a third party does not fulfil the legal threshold.

On interventions by third parties, the EBA stated that the exceptional nature of this legal remedy inherently precludes an extensive interpretation and application thereof. An intervener at appeal cannot procedurally benefit from any status in the preceding administrative proceedings and becomes a party as of right. Intervention at appeal needs to fit into the legal and procedural framework of the boards of appeal as the first and final judicial instance in proceedings under the EPC. The principle of party disposition, the binding nature of the parties’ requests and the prohibitions of ruling ultra petita and reformatio in peius limit the option for procedural action of all involved in appeal proceedings, including interveners. Parties to appeal proceedings as of right do not have a legal status independent of the appeal. Awarding an intervener such status would require an explicit legal provision in the EPC.

Therefore, if the sole or all appeals are withdrawn, the proceedings end with regard to all substantive issues for all parties involved and cannot be continued with an intervener at the appeal stage or any other non-appealing party.

In T 2328/22 bestätigte die Kammer die Entscheidung der Einspruchsabteilung, dass sich der Umfang des Beitritts der Einsprechenden 2 (Beschwerdeführerin) auf Einwände gegen die Anpassung der Beschreibung beschränkt (res judicata, Art. 111 (2) EPÜ). Mit der Entscheidung T 2538/16 vom 18. Februar 2020 hatte die Beschwerdekammer die Angelegenheit an die Einspruchsabteilung mit der Anordnung zurückverwiesen, das Patent in geänderter Fassung gemäß Hauptantrag und einer noch anzupassenden Beschreibung aufrechtzuerhalten. Während der Fortsetzung des Einspruchsverfahrens zur Anpassung der Beschreibung ist am 21. Dezember 2020 die Einsprechende 2 als vermeintliche Patentverletzerin beigetreten.

Punkt 50 der angefochtenen Entscheidung betonte zu Recht, dass ein Beitritt kein Rechtsmittel sei, mit dem sich eine im Einspruchsbeschwerdeverfahren ergangene Entscheidung anfechten ließe. Ein Betritt eröffnet auch keinen neuen Verfahrensabschnitt, der die verbindlichen Ergebnisse des bisherigen Verfahrens außer Kraft setzen könnte. Ein Beitritt zu einem laufenden Verfahren kann nur in den Grenzen möglich sein, in denen das Verfahren noch zur Entscheidung offen ist. Der Beitretende muss das Verfahren so übernehmen, wie es steht. Etwaige ergangene Entscheidungen binden ihn daher nicht etwa wegen einer direkt ihm gegenüber eingetretenen res judicata Wirkung, sondern wegen der Akzessorietät des Beitritts zu einem Verfahren mit nur noch beschränktem Streitgegenstand.

Die Beschwerdeführerin berief sich auf die G 1/94 (Nr. 13 der Gründe), und die T 167/93. Die Kammer war davon nicht überzeugt, und befand, dass diese Entscheidungen im vorliegenden Fall nicht anwendbar sind. Stattdessen folgte die Kammer der T 694/01, in der es um eine ähnliche Situation ging wie im vorliegenden Fall.

Die Entscheidung T 694/01 legt überzeugend dar, dass nicht davon ausgegangen werden kann, dass der Entscheidungsgrund 13 der G 1/94 ausdrücklich auch Konstellationen wie die vorliegende regeln wollte, in der bereits eine abschließende Entscheidung über die Patentfähigkeit eines bestimmten Anspruchswortlauts getroffen worden war bzw. dass die Große Beschwerdekammer mit ihrer Erwägung so fundamentale Verfahrensgrundsätze wie die formelle und materielle Rechtskraft einer Entscheidung außer Kraft setzen wollte, ohne dass dies im EPÜ ausdrücklich vorgesehen wäre. Art. 105 (1) EPÜ schließt aus, dass mit dem Beitritt ein gänzlich neues Verfahren oder ein eigenständiger Verfahrensabschnitt in Gang gesetzt werden kann, und erlaubt nicht mehr als den Beitritt zu einem anhängigen Einspruchsverfahren. Diese Auslegung von Art. 105 EPÜ entspricht auch der in G 4/91 (Nr. 7 der Gründe) getroffenen Feststellung, dass ein Beitritt gegenstandslos ist, wenn er nach Erlass der Entscheidung der Einspruchsabteilung erfolgt und die zuvor Beteiligten keine zulässige Beschwerde einlegen.

Zusammenfassend war aus Sicht der Kammer daher kein Grund ersichtlich von den überzeugenden Ausführungen in der T 694/01 abzuweichen, dass ein Beitretender einem fremden Verfahren beitritt und infolgedessen das Verfahren in der Lage annehmen muss, in der es sich zum Zeitpunkt des Beitritts befindet.

Der Beitritt der Einsprechenden 2 hängt vom rechtlichen Umfang der Anhängigkeit des Einspruchsverfahrens ab. Da im vorliegenden Fall das Einspruchsverfahren nur noch bezüglich der Anpassung der Beschreibung anhängig ist, kann die Beitretende nicht mehr dem verfahrensrechtlich abgeschlossenen Teil des Einspruchsverfahrens beitreten, der die Gültigkeit des Wortlauts der Patentansprüche betraf. Da darüber abschließend entschieden wurde, ist die Frage, ob die Einsprechende 2 ihre Einwände auf einen bekannten oder einen neuen Sachverhalt stützt, irrelevant.

Zu den Vorlagefragen nach Art. 112 (1) EPÜ stellte die Kammer fest, dass in T 694/01, einem weitgehend ähnlichen Fall, eine klare und überzeugende Entscheidung getroffen wurde, der sich die Kammer anschloss. Eine Vorlage an die Große Beschwerdekammer war daher nicht erforderlich.

In T 1841/23 the board had accelerated the appeal proceedings due to parallel infringement proceedings before the Unified Patent Court. The board summoned the parties to oral proceedings to be held on 11 December 2024. According to its preliminary opinion, the patent was most likely to be revoked on the ground of added subject-matter. A notice of intervention was filed ca. three weeks before the arranged oral proceedings and the patent proprietor quickly requested their postponement. By communication of 26 November 2024 the board invited the proprietor and opponent 1 to file observations on the notice of intervention by 4 December 2024. Oral proceedings were held on 11 December 2024 as originally scheduled.

According to the board, the proprietor's argument, in effect invoking the right to be heard, that two weeks was an insufficient period to fully respond to the notice of intervention, had no bearing on the question of the date for oral proceedings as governed by Art. 15(2) RPBA. The same applied to its complaint that new arguments were put forward in the notice of intervention, and that the discussion had developed into an intertwined tripartite debate. As the proprietor's core concern was the right to be heard, and since oral proceedings served to protect that very right by providing another opportunity for parties to present their comments, the continuation of the oral proceedings before the board did not adversely affect the parties to the appeal proceedings.

The board also disagreed with the proprietor's suggestion, invoking decision T 1961/09, that continuing the oral proceedings before the board could only be fair to the proprietor if the intervener did not make any submissions at all. The implications of an intervention filed shortly before the arranged oral proceedings had to be determined on a case-by-case basis. In the board’s view, there seemed to be no appreciable disagreement between the two boards in methodological terms. In the present case, unlike the one underlying T 1961/09, the notice of intervention did not raise any further objections or new issues, but only argued on old topics.

The board then moved on to the added subject-matter objections against the patent and concluded that all claim requests were unallowable under Art. 123(2) EPC. After the board reached this conclusion but before any decision was announced, the proprietor submitted a written objection under R. 106 EPC.

The board observed that the proprietor's right to be heard was at the heart of the R. 106 objection. At issue was the decision to revoke the patent because recurring feature F3 was not originally disclosed, thus contravening Art. 123(2) EPC. The board noted that this ground and evidence had been around since the beginning of the opposition proceedings, and the evidence was entirely by the proprietor's own hand. It could not agree with the proprietor's view, namely that any late-refining or further developing of the arguments on the same old ground and evidence would raise concerns with respect to the right to be heard. The board recalled that a first indication of what the board found particularly relevant in this case had already been given in the preliminary opinion, in which the added-matter objection was one of merely two substantive objections addressed. The notice of intervention was evidently never considered relevant as a basis for the decision on the appeal, since an objection being most likely prejudicial to the opposed patent's maintenance was already in the proceedings. The proprietor could not have been taken by surprise by the grounds and evidence forming the basis of the present decision. Moreover, the proprietor had an opportunity to present its comments on them.

While an admissible intervention was to be treated as an opposition (Art. 105(2) EPC), its filing shortly prior to the oral proceedings before a board did not generally excuse the proprietor, and in particular it did not hand them a voucher for more time. Its concrete implications for opposition appeal proceedings were rather to be determined on a case-by-case basis, under the provisions of the EPC and the RPBA. Nor were opposition appeal proceedings designed to serve as a placeholder for tactical considerations in parallel proceedings for infringement. They were rather an existential challenge to the title, on the basis of which enforcement was pursued in the infringement proceedings, and parameters such as legal certainty and procedural economy were also involved. Any difficulties for the proprietor in drafting auxiliary requests that also provided the best scope of protection, considering the ongoing infringement proceedings, were not a reason to delay the opposition appeal proceedings.

For these reasons, which also translated into a lack of "special reasons" under Art. 15(6) RPBA, the board did not refrain from deciding on the appeal on a ground for opposition that appeared also in the notice of intervention. As a result, the objection submitted by the proprietor under R. 106 EPC was dismissed.