6. Interprétation des revendications

In T 903/24 war die Auslegung des Merkmals M0106 entscheidend für die Neuheit des Gegenstands von Anspruch 1 des Hauptantrags. Dieses Merkmal verlangte, dass "das erste Verkleidungselement auf der Schmalseite wenigstens lokal mehrere übereinanderliegende Lagen des Flachmaterials aufweist".

Die Kammer stellte fest, dass der Ausdruck "übereinanderliegende Lagen" nach dem allgemeinen Sprachverständnis nicht bedeutet, dass die Lagen direkt miteinander in Kontakt stehen und sich berühren müssen. Dasselbe ergab sich bei Berücksichtigung der in der Beschreibung erläuterten funktionalen Bedeutung der "übereinanderliegenden Lagen" für die Versteifung und Formstabilität der wärmeisolierenden Wand sowie für die Wärmebrückenbildung durch diese Lagen.

Die Kammer merkte an, dass die drei "übereinanderliegenden" zwar als direkt miteinander in Kontakt stehende Lagen in den Figuren 2 und 3 des Streitpatents dargestellt waren, das Patent jedoch keine Erläuterung oder Definition dahingehend enthielt, dass "übereinanderliegende" Lagen sich stets berühren müssten. Vielmehr enthielten die Ausführungsformen der Figuren 5, 6 und 7 Hinweise, dass dies gerade nicht so zu verstehen war.

Die Kammer fügte hinzu, dass der erteilte Anspruch 7, der "mehrere übereinanderliegende Lagen (40, 41, 49)" definierte, sich auf die Ausführungsform in Figur 6 bezog. Aufgrund der Bezugszeichen war ersichtlich, dass die Lagen 40, 41 und 49 in Figur 6 im Sinne des Patents "übereinanderliegende Lagen" waren, auch wenn sich zwischen den Lagen 40 und 49 ein anderes Element befand und sich diese daher nicht berührten und nicht direkt miteinander in Kontakt standen.

Weiterhin stellte die Kammer fest, dass R. 43 (7) Satz 2 EPÜ besagt, dass Bezugszeichen nicht zu einer einschränkenden Auslegung des Patentanspruchs herangezogen werden dürfen. Dies bedeutet insbesondere, dass im Patentanspruch angeführte Bezugszeichen den Anspruchsgegenstand nicht auf Ausführungsbeispiele beschränken, die den Zeichnungen bzw. Figuren entsprechen, in denen diese Bezugszeichen verwendet werden. Dies war bei der oben dargelegten Begründung auch nicht der Fall. Gemäß R. 43 (7) EPÜ sollen Bezugszeichen das Verständnis des Patentanspruchs erleichtern. Dies war etwa dann der Fall, wenn durch Bezugszeichen erläutert wurde, in welchem Zusammenhang Merkmale des Patentanspruchs in einem im Patent genannten Ausführungsbeispiel zueinander standen.

Die Kammer wies darauf hin, dass Figur 6 Teil der bei der Anspruchsauslegung gemäß G 1/24 stets heranzuziehenden Beschreibung und Zeichnungen war. Laut Kammer erleichterten die Bezugszeichen in Anspruch 7 das Verständnis des Verhältnisses von dem in Figur 6 gezeigten Ausführungsbeispiel zu Anspruch 7. Die Berücksichtigung der Bezugszeichen dahingehend, dass jedes der Bezugszeichen auf eine der in Figur 6 gezeigten "übereinanderliegenden Lagen" verwies, stand insofern im Einklang mit R. 43 (7) EPÜ. Der Umstand, dass sich hieraus über Figur 6 indirekt eine erläuternde Rückwirkung der Bezugszeichen auf das Verständnis der im Anspruch verwendeten Begriffe ergab, entsprach der gemäß R. 43 (7) Satz 1 EPÜ erwünschten Funktion der Bezugszeichen, das Verständnis des Patentanspruchs zu erleichtern. Anspruch 7 war ein abhängiger Anspruch, der sich (mittelbar) auf Anspruch 1 bezog, in dem der Begriff "übereinanderliegend" ebenso wie in Anspruch 7 verwendet wurde. Der Begriff war in diesen beiden Ansprüchen daher einheitlich auszulegen.

Die Kammer kam zu dem Schluss, dass der Ausdruck "übereinanderliegende Lagen" in Anspruch 1 nicht auf Lagen beschränkt war, die in direktem Kontakt zueinander standen und sich berührten. Dieses Verständnis ergab sich nicht aus einer bloßen Betrachtung der Bezugszeichen, sondern aus der gemäß G 1/24 bei der Auslegung von Ansprüchen stets gebotenen Heranziehung der Beschreibung und Zeichnungen (einschließlich der Referenzzeichen) aus der Sicht der Fachperson, ggf. unter Einbeziehung der funktionalen und üblichen sprachlichen Bedeutung der im Anspruch verwendeten Begriffe.

Der Gegenstand von Anspruch 1 des Hauptantrags war daher nicht neu.

In T 873/24, in each of the originally filed sets of claims of the application, the parent and the grandparent application, the titanium to nitrogen ratio was explicitly defined by expressing their respective amounts in weight percent, as being in excess of 3.42, thus resulting in a weight ratio. In contrast, claim 1, feature F1.3 of the patent in suit did not specify that the amounts of titanium and nitrogen had to be expressed as weight percent in order to determine the ratio. Appellant 2 argued that subject-matter had been added since the application as filed (as well as the parent and grandparent applications) only disclosed a ratio based on weight but not a generalisation of the ratio by omission of the unit, as claimed.

According to the board, the case hinged on the extent to which the information found in the description might influence the interpretation of claim 1 and on what possible interpretations of the claim needed to be originally disclosed.

The board observed that most decisions acknowledged that the principles of G 1/24 as to the role of the description in claim interpretation also applied to the assessment under Art. 76(1) and 123(2) EPC. Generally, most decisions adopted a two-step approach, first interpreting the amended claim and then assessing whether the amended claim contained added subject-matter. The board identified three approaches regarding the extent to which the description was relied upon during this first step of interpreting the amended claims. Under the first approach, the description was consulted only to define the skilled person. Under the second, there was no broadening or limitation of claims based on the patent specification. The third was a holistic approach permitting broadening and/or narrowing the interpretation in view of the patent specification. The board noted that the three approaches led to a different outcome when applied to the case in hand. Under the first and second approaches, the amendment to claim 1 would be deemed to add subject-matter. The third approach would lead to the conclusion that feature F1.3 fulfilled the requirements of Art. 123(2) EPC..

After addressing the admissibility of the referral (see abstract under Art. 112(1) EPC), the board referred the following questions to the Enlarged Board (referral pending under G 1/26 – "Coated steel strips").

"1. May a decision be considered to be "required" for the purposes of Article 112(1) EPC, if the referring Board demonstrates that the point of law in question arises out of the context of the case pending before it and, in the circumstances of the proceedings, it is reasonable for the Board to examine it and decide on it next.

2. (a) Does the fact that the claims are the starting point and the basis for assessing the patentability of an invention generally preclude a feature which is only disclosed in the description or the drawings of a patent from being read into the meaning of a granted claim, in particular if this leads to a restrictive reading of terms used in the claim.

2. (b) If the answer to question 2.a) is no: is claim interpretation the result of both reading the claims and consulting the description and drawings as a unitary process and does the claim being the starting point and the basis for assessing the patentability rule out only those interpretations which can be derived from the patent as a whole but would clearly contradict the general technical understanding of the terms used in the claim.

3. (a) When assessing compliance with Article 123(2) EPC, must a term used in a claim be assessed against all interpretations that make technical sense to the skilled reader on the basis of the claim alone.

3. (b) If the answer to question 3.a) is no: is it sufficient that only the interpretations of the subject-matter of the claim established against the background of the patent specification as a whole are directly and unambiguously derivable from the application as filed?"

In T 847/24 the board addressed the principles of claim interpretation endorsed by the Enlarged Board in G 1/24. The first principle was that the claims were the starting point and the basis for assessing the patentability of an invention. The board understood this as a recognition that the claims defined the claimed subject-matter and that it was the claims themselves which were being interpreted. Accordingly, the claims, on the one hand, and the description and the drawings, on the other, were not on the same footing. This understanding of the significance to be given to the claims aligned with Art. 69 EPC (see T 1473/19), the wording and principles of which the Enlarged Board appeared to consider applicable by analogy. It was also consistent with the Enlarged Board's statement that this first principle of claim interpretation was a settled point in the case law of the boards.

The second principle endorsed by the Enlarged Board was that the description and drawings had to always be consulted to interpret the claims, and not only if the person skilled in the art found a claim to be unclear or ambiguous when read in isolation. According to the board, it followed from this that, without prejudice to the requirement under Art. 84 EPC that claims had to be clear in themselves, a claim should not be read in isolation. In other words, the meaning of a claim and its features was not to be determined in the abstract or on the basis of the skilled person's common general knowledge alone, but in the specific context in which it was used, which included the description and the drawings (as well as other claims). Such consultation could have an impact on the result of the interpretation. This impact was not limited to merely defining the person skilled in the art for the purposes of claim interpretation (see T 439/22).

The board noted that the above understanding of G 1/24 conformed with the Enlarged Board's reference to the harmonisation philosophy behind the EPC and its aim of preventing the EPO from adopting a practice of claim interpretation which would be contrary to the practice of the national courts of EPC contracting states and the UPC. It also fitted seamlessly with the direct applicability of Art. 69(1) EPC and the Protocol thereto in proceedings before the EPO when interpreting a claim to assess compliance with Art. 123(3) EPC.

The board pointed out that determining a patent claim's subject-matter, i.e. establishing the meaning of the claimed features, was not distinguishable from interpreting that claim and its features (see T 1473/19), and that the terms in a given patent claim had to be interpreted in a uniform, consistent and objective manner (see T 1345/23, T 177/22, and T 1473/19). It followed that the same claim interpretation step which, in accordance with G 1/24, had to be carried out when assessing e.g. novelty also had, for reasons of consistency, to be carried out when e.g. assessing added subject-matter, sufficiency of disclosure or extension of protection. This also aligned with the UPC Court of Appeal's statement in its order of 26 February 2024 in NanoString Technologies v. 10x Genomics, UPC_CoA_335/2023, according to which the "principles for the interpretation of a patent claim apply equally to the assessment of the infringement and the validity of a European patent", the term "validity" not being limited to "patentability" under Art. 52 to 57 EPC.

According to the board, the requirement "to interpret patent claims" pursuant to G 1/24 implied that the correct interpretation of a claim could not, if decisive for the outcome, be left open. As to a possible lack of clarity or ambiguity in a claim, this could, as such, only be addressed under Art. 84 EPC, which is not a ground for opposition. Such a deficiency could not be invoked indirectly under a different legal provision not concerned with this issue, such as Art. 123(2) or (3) EPC. A lack of clarity can have ramifications for how the deciding body interprets the claim under consideration and determines the claimed subject-matter, which may in turn have an impact on the outcome of the assessment of a ground for opposition under Art. 100 EPC. However, adopting e.g. a broad interpretation had to be distinguished from leaving the interpretation open or adopting two mutually exclusive claim interpretations simultaneously (see T 367/20).

In T 638/24, the appeal was filed by the patent proprietor against the opposition division's decision revoking the European patent.

Claim 1 of the granted patent (main request) read as follows: "A process for the production of a refined oil having a reduced 3-MCPD ester and/or glycidyl ester content characterized in that it comprises subjecting an oil to the following steps, in order: (a) a bleaching step, (b) a deodorization step, and (c) a final bleaching step with activated bleaching clay, and (d) a final deodorization step is carried out at least 40°C lower than deodorization step (b) and the final deodorization step (d) is carried out at a temperature less than 180°C..

The appellant contested the opposition division's finding that this process lacked novelty over D1. In particular, based on paragraph 0044] of the description of the opposed patent, the appellant argued that the wording "having reduced 3-MCPD ester and/or glycidyl ester content" required the process to result in a refined oil having a 3-MCPD ester and/or glycidyl ester content which was lower than that found in an oil subjected to standard refining processes.

The board did not find this argument persuasive. Claim 1 defined neither a "standard" refining process nor the amount of esters found in oils refined by these processes. Furthermore, there was no evidence that certain refining processes were considered "standard" according to common general knowledge at the filing date. Moreover, the ester content in a refined oil depended on the type of oil used, its origin, the extraction method and the conditions implemented during refinement. For these reasons, the board found that the purported reference to an undefined refined oil, allegedly obtained by an undefined "standard" process, was not suitable to distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art.

The board observed that the reference to "standard refining (i.e. standard degumming, bleaching and deodorization)" in paragraph [0044] of the description did not provide further guidance on how these refining methods should be carried out. There was no evidence that specific standardised methods and working conditions for carrying them out were part of the common general knowledge at the filing date either. Thus, this passage could not be relied upon to limit the scope of claim 1. G 1/24 could not be invoked to construe a claim relying on an unspecified and unqualified definition. The board concluded that, reading claim 1 and consulting the description, taking into account the skilled person's perspective, it was clear that what was claimed was a process which reduced the content of 3-MCPD and/or glycidyl esters in an oil which contained them. Furthermore, the process included the specified steps, in the given order.

On the basis of this claim construction, the board held that claim 1 of the main request lacked novelty over D1.

In T 420/24, the appellant (patent proprietor) contended that the prior art document D1 disclosed all features of claim 1 of the patent as granted (main request). Among other things, the appellant submitted that the opposition division had incorrectly interpreted the feature "to reduce a cantilevered beam length of the corrugated knife"..

To construe this feature in claim 1, the opposition division had used the definition of cantilevered beam length provided in paragraph [0026] of the contested patent, which reads as follows:.

"Alternatively or in addition, the fingers 148 may improve the stability of the leading edge of the knife 126 by reducing the cantilevered beam length of the knife 126, which as used herein refers to the length or distance between the cutting edge 127 of the knife 126 and the nearest adjacent extremity of the clamp 132A applying a clamping load to the knife 126. In this case, the nearest adjacent extremity of the clamp 132A is defined by the distal ends of the fingers 148....

The board recalled that, according to G 1/24, the description and drawings shall always be consulted to interpret the claims when assessing patentability of an invention under Art. 52 to 57 EPC. It disagreed with the appellant's view that the definition in the contested patent was only intended to be understood in relation to the specific embodiment referred to. According to the board, the use of the phrase "which as used herein refers to" indicated that the definition was a general definition.

The board therefore agreed with the opposition division that the skilled person, when interpreting the term "cantilevered beam length", would take into account the clear definition given in paragraph [0026] of the description of the contested patent.

The board concluded that the appellant had not convincingly demonstrated that the decision under appeal was incorrect with respect to the main request.