A. Beschwerdeverfahren

Orientierungssatz: 

Zum Argument, ein neuer Hilfsantrag sei nur eine Korrektur und keine Änderung im Sinne Art 13(2) VOBK, Gründe 5.1 bis 5.5

Catchword:

Zu einem Antrag auf Zurückverweisung zur weiteren Prüfung von erstinstanzlich nicht behandelten Hilfsanträgen, Gründe 4.1 und 4.2

Catchword:

Different interpretation of Article 109(1) EPC from that provided for in the Guidelines for Examination in the EPO - application of Article 20(2) RPBA 2020 (see point 2.4.3 of the Reasons).

Orientierungssatz:

Ein von der Einspruchsabteilung nicht zugelassenes Dokument kann in der Beschwerde durchaus zugelassen werden, wenn die Vorinstanz verkannt hat, dass der beanspruchten Erfindung nur eine Teilpriorität zukommt und das erstinstanzlich nicht zugelassene Dokument als Stand der Technik für die Frage der erfinderischen Tätigkeit der nicht prioritätsberechtigten Alternativen des unabhängigen Anspruchs relevant ist.

Catchword:

Any reasons as to why an amendment to a party's appeal case overcomes an objection which is not part of the decision under appeal or of the appeal proceedings do not constitute valid reasons for admitting the amendment in view of Article 12(4) RPBA, second paragraph.

Orientierungssatz: 

1. Es scheint sich eine einheitliche Rechtsprechungslinie dahingehend zu entwickeln, dass in Fällen, in denen durch eine unkomplizierte Änderung wie das Streichen einer gesamten Anspruchskategorie eine Antragsfassung vorliegt, auf deren Basis das Patent erkennbar aufrechterhalten werden kann, außergewöhnliche Umstände im Sinne von Artikel 13(2) EPÜ vorliegen können. Diese erlauben dann eine positive Ermessensausübung, wenn die Änderung den faktischen oder rechtlichen Rahmen des Verfahrens nicht verschiebt, keine Neugewichtung des Verfahrensgegenstandes bedingt und weder dem Grundsatz der Verfahrensökonomie, noch den berechtigten Interessen einer Verfahrenspartei zuwiderläuft (im Anschluss an T 2295/19; siehe Gründe Nr. 3.4.2 bis 3.4.6)  2. Diese Rechtsprechung fügt sich hinsichtlich des Grades der geforderten prima facie Relevanz in die Stufen des mit der VOBK etablierten Konvergenzansatzes ein und führt diesen logisch fort (vgl. Gründe Nr. 3.4.7).  3. Es besteht keine Notwendigkeit (mehr), zur Sicherung einer einheitlichen Rechtsanwendung die Große Beschwerdekammer zu befassen (vgl. Gründe Nr. 4 bis 4.4).

Catchword: 

Exceptional circumstances may justify the admissibility of a request filed for the first time at the oral proceedings before the board even when the amendment to the case is made in response to an objection of added subject-matter raised long in advance (see Reasons, 1.5).

Catchword:

1. From the company name of an appellant alone it can generally not be derived that the appellant does not meet the conditions of Rule 6(4,5) EPC in conjunction with European Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 for payment of the reduced appeal fee. This applies even where a company name is well-known. 2. Where it is not clear from the file at the end of the appeal period whether or not an appellant at the point in time of payment of the reduced fee meets the conditions of Rule 6(4,5) EPC, no clear intention to pay the regular appeal fee can be detected that under the principles of T 152/82 would entitle the EPO to ex officio debit the amount of the regular fee. 3. An appellant who gives a debit order for payment of the reduced appeal fee even though it clearly does not meet the conditions of Rule 6(4,5) EPC commits an obvious mistake in the meaning of J 8/80 and G 1/12. Such an appellant is imputed to have had the clear intention to pay the regular fee, reason why no evidence to prove this intention is required. 4. The exhaustive criteria to assess Rule 139 EPC are "principles" (a) to (c) of G 1/12, i.e. essentially those of J 8/80, points 4 and 6: (a) The correction must introduce what was originally intended. (b) Where the original intention is not immediately apparent, the requester bears the burden of proof, which must be a heavy one. The same applies, pursuant to J 8/80, point 6, where the making of the mistake is not self-evident. (c) The error to be remedied may be an incorrect statement or an omission. complemented by criterion (d) balancing of the public interest in legal certainty with the interest of the party requesting correction, with the factors (i.e. sub-criteria of this criterion) relevant to the specific case.

Catchword:

1. Entspricht der Antrag, der der Entscheidung der Einspruchsabteilung zugrunde liegt, zum Zeitpunkt der Entscheidung nicht dem Willen einer Partei, so ist diese Partei beschwert und ihre Beschwerde gegen die Entscheidung zulässig (Punkt 1.1 der Entscheidungsgründe).  2. Die Kammer sieht es als erwiesen an, dass die Entscheidung der Einspruchsabteilung nicht auf der beabsichtigten Fassung des Hilfsantrags beruht, die in der mündlichen Verhandlung erörtert wurde. Im vorliegenden Fall hat die Einspruchsabteilung entweder über den falschen Antrag entschieden, der nicht dem Tenor der Entscheidung entspricht, oder aber über einen Antrag, zu dem die Parteien nicht gehört wurden. Beides stellt einen schwerwiegenden Verfahrensmangel dar, und daher ist die Entscheidung aufzuheben (Punkte 3.4 - 3.6 der Entscheidungsgründe).  3. Ein Fehler in einem während der mündlichen Verhandlung eingereichten Anspruchssatz, der Teil einer in der mündlichen Verhandlung verkündeten Entscheidung geworden ist, ist weder einer späteren Korrektur über Regel 140 EPÜ zugänglich, noch über Regel 139 EPÜ, sofern es ihm an der Offensichtlichkeit mangelt (Punkte 5.1 - 5.5 der Entscheidungsgründe).

Orientierungssatz: Gründe 5.1, 6, 7

Catchword: 1. The discretionary decision under Article 111(1) EPC to remit a case or not is to be taken ex officio, at any time during the appeal proceedings. It is not dependent on any request by a party. A request for remittal made by a party is therefore not subject to the provisions of Articles 12 and 13 RPBA 2020 (points 23 and 24 of the Reasons). 2. Articles 12 and 13 RPBA 2020 serve to take account of changes in the facts or the subject-matter of the appeal proceedings ("amendments" within the meaning of Articles 12(4) and 13(1) and (2) RPBA), within narrow limits (point 25 of the Reasons). 3. Procedural requests are not amendments within the meaning of Articles 12(4) and 13(1) and (2) RPBA. They can therefore be made at any time during the appeal proceedings and must be considered by the board, regardless of when they are made (points 26 to 29 of the Reasons)

Catchword:

Im vorliegenden Fall konnte von der Beschwerdeführerin nicht erwartet werden, auf einen einzelnen Aspekt einer in ihrer Gesamtheit nicht überzeugenden Argumentationslinie in der angefochtenen Entscheidung der Prüfungsabteilung mit auf diesen Aspekt gerichteten Änderungen, die alle Einwände der Beschwerdekammer ausräumen, bereits bei Einlegen der Beschwerde zu reagieren.

Catchword:

Using a passage of the description to interpret a term in the claims does not constitute an "exceptional circumstance" which could justify amendments to the appeal case in the present case (see reasons point 5).

Catchword:

1. Neither the omission of a procedural act nor an error caused by miscommunication between the applicant and the representative or by an incorrect recollection of the applicant's instructions can be regarded as an error under Rule 139 EPC, provided that the document filed with the EPO is deemed to express the representative's intention at the time of filing. 2. A request for correction of a declaration of withdrawal of an appeal under Rule 139 EPC does not reopen the appeal proceedings, but only starts ancillary proceedings to decide whether the appeal proceedings should be reopened.

Catchword: 

1. If the deletion of dependent claims after notification of a summons to oral proceedings enhances procedural economy by clearly overcoming existing objections without giving rise to any new issues this might constitute cogent reasons justifying exceptional circumstances in the sense of Article 13(2) RPBA 2020. 

2. For a first medical use of a substance or composition according to Article 54(4) EPC to be sufficiently disclosed it is not required to show the suitability for each and every disease, but it usually suffices to show that at least one medical use is credibly achieved.

Catchword:

Berichtigung der Erklärung betreffend die Methode für die Entrichtung der Beschwerdegebühr im Formblatt 1038 - Ermittelung der ursprünglichen Absicht bei der Auswahl der Zahlungsmethode, siehe Entscheidungsgründe 6.4

Orientierungssatz: 

Nicht-Zulassung eines spät eingereichten prozeduralen Antrags (Punkt 2 der Entscheidungsgründe)

Catchword:

The substance of the request filed during the oral proceedings before the board - i.e. the claimed subject-matter and the attacks against it - is fully encompassed by both the appellant's and the respondent's initial appeal case within the meaning of Article 12(1) to (3) RPBA. The request certainly limits the potential issues for discussion. This means that, in view of the totality of the facts of the present case, the filing of this request, although formally an amendment and as such potentially subject to the strict provisions of Article 13(2) RPBA, in substance does not constitute an amendment of a party's case within the meaning of Article 12(4) RPBA, but rather a partial abandonment of the initial appeal case. There is no apparent reason not to admit such a request under any of the Articles 12(5), 13(1) or 13(2) RPBA. (Reasons 23.)

Orientierungssatz:

Ein Antrag mit einem Anspruchssatz, der in dem erstinstanzlichen Verfahren eingereicht, jedoch nicht verbeschieden wurde, wird im Beschwerdeverfahren nicht automatisch zugelassen sondern daraufhin geprüft, ob er im erstinstanzlichen Einspruchsverfahren in zulässiger Weise vorgebracht und aufrechterhalten wurde. Dabei ist das Kriterium der Konvergenz mit höherrangigen Anträgen zu berücksichtigen. Sollte der Antrag nicht in zulässiger Weise vorgebracht und aufrechterhalten worden sein, hat die Kammer das Ermessen ihn nicht zuzulassen. Siehe Punkte 3.1 bis 3.7 der Entscheidungsgründe.

Catchword:

Prima facie allowability under Article 123(2) EPC of a late filed amended claim request may be a valid criterion to be used by the opposition division when deciding on the admittance of this claim request. However, using this criterion, to object for the first time at oral proceedings to a feature of the late-filed claim request that was already present in higher ranking claim requests and had never been objected to before, not even when deciding on the allowability or admittance of those higher-ranking claim requests, goes against the principles of fairness and good faith (see point 2.6.11 of the reasons).

Catchword: Siehe Gründe Punkt 1.1

Catchword:

1. A request for reimbursement of the appeal fee under Rule 103(1)(a) EPC can no longer be filed after the department of first instance has granted interlocutory revision (Reasons 2). 

2. If the department of first instance grants interlocutory revision only to refine the written reasons which already complied with Rule 111(2) EPC, this may constitute a substantial procedural violation (Reasons 1).

Catchword:

Artikel 12(4) VOBK 2020 enthält keine Einschränkung dahin, dass sich jede Partei in der Beschwerde nur auf diejenigen Gegenstände des Vorverfahrens beziehen dürfte, die sie selbst dort "in zulässiger Weise vorgebracht" hat. Daher erscheint es legitim, sich auch auf Angriffslinien zu beziehen, die von anderen Beteiligten ins Einspruchsverfahren eingeführt worden waren. Geschieht dies, liegt insoweit daher keine zulassungsbedürftige Änderung des Vorbringens vor (siehe Punkt 4.4).

Catchword:

The principles expressed in Article 12(6) RPBA 2020 for the admittance of non-maintained or non-admitted requests may be considered in the exercise of discretion to admit amendments based on such requests under Article 12(4) RPBA 2020.

Exergue:

1) Le mémoire exposant les motifs du recours d'un requérant (opposant) doit comprendre l'ensemble des moyens couvrant toutes les requêtes pendantes devant la division d'opposition, y compris celles qui n'ont pas été considérées dans la décision contestée. Faute de quoi, le réquérant s'expose à ce que des moyens déposés après le mémoire exposant les motifs du recours et visant des requêtes subsidiaires pendantes devant la division d'opposition et déposées en réponse au mémoire de recours par le propriétaire du brevet soit écartés de la procédure (point 3 des motifs). 2) Lorsqu'un propriétaire de brevet modifie une revendication de produit en énonçant que le produit est destiné à une utilisation particulière, alors c'est à lui qu'appartient la charge de la preuve de démontrer que les produits de l'état de la technique cités contre la nouveauté et satisfaisant à toutes les autres caractéristiques de la revendication sont inaptes à l'utilisation en question (point 9 des motifs). 3) Une formulation dite « en cascade » de caractéristiques est susceptible d'entraîner une ambiguïté de la revendication. Lorsqu'une revendication est définie comme incluant une classe générique de composés présents dans une gamme pondérale et que la revendication est modifiée « en cascade » en indiquant que la classe générique est un composé spécifique, alors la gamme pondérale s'applique à ce composé spécifique, et non plus à la classe générique (point 11 des motifs). La portée de la revendication ne doit pas être interprétée sur la base d'une prétendue intention du rédacteur de la revendication, mais doit être appréciée sur la base de ses caractéristiques. L'ambiguïté d'une formulation « en cascade » ne peut pas être utilisée pour interpréter la revendication comme excluant tous les composés de la classe générique autres que ceux mentionnés ou en imposant une limitation pondérale à l'ensemble de la classe générique (point 12 des motifs)(T0999/10 - non suivi

Orientierungssatz:

Die Frage, ob ein Ermessen fehlerfrei, zum Beispiel unter Berücksichtigung der richtigen Kriterien ausgeübt wurde, ist eine inhaltliche Frage materiell-rechtlicher Natur, und keine verfahrensrechtliche. Daher liegt in einer inhaltlich unrichtigen Ermessensentscheidung, die unter korrekter Anwendung der Verfahrensvorschriften des EPÜ ergangen ist, kein Verfahrensmangel im Sinne der Regel 103 (1) a) EPÜ (Entscheidungsgründe Punkt 1.4).

Catchword:

In general, an auxiliary request which is directed to a combination of granted dependent claims as new independent claim, and filed after the statement of grounds or the reply thereto, will be an amendment of the party's appeal case within the meaning of Article 13 RPBA 2020. See reasons 9. A skilled person assessing the contents of the original application documents uses his technical skill. If they recognise that certain elements of the original application documents are essential for achieving a technical effect then adding that technical effect to a claim without also adding the essential elements can create fresh subject-matter even if the essential elements are originally portrayed as being optional. See reasons 3.6.3.

Catchword:

To judge whether a claim request was admissibly raised in opposition proceedings within the meaning of Article 12(4) RPBA 2020, a board has to decide whether the opposition division should have admitted the claim request, had a decision on admittance been required. If so, the claim request was admissibly raised (reasons, point 7). As a rule, claim requests filed in reply to the notice of opposition within the time limit set under Rule 79(1) EPC should have been admitted by the opposition division and were thus admissibly raised. Not admitting these claim requests and thus considering them not to have been admissibly raised must be limited to truly exceptional situations (reasons, points 7.1.2 and 7.1.3). Whether or not a claim request filed after the expiry of the time limit set under Rule 79(1) EPC and before the expiry of the time limit set under Rule 116(1) EPC is to be considered filed in due time depends on whether this request was submitted in direct and timely response to a change to the subject of the proceedings introduced by the opponent or the opposition division. Opposition divisions have the discretion to not admit any late-filed claim request and therefore the board has the discretion to consider a late-filed claim request not to have been admissibly raised (reasons, points 7.2.4 and 7.2.6). The criteria generally used by the boards of appeal when exercising their discretion to admit or not a party's submission in appeal under the Rules of Procedure 2020 may also be considered when deciding whether or not a late-filed claim request submitted after the expiry of the time limit set under Rule 79(1) EPC and before the expiry of the time limit set under Rule 116(1) EPC should have been admitted by the opposition division and was thus admissibly raised. However, when taking this decision, in view of the administrative character of opposition proceedings, these criteria should be used by the boards in a more lenient way than for a party's submission filed during appeal proceedings. In fact, to properly defend its patent, a patent proprietor must in principle be permitted to redefine its fallback positions in terms of auxiliary claim requests also at a late stage of opposition proceedings (reasons, points 7.2.7 and 7.2.10).

Orientierungssatz: 

Falls das Patent mit der Einspruchsentscheidung in erteilter oder geänderter Fassung aufrechterhalten wird, wären zusätzliche, in der Rangfolge niedriger stehende Hilfsanträge im Einspruchsverfahren nicht unbedingt im Sinne von Artikel 12(6) VOBK 2020 vorzubringen gewesen. Solchen am Beginn des Beschwerdeverfahrens eingereichten Anträgen kann die Zulassung ins Beschwerdeverfahren nicht ausschließlich unter Verweis auf diese Bestimmung verwehrt werden, siehe Punkt 5.4 der Entscheidungsbegründung.

Orientierungssatz:

Zur Notwendigkeit einer rechtzeitigen Replik:

1. Unter der seit 1. Januar 2020 geltenden Verfahrensordnung der Beschwerdekammern (VOBK 2020) obliegt es den Parteien, ihren Vortrag so rechtzeitig im Verfahren zu bringen, dass die Beschwerdekammer ihn bereits bei Abfassung des Ladungsbescheids berücksichtigen kann.

2. Soweit die Beschwerdeführerin einen Teil ihres Vortrags nicht, wie es Artikel 12 Abs. 3 VOBK 2020 eigentlich fordert, bereits in der Beschwerdebegründung unterbreiten kann, weil es sich um die Antwort auf Angriffe bzw. Hilfsanträge handelt,die nicht bereits Gegenstand der angegriffenen Entscheidung waren, sondern von der Beschwerdegegnerin in der Beschwerdeerwiderung unterbreitet wurden, stellt eine Replik hierauf für die Beschwerdeführerin das geeignete Mittel der Wahl dar, um ihre Antwort rechtzeitig vorzubringen. Gerade aus diesem Grund sieht Artikel 15 (1) VOBK 2020 vor, dass die Kammer sich bemüht, nicht früher als zwei Monate nach Erhalt der Beschwerdeerwiderung (gemäß Artikel 12 (1) c) VOBK 2020) die Ladung zu versenden.

3. Das Argument, es sei nicht zumutbar, Kaskaden von Argumentationslinien im Hinblick auf jede denkbare Einschätzung der Kammer vortragen zu müssen, greift nicht. Im zweiseitigen Beschwerdeverfahren trifft die Parteien die Pflicht zur sorgfältigen und beförderlichen Verfahrensführung, aus Gründen der Fairness gegenüber der anderen Partei, aber auch um das Verfahren innerhalb einer angemessenen Verfahrensdauer zum Abschluss zu bringen. Artikel 13 (2) VOBK 2020 sanktioniert diese Pflicht zur Verfahrensförderung.

4. Das Argument der Beschwerdeführerin, es sei der Kammer und auch der Patentinhaberin zumutbar, sich in der mündlichen Verhandlung mit der Diskussion eines einfachen neuen Sachverhaltes zu beschäftigen, lässt den Einfluss auf den weiteren Verfahrensverlauf außer Acht. Die erstmalige Diskussion einer Argumentationslinie in der mündlichen Verhandlung mag zu einer Situation führen, in der die andere Partei ihre Verteidigungslinie erstmalig in der mündlichen Verhandlung überdenken und ggf. anpassen muss, was zu einer deutlichen Verzögerung des Verfahrens führen und eine sachgerechte ntscheidung in der mündlichen Verhandlung erschweren oder unmöglich machen kann.

Catchword: 

Since the initial main request, filed for the first time with the statement of grounds of appeal, would not have been admitted under Article 12(4) RPBA 2007, the objections raised by the board in the communication annexed to the summons to oral proceedings against this initial main request are of a hypothetical nature and do not establish exceptional circumstances referred to in Article 13(2) RPBA 2020 which could justify amending the applicant's appeal case.

Catchword:

Admittance under Article 13(2) RPBA of claims and an adapted description filed as a response to the express invitation of the Board in its communication under Article 15(1) RPBA to file such amended application documents (Reasons 3).

Catchword: 

1. Two successive appeals, interlocutory revision, request for reimbursing first or second appeal fee.  2. Giving one single ground for the refusal, presently a violation of Article 123(2) EPC, may not be procedurally optimal, but is in itself not a procedural violation. Depending on the subject-matter claimed, it can be a defendable procedure to refrain from examining certain substantive issues, such as inventive step and novelty, as long as the division is not convinced that the potential distinguishing features have a proper basis under Article 123(2) EPC. An erroneous assessment of a substantive issue by the division is not a substantial procedural violation, either. In sum, there was no basis for the ordering of the reimbursement of the (first) appeal fee in the decision allowing the interlocutory revision (Reasons 5.9).  3. The board notes that the applicant may not have been able to avoid paying the second appeal fee in all circumstances. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the division would not have allowed the interlocutory revision and instead would have referred the first appeal to the Board of Appeal under Article 109(2) EPC, the payment of a second appeal fee might still have become unavoidable. Since the first refusal decision only dealt with added subject-matter, it would still have been quite likely that the case would have been remitted to the examining division for examination of the outstanding substantive issues even after a successful (first) appeal (Reasons 5.13).  4. Once the examining division reopens the examination, it is formally not prevented from re-examining all the issues which were already the subject of the previous decision. The principle of prohibition of reformatio in peius does not apply in this situation (Reasons 5.18).

Catchword:

If, as in the present case, no causality exists between a newly raised aspect and the final conclusion of the Board, the newly raised aspect does not qualify as an exceptional circumstance according to Article 13(2) RPBA 2020 that could justify taking a new request into account. (Reasons 2.5.2)

Catchword:

Änderung eines Anspruchssatzes durch Streichung von Ansprüchen. Zur Frage seiner Zulassung unter Artikel 13 (2) RPBA 2020 siehe Entscheidungsgründe Nr. 3.4.1 bis 3.4.14            

Catchword: 

An inescapable trap (Article 123(2) and (3) EPC) intrinsically precludes the admission of new requests under Articles 13(1) and (2) RPBA 2020, as the requirements of Article 123(2) and (3) EPC cannot both be satisfied (Reasons 4.3).

Catchword:

Ein nach der Ladung zur mündlichen Verhandlung eingereichter neuer Hilfsantrag, der nur noch einen bereits im von der Einspruchsabteilung aufrechterhaltenen Hauptantrag enthaltenen unabhängigen Verfahrensanspruch enthält, während alle anderen vorrangigen (Produkt-)Ansprüche gestrichen wurden, kann dann nicht als grundsätzlich unberücksichtigt bleibende Änderung des Beschwerdevorbringens im Sinne des Artikels 13(2) VOBK 2020 angesehen werden, wenn das bisherige Vorbringen der Beteiligten bereits eine hinreichende Grundlage zur Entscheidung über den neuen Hilfsantrag bietet (abweichend von T 2091/18, vgl. Punkt 5 der Gründe).

Catchword:

The Board understands [the wording of Article 13(2) RPBA 2020] as laying down a basic rule but leaving some limited leeway for exceptions. The basic rule is that amendments are not considered unless there are exceptional circumstances justified by cogent reasons (by the submitting party). The leeway for deviating from this rule lies in the expression "in principle" ("en principe"; "grundsätzlich"), which the Board reads roughly as "as a rule", meaning that the provision's basic rule is not entirely without exception. This leeway, when applied, means that an amendment can be considered despite the absence of exceptional circumstances justified by cogent reasons.

Catchword:

There is no right of the parties to choose in which form the Board of Appeal should exercise its competences under Article 111(1) EPC. The Board is entitled to decide on the issue of admittance of auxiliary requests without being bound to the respondent's request for prioritisation of the request for remittal. (Reasons, points 8.2 to 8.4)

Catchword:

I. A debit order has to be interpreted on its substance, according to the (objectively) clear intention of the appellant expressed therein to pay a fee in the applicable amount.

II. Under the Arrangements for deposit accounts valid as from 1 December 2017 (ADA 2017), a debit order having the clear purpose of paying a particular fee (here: the appeal fee) authorises the EPO to debit that fee in the applicable amount.

Catchword:

1. The Guidelines, Part E, Chapter XI, set out the procedure whereby the reasons of a responsible superior's decision rejecting a challenge to the impartiality of a division can be appealed. This procedure does not make the responsible superior's decision formally appealable (Reasons 2.3 and 2.4).

2. The unexplained omission of the reasons of the responsible superior's decision from the final decision of the division justifies the suspicion of partiality and constitutes a substantial procedural violation (Reasons 2.9 and 2.15).

3. The principle of the prohibition of "reformatio in peius" is not applicable where a case is to be remitted to a division in a new composition because of a suspicion of partiality (Reasons 5.5 and 5.6).

Catchword:

A characteristic employed in the prior art concerned was introduced to the claims as a limitation. This amendment was not suitable for addressing the fundamental novelty issue in the case. In that sense, the amended claim set (auxiliary request 5) did not "[relate] to the case under appeal" and was not taken into account (Article 12(4) RPBA 2007).

Catchword:

Aufgrund folgender außergewöhnlicher Umstände ist das von der Einsprechenden verspätet eingereichte Dokument E65a im Sinne der Artikel 13 (1) und (2) VOBK 2020 im Verfahren zu berücksichtigen: - Das Dokument war objektiv schwer auffindbar. - Es wurde zweifellos nicht absichtlich zurückgehalten, sondern von einem Dritten erstmals in einem vom vorliegendem Einspruchsverfahren getrennten Einspruchsverfahren entgegengehalten und ist hierdurch der Einsprechenden bekannt geworden. - Es gehört prima facie zum Stand der Technik. - Es ist prima facie sehr relevant. (Siehe Punkt 3.3 der Entscheidungsgründe)

Catchword:

Modification des moyens selon l'article 13(2) RPCR ; recevabilité de requêtes dans lesquelles certaines revendications indépendantes sont supprimées ; échelonnement des requêtes subsidiaires déposées tout au long de la procédure de recours qui donne lieu à une approche "par tâtonnements" ou une tactique par élimination (tactique du "salami") (voir points 2 et 3 des motifs).

Catchword:

"Exceptional circumstances" in Rule 13(2) RPBA interpreted as those that compromise neither the procedural rights of the other party, nor procedural economy.

Catchword:

Eligibility requirements for paying a reduced appeal fee by an appellant - opponent in case of opposition filed as a straw man (Reasons 1 to 9.2).

Catchword:

Amendment of a set of claims by deletion of claims. Admittance of said amended set of claims pursuant to Article 13(2) RPBA 2020: see points 3.1 to 3.16 of the Reasons for the Decision.

Catchword: 

Whether the documents which are taken as starting points for newly raised inventive step objections were previously used for objections regarding a lack of novelty has no bearing for determining whether these inventive step objections constitute an amendment to the opponent's appeal case under Article 13(2) RPBA 2020 (Reasons 4.7).

Catchword:

That a "new" objection was raised by a board in appeal proceedings cannot per se amount to "exceptional circumstances" within the meaning of Article 13(2) RPBA 2020 (see point 4.3 of the Reasons).

Catchword:

1. An opposition division's rejection of a request for extension of the time limit indicated in its communication under Rule 79(1) EPC does not terminate the opposition proceedings. Therefore, a patent proprietor is in a position to respond to the notice of opposition beyond the expired time limit or, at least, request the rejection of the opposition as well as oral proceedings. The patent proprietor must anticipate that an opposition division may issue its decision after expiration of the time limit (see Reasons 4.5, 4.6 and 4.9).

2. There is no legal basis for a duty on the part of the opposition division to notify the patent proprietor in advance of its intention to reach a decision, even if that decision concerns the revocation of the patent (see Reasons 4.8, 4.10 and 4.11).

3. If a patent proprietor chooses not to file any submissions during the opposition proceedings but to present them only with its statement of grounds of appeal, this amounts to bringing an entirely fresh case in appeal proceedings. This is at odds with the primary object of the appeal proceedings to review the decision under appeal in a judicial manner. Consequently, a board has the discretion under Article 12(4) RPBA 2007 not to admit the patent proprietor's defence submissions into the appeal proceedings. This does, however, not necessarily lead to revocation of the patent. The decision under appeal is still to be reviewed by the board, which might overturn the impugned decision, for example if it is not convinced by the reasons given by the opposition division or in the event of a substantial procedural violation (see Reasons 5.5 and 5.6).

Catchword: 

In order to substantiate an objection in the appeal proceedings which the Opposition Division did not consider convincing, it is necessary to provide specific reasons why the finding and the reasoning in the decision under appeal is supposedly incorrect with regard to this objection (Reasons 2.2.2-2.2.11). As a rule, in appeal proceedings general references to submissions made in the proceedings before the departments of first instance are not taken into account due to a lack of substantiation. Attaching the notice of opposition to the statement of grounds of appeal is to be considered equivalent to such a general reference to previous submissions (Reasons 2.2.13-2.2.14). An objection is to be considered to have been validly submitted only at the time on which sufficient substantiation is provided (Reasons 2.2.17).

Catchword:

Special reasons present in the sense of Article 11 (1) RPBA 2020 (see point 6 of the reasons for the decision).

Catchword:

If a request for oral proceedings is withdrawn after a date for oral proceedings has been set but before the notification of a communication issued in preparation for the oral proceedings, the withdrawal occurs "within one month of notification" for the purpose of Rule 103(4)(c) EPC.

Catchword:

Notification of the statement of grounds of appeal is not a Rule 100(2) EPC communication (Reasons 1.4) 
Article 13(2) RPBA – “in principle” (Reasons 2.1)

Catchword:

siehe Punkt 5.1.

Catchword:

While objections raised by the Board for the first time in a communication under Article 15(1) RPBA 2020 may be considered to give rise to exceptional circumstances within the meaning of Article 13(2) RPBA 2020, and may possibly justify the filing of amendments which specifically respond to the new objections, this does not open the door to additional amendments which are unrelated to the new objections, and for which no exceptional circumstances exist (Reasons, point 3.10).

 Catchword: Entscheidungsgründe 4

Catchword:

1.) Im Beschwerdeverfahren bestehen Beschränkungen neuen Vorbringens sowohl durch die Rechtsprechung der Großen Beschwerdekammer in G 10/91, G 1/95 und G 7/95 zur Berücksichtigung neuer Einspruchsgründe, als auch durch die den Kammern in Artikel 114 (2) EPÜ und der Verfahrensordnung der Beschwerdekammern eingeräumte Möglichkeit, verspätetes Vorbringen nicht zuzulassen. Diese Beschränkungen bestehen unabhängig voneinander und wirken kumulativ (Nr. 4.5 der Gründe). 

2.) Vorbringen, das nicht auf die in der Beschwerdebegründung oder Erwiderung enthaltenen Anträge, Tatsachen, Einwände, Argumente und Beweismittel gerichtet ist, bewirkt eine Änderung des Beschwerdevorbringens im Sinne des Artikel 13 (2) VOBK (J 14/19, Nr. 1.4 der Gründe). In diesem Zusammenhang stellt sowohl eine neue Kombination von Tatsachenelementen (z.B. die Wahl einer anderen Entgegenhaltung oder einer anderen Textstelle einer Entgegenhaltung als Ausgangspunkt für einen Einwand erfinderischer Tätigkeit) als auch eine neue Kombination von Tatsachen- und Rechtselementen (z.B. die Bezugnahme auf ein Dokument oder eine Textstelle in einem anderen rechtlichen Zusammenhang) eine Änderung des Beschwerdevorbringens dar. Ein in der mündlichen Verhandlung vor der Beschwerdekammer erstmals vorgetragener Einwand mangelnder erfinderischer Tätigkeit ausgehend von einer Entgegenhaltung, die zuvor lediglich Gegenstand eines Neuheitseinwandes war, stellt somit regelmäßig eine Änderung des Beschwerdevorbringens gemäß Artikel 13 (2) VOBK 2020 dar. (Nr. 4.9 der Gründe).

Catchword:

The requirement under Article 12(2) RPBA 2007 to present a complete case does not imply that an appellant/opponent, impugning a decision to maintain a patent in granted or amended form, has to raise objections against all dependent claims (point 4.2 of the reasons).

Catchword: 

1. "Proceedings" to be re-opened under Article 112a(5) EPC following an allowable petition are limited to rectifying the defect found according to the review decision. The present proceedings as re-opened by the Enlarged Board in R 3/22 are thus not the appeal proceedings, but "ancillary proceedings" with the limited purpose to decide on the request for correction of the withdrawal of the appeal (see point 2 of the Reasons).  2. Rule 139 EPC is applicable only if proceedings before the EPO for some other purpose are pending when the request for correction is received by the EPO. The request for correction is inadmissible if received when no such proceedings are pending (see point 3 of the Reasons).  3. A patent application subject to the examining division's refusal, which is in turn subject to an appeal that has been withdrawn, is not "pending" within the meaning of Rule 36(1) EPC (see point 4 of the Reasons).

Catchword:

A request in which some claims have been deleted compared to the requests that were filed previously with the grounds of appeal or the reply is, according to the systematic context of Article 12(3) RPBA 2020 and Article 13 RPBA 2020, a new request and thus usually amounts to an "amendment to the party's appeal case".

Catchword: 

- Binding effect of a referring decision (see Reasons, points 9 to 9.4.5)
- Interpretation of order no. 2 of G 2/21 (see Reasons, points 10 to 11.14, in particular points 11.10 and 11.14)
- Submissions based on earlier decisions of the boards of appeal
- admittance into the appeal proceedings (see Reasons, points 32 to 32.4, in particular point 32.3)

Catchword:

The respondent's requests regarding the ground for opposition under Article 100 c) EPC confront the Board with the issue of admittance of a new ground for opposition which was raised during the oral proceedings before the opposition division but had deliberately not been decided upon by the opposition division. In the absence of a positive decision on admittance by the opposition division, the Board considers that the ground for opposition under Article 100 c) EPC should be treated as a fresh ground at the appeal stage and its admittance should be governed by the principles set forth in G 10/91, which require the proprietor's consent for its introduction in the appeal proceedings. In view of the appellant's refusal thereto, the ground for opposition under Article 100 c) is not to be introduced in the appeal proceedings.

Catchword:

As to the divergence in the jurisprudence of the Boards of Appeal concerning the notion of an "amendment" within the meaning of Article 12(4) RPBA 2020, see point 2.4 of the Reasons.

Catchword:

There is no legal basis in the EPC or the RPBA (in the versions of 2007 and 2020) that prevents the board from examining in the case at hand an objection of lack of inventive step raised by the respondent in the appeal proceedings against the patent as granted or as amended that was not addressed in the decision under appeal. Nor does the case law prevent the board from doing so. This means that the board may examine whether such an objection is substantiated, whether it should be admitted into the appeal proceedings and whether it prejudices the maintenance of the patent as granted or as amended, as the case may be. (See section 2 of the Reasons)]

Catchword:

Le fait que la chambre ait retenu un argument nouveau (absence d'effet technique clairement identifiable) dans la chaîne argumentaire conduisant au constat provisoire d'absence d'activité inventive ne saurait être ignoré. Il justifie que les requêtes qui visent et se limitent à remédier à cette objection soient admises.

Catchword:

Weder Artikel 13(2) VOBK 2020 noch die erläuternden Bemerkungen dazu in CA/3/19 enthalten eine Erklärung, wie allgemein zu bestimmen ist, ob die Umstände "außergewöhnlich" sind. Die Erläuterungen der VOBK 2020 nennen als Beispiel für solche "außergewöhnlichen" Umstände allerdings den Fall, dass die Kammer einen Einwand erstmals in einer Mitteilung erhoben hat. In diesem Fall rechtfertige die veränderte Grundlage des Beschwerdeverfahrens ein verändertes Vorbringen. Die Frage, ob umgekehrt durch geändertes Vorbringen auch die Grundlage des Beschwerdeverfahrens verändert wird, stellt somit ein mögliches Kriterium dar, das für die Beurteilung der Außergewöhnlichkeit der Umstände heranzuziehen ist (Punkt 6.3 der Entscheidungsgründe).

Catchword: 

If the opponent is the sole appellant against an interlocutory decision maintaining a patent in amended form, an objection related to the inadmissibility of the opposition is subject to the principle of the prohibition of reformatio in peius. In such a procedural situation, the Board is prohibited from ordering the maintenance of the patent as granted due to the inadmissibility of the opposition (Reasons 3.19).

Catchword: 

The yardstick for determining whether the position of an appellant is, because of its own appeal, worsened in a way which is incompatible with the principle of the prohibition of reformatio in peius is the order of the decision under appeal, in particular the order's legal effect on the appellant.  If an opposition is considered inadmissible in the appeal proceedings, an appellant whose opposition was rejected in the decision under appeal as unallowable would not be in a worse position than if it had not appealed, as in both cases the patent would be maintained as granted. The legal reasons leading to this result, including whether the opposition is rejected as inadmissible or unallowable, do not fall within the scope of the principle of the prohibition of reformatio in peius (Reasons 3.5).

Catchword: 

If there is an amendment to the patent in the appeal proceedings which has never been examined before, the Enlarged Board's obiter dictum in G 10/91, Reasons 19, is fully respected when only the prima facie relevance of an objection under Article 123(2) EPC is considered in the context of assessing whether there are exceptional circumstances under Article 13(2) RPBA 2020 (Reasons 2.3.1-2.3.14).

Catchword: 

Admittance of objections raised in appeal, said objections having been raised before the opposition division against a different claim request (point 4.3 of the Reasons

Catchword:

A request not to admit a certain document, this request having been filed for the first time during oral proceedings before the board, may constitute an amendment of the appeal case the admittance of which is governed by Article 13(2) RPBA 2020 (point 3 of the reasons).

Catchword: 

If more than one summons are issued in appeal proceedings, both after the entry into force of the revised version of the Rules of Procedure, the first of these summons are the summons referred to in Article 13(2) RPBA 2020. Summons represent a predictable and objectively determinable trigger for the third level of convergence. This trigger function is independent of any subsequent procedural development, see reasons 2.  The postponement of oral proceedings due to a request for a referral of a question of law to the Enlarged Board of Appeal which was not announced in advance by the party making the request normally does not justify apportionment of costs. Since there is no guarantee that such a request will be successful, all parties will normally have to prepare for a discussion of the substance of the case irrespective of whether the request is announced in advance or not, see reasons 8.

Catchword:
The Boards of Appeal may review discretionary decisions. There are, however, limits on the extent of review that reflect the discretion accorded to the deciding body. In the present case, the Opposition Division decided to consider document D8 and the review of this decision is a primary object of the appeal proceedings (Article 12(2) RPBA 2020) - see Reasons 1 - 9.

Zusammenfassung

In T 1695/21 beantragte die Beschwerdegegnerin (Patentinhaberin), einen Einwand nach Art. 84 EPÜ gegen ihren Hauptantrag nicht in das Verfahren zuzulassen, da in der Beschwerdebegründung keine konkreten Passagen der Beschreibung angegeben worden seien, durch die dieser Einwand begründet sein könnte, und dieser daher nicht substantiiert sei (Art. 12 (3) und (5) VOBK).

Die Kammer rief in Erinnerung, dass gemäß Art. 12 (3) VOBK die Beschwerdebegründung und die Erwiderung das vollständige Beschwerdevorbringen der Beteiligten enthalten müssen. Dementsprechend müssen sie laut dieser Vorschrift deutlich und knapp angeben, aus welchen Gründen beantragt wird, die angefochtene Entscheidung aufzuheben, abzuändern oder zu bestätigen; sie sollen ausdrücklich alle geltend gemachten Anträge, Tatsachen, Einwände, Argumente und Beweismittel im Einzelnen anführen.

Die Kammer wies darauf hin, dass die Beschwerdeführerin im vorliegenden Fall in ihrer Beschwerdebegründung auf spezifische Punkte der Niederschrift über die mündliche Verhandlung vor der Einspruchsabteilung verweise. Dort seien die Absätze der Beschreibung konkret angegeben, auf welche sich die Beschwerdeführerin im Einspruchsverfahren hinsichtlich des Einwands nach Art. 84 EPÜ bezogen habe. Die Kammer merkte auch an, dass diese in identischer Weise auch in der angefochtenen Entscheidung wiedergegeben seien. Nach Ansicht der Kammer ist aufgrund dieses Verweises und der Erläuterung, worin die vermeintliche Inkonsistenz der Beschreibung bestehe, der Beschwerdebegründung zu entnehmen, welche Passagen der Beschreibung die Beschwerdeführerin als problematisch im Hinblick auf Art. 84 EPÜ ansah. Damit sei der Gegenstand des Einwands zumindest im Wesentlichen erkennbar. Die Kammer teilte daher die Schlussfolgerung der Beschwerdegegnerin, dass ein Verstoß gegen Art. 12 (3) VOBK vorliege, nicht, sondern sah den von der Beschwerdeführerin erhobenen Einwand nach Art. 84 EPÜ als ausreichend substantiiert an.

Die Kammer berücksichtigte den Einwand daher im Beschwerdeverfahren und gelangte zu dem Ergebnis, dass dieser Einwand dem Hauptantrag entgegenstehe, der somit zurückgewiesen wurde.

Zusammenfassung

In T 1135/22 reichte die Beschwerdegegnerin (Patentinhaberin) Hilfsanträge 1 bis 12 mit der Beschwerdeerwiderung ein. Zuvor hatte sie diese Hilfsanträge bereits im Einspruchsverfahren innerhalb der Schriftsatzfrist nach R. 116 (1) und (2) EPÜ eingereicht. Die Hilfsanträge mussten jedoch von der Einspruchsabteilung nicht behandelt werden, da das Streitpatent wie erteilt aufrechterhalten wurde (sog. "carry-over requests").

Die Patentinhaberin brachte hierzu vor, dass Hilfsanträge 1 bis 12 automatisch Bestandteil des Beschwerdeverfahrens seien, da sie im Sinne von Art. 12 (2) VOBK bereits der angefochtenen Entscheidung "zugrunde gelegen" hätten. Dies sei auch der angefochtenen Entscheidung explizit zu entnehmen, weil deren Einreichung und Erörterung durch die Patentinhaberin im Teil "Sachverhalt und Anträge" der angefochtenen Entscheidung erwähnt werde. Somit seien diese Hilfsanträge keine "Änderung" im Sinne von Art. 12 (4) Satz 1 VOBK.

Die Kammer teilte diese Ansicht nicht. Die bloße Erwähnung von Hilfsanträgen im Teil "Sachverhalt und Anträge" könne nicht damit gleichgesetzt werden, dass sie im Sinne von Art. 12 (2) VOBK der angefochtenen Entscheidung "zugrunde lagen". Anderenfalls wäre der Passus von Art. 12 (4) Satz 1 VOBK "sofern der Beteiligte nicht zeigt, dass dieser Teil in dem Verfahren, das zu der angefochtenen Entscheidung geführt hat, in zulässiger Weise vorgebracht und aufrechterhalten wurde" belanglos. Es entspreche vielmehr sowohl Sinn und Zweck von Art. 12 (2) VOBK als auch der mittlerweile gefestigten Rechtsprechung der Beschwerdekammern (siehe z. B. T 42/20, T 221/20, T 1800/20, T 364/20), dass Änderungsanträge nur dann der angefochtenen Entscheidung "zugrunde liegen", wenn das Entscheidungsorgan diese Anträge auch behandelt und darüber entschieden hat.

Ferner erläuterte die Kammer, es ergebe sich aus dem Wortlaut von Art. 12 (4) VOBK, dass die Kammer, bei der Prüfung der Frage, ob sie über einen Ermessensspielraum bei der Berücksichtigung von sog. "carry-over requests" verfügt, zwei Aspekte zu untersuchen habe: Zunächst ob der Beteiligte "gezeigt" hat, wie und warum die betreffenden Anträge im erstinstanzlichen Verfahren "in zulässiger Weise vorgebracht und aufrechterhalten" wurden; dann, wenn ein solcher Vortrag vorliegt, ob das betreffende Vorbringen sachlich zutreffend ist.

Zum ersten Aspekt verwies die Kammer auf T 246/22, wo sie in anderer Besetzung ausgeführt hatte, dass – wie aus dem Wortlaut von Art. 12 (4) VOBK klar hervorgehe – der Gesetzgeber den Kammern keine Verpflichtungen auferlegen wollte, von Amts wegen das erstinstanzliche Verfahren zu studieren, Anträge zu identifizieren und bis zu ihrem Ursprung zurückzuverfolgen und zu verstehen, warum sie eingereicht wurden. Vielmehr obliege es dem betreffenden Verfahrensbeteiligten, darzulegen, dass diese Anträge "in zulässiger Weise vorgebracht" wurden. Dass diese Darlegung bereits in der Beschwerdebegründung oder -erwiderung erfolgen müsse, ergebe sich aus dem Erfordernis des Art. 12 (3) Satz 1 VOBK.

Nach Auffassung der Kammer war die Patentinhaberin im vorliegenden Fall dieser Darlegungslast nicht nachgekommen. Den Verweis auf den Umstand, dass die Anträge innerhalb der erstinstanzlichen Schriftsatzfrist gemäß R. 116 (1) und (2) EPÜ eingereicht worden waren, hielt die Kammer nicht für ausreichend, da auch solche Anträge nach der Rechtsprechung "verspätet" sein könnten (s. z. B. T 364/20). Auch hatte die Patentinhaberin in ihrer Beschwerdeerwiderung nur die jeweilige Basis für die vorgenommenen Änderungen angegeben und kursorisch erwähnt, dass die hinzugefügten Merkmale im Stand der Technik nicht offenbart seien, nicht aber ausgeführt, ob die Anträge in zulässiger Weise erstinstanzlich vorgebracht wurden.

Die Kammer kam daher zu dem Schluss, dass die Zulassung dieser Änderung des Beteiligtenvorbringens in ihrem Ermessen stand. Bei der Ausübung dieses Ermessens berücksichtigte die Kammer zum einen, dass die Erfordernisse der Art. 56, 83, 84 und 123 (2) EPÜ der prima facie Gewährbarkeit nicht zwingend entgegenstanden, zum anderen die in Art. 12 (4) Satz 5 VOBK genannten Kriterien, und ließ den Hilfsantrag 6 ins Beschwerdeverfahren zu.

Zusammenfassung

In T 1820/22 the board decided not to admit auxiliary requests 1 to 8 filed with the statement of grounds of appeal, nor auxiliary requests auxiliary requests 1a, 1b, 1c, 2a, 2b, 3a, or 4a filed with further submissions after the summons to oral proceedings. All these requests were filed for the first time on appeal and were therefore subject to the discretion of the board under Art. 12(6) RPBA (together with Art. 13(1) RPBA for the later requests).

The appellant (patent proprietor) had argued that all auxiliary requests contained amendments which addressed the added subject-matter objection on which the decision was based. However, the board observed that the proprietor had not made any attempt to address the objection by amendment during the opposition proceedings, even though the objection was known to them from the outset (as it was set out in the notice of opposition), and from the annex to the summons, where the issue was again raised. The appellant proprietor had been given ample opportunity to address the issue by amendment and had indeed submitted various requests in the course of the opposition proceedings, none of which however dealt with the issue of added subject-matter. The board concluded that although they could have addressed the issue of added subject-matter, they chose not to do so.

The board was not convinced by the appellant's explanation that they had chosen not to address the issue by amendment in opposition proceedings because they had been persuaded that this was futile due to an Art. 123(3) EPC trap. According to the appellant this seemed to have also been the understanding of both parties and the opposition division. Only the mention of claim 18 as originally filed as possible basis in the decision offered an opening.

However, the board pointed out that nothing had changed in the underlying facts. The issue of added subject-matter arising from a feature added before grant was still the very same as at the outset of the opposition proceedings. In the board's view the appellant proprietor should have known ab initio what the basis was in the original disclosure of their patent for the reading of a claim feature they were arguing. If they were unable to identify a basis or failed to do so earlier, they had to bear the consequences. Thus, the board was unable to see a justification for the late submission of amendments only in appeal as a result of a belated realisation on their part, however that realisation may have come about.

Moreover, the board held that the amendments of these requests did not appear suitable to overcome the added subject-matter objection on which the decision was based and some amendments were not occasioned by a ground of opposition in the sense of R. 80 EPC. Thus, additionally, the requirements of Art. 12(4) RPBA were not met.

Finally, the board pointed out that the nature of the requests was complex and considered the number of requests, 16 in all, most of which offered different attempts to resolve the issue of added subject-matter, to be disproportionate to that issue. This was all the more so in view of the argument that a single passage, original claim 18, would provide a basis for the amendment.

Therefore, the board concluded that the circumstances of the appeal case did not justify the admission of these auxiliary requests, which should have been filed during opposition proceedings, Art. 12(6) and Art. 13(1) RPBA.

Zusammenfassung

In T 2124/21 the appellant (applicant) had filed with the statement of grounds of appeal a main request and a first auxiliary request that superseded the sole request subject of the appealed decision. In its communication under Art. 15(1) RPBA, the board informed the appellant of its preliminary intention not to admit these requests, inter alia because no reason had been given why these amendments were filed only on appeal, and because prima facie they contained added subject-matter. In its written reply the appellant withdrew the main request and the first auxiliary request and requested, by reference, the grant of a patent based on the claims of the request subject of the appealed decision.

The board first explained that it was with the main request and first auxiliary request that the resubmitted sole request subject of the appealed decision had to be compared when establishing whether it was an "amendment" to the appeal case. Since the sole request had been abandoned by the statement of grounds of appeal it was not pending anymore when resubmitted. Therefore, it could not be the object of comparison for the purposes of Art. 13(2) RPBA. The board then pointed out that, since claim 1 of each of the main request and the first auxiliary request had an additional feature compared with claim 1 of the sole request subject of the appealed decision, the resubmitted request constituted an amendment to the appeal case within the meaning of Art. 13(2) RPBA.

Regarding the question whether there were exceptional circumstances justified by cogent reasons, the board, citing Art. 12(2) and (3) RPBA, explained that the appellant had made a choice, at the outset of appeal proceedings, not to seek a review of the appealed decision and thereby prevented the board from pursuing the primary object of the appeal proceedings (cf. Art. 12(1)(a) and (b) and (2) RPBA). In the board's view, it could not be expected to begin the judicial review of the appealed decision only at the last stage of the appeal proceedings.

Moreover, the board held that the fact that the amendment in question did not imply a substantial technical change of the claimed subject-matter, was not a circumstance that justified admittance of the sole request. Rather, the only exceptional aspect of the case was the appellant's own choice to avoid the board's review of the appealed decision until the last stage of the appeal proceedings. The objection raised in the preliminary opinion against the then freshly filed main request and first auxiliary request was not an exceptional circumstance.

Since there was no admitted request on file the appeal was dismissed.

Zusammenfassung

In T 419/21 erklärte die Beschwerdeführerin (Anmelderin) die Rücknahme der Beschwerde mit folgender Bedingung: "...namens und in Vertretung der Beschwerdeführenden (sic) Anmelderin wird die vorliegende Beschwerde T 0419/21- 3.5.02 zurückgenommen, sofern nicht

- die Jahresgebühr für das sechste (6.) Jahr (= EPA-Gebühren-Code 036) sowie

- die Zuschlagsgebühr zur Jahresgebühr für das sechste (6.) Jahr (= EPA-Gebühren-Code 096) wirksam entrichtet sind."

Die Kammer erläuterte, dass die Beschwerdeführerin das Beschwerdeverfahren nicht rechtswirksam durch die Erklärung der Beschwerderücknahme beendet hatte, da diese unter einer unzulässigen Bedingung erfolgte und nicht eindeutig war. Generell sei nämlich anerkannt, dass Verfahrenserklärungen, von denen abhängt, ob ein Verfahren einzuleiten oder fortzusetzen ist, im Interesse der Rechtssicherheit nicht an Bedingungen geknüpft sein dürfen, wenn dadurch offen bliebe, ob das Europäische Patentamt das Verfahren fortsetzen kann. Dies gelte insbesondere, wenn Dritte über die aufschiebende Wirkung einer Beschwerde nach Art. 106 (1) Satz 2 EPÜ im Unklaren bleiben würden. Sinn und Zweck einer Beschwerderücknahme sei es zudem, das Beschwerdeverfahren unmittelbar und ohne weiteren Prüfungsaufwand der Kammer zu beenden. Im Gegenzug werde der Beschwerdeführerin die entrichtete Beschwerdegebühr nach R. 103 EPÜ ganz oder teilweise erstattet. Dem würde es nach Ansicht der Kammer zuwiderlaufen, wenn sie aufgrund der bedingten Erklärung erst prüfen müsste, ob für die für eine bedingte Rücknahmeerklärung maßgeblichen tatsächlichen oder rechtlichen Umstände eingetreten sind. Es wäre auch nicht gerechtfertigt, eine etwaige unzureichende Abstimmung zwischen Anmelder und Mandanten und die daraus resultierende Unklarheit über erfolgte Gebührenzahlungen auf das Beschwerdeverfahren zu übertragen und die nicht erfüllten Abstimmungs- und Prüfungspflichten auf die Beschwerdekammer zu verlagern, um die Erstattung der Beschwerdegebühr zu ermöglichen. Dadurch würde die Kammer mit Prüfungspflichten belastet, die in den originären Verantwortungsbereich des Anmelders fallen, und es würde ohne rechtfertigenden Grund eine unklare Rechtssituation zu Lasten Dritter geschaffen. Auch im Falle der von der Beschwerdeführerin angeführten Gebührenzahlung durch Dritte bestehe insoweit kein schutzwürdiges Interesse des Anmelders, da die Zahlung von Gebühren originär in seinen Verantwortungsbereich falle. Unterlasse es der Anmelder, selbst oder durch seine Vertreter entsprechende Zahlungen (rechtzeitig) zu veranlassen, so könne er entweder auf Zahlungen durch Dritte vertrauen oder seine Beschwerde (unbedingt und eindeutig) zurücknehmen, um die Beschwerdegebühr erstattet zu bekommen.

Eine bedingte Beschwerderücknahme sei demnach rechtlich nicht wirksam, wenn dadurch zunächst offenbleibt, ob das Beschwerdeverfahren fortgesetzt werden kann.

Ungeachtet der grundsätzlichen Problematik einer bedingten Beschwerderücknahme war die Rücknahmeerklärung der Beschwerdeführerin vorliegend nach Auffassung der Kammer auch deshalb nicht wirksam, weil sie unklar war. Die Abgabe einer verfahrensbeendenden Erklärung unter einer Bedingung, die nicht eindeutig ist, könne keine Rechtswirkungen entfalten. Die Beschwerdeführerin hatte ihre Rücknahmeerklärung an die wirksame Entrichtung der 6. Jahresgebühr und der Zuschlagsgebühr geknüpft. Die Formulierung "wirksam entrichtet sind" war jedoch unklar, denn, so die Kammer, es war nicht eindeutig erkennbar, ob die Rücknahmeerklärung unter der Bedingung stehen sollte, dass die Gebühren nicht bereits vor Eingang des Schriftsatzes vom 31. Januar 2023 gezahlt worden waren, oder ob auch eine Zahlung nach Eingang dieses Schriftsatzes, aber vor Ablauf der in R. 51 (2) EPÜ geregelten Frist, der Rücknahme entgegenstehen sollte. Zudem war auch nicht eindeutig erkennbar, ob allein auf die tatsächliche fristgerechte Einzahlung abgestellt werden sollte oder auf eine verfahrensabschließende Feststellung der (Un-)Wirksamkeit in einem Verfahren nach R. 112 (2) EPÜ, Art. 122 EPÜ oder Art. 7 (3) und (4) GebO.

Und schließlich war die Erklärung der Beschwerderücknahme nach Ansicht der Kammer auch deshalb nicht wirksam, weil sie unter einer Bedingung erfolgt war, die nicht rein innerprozessualer Art war. Die Kammer bestätigte die Rechtsprechung, wonach die Erklärung der Beschwerderücknahme unter einer Bedingung, die es erforderlich macht, Fragen zu prüfen, die nicht Bestandteil des eigentlichen Beschwerdeverfahrens sind, nicht wirksam ist.

Zusammenfassung

In T 559/20 ließ die Kammer die Hilfsanträge 1 bis 3 gemäß Art. 12 (5) i. V. m. Art. 12 (3) VOBK nicht zu, da sie nach ihrer Auflassung ohne erkennbare inhaltliche Begründung gestellt worden waren.

Die Beschwerdeführerin (Patentinhaberin) hatte lediglich argumentiert, die Hilfsanträge schränkten den Schutzumfang des Gegenstands des Hauptantrags weiter ein, so dass sie ebenso wie der Hauptantrag neu und erfinderisch seien.

Da diese Hilfsanträge aber bereits Gegenstand der angefochtenen Entscheidung waren, wäre nach Ansicht der Kammer zu erwarten gewesen, dass sich die Beschwerdeführerin mit den Entscheidungsgründen zu den Hilfsanträgen auseinandersetzt.

Zudem sei die von der Beschwerdeführerin vorgebrachte pauschale Begründung, die Hilfsanträge seien eingeschränkter und daher aus demselben Grund wie der Hauptantrag neu und erfinderisch, ersichtlich nicht geeignet, ihre Gewährbarkeit für den Fall zu begründen, dass die Kammer den Hauptantrag für nicht gewährbar hält. Daher komme diese Begründung dem völligen Fehlen einer Begründung gleich.

Zusammenfassung

In T 2482/22 the appellant (opponent) raised for the first time during the oral proceedings before the board an objection of lack of novelty over D1. The appellant's representative justified the late submission by arguing that he took over the case from a colleague, who had overlooked the novelty objection when he drafted the grounds of appeal. The appellant also argued that, because this concerned a European patent, it was of utmost importance that there be no doubts concerning validity. None of these arguments convinced the board of the existence of exceptional circumstances under Art. 13(2) RPBA.

As regards the meaning of the term "exceptional circumstances", according to the board it was established jurisprudence of the boards that such circumstances concerned new or unforeseen developments in the appeal proceedings, such as new objections raised by the board or another party.

In the present case, the appellant had already overlooked that objection when they drafted the notice of opposition, which was signed by the appellant's present representative. Thus, the fact that another representative of the appellant overlooked the novelty objection when drafting the grounds of appeal was not a development of the appeal proceedings, let alone a new or unforeseen one. The appellant alone had to bear the responsibility for any such errors and mistakes.

The board understood the appellant's further argument as implying that the legitimacy of the European patent system depended on the strength of validity of patents issued by it, and that therefore any concerns of validity had to trump any other considerations, e.g. those of procedural economy and transparency or the nature of appeal proceedings as a judicial review. The board pointed out that the legislator had seen this differently, as was evident from Art. 12(2) RPBA as adopted by Decision of the Administrative Council of 26 June 2019, according to which the primary object of the appeal proceedings is to review the decision under appeal and a party should direct their appeal case at the requests, facts, objections, arguments and evidence on which the decision under appeal is based. As a consequence, the possibility of a party to change its case or add to it was very limited, increasingly so as the appeal procedure progressed (see document CA/3/19, points 47 and 48, explaining the convergent approach underlying Art. 12 and 13 RPBA, as well as the explanatory remarks to these articles, reproduced in OJ 2020, Supplementary publication 2).

The board further explained that Art. 12 and 13 RPBA lay out the criteria by which the boards have to exercise their discretion when considering amendments to a party's appeal case. Art. 12(4) and 13(1) RPBA do still include criteria that could be seen as reflecting on the merits or relevance of new submissions (e.g. suitability to address issues), albeit subject to justifying reasons. Indeed, and following established case law (G 7/95, OJ 1996, 626), at an early appeal stage it might still be possible to consider novelty, even if not raised before, vis-a-vis a closest prior art already cited against inventive step, but only in the context of assessing inventive step. The board pointed out, however, that such criteria are entirely absent from the wording Art. 13(2) RPBA which was purposely chosen to express the much more stringent criterion applicable at this last stage of the appeal proceedings. The board rejected the approach according to which merit or relevance were somehow subsumed in the sole criterion of "exceptional circumstances". As was clear from the examples, these only concerned circumstances that arose from the way the proceedings had developed, i.e. from the procedure itself and not its subject.

Zusammenfassung

In T 1774/21 the appellant had raised a new objection under Art. 123(2) EPC against a feature of the main request (patent as maintained by the opposition division) in its statement of grounds of appeal. The respondent, after first having replied to this allegedly new line of attack with counter-arguments, had requested only in its response to the board's communication under Art. 15(1) RPBA that this line of attack not be admitted into the proceedings pursuant to Art. 12(2), (4), (6) RPBA. The board rejected this request for non-admittance of the objection.

The board first explained that, in the context of the RPBA, the term "requests" included requests for non-admittance of, for example, an objection (contrary to what was suggested in T 1006/21). The general term "requests" was not limited to texts of patent applications or patents. When the RPBA sought to specifically address the issue of amendments of such texts, it expressly referred to "an amendment to a patent application or patent" (see Art. 12(4), fourth sentence, or Art. 13(1), fourth sentence, RPBA). This understanding was also confirmed in the explanatory remarks to Art. 12(2) RPBA (see Supplementary publication 2, OJ EPO 2020, 17). The board concluded that a request for non-admittance of an objection filed after the initial phase of the appeal proceedings constituted an amendment to the party's appeal case.

The respondent also argued that the request for non-admittance of the "new line of attack" should be admitted into the proceedings due to exceptional circumstances, as the appellant had failed to identify the "new line of attack" as an amendment in its statement of grounds of appeal and to give reasons why it had not been raised before the opposition division, contrary to what was required by Art. 12(4) RPBA. The appellant had countered that this objection was not "new" as it had been raised during oral proceedings before the opposition division.

The board held that, even assuming in the respondent's favour that this objection was indeed raised for the first time in the appellant's statement of grounds of appeal, the circumstances of the present case were neither exceptional nor could they justify the filing of the respondent's request for non-admittance only after the board's communication. The board pointed out that it was for the party itself to assess whether there is – in its opinion – an amendment to the other party's case and how to respond to it.

The board rejected the respondent's argument that the board was under the obligation, ex officio, to assess and decide on admittance of the "new line of attack". It explained that a board may indeed examine of its own motion the question of whether an objection was filed "late", since it was not restricted to the facts, evidence and arguments provided by the parties and the relief sought (Art. 114(1), second sentence, EPC). Moreover, Art. 114(2) EPC gave the board the power to "disregard facts or evidence" which are not submitted in due time. However, the fact that Art. 114(2) EPC stated that the EPO (therefore a board of appeal), "may" do so, also meant, that a board was not obliged ex officio to examine whether a submission was made "in due time". In the board's view such an obligation could also not be inferred from the principle of ex officio examination laid down in Art. 114(1), first sentence, EPC. In general, the principle of ex officio examination was to be applied in opposition appeal proceedings in a more restrictive manner (cf. G 9/91, point 18 of the Reasons), which was due to the fact that such proceedings could be regarded as essentially party-driven. In addition, this principle did not go so far as to require a board to examine whether an objection was late filed. Such an understanding of Art. 114(1), first sentence, EPC would be difficult to reconcile with the power given under Art. 114(2) EPC that may or may not be used. The board disagreed with point 27 of the Reasons of decision T 1006/21 in this respect.

Zusammenfassung

In J 3/24 the examination and designation fees (due on Friday, 10 February 2023) had been paid too late (on Monday, 13 February 2023). By letter of 12 February 2023, the appellant's representative had requested that the payment be considered as made on time, as he had wrongly assumed that he had given an automatic debit order. On 21 February 2023, a notification of loss of rights had been sent undated, and had been sent again on 7 March 2023 (together, the "Notification") informing the appellant that the application had been deemed to be withdrawn due to the late payment. The Notification indicated as available means of redress a request for further processing under Art. 121 EPC and a request to consider the fee to have been paid on time under Art. 7(3), 7(4) RFees, each within a two-month time limit for filing. No valid request for further processing had been filed during that time.

The appellant argued that the fact that the Receiving Section had not replied to his letter of 12 February 2023 and had wrongly stated that a reply had been given with the Notification constituted a substantial procedural violation. He requested reimbursement of the appeal fee.

The Legal Board did not consider that the requirements in R. 103(1)(a) EPC were met in the present case. It recalled that according to the established case law of the Boards of Appeal, the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations (also referred to as the principle of good faith) requires communications addressed to applicants to be clear and unambiguous, i.e. drafted in such a way as to rule out misunderstandings on the part of a reasonable addressee. An applicant must not suffer a disadvantage as a result of having relied on a misleading communication (see G 2/97, J 2/87, J 3/87, J 4/23, T 2092/13). If a communication is not as clear and unambiguous as it should be and misleads a reasonable recipient, this may constitute a substantial procedural violation and entitle the appellant to reimbursement of the appeal fee (see J 3/87). On the other hand, both the EPO and users of the European patent system who are parties to proceedings before it are obliged to act in good faith. The principle of the protection of legitimate expectations does not give carte blanche to the person relying on it (J 4/23). It is the responsibility of users of the European patent system to take all necessary procedural actions to avoid a loss of rights (see G 2/97, R 4/09). It is also inherent in the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations that a person can only successfully invoke an expectation on which they could, on an objective basis, legitimately rely. The erroneous information from the EPO must objectively justify their conduct (see J 4/23; G 2/97). Thus it must be established that, on an objective basis and in the circumstances of the case, it was reasonable for the appellant to have been misled by the information on which they relied (see J 4/23, J 27/92, G 2/97).

The Legal Board acknowledged that the Notification made reference to the late payment but did not expressly address the request of 12 February 2023 for the late payment to be considered as having been made on time. It was therefore not clearly apparent whether the Receiving Section had taken this request into account in the Notification. However, it was not reasonable for the appellant to completely disregard the Notification. Even if the appellant's representative had considered the Notification as having been generated automatically without taking into account the request of 12 February 2023, it was expected that communications from the EPO would be observed. The Notification pointed out the legal remedies available to overcome the loss of rights caused by the late payment and indicated the time limit for filing a request for further processing. Such an official communication could not simply be ignored and set aside. Rather, it was the appellant's own responsibility to enquire about the situation regarding his request before expiry of the triggered time limits to ensure that he did not suffer any loss of rights. The fact that he only contacted the Receiving Section on 1 June 2023 had to be attributed solely to him. The Legal Board reiterated that it was the responsibility of users of the European patent system to take all necessary procedural actions to avoid a loss of rights. This applied all the more in the case at hand as the matter was initially set in motion by an error on the part of the appellant's representative. Moreover, even if a substantial procedural error were to be assumed – which could not be recognised here – reimbursement of the appeal fee would not be equitable within the meaning of R. 103(1)(a) EPC, since the behaviour of the appellant had contributed to the situation.

The request for reimbursement of the appeal fee was refused.

Zusammenfassung

In T 1445/22 the appellant requested the admittance into the appeal proceedings of late-filed documents D10 to D12, D14, D15 and D20, which had not been admitted into the opposition proceedings for being prima facie not relevant with respect to the sufficiency of disclosure objection, as well as D26 and D27 filed with the statement of grounds of appeal.

The board first examined Art. 12(6), first sentence, RPBA and noted that evidence submitted by an opponent after the expiry of the nine-month period according to Art. 99(1) EPC was generally to be regarded as late-filed. Exceptions to this rule were where such evidence could not have been filed earlier, for example where the subject of the proceedings had changed. This was typically the case where new claim requests were filed such that there was no reason to file the evidence in response thereto any earlier or where the opposition division had raised a new issue.

In the case in hand the opposition division had not raised any new aspects in its preliminary opinion, but rather reiterated the position, given by the respondent (patent proprietor) in its reply to the notice of opposition. The board found therefore that there had been no change in the subject of the proceedings before the opposition division which would have led to new evidence being considered to be timely filed.

The board also did not consider the circumstances leading to the obtainment of the evidence by the party filing it as relevant for the issue of whether a document was filed in due time. These circumstances were external to the proceedings and it would run counter to the concept of discretionary power if that discretion were denied to a deciding body by circumstances external to the proceedings. Were such discretion to be denied, then all documents created or coming to light at any stage of the proceedings that were filed by a party would automatically be part of the proceedings. However, this would undermine the nine-month period under Art. 99(1) EPC which aims to establish the factual and legal framework within which the substantive examination of the opposition is, in principle, conducted, allowing the patent proprietor a fair chance to consider its position at an early stage of the proceedings (see G 10/91, point 6 of the Reasons, and T 1002/92). Therefore, documents D10 to D12, D14, D15 and D20 had not been filed in due time and the opposition division had the discretion, under Art. 114(2) EPC, not to admit them.

The appellant (opponent) argued that it had not been given the opportunity to present detailed arguments based on documents D10 to D12, D14, D15 and D20, as only prima facie relevance had been discussed before the opposition division. The board found, however, that the appellant had in fact had the opportunity to present its arguments relating to the admittance and prima facie relevance of those documents during the opposition proceedings. It also noted it was established case law that a board of appeal should only overrule the way an opposition division exercised its discretion if it did so according to the wrong principles, not taking into account the right principles or in an unreasonable way. It was, therefore, not the function of a board of appeal to review all the facts and circumstances of the case to decide whether it would have exercised its discretion in the same way or not. In the case in hand the opposition division had regarded D10 to D12 as representing common general knowledge which did not need to be supported, and it could not see the relevance of D14, D15 or D20 for supporting the objection to insufficiency of disclosure. Thus, the opposition division had considered these documents as prima facie not relevant and had exercised its discretion reasonably, according to the right principles, after hearing both parties.

In its statement of grounds of appeal, the appellant had further requested that documents D10 to D12, D14, D15 and D20 be admitted into the appeal proceedings with respect to the appellant's lack of inventive step objections. The board decided to exercise its discretion under Art. 114(2) EPC and Art. 12(4) RPBA and not admit these documents into the appeal proceedings as none of the documents were suitable to address the issues which led to the decision under appeal.

In addition, the board found that there was no change in the opposition proceedings or particular circumstances in the present case which necessitated the filing of documents D26 and D27 for the first time in the appeal proceedings. D26 and D27 could and should have been filed during the opposition period. Therefore, the board did not admit them into the appeal proceedings (Art. 12(6), second sentence, RPBA and Art. 12(4) RPBA).

Zusammenfassung

In T 446/22 beantragte die Beschwerdeführerin (Einsprechende), die mit der Beschwerdeerwiderung eingereichten Hilfsanträge 3.1 und 3.2 nicht in das Beschwerdeverfahren zuzulassen. Diese Hilfsanträge entsprachen den vor der Einspruchsabteilung vorgelegten Hilfsanträgen 3.1 und 3.2, über die die Einspruchsabteilung nicht entschieden hatte, da sie den höherrangigen Hilfsantrag 1 für gewährbar erachtet hatte. Wie von der Kammer festgestellt, bildeten diese Anträge daher einen Teil des Beschwerdevorbringens der Beschwerdegegnerin (Patentinhaberin), welcher der angefochtenen Entscheidung nicht zugrunde lag und somit die Erfordernisse des Art. 12 (2) VOBK nicht erfüllte.

Bei der Prüfung der Frage, ob die Hilfsanträge 3.1 und 3.2 im Verfahren vor der Einspruchsabteilung in zulässiger Weise vorgebracht und aufrechterhalten wurden, zog die Kammer die zum Zeitpunkt der mündlichen Verhandlung vor der Einspruchsabteilung gültige Fassung der Richtlinien für die Prüfung im Europäischen Patentamt (März 2021) heran. Danach waren geänderte Anträge, die in Reaktion auf die in der Anlage zur Ladung erläuterte vorläufige Auffassung der Einspruchsabteilung, dass das Patent wahrscheinlich widerrufen wird, eingereicht wurden, in der Regel zuzulassen, sofern dies vor dem nach R. 116 EPÜ bestimmten Zeitpunkt erfolgte. Die Kammer sah diese Voraussetzung als erfüllt an, auch wenn die betreffenden Hilfsanträge erst nach dem in einer ersten Ladung festgelegten Zeitpunkt nach R. 116 EPÜ eingereicht worden waren. Sie sah es als entscheidend an, dass die Hilfsanträge vor dem Zeitpunkt nach R. 116 EPÜ eingereicht worden waren, der in der Ladung zur durchgeführten mündlichen Verhandlung festgesetzt worden war. Durch die Aufhebung der Ladung sei auch der mit dieser Ladung bestimmte Zeitpunkt nach R. 116 EPÜ rechtlich unwirksam geworden (s. a. T 1706/19).

Bei dieser Sachlage kam die Kammer zum Schluss, dass die Einspruchsabteilung in Anwendung der damals gültigen Richtlinien die fristgerecht vorgelegten Hilfsanträge 3.1 und 3.2 wohl ins Einspruchsverfahren zugelassen hätte, falls sie die höherrangigen Hilfsanträge 1 und 2 als nicht gewährbar erachtet hätte. Die Hilfsanträge 3.1 und 3.2 wurden daher nach ihrer Ansicht im Einspruchsverfahren in zulässiger Weise vorgebracht. Darüber hinaus wurden diese Hilfsanträge am Ende der mündlichen Verhandlung nicht zurückgenommen. Infolgedessen galten die mit der Beschwerdeerwiderung eingereichten Hilfsanträge nicht als Änderung im Sinne von Art. 12 (4) VOBK. Hilfsantrag 3.2 konnte zudem die Einwände nach Art. 123 (2), 54 und 56 EPÜ überwinden und die Angelegenheit wurde an die Einspruchsabteilung zurückverwiesen mit der Anordnung, das Patent in geändertem Umfang aufrechtzuerhalten.

Zusammenfassung

In T 1311/21 the first auxiliary request, which had been first filed as auxiliary request IV with the patentee's statement of grounds of appeal, differed from claim 1 as granted by the addition of two features and the replacement of one feature. These amendments were also present in claim 1 of auxiliary requests 1 to 3 underlying the appealed decision, which however additionally contained further amendments as compared to claim 1 as granted in order to overcome all the objections raised during the opposition proceedings. These additional features had been omitted in claim 1 of the first auxiliary request.

The board observed that the discussion on whether the amendments in the first auxiliary request (compared to claim 1 as granted) extended its subject-matter beyond the content of the application as filed had already taken place in the first-instance proceedings. Moreover, it was not under dispute that the omitted features were not relevant for the question of novelty and inventive step. Therefore, the amendments of claim 1 of the first auxiliary request did not introduce new issues and did not increase the complexity of the examination of the patent. The board further noted that they were not only suitable to address, but actually overcame the objections of added matter. The board concluded that there was no reason not to admit the amendments of claim 1 into the appeal proceedings under Art. 12(4) RPBA.

Regarding Art. 12(6), second sentence, RPBA, the board explained that claim 1 at issue comprised all the amendments required by the opposition division to overcome its objection of added subject-matter against a certain feature of the main request then on file, but omitted all the amendments required by the opposition division to overcome its objection of added subject-matter against two other features. The patentee had argued that the opposition division had decided on all objections of added subject-matter at once and that this would have made the filing of requests that were already decided not to comply with Art. 123(2) EPC a violation of the rules of procedural efficiency. The board pointed out that it followed from this that the patentee could have filed claim 1 during the first-instance proceedings, but not that it should have done so. Indeed, such a filing would have been pointless in view of the fact that the opposition division had already decided that such claim 1 infringed the requirements of Art. 123(2) EPC. The board held that, in the absence of a compelling reason for the patentee to file present claim 1 during the first-instance proceedings, there was no reason for it not to admit the amendments of present claim 1 into the proceedings under Art. 12(6), second sentence, RPBA.

In the end, however, the board did not allow the first auxiliary request as it contained subject-matter which extended beyond the content of the application as filed.

Zusammenfassung

In T 957/22 after having withdrawn its own appeal, the proprietor in its respondent's role was therefore limited to defending the patent in the form held allowable by the opposition division, or in a more restricted form.

The numbering of auxiliary requests 2-13 (lower ranking compared to the request to dismiss the opponent's appeal, i.e. to maintain the patent based on auxiliary request 1) suggested that they were part of the proprietor's defence against the opponent's appeal. However, claim 1 of each of these requests was not based on the restricted wording of auxiliary request 1 (which included "consisting of") held allowable by the opposition division, but on a broader wording of the main request (with "containing"), that the division had rejected.

While the formulation "consists of" was not clear in the context of claim 1 of auxiliary request 1, the board noted that substituting this term with "containing" nevertheless broadened the claimed subject-matter, compared to the first auxiliary request found allowable by the opposition division. While the term "consists of" limited the subject-matter of claim 1 of auxiliary request 1 to the components defined in the claim by excluding the presence of any further components, the substitution of this term with "containing" factually deleted this limiting feature, so that granting any one of these requests would put the opponent/appellant in a worse situation than if it had not appealed. This would not be in conformity with the prohibition of reformatio in peius.

In decision G 1/99 (OJ 2001, 382, Headnote), the Enlarged Board formulated an exception to the prohibition of reformatio in peius, namely "in order to meet an objection put forward by the opponent/appellant or the Board during the appeal proceedings, in circumstances where the patent as maintained in amended form would otherwise have to be revoked as a direct consequence of an inadmissible amendment held allowable by the opposition division in its interlocutory decision".

The board however agreed with the opponent that this exception did not apply in the case at hand, because the proprietor had deliberately withdrawn its appeal, and thus waived the possibility of defending its patent in a broader version than that upheld by the opposition division, although it was aware that the board had endorsed in its preliminary opinion the objection under Art. 123(2) EPC against the first auxiliary request. In this situation, there was no justification to grant the proprietor back this possibility for reasons of equity, i.e. to establish an exception from the prohibition of reformatio in peius. A party who waives an existing right in full knowledge of the legal situation could not expect to be granted back this right for reasons of equity.

Moreover, even if the principles as set out in decision G 1/99 were to be applied to the case at hand, i.e. if the proprietor could benefit from an exception to the principle of reformatio in peius, according to the decision of the Enlarged Board such an exception can only be made if the objection cannot be overcome by two other forms of amendments set out in the Headnote of decision G 1/99. However, the proprietor had not argued, nor was it discernible for the board, that claim amendments of these types were not possible.