8.3.3 Rechtsprechung zu mündlichen Verhandlungen, die nach Ende der Pandemiemaßnahmen vor den Beschwerdekammern durchgeführt wurden

In case T 0745/23 the board had summoned the parties to oral proceedings on the EPO premises. The respondent had requested that the oral proceedings be held by videoconference. The appellant had requested, in response, that the oral proceedings be held in person, or, alternatively, that the board refer to the Enlarged Board the following questions:.

"1. Is the conduct of oral proceedings as a videoconference in appeal proceedings outside a general emergency situation without the consent of the parties in accordance with the provisions of the EPC.

2. If yes, on which criteria should the discretion be exercised if a Board of Appeal decides on its own motion to hold oral proceedings as a videoconference pursuant to Art. 15a(1) RPBA against the request of a party?.

In the communication under Art. 15(1) RPBA, the board had found the case in hand suitable for being heard by videoconference. The appellant had not responded to this communication, and hence, according to the board, had not objected to the board’s intention to grant the respondent’s request for a videoconference. Therefore, the board had changed the venue of the oral proceedings to videoconference.

At the oral proceedings, the appellant argued that Art. 15a RPBA did not define the criteria for exercising the board’s discretion. This gave rise to different practices and legal uncertainty. Since, according to G 1/21, oral proceedings in person were the gold standard, there could be doubt as to whether Art. 15a RPBA was actually in line with the EPC.

The board disagreed. Art. 15a RPBA provided the board with the discretion to decide to hold oral proceedings pursuant to Art. 116 EPC by videoconference if the board considered it appropriate to do so, either upon a party's request or of its own motion. Its scope was general and not limited to a pandemic situation. In G 1/21, the Enlarged Board had expressly acknowledged that oral proceedings in the form of a videoconference were oral proceedings within the meaning of Art. 116 EPC. The board failed to see how Art. 15a RPBA as such violated any EPC provisions governing the fair conduct of proceedings and the right to be heard.

Furthermore, the board stated that it interpreted the discretionary power set out in Art. 15a RPBA within the framework of decision G 1/21. This decision had not excluded videoconference oral proceedings a priori, but had set certain limitations and restrictions, especially when a party did not give its consent. The board exercised its discretion in view of the particular circumstances of the case and of the reasons provided by each party in support of their opposing requests as to the format. Thus, also the party not consenting to a videoconference should provide some reasons as to why it considered that videoconference, in the case in hand, was not suitable or why the party was otherwise disadvantaged. In the case in hand, the appellant, however, had not submitted any objective or subjective reason why the case in hand should not be heard by videoconference. In the absence of any further submissions by the appellant regarding the format of the oral proceedings, the board had had no reason to (again) change the format of the oral proceedings.

The board rejected the appellant’s request for referral. The first question proposed for referral had already been answered by the Enlarged Board in section C.5 of G 1/21. This section undoubtedly had a general character, despite the judgement essentially being limited to the pandemic (as also acknowledged in T 2432/19). The board held that in the case in hand, it failed to identify a departure from the teaching of G 1/21, and thus a need to (again) refer the first question in order to decide the present case. The posed question thus did not warrant a referral, which would otherwise be of theoretical interest only.

With regard to the second question proposed for referral, the board found that any answer to it depended on the specific case and providing anything more than general instructions would risk compromising the principle of judicial discretion. The board held that, for this reason alone, it could not be regarded as a point of law suitable for being referred to the Enlarged Board.

Der Antrag auf Überprüfung in R 7/22 wurde darauf gestützt, dass die zu überprüfende Entscheidung in mehrfacher Hinsicht mit einem schwerwiegenden Verfahrensmangel behaftet sei, und – ebenfalls in mehrfacher Hinsicht – ein schwerwiegender Verstoß gegen Art. 113 EPÜ vorliege.

Bei der Prüfung der Begründetheit des Überprüfungsantrags bezüglich der geltend gemachten Verfahrensmängel gemäß Art. 112a (2) d) EPÜ erinnerte die Große Beschwerdekammer (GBK) daran, dass die in R. 104 EPÜ nicht genannten Verfahrensmängel nicht als schwerwiegende Verfahrensmängel im Sinne des Art. 112a (2) d) EPÜ gelten. Die Antragstellerin hatte sich aber weder auf das Übergehen eines Antrags auf mündliche Verhandlung (R. 104 a) EPÜ) noch eines sonstigen relevanten Antrags im Verfahren (R. 104 b) EPÜ) berufen. Dementsprechend betrachtete die GBK den Überprüfungsantrag bezüglich dieser geltend gemachten Verfahrensmängel als offensichtlich unbegründet.

Im Rahmen der Prüfung der Begründetheit des Überprüfungsantrags im Hinblick auf die geltend gemachten Verfahrensmängel nach Art. 112a (2) c) EPÜ befasste sich die GBK mit den beanstandeten Verstößen gegen Art. 113 (1) EPÜ im Zusammenhang mit der angekündigten mündlichen Verhandlung in Präsenz und derer tatsächlicher Durchführung als Videokonferenz. Dabei betonte die GBK unter anderem Folgendes:

In G 1/21 hat die GBK entschieden, dass die Durchführung einer mündlichen Verhandlung als Videokonferenz grundsätzlich mit dem Recht auf rechtliches Gehör vereinbar ist, und in R 12/22 hat die GBK das ausführlich dargestellt. Im vorliegenden Fall hatte die Antragstellerin sich darauf beschränkt zu rügen, die im Fall G 1/21 gesetzten, sehr engen Voraussetzungen für die Durchführung einer mündlichen Verhandlung als Videokonferenz hätten nicht vorgelegen. Sie hatte keine konkreten Umstände behauptet, wodurch ihr die Ausübung ihres Rechts auf rechtliches Gehör im Beschwerdeverfahren verweigert wurde. Für die GBK waren auch keine derartigen Umstände ersichtlich. Eine allgemeine Beanstandung zu Beginn der Verhandlung, die Voraussetzungen für die Durchführung der mündlichen Verhandlung als Videokonferenz seien nicht gegeben, genügt aus den vorgenannten Gründen (wonach eine mündliche Verhandlung in Form einer Videokonferenz grundsätzlich mit dem Recht auf rechtliches Gehör vereinbar ist) nicht. Damit liegt in der Durchführung der mündlichen Verhandlung als Videokonferenz offensichtlich kein Gehörsverstoß.

Darüber hinaus befand die GBK, dass anders als im Falle der Ermessensausübung beim Thema Zulassung, eine unzutreffende Ermessensausübung zugunsten der Durchführung einer mündlichen Verhandlung als Videokonferenz mangels Einfluss auf das Recht auf rechtliches Gehör keinen Verstoß gegen dieses Recht begründen kann, wenn – wie hier – ein konkreter Mangel der Videokonferenz während derselben nicht behauptet worden war. Die Beteiligten waren im Übrigen zur Frage der Durchführung der mündlichen Verhandlung als Videokonferenz gehört worden, so dass auch insofern kein Gehörsverstoß vorlag.

In Bezug auf die durch die Antragstellerin geltend gemachten Mängel in der Begründung der zu überprüfenden Entscheidung verwies die GBK auf die in R 3/15, R 8/15, R 8/19, R 10/20 und R 12/22 formulierten relevanten Grundprinzipien. Sie erinnerte unter anderem daran, dass eine widersprüchliche Begründung nur dann beanstandet werden kann, wenn die Widersprüche gleichbedeutend damit sind, dass die Kammer das Vorbringen in den Entscheidungsgründen nicht behandelt und dieses objektiv betrachtet entscheidend für den Ausgang des Falles war. Ebenso wie die objektiv entscheidende Bedeutung für den Ausgang des Falles sich aufdrängen muss, muss sich auch aufdrängen, dass die widersprüchliche Begründung gleichbedeutend ist mit einer Nicht-Begründung, indem sie beispielsweise völlig konfus ist (R 12/22).

Zum Argument der Antragstellerin, die Begründungsmängel seien für den Fachmann augenfällig, befand die GBK, dass es sich bei der relevanten Person, der eklatante Begründungsmängel ins Auge springen müssen, um den Durchschnittsleser und nicht den Fachmann handelt.

Der Antrag auf Überprüfung wurde teilweise als offensichtlich unzulässig und im Übrigen als offensichtlich unbegründet verworfen.

In the course of the written proceedings before the board in T 744/23, the respondent (opponent) had requested, inter alia, that the oral proceedings be conducted in person. In its communication pursuant to Art. 15(1) RPBA the board had taken note thereof and had added that it would, however, be appropriate to hold the oral proceedings by videoconference pursuant to Art. 15a RPBA, as this would be the most sustainable format, and no particular reasons had been put forward nor had any been apparent, as to why this would not be appropriate in the present case.

Oral proceedings had been held by videoconference. Four weeks later, the respondent had submitted a request for correction of the minutes of the oral proceedings. The respondent had asked for text passages to be inserted dealing with its request to hold the oral proceedings in person. Referring to R. 124(1) EPC, the respondent argued that the requests of the parties without doubt represented "essentials of the oral proceedings" in the sense of this provision. It was therefore indispensable that the minutes summarise each of the requests brought forward by a party in the course of the procedure and elaborated on during the oral proceedings. Furthermore, it noted that the technical issues, which had affected the access of the board to the internet and, thus, the videoconference facility and required an interruption of the oral proceedings, underlined why a hearing in person had been mentioned as the optimum format and the "gold standard" in G 1/21.

The board rejected the respondent's request for correction of the minutes of the oral proceedings. It recalled that minutes of oral proceedings must contain, inter alia, the essentials of the oral proceedings and the relevant statements of the parties (R. 124(1) EPC). According to the jurisprudence of the boards of appeal, these essentials of the oral proceedings or the relevant statements of the parties were to be determined with a view to what the board may have to decide on (e.g. T 966/99, T 263/05, T 262/17, T 1891/20). This also applied to statements disposing of the subject-matter of the appeal proceedings or parts thereof. However, the minutes did not have to contain the complete arguments of the parties (e.g. T 118/20 and T 1891/20). All the more so, the minutes may not contain arguments or statements of the parties which they considered to be (only) of use in subsequent proceedings before national courts or the Unified Patent Court and which had no bearing on the decision of the board (T 966/99, T 263/05, T 262/17).

The board stated that the format of the oral proceedings was an ancillary question which was regularly not to be dealt with in the order of a (substantive) decision. The choice of format was a discretionary procedural decision (G 1/21, R 12/22) which had to be made ex officio in advance, in accordance with the criteria of Art. 15a(1) RPBA ("appropriateness"). It therefore did not concern, in itself, the essentials of the oral proceedings, nor were the statements made in the oral proceedings, which related to their format as such, relevant statements within the meaning of R. 124(1) EPC.

The board noted that the oral proceedings in this case had been affected by a general network failure on the EPO premises and that this was already reflected in the minutes. However, the discussions which the respondent also wished to have included in the minutes related solely to the format of the oral proceedings, and to its request for in-person oral proceedings, which it had made in writing before, and which had already been addressed in the board's communication. The board concluded that, contrary to the respondent's contention, not all "requests of the parties without doubt represent 'essentials of the oral proceedings'" to be included in the minutes by default, but only under the requirements as also outlined above (e.g. T 1891/20). In particular, the request concerning the format of the oral proceedings and the related discussions, which the respondent wished to have reflected in the minutes, did not fulfil these requirements. There was no connection between the technical issues caused by the network failure during the oral proceedings and these discussions. Likewise, these technical issues had not, in retrospect, made the respondent's request and the discussions on the format of the oral proceedings essential.