3. Accessibilité au public

In G 0001/23 the Enlarged Board answered the referred questions as follows:

"1. A product put on the market before the date of filing of a European patent application cannot be excluded from the state of the art within the meaning of Article 54(2) EPC for the sole reason that its composition or internal structure could not be analysed and reproduced by the skilled person before that date.

2. Technical information about such a product which was made available to the public before the filing date forms part of the state of the art within the meaning of Article 54(2) EPC, irrespective of whether the skilled person could analyse and reproduce the product and its composition or internal structure before that date.

3. In view of the answers to Questions 1 and 2 an answer is not required."

The Enlarged Board decided that in interpreting the referred questions, it was not needed to treat analysability independently from reproducibility. The questions turned on the requirement of reproducibility and whether this was indeed a valid condition of an available product for forming part of the state of the art. The Enlarged Board highlighted that the prior art status of non-reproducible man-made products put on the market and non-reproducible naturally occurring materials can be assessed similarly. In addition, the term "reproduce" could cover two possibilities: obtaining again a product put on the market in its readily available form, as well as for the skilled person to manufacture the product themselves. In the context of the referral, the EBA understood the term "reproduce" in the latter, more limited sense. In any event, "reproducibility" was to be understood as being only on the basis of the common general knowledge the skilled person has before the filing date.

The EBA concluded that both interpretations of G 1/92 proposed by the referring board and existing case law lead to absurd results. The first interpretation postulated that non-reproducible but otherwise existing and commercially available products do not belong to the state of the art. The EBA saw this interpretation as establishing a legal fiction overriding facts and which was not explicitly stated in the law. The second interpretation, according to which only the composition of a non-reproducible product is excluded from the prior art, was also seen to lead to absurd results. All starting materials used by the skilled person must be selected on the basis of their desired properties, which in turn are determined by the composition of the material. Also the very first raw material in the production chain inevitably had to come from a natural source. Its composition must be known and consciously exploited by the skilled person, even where they would not be able to reproduce the composition by a different route. The non-reproducible property, the composition, could not be ignored or disregarded, or else there would be no material left for the skilled person to work with.

The EBA therefore provided the correct interpretation of G 1/92 and held that the expected reproducibility of the product must be understood in a broader sense, namely as the ability of the skilled person to obtain and possess the physical product. This meant that the requirement would be inherently fulfilled by a product put on the market. The proper reading of the answer of G 1/92 was set out as follows: "The chemical composition of a product is part of the state of the art when the product as such is available to the public and can be analysed by the skilled person, irrespective of whether or not particular reasons can be identified for analysing the composition."

In turn, this meant that all analysable properties of a product put on the market become public alone by the possibility that they can been analysed, because the product was physically accessible. If the composition can be analysed, this becomes part of the state of the art as well, also if the skilled person is not in the position to reproduce it on their own.

The EBA also explained that prior art that is not considered relevant does not mean that the prior art does not exist. Something that belongs to the existing state of the art need not be relevant for any invention and for all provisions of the EPC where the state of the art is to be taken into account. That a non-reproducible product belongs to the state of the art does not necessarily mean that the product or its features must be taken into account equally when assessing novelty or inventive step.

In T 2463/22 the opposition division had held that the prior uses had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt (up to the hilt), in particular with regard to whether the products of the prior uses had actually been delivered. The parties before the board focused on which standard of proof had to be applied in view of G 2/21 and T 1138/20 and whether the applicable standard had been met. In the respondent-proprietor’s view, T 1138/20 was an isolated decision, not compatible with G 2/21.

On the required standard of proof, the present board observed that G 2/21 recognised that different concepts as to the standard of proof had been developed in the case law. According to T 1138/20 only one standard should be applied, namely "the deciding body must be convinced, taking into account the circumstances of the case and the relevant evidence before it, that the alleged fact occurred".

In the present board's view, under the principle of free evaluation of evidence, it was always decisive in the evaluation of evidence that the members of the deciding body were personally "convinced". Moreover, they had to always be convinced of whether, as stated in T 1138/20, "the alleged fact has occurred". The board stated this was true regardless of which standard of proof was applied. The standard of proof refers to the nature or degree of conviction that the members of the deciding body must have to be satisfied that an alleged fact occurred (see T 832/22).

According to the board, and with reference to a UK House of Lords decision, two important aspects had to be stressed. Firstly, that the standard of proof is related to the required degree of conviction of the members of the deciding body. Secondly, that it is not related to what is evaluated by the deciding body. Hence, also when a lower standard of proof such as the balance of probabilities is applied, the deciding body must assess whether or not the alleged fact indeed occurred. In other words, also when such a standard of proof is applied, the question is not whether the alleged fact might have occurred with some probability. The board considered G 2/21 (points 31 and 45 of the Reasons) consistent with this understanding.

The more specific question as to whether there was only a single standard of proof or more than one could be left unanswered according to the board. The board held that if the deciding body was convinced beyond reasonable doubt that an alleged fact had occurred, there was no need to decide how many standards of proof there were and which one was applicable (see T 832/22).

The board then gave some consideration to the assessment of factual allegations using the beyond reasonable doubt standard of proof. The European Patent Organisation being an independent international organisation, the board stated the standard had an autonomous meaning within this autonomous legal order. Secondly the board agreed with T 832/22 that it seemed expedient to focus on the term "reasonable".

The board then considered the prior uses, focusing especially on prior use relating to the sale of product 5 (sample of a powder mix from a specific lot number), the content of the sample and whether it was available to the public. In view of all the information (including invoices, affidavit, emails, test report, excerpt from database), which also involved evidence provided by a third party (the buyer), the board was convinced beyond reasonable doubt that product 5, with a specific lot number, was sold prior to the effective date of the patent. Since it had also been shown that product 5 disclosed all features of claim 1, lack of novelty prejudiced the maintenance of the patent as granted. Concerning the third auxiliary request, product 5 was suitable for use as closest prior art. The board referred to the reluctance sometimes in the case law to treat an object of a prior use as the closest prior art. Often, there was neither information on what the object did and what properties it had in the technical environment in which it was applied nor on how the process for its manufacture could be modified. These considerations indeed spoke against regarding a prior use as a suitable starting point for assessing inventive step. In the case in hand however, the skilled person was faced with a different situation. The board concluded that the third auxiliary request did not involve an inventive step. The decision of the opposition division was set aside and the patent revoked.

In T 1612/21 hatte die Einspruchsabteilung auf Grundlage der ihr zur Verfügung stehenden Beweismittel zutreffend festgestellt, dass es deutliche Hinweise auf das Bestehen einer Geheimhaltungsverpflichtung gab – insbesondere durch die Aussage des Zeugens der Beschwerdeführerin, Herrn Trick, wonach die Beschwerdeführerin grundsätzlich eine Geheimhaltung mit ihren Kunden vereinbart.

Der von der Beschwerdeführerin selbst angebotene Zeuge, Herr Trick, hatte vor der Einspruchsabteilung zudem ausdrücklich erklärt, dass die Generation 2 der CBC-200 für den Auftrag der Daimler AG entwickelt worden war. Dazu war die Maschine verändert worden. Dies möge vorrangig die Prozessentwicklung betroffen haben, wie es die Beschwerdeführerin vortrug, dies führte jedoch laut der Aussage des Zeugens auch zu Veränderungen an der Maschine. Es handelte sich bei der an die Daimler AG gelieferten Anlage CBC-200 also nicht von Anfang an um eine Standardmaschine der Beschwerdeführerin, sondern diese war das Ergebnis der Kooperation mit der Daimler AG.

Vor diesem Hintergrund ließ die Aussage des Zeugens, dass grundsätzlich eine Geheimhaltung mit den Kunden bestand, ob schriftlich oder üblicherweise in mündlicher Form zu den Verfahrensparametern, wie es die Beschwerdeführerin angab, ausreichend Zweifel an der Behauptung der Beschwerdeführerin entstehen, dass die Lieferung der Anlage CBC-200 nicht einer Geheimhaltungsvereinbarung unterlag, so dass sich die Beweislast zur Existenz der Geheimhaltungsverpflichtung auf die Beschwerdeführerin verlagerte.

Vor diesem Hintergrund waren die von der Beschwerdeführerin angeführten Entscheidungen T 2210/12 und T 2273/11 für den gegebenen Fall nicht einschlägig, da diese jeweils Sachverhalte betrafen, in dem sich keinerlei Anhalt für eine Geheimhaltungsverpflichtung bot, bzw. eine solche explizit verneint wurde. Die Beschwerdeführerin war hingegen an der geltend gemachten Vorbenutzung als Verkäuferin beteiligt. Folglich lagen praktisch alle Beweismittel zu der Offenkundigkeit in ihrer Verfügungsmacht und ihrem Wissen. Es oblag auch deshalb im gegebenen Fall der Beschwerdeführerin, die durch ihren eigenen Zeugen aufgebrachten Zweifel an der Offenkundigkeit der Vorbenutzung in überzeugender Weise auszuräumen.

Da aber auch die weiteren im Verfahren befindlichen Beweismittel nicht geeignet waren, diese Zweifel auszuräumen, sondern im Gegenteil zu der Geschäftspraxis schwiegen und insbesondere der von der Beschwerdeführerin selbst angebotene Zeugenbeweis die Existenz einer Geheimhaltungsverpflichtung als geschäftsüblich nahelegte, schließ sich die Kammer der Feststellung der Einspruchsabteilung an, dass die geltend gemachte Vorbenutzung CDC-200 nicht offenkundig war und somit nicht dem Stand der Technik zugerechnet werden konnte.

In T 733/23 the opposition division had concluded that there had been insufficient evidence to prove that the data sheets D2, D4, and D7 to D9 had been made available to the public before the filing date. Rather than concluding that, as a result of the data sheets not being considered state of the art under Art. 54 EPC, the subject-matter of the claims was novel, the opposition division decided not to admit them into the opposition proceedings. The board concluded that not admitting these data sheets, filed in due time, constituted a substantial procedural violation (see details as from point 4 of the Reasons including discussion on D19, an affidavit).

The board, in support of its decision, presented some key considerations on public availability of advertising brochures and data sheets, as well as the standard of proof to be applied. The board stated that when a document was clearly intended to be publicly distributed, as was the case with advertising or commercial brochures, the absence of a specific publication or distribution date, a situation quite common in this type of document, was not in itself sufficient to conclude that the document did not constitute prior art. As with any other type of evidence, the key question was not whether the exact date of publication could be determined, but whether it could be established that the relevant subject-matter was made available to the public before the priority or filing date.

Data sheets often represent an intermediate case between internal documents and advertising brochures. Where no publication date is present, the board held it should first be assessed whether the document was intended for public distribution. If so, additional sources must be examined to establish whether the relevant subject-matter was publicly accessible before the patent’s filing or priority date. Here, the opposition division had failed to provide a reasoned decision on public availability, giving no weight to the dates printed on their front pages.

As to the standard of proof, the present board concurred with the position in T 1138/20 that there is only one standard of proof: the deciding body must be convinced, based on the underlying circumstances.

According to the present board, this did not imply that all cases were to be treated identically, as in practice the degree of proof required to establish credibility (i.e. to persuade the board) might vary depending on the specific circumstances. In other words, it was not the standard of proof that adjusted with the circumstances, but rather the credibility of the arguments made by the different parties. For example, when the evidence was exclusively controlled by one party, any gaps in the relevant information might significantly undermine that party's credibility. Conversely, when the information was equally accessible to both parties but only one party submitted evidence, merely raising doubts might not be sufficient to challenge the credibility.

In the present case, the conclusions of the opposition division suggested that the standard of proof "up-to-the-hilt" was applied to determine the public availability of the data sheets. Even if the board agreed that different standards should be applied, this would not be justified in the case in hand, as the relevant information to prove the public availability of the data sheets was not within the exclusive sphere of the appellant (opponent). In this instance, the relevant information would more likely be within the sphere of the patentee. Therefore, there was no basis for applying the strict standard of "up-to-the-hilt" or for questioning the credibility of the appellant (opponent) solely on the grounds that some information was missing.

The patentee argued that, when in doubt, the patent should be upheld. The board disagreed. Fact-finding boiled down to a binary exercise: either something had been proven, or it had not. In addition, there was no presumption of patent validity in proceedings meant to re-assess the validity of this very patent.