2.3.3 Pertinence de la question soumise pour l'affaire sous-jacente

In G 2/24 the Enlarged Board ("EBA") answered the referred questions as follows: "After withdrawal of all appeals, appeal proceedings may not be continued with a third party who intervened during the appeal proceedings in accordance with Article 105 EPC.

The intervening third party does not acquire an appellant status corresponding to the status of a person entitled to appeal within the meaning of Article 107, first sentence, EPC..

The EBA found the referral admissible. It held that the referral concerned an aspect of fundamental importance and the final decision on the appeal hinged on the answer to the referred questions. It explained that while Art. 21 RPBA allows for the further development of the case law and grants boards ample discretion for referral, in view of the legislative intent of Art. 112 EPC to ensure a uniform application of the law, a board was expected to substantiate why it considers an earlier ruling to have been superseded by a subsequent change in the law, there to be potential gaps in its reasoning or the existence of a new factual or procedural situation. The EBA took note of the referring board’s criticism of G 3/04.

The EBA concluded that the findings of G 3/04 continue to apply. None of the provisions relevant to the referral (i.e. Art. 99(1), 105 and 107 EPC) had been amended in a substantive manner after G 3/04 had been issued.

The EBA reaffirmed that appeal proceedings are of a judicial nature and the appeal is designed as a remedy on facts and law for parties to proceedings before the administrative departments of the EPO with the aim of eliminating an "adverse effect" of the impugned decision. The scope of the appeal proceedings is primarily determined by the decision under appeal, the appellant’s requests submitted with the notice of appeal and the statement of grounds of appeal, and, in inter partes proceedings, the submissions of the other party or parties in reply to the appellant’s statement of grounds of appeal. The appeal is not an ex officio procedure but depends on the appellant to initiate, determine the scope of, and conclude it within that party’s power of disposal, in accordance with the principle of party disposition.

The EBA further held that a party entitled to appeal within the meaning of Art. 107, first sentence, EPC is only the person who formally participated in the proceedings before the administrative department that issued the impugned decision, unless a third party’s entitlement to participate in those proceedings had been ignored due to procedural error or incorrect application of law. An adverse effect within the meaning of this provision only exists if a decision falls short of the request of a party to the proceedings or deviates from it without their consent. Any other "negative " or "disadvantageous " impact or effect on a third party does not fulfil the legal threshold.

On interventions by third parties, the EBA stated that the exceptional nature of this legal remedy inherently precludes an extensive interpretation and application thereof. An intervener at appeal cannot procedurally benefit from any status in the preceding administrative proceedings and becomes a party as of right. Intervention at appeal needs to fit into the legal and procedural framework of the boards of appeal as the first and final judicial instance in proceedings under the EPC. The principle of party disposition, the binding nature of the parties’ requests and the prohibitions of ruling ultra petita and reformatio in peius limit the option for procedural action of all involved in appeal proceedings, including interveners. Parties to appeal proceedings as of right do not have a legal status independent of the appeal. Awarding an intervener such status would require an explicit legal provision in the EPC.

Therefore, if the sole or all appeals are withdrawn, the proceedings end with regard to all substantive issues for all parties involved and cannot be continued with an intervener at the appeal stage or any other non-appealing party.

In case T 0745/23 the board had summoned the parties to oral proceedings on the EPO premises. The respondent had requested that the oral proceedings be held by videoconference. The appellant had requested, in response, that the oral proceedings be held in person, or, alternatively, that the board refer to the Enlarged Board the following questions:.

"1. Is the conduct of oral proceedings as a videoconference in appeal proceedings outside a general emergency situation without the consent of the parties in accordance with the provisions of the EPC.

2. If yes, on which criteria should the discretion be exercised if a Board of Appeal decides on its own motion to hold oral proceedings as a videoconference pursuant to Art. 15a(1) RPBA against the request of a party?.

In the communication under Art. 15(1) RPBA, the board had found the case in hand suitable for being heard by videoconference. The appellant had not responded to this communication, and hence, according to the board, had not objected to the board’s intention to grant the respondent’s request for a videoconference. Therefore, the board had changed the venue of the oral proceedings to videoconference.

At the oral proceedings, the appellant argued that Art. 15a RPBA did not define the criteria for exercising the board’s discretion. This gave rise to different practices and legal uncertainty. Since, according to G 1/21, oral proceedings in person were the gold standard, there could be doubt as to whether Art. 15a RPBA was actually in line with the EPC.

The board disagreed. Art. 15a RPBA provided the board with the discretion to decide to hold oral proceedings pursuant to Art. 116 EPC by videoconference if the board considered it appropriate to do so, either upon a party's request or of its own motion. Its scope was general and not limited to a pandemic situation. In G 1/21, the Enlarged Board had expressly acknowledged that oral proceedings in the form of a videoconference were oral proceedings within the meaning of Art. 116 EPC. The board failed to see how Art. 15a RPBA as such violated any EPC provisions governing the fair conduct of proceedings and the right to be heard.

Furthermore, the board stated that it interpreted the discretionary power set out in Art. 15a RPBA within the framework of decision G 1/21. This decision had not excluded videoconference oral proceedings a priori, but had set certain limitations and restrictions, especially when a party did not give its consent. The board exercised its discretion in view of the particular circumstances of the case and of the reasons provided by each party in support of their opposing requests as to the format. Thus, also the party not consenting to a videoconference should provide some reasons as to why it considered that videoconference, in the case in hand, was not suitable or why the party was otherwise disadvantaged. In the case in hand, the appellant, however, had not submitted any objective or subjective reason why the case in hand should not be heard by videoconference. In the absence of any further submissions by the appellant regarding the format of the oral proceedings, the board had had no reason to (again) change the format of the oral proceedings.

The board rejected the appellant’s request for referral. The first question proposed for referral had already been answered by the Enlarged Board in section C.5 of G 1/21. This section undoubtedly had a general character, despite the judgement essentially being limited to the pandemic (as also acknowledged in T 2432/19). The board held that in the case in hand, it failed to identify a departure from the teaching of G 1/21, and thus a need to (again) refer the first question in order to decide the present case. The posed question thus did not warrant a referral, which would otherwise be of theoretical interest only.

With regard to the second question proposed for referral, the board found that any answer to it depended on the specific case and providing anything more than general instructions would risk compromising the principle of judicial discretion. The board held that, for this reason alone, it could not be regarded as a point of law suitable for being referred to the Enlarged Board.

In G 1/24 the Enlarged Board ("EBA") considered the points of law referred to it by Technical Board of Appeal 3.2.01 in T 439/22 of 24 June 2024. The first question was whether Art. 69(1), second sentence, EPC and Art. 1 of the Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69 EPC are to be applied to the interpretation of patent claims when assessing the patentability of an invention under Art. 52 to 57 EPC. The second question concerned whether the description and figures are to be consulted when interpreting the claims to assess patentability and, if so, whether this may be done generally or only if the person skilled in the art finds a claim to be unclear or ambiguous when read in isolation. The third and final question was whether a definition or similar information on a term used in the claims, which is explicitly given in the description, can be disregarded when interpreting the claims to assess patentability and, if so, under what conditions.

The EBA confirmed that the departments of the EPO were required to interpret patent claims when assessing the patentability of an invention under Art. 52 to 57 EPC. As regards Question 1, the EBA held that there was no clear legal basis, in terms of an article of the EPC, for claim interpretation when assessing patentability. Article 69 EPC and Art. 1 of the Protocol were arguably only concerned with infringement actions and therefore were not entirely satisfactory as a basis for claim interpretation when assessing patentability. Article 84 EPC could also be criticised as an alternative legal basis as it addresses the content of the patent application and is formal in nature without providing guidance on how to interpret claims. It only sets out an instruction to the drafter of what needs to be in the claims and an instruction to the EPO to determine whether the claims meet that purpose. The EBA considered, however, that there was an existing body of case law of the Boards of Appeal which applied the wording of the aforementioned provisions in an analogous way to the examination of patentability under Art. 52 to 57 EPC, and from which the applicable principles of claim interpretation could be extracted.

The EBA further held it a settled point in the case law of the Boards of Appeal that the claims are the starting point and the basis for assessing the patentability of an invention under Art. 52 to 57 EPC.

As regards Question 2, the EBA stated that the description and any drawings must always be consulted when interpreting the claims, and not just in the case of unclarity or ambiguity. In adopting this position, the EBA rejected the case law of the Boards of Appeal that sees no need to refer to the descriptions and drawings when interpreting a claim, unless the claim is unclear or ambiguous. It found that this case law was contrary to the wording, and hence the principles, of Art. 69 EPC. It was also contrary to the practice of both the national courts of the EPC contracting states and the UPC. Moreover, from a logical point of view, the finding that the language of a claim is clear and unambiguous was an act of interpretation, not a preliminary stage to such an interpretative act.

Question 3 was held inadmissible by the EBA, which considered it to be encompassed by Question 2.

The EBA also referred to the harmonisation philosophy behind the EPC and noted that the case law of the UPC Court of Appeal on claim interpretation appeared to be consistent with the above conclusions. It further highlighted the importance of the examining division carrying out a high quality examination of whether a claim fulfils the clarity requirements of Art. 84 EPC, and stated that the correct response to any unclarity in a claim was amendment.

The order by the EBA in G 1/24 reads as follows: "The claims are the starting point and the basis for assessing the patentability of an invention under Articles 52 to 57 EPC. The description and drawings shall always be consulted to interpret the claims when assessing the patentability of an invention under Articles 52 to 57 EPC, and not only if the person skilled in the art finds a claim to be unclear or ambiguous when read in isolation."