D. Priorität

In T 883/23 the board had to decide whether claim 1 of the main request was entitled to claim priority from the earliest priority application (P1). P1 disclosed a method for treating pancreatic cancer in a human subject who has not previously received chemotherapy involving the administration of MM-398 liposomal irinotecan, wherein the liposomal irinotecan was administered in combination with oxaliplatin, leucovorin and 5-fluorouracil (claim 3). P1 defined doses of 60 or 80 mg/m2 liposomal irinotecan (claim 5) and 60, 75 or 85 mg/m2 oxaliplatin (claim 8)..

Example 4 of the patent presented the results of a dose escalation/de-escalation study demonstrating the tolerability of the selected dose combination of claim 1 of the main request, as opposed to the intolerable and thus unsuitable alternative dose combinations defined in claims 5 and 8 of P1. The board observed that information concerning the tolerability of the selected dose combination of claim 1 of the main request was not revealed in P1. In particular, this information was not provided by the mere outline for the dose escalation/de-escalation study in P1, which the patent proprietor relied on as a pointer to the subject-matter of claim 1 of the main request with reference to T 1261/21. The board noted that in T 1261/21 the competent board had explained that a "pointer" in an original disclosure was an implicit or explicit indication or hint towards a combination of features, which demonstrated that this combination of features did not represent an arbitrary combination of features only conceptually comprised, but was actually envisaged in the original disclosure. However, the competent board had emphasised that what information a skilled person would directly and unambiguously derive from the original disclosure remained to be assessed on a case-by-case basis.

According to the board, in the present case, P1 provided with the outline for the dose escalation/de-escalation study only a conditional proposal for the use of a combination of 60 mg/m2 liposomal irinotecan and 60 mg/m2 oxaliplatin as part of a study still to be carried out. This proposal could not be considered to provide any pointer to the combination of 60 mg/m2 liposomal irinotecan and 60 mg/m2 oxaliplatin uniquely tolerable in first-line treatment of patients with metastatic pancreatic cancer as defined in claim 1 of the main request.

The board rejected the patent proprietor's argument that P1 described the same subject-matter as defined in claim 1 of the main request, which should in accordance with G 2/98 therefore benefit from the priority of P1, regardless of any additional technical effects, such as the results of the dose escalation/de-escalation study, which may have been described only in the subsequent application from which the patent was derived. The board observed that, according to the established jurisprudence of the Boards of Appeal, attaining the claimed therapeutic effect was regarded as a functional technical feature of claims in the format of Art. 54(5) EPC. Notably, the tolerability of the defined treatment was a prerequisite for the therapeutic efficacy (T 2506/12). The tolerability of the dose combination as defined in claim 1 of the main request, as opposed to the intolerability of the alternative combinations with higher doses of claims 5 and 8 and the dose escalation/de-escalation scheme in P1, was thus a functional technical feature of the subject-matter defined in claim 1 of the main request. This feature concerned information which was not directly and unambiguously derivable from P1.

The board further observed that the Enlarged Board determined in G 2/98 that it is a condition for the compliance with the requirement of "the same invention" that the claimed subject-matter is directly and unambiguously derivable from the earlier application. However, the Enlarged Board did not conclude that the requirement of "the same invention" is necessarily satisfied if this condition is fulfilled, irrespective of any technical information associated with the claimed subject-matter, which is only described in the subsequent patent application. Notably, the established jurisprudence confirmed the need for sufficient disclosure of the claimed invention in the priority document.

In T 2565/22 the patent concerned a system for replacing a deficient native heart valve. The proprietor submitted in the written procedure that for each feature of claim 1 a basis could be found in the priority application D34. In its communication the board expressed the preliminary view that only a partial priority was validly claimed. At the oral proceedings, the proprietor did not provide any further argument but merely referred to its written submission in this respect.

The board explained that, compared with D34, granted claim 1 had been broadened by deleting the feature "adapted to be deployed by exerting substantially radial forces from within by means of a deployment device". Claim 1 could be regarded as a generic OR-claim in the sense of G 1/15. The two alternatives comprised by the claim were:.

(a) a device comprising a support frame "adapted to be deployed by exerting substantially radial forces from within by means of a deployment device to a deployed state", such as a balloon-expandable stent; and.

(b) a device comprising a support frame which is not adapted in this way, i.e. non-balloon-expandable or self-expandable.

Contrary to the proprietor's submission, D34 did not disclose the mechanism by which the frame expands in a generic way. Even though the expansion mechanism was not specified each time the frame was mentioned, D34 was directed to devices adapted to be deployed by exerting substantially radial forces from within by means of a deployment device. Unlike D35, D34 did not disclose any self-expandable frames or deployment methods that did not involve deployment means such as a balloon catheter. The fact that nitinol was disclosed as a material for the frame in D34 did not imply that its shape memory properties were used to provide a self-expandable frame, i.e. a stent made of nitinol was not necessarily self-expanding even though this material had been used for this purpose in several prior art documents. Therefore, D34 did not disclose the combination of features of granted claim 1 without the feature omitted by granted claim 1. The board was thus of the opinion that only part (a) above enjoyed priority. Accordingly, D1 was prior art under Art. 54(2) EPC for part (b) and could be considered in deciding whether there had been an inventive step.

In T 195/23 was an appeal against the interlocutory decision of the opposition division concerning the maintenance of the patent in amended form. The opponents disputed the decision's finding that the priority claim was valid. In particular, they challenged the validity of the priority claim for the alternative "wherein the smoke modifying additive is disposed only in said axial region of the filter material of the first filter section" in the feature directed to the location of the smoke modifying article in claim 1 of auxiliary request 3.

The board concurred with the proprietor that the drawings in the priority document were specifically intended to show the location of the smoke modifying additive. In fact, figures 1-5 of the priority document depicted various types of additive located in the central region of a filter section. For example, in figures 1 and 4, a capsule was located in an axial region of a first filter section. In figures 2 and 5, the absorbent material had an additive carrying thread disposed therein in an axial region. In figure 3, the absorbent material 47 had a plurality of microcapsules disposed therein in an axial region thereof. However, none of these passages contained a statement to the effect that the depicted smoke modifying additive was the only additive in the filter. In the board's view, these drawings therefore could only serve as a basis for a positive feature directed to the presence of such additive in a central region of the filter. Such a positive feature did not rule out the presence of some further, non-depicted additive in another region of the filter.

In contrast, the board construed the feature "only in the axial region" as a negative feature which was directed to the absence of any smoke modifying additive from other regions of the filter, e.g. its peripheral region. The board referred to established jurisprudence (see CLB, II.E.1.13.3, 10th edition) according to which, a negative feature, i.e. the absence of not depicted elements, usually cannot be derived from drawings. This was aggravated in the present case by the disclosure in the priority document, which explicitly stated that there could be additive – though at a lower concentration – in non-axial regions of the filter. In light of this explicit disclosure in the priority document, which did not contradict the drawings and the corresponding explanations to the drawings in the description, the board was not convinced by the respondent's argument that the skilled person would interpret the drawings as such, rather than entertaining the notion that they did not illustrate some smoke modifying additive. As a consequence, the board did not consider the feature directed to the smoke modifying additive being disposed only in the axial region of the first filter section to be an implicit feature of the priority document.

The board concluded that the application underlying the patent in suit was not filed in respect of the same invention for the alternative "wherein the smoke modifying additive is disposed only in said axial region of the filter material of the first filter section" of claim 1 of auxiliary request 3, and thus, the patent proprietor should not enjoy a right of priority for this alternative..

The above conclusions also applied to independent claim 1 of auxiliary requests 5 to 18, which also contained the alternative "wherein the smoke modifying additive is disposed only in said axial region of the filter material of the first filter section".

In T 98/23 the patent related to a CRISPR-Cas 9 composition for therapeutic use. It was based on a European patent application resulting from an international PCT application claiming priority from 13 earlier US applications including P1, P2, P3, P5 and P13. In its decision revoking the patent, the opposition division had found that formal entitlement to priority from P1, P2, P5 and P13 had not been validly claimed because not all applicants of these priority applications were named in the subsequent application leading to the patent. Thus, novelty and inventive step were examined based only on documents published before P3, in particular D10. The subject-matter of claim 1 of the patent as granted was found to lack novelty over the disclosure of D10.

References to G 1/22 in this abstract should be understood as referring to both G 1/22 and G 2/22.

The board explained that, as in T 844/18, T 2360/19, T 2516/19 and T 2689/19, the issue was whether Mr Marraffini as one of the claimed inventors or The Rockefeller University as his successor in title, had given their consent to the subsequent filing of the patent application in question. A further issue was whether The President and Fellows of Harvard College had given their consent to the subsequent filing of the patent application. The presumption, following G 1/22, is that they did. This presumption may be rebutted.

The board recalled that according to G 1/22, the presumption of priority entitlement, by way of an implicit (implied/informal or tacit) agreement on the transfer of the right to claim priority "under almost any circumstances" applied to any case where the subsequent applicant was not identical with the priority applicant. Also ex-post (retroactive, nunc pro tunc, ex tunc) transfers concluded after the filing of the subsequent application were valid. The presumption of an implied agreement was rebuttable. To question the implied agreement, evidence was thus needed that such agreement had not been reached or was fundamentally flawed.

In the board's opinion, there was no evidence that rebutted the presumption in this case, rather there was evidence on file that supported the presumption. The inventorship dispute between Mr Marraffini/The Rockefeller University and Mr Zhang/The Broad Institute Inc/Massachusetts Institute of Technology had been settled in 2018 by decision of an arbitrator. Applying G 1/22, the settlement by arbitration contained (and confirmed that there was), at least, an implicit agreement nunc pro tunc. Thus, the presumption of entitlement to priority was on the earliest date on which priority was claimed, 12 December 2012. G 1/22 explicitly also stated that "the presumption of entitlement exists on the date on which the priority is claimed and the rebuttal of the presumption must also relate to this date", and that "later developments cannot affect the rebuttable presumption". As being retroactive, the at least implicit transfer agreement by way of the settlement of the inventorship dispute related to this date, and confirmed the presumption of entitlement to exist on this date.

As to whether The President and Fellows of Harvard College had given their consent, no evidence had been filed by the opponents either establishing that the real priority right holder did not allow the subsequent applicants to rely on the priority (see also T 1975/19).

The board concluded that entitlement to priority had been validly claimed in view of G 1/22. The case was remitted to the opposition division for a fresh assessment of the patentability requirements of the main request (the patent as granted), based on a valid priority entitlement to P1.

In T 493/23 the invention related to a threaded pipe connection. The patent had been granted on the basis of an application (the "PCT application") filed on 15 September 2017 published under the PCT and claiming priority from application JP 2016-181176 (the "priority application"). The appellant (opponent) argued that neither claim 1 of the twelfth auxiliary request nor claim 1 of the thirteenth auxiliary request validly claimed priority from the priority application.

(1) Twelfth auxiliary request

Compared to the priority application, claim 1 of the twelfth auxiliary request had been amended by adding, inter alia, feature 1.3. This requirement limited the female thread in that it should include a varying-thread-width portion having a thread-ridge width gradually increasing and a thread-groove width gradually decreasing toward a centre of the box. The parties agreed that this additional feature was taken verbatim from the description of the priority application and, in this respect, mentioned paragraph [0049] of D10 (a marked-up version of the English translation of the PCT-application showing the changes made in relation to the priority application). The appellant's objection was directed against the fact that the additional constraint of paragraph [0049] of D10 that the thread-groove width of the female thread corresponds to the thread-ridge width of the male thread in the respective varying-thread-width portions was not incorporated in claim 1 of the twelfth auxiliary request. The appellant argued that the verb "to correspond" implied that the widths were equal. Contrary to the view of the opposition division, the additional text in claim 1, did not require this.

According to the board, the expression "correspond to" in paragraph [0049] of D10 was not to be understood in a broad sense as encompassing variations that result in gaps between the thread flanks. The opposition division seemed to have inferred the additional constraint of paragraph [0049] from features 1.4 to 1.6 of claim 1 of the then auxiliary request 9. However, the board was unable to derive from the general wording of these features whether or not the widths of the individual female ridges and grooves corresponded to those of the male grooves and ridges, respectively, in the varying-thread-width portions. Also the additional features 1.7a and 1.8a of claim 1 of the twelfth auxiliary request did not imply the constraint set by the last sentence of paragraph [0049] of D10. The board concluded that there was no direct and unambiguous disclosure in the priority application of a threaded connection having feature 1.3 of claim 1 without the additional constraint.

In a further line of argument and referring to G 1/15, the respondents (patent proprietors) submitted that claim 1 enjoyed partial priority for those threaded connections where the widths were the same in the varying-thread-width portions. The board was not persuaded. In the present case, claim 1 did not contain any generic expression that could be understood to encompass alternative subject-matter. Claim 1 was not a generic "OR"-claim in the sense of G 1/15. The board concluded that claim 1 of the twelfth auxiliary did not validly claim priority. As a result, D5 was novelty destroying.

(2) Thirteenth auxiliary request

All three lines of argument raised by the appellant were rejected by the board. On the first, the board concluded that, compared to the priority application, the meaning of the expression "toward a centre of the box" in feature 1.3 of claim 1 did not change by adding it to a claim which did not specify the type of threaded connection. Also for embodiments of the integral-type connection there was basis in the priority application for the claimed changes of the female thread width towards the centre of the box. On the second line of argument (which built further on the objection raised in the context of the twelfth auxiliary request), the board concluded that the various restrictions of claim 1 were such that also the feature disclosed in the last-but-one sentence of paragraph [0049] of D10 was implicit. The third line of argument was directed against the omission from claim 1 of the physical location of the constant-thread-width portions and the varying-thread-width portions, despite it being disclosed in paragraphs [0054] and [0055] of D10 on which the amendments of features 1.5 and 1.6 were based. The board considered these positions to be implicit in claim 1. The board concluded that claim 1 of the thirteenth auxiliary request validly claimed the priority from the priority application. The effective date was thus 16 September 2016. As a consequence, D5 was not comprised in the state of the art under Art. 54(2) or (3) EPC.

In T 518/22 the board established that the "A3" mutant disclosed in D2 anticipated the subject-matter of claim 1 of auxiliary request 1 at least under Art. 54(3) EPC.

Claims 1 and 9 of auxiliary request 2 differed from the respective claims in auxiliary request 1 in that an undisclosed disclaimer had been introduced to exclude the A3 mutant disclosed in D2 from the subject-matter claimed.

The board explained that, according to G 1/03, an amendment to a claim by the introduction of a disclaimer may not be refused under Art. 123(2) EPC for the sole reason that neither the disclaimer nor the subject-matter excluded by it from the scope of the claim have a basis in the application as filed. G 1/03 defines the criteria when such an undisclosed disclaimer is allowable, stipulating that it can be introduced into a claim inter alia to restore novelty by delimiting a claim against the state of the art under Art. 54(3) EPC but not under Art. 54(2) EPC (except for a so-called accidental disclosure).

In order to determine whether D2 was prior art under Art. 54(2) or (3) EPC for the claimed subject-matter, the board assessed whether the subject-matter of claim 1 as a whole was entitled to claim priority from P and whether D2 was entitled to claim priority from P1.

The board found that D2's priority based on P1 was valid. Appellant I had objected to D2's formal entitlement to priority because the applicants of P1 and those of the international patent application D2 were not the same. The board explained that G 1/22 and G 2/22 established that a presumption exists that a claim to priority is valid by way of an implicit agreement on the transfer of the right to claim priority in the absence of evidence that such an agreement (implicit or explicit) did not exist. This presumption applies to any case where the subsequent applicant is not identical with the priority applicant. On account of this general teaching, the board understood that the presumption applied also to patent applications cited as prior art, as in the present case (see also T 521/18).

This presumption could be rebutted to take into account "rare exceptional cases" where the subsequent applicant could not justifiably rely on the priority (G 1/22). This, however, involved the reversal of the burden of proof, i.e. the party challenging the subsequent applicant’s priority entitlement (here appellant I) had to prove that this entitlement was missing. Merely raising speculative doubts was not sufficient. Instead, evidence was required that specific facts supported serious doubts about the subsequent applicant's entitlement to priority (G 1/22). In the absence of evidence suitable to establish that the alleged real priority right holder did not allow the subsequent applicant to rely on the priority (see also T 1975/19), appellant I's objection against D2's formal entitlement to priority from P1 was not sufficient to rebut the presumption of validity, which always existed on the date on which priority was claimed (G 1/22). Hence, D2 validly claimed priority from P1.

As regards the validity of the patent's priority claim based on P, the board established that the relevant date for the subject-matter of claim 1 in several embodiments concerning SEQ ID NOs: 5 to 8 was the filing date of the patent application, whereas several embodiments of claim 1 in relation to SEQ ID NO: 4 were entitled to claim partial priority from P (G 1/15).

Therefore, D2 was prior art under Art. 54(2) EPC for the subject-matter of claim 1 not enjoying priority, i.e. in relation to several embodiments concerning SEQ ID NOs: 5 to 8, and prior art under Art. 54(3) EPC for the subject-matter of claim 1 enjoying priority, i.e. in relation to several embodiments concerning SEQ ID NO: 4.

Since the undisclosed disclaimer added to claim 1 in auxiliary request 2 removed embodiments of D2 which belonged to the state of the art pursuant to Art. 54(2) EPC and were not an accidental disclosure, such amendment was not allowable under Art. 123(2) EPC. Auxiliary request 2 comprised added subject-matter (G 1/03 and G 1/16) and did not fulfil the requirements of Art. 123(2) EPC.