B. Verfahren vor der Großen Beschwerdekammer

Der Überprüfungsantrag in R 16/22 war gegen die Entscheidung T 2175/15 vom 1. April 2022 gerichtet, mit der die Beschwerdekammer (in der Besetzung nach Art. 24 (4) EPÜ) den Antrag auf Vorlage von Fragen an die Große Beschwerdekammer abgelehnt, und den Ablehnungsantrag betreffend die Mitglieder der Kammer in ihrer ursprünglichen Besetzung vom 24. Dezember 2021 als unbegründet zurückgewiesen hatte.

Zwei Wochen vor der mündlichen Verhandlung erklärte die Antragstellerin in einem Schreiben, dass sie nach nochmaliger Überprüfung der Rechtslage der Auffassung sei, dass die Große Beschwerdekammer im Verfahren nach Art. 112a EPÜ die Möglichkeit habe, "zur Sicherung einer einheitlichen Rechtsprechung den vorliegenden Fall an die Große Beschwerdekammer gemäß Art. 112 EPÜ vorzulegen". Zu Beginn der mündlichen Verhandlung stellte die Antragstellerin auch den formellen Antrag, der Großen Beschwerdekammer in der Besetzung gemäß Art. 112 EPÜ die Rechtsfrage vorzulegen, ob der Anwendungsbereich von Art. 112a EPÜ auf solche rechtskräftigen Entscheidungen einer Beschwerdekammer beschränkt ist, die ein Beschwerdeverfahren abschließen, oder ob dieser Anwendungsbereich sämtliche rechtskräftigen Entscheidungen einer Beschwerdekammer umfasst..

Im Zusammenhang mit diesem Antrag merkte die Große Beschwerdekammer an, dass gegen die Möglichkeit einer solchen Vorlage allerdings bereits der Wortlaut des EPÜ, der nicht nur in Art. 112 EPÜ klar zwischen "Beschwerdekammer" und "Große Beschwerdekammer" unterscheidet, spricht. Sie fügte hinzu, dass die Große Beschwerdekammer entsprechend in Verfahren gemäß Art. 112a EPÜ auch schon entschieden hat, dass sie der Großen Beschwerdekammer keine Rechtsfragen in einem Verfahren nach Art. 112 EPÜ vorlegen kann (R 7/08, bestätigt z. B. in R 8/12). Was das diesbezügliche Vorbringen der Antragstellerin angeht, konnte die Große Beschwerdekammer keine besonderen Gründe im Sinne von Art. 12 VOGBK erkennen, welche eine Berücksichtigung des verspätet vorgebrachten Antrags auf Vorlage an die Große Beschwerdekammer unter Art. 112 EPÜ rechtfertigen würden. Der Antrag wurde daher als verspätet zurückgewiesen.

In Bezug auf die Zulässigkeit von Überprüfungsanträgen gegen Zwischenentscheidungen befand die Große Beschwerdekammer, dass im Hinblick auf R 5/23 und R 2/15 eine uneinheitliche Rechtsprechung vorliegt. Allerdings habe die Große Beschwerdekammer in einem Verfahren nach Art. 112a EPÜ keine Möglichkeit, eine entsprechende Rechtsfrage zur Sicherung einer einheitlichen Rechtsanwendung nach Art. 112 EPÜ der Großen Beschwerdekammer vorzulegen.

Zum Begriff der "Entscheidung" in Art. 112a EPÜ erklärte die Große Beschwerdekammer, dass sich unterschiedliche Verfahrenshandlungen des EPA durchaus bezüglich ihrer Anfechtbarkeit unterscheiden können, auch wenn sie in gleicher Weise als "Entscheidungen" bezeichnet werden. Sie teilte die in den Entscheidungen R 2/15 und R 5/23 vertretene Auffassung, dass die Bestimmungen von Art. 106 (2) EPÜ im Rahmen des Überprüfungsverfahrens nicht anwendbar sind. Die grundsätzlichen Überlegungen hinter Art. 106 EPÜ, die einer selbständigen Beschwerde gegen Zwischenentscheidungen entgegenstehen (z. B. Vermeidung von Verfahrensverzögerungen), seien dagegen durchaus auf das Überprüfungsverfahren unter Art. 112a EPÜ anwendbar. Diese Überlegungen sprechen gegen eine Möglichkeit der Überprüfung von Zwischenentscheidungen unter Art. 112a EPÜ..

Der Großen Beschwerdekammer zufolge sind auch der Sinn und Zweck des Überprüfungsverfahrens, insbesondere die Ausgestaltung als außerordentlicher Rechtsbehelf, Aspekte, die nicht für eine Gleichsetzung von Überprüfungsanträgen mit Beschwerden im Hinblick auf die Anfechtungsmöglichkeiten oder gar für eine großzügigere Praxis sprechen, sondern eher für eine strengere Beurteilung der Zulässigkeit bei Überprüfungsanträgen. Darüber hinaus impliziert der Wortlaut von Art. 112a (5) EPÜ, der auf die Wiederaufnahme des Verfahrens "vor den Beschwerdekammern" Bezug nimmt, dass vor den Beschwerdekammern eben kein Verfahren mehr anhängig ist. Diese Regelung stützt jedenfalls nach Auffassung der Großen Beschwerdekammer die Auslegung, nach der Zwischenentscheidungen nicht selbständig bzw. gesondert unter Art. 112a EPÜ überprüft werden können.

Der Antrag auf Überprüfung wurde folglich als unzulässig verworfen.

In R 11/23 the petition was based on Art. 112a(2)(c) EPC, i.e. the fundamental violation of Art. 113(1) EPC. It was alleged that the clarity objection against auxiliary request 8, which had led to the board's finding that said request had been unallowable, had never been discussed, neither in the written nor in the oral proceedings, but had been brought forward only in the board's written decision..

Specifically, the petitioner argued that there had been two distinct clarity objections against claim 1 of auxiliary request 8: the alleged lack of clarity regarding what "maintaining currents in an allowable range" meant (the "allowable current range objection") and the alleged lack of information on which components were to be protected by the protective circuit (the "unspecified components objection"). The petitioner acknowledged that it had been heard in the context of the "allowable current range objection" but it asserted that it had been confronted with the "unspecified components objection" only when reading the written decision.

The Enlarged Board held that it did not see any clear indication that the "unspecified components objection" had been raised implicitly, for example as an aspect of an overarching clarity objection..

The Enlarged Board agreed with the petitioner in that it was not sufficient for a relevant specific aspect such as the "unspecified components" to be covered or encompassed by a broader clarity objection that had been discussed if the parties had not been aware of the specific aspect during the discussion. In this context, opponent 2 had referred to paragraph [0018] of the patent which had been mentioned in point 7.4 of the decision under review. The Enlarged Board could not see that such a reference implied that the "unspecified components objection" had been discussed. Furthermore, it did not regard the wording of point 7.5 of said decision as evidence that the "unspecified components objection" had been discussed, because it was not clear whether the phrase "as the appellants and the infringer [sic] correctly argue" was linked to the "unspecified components objection".

According to the Enlarged Board, since it had no power or ability to investigate further whether other facts or indications might suggest that the petitioner could be aware that the board had had doubts about the specific aspect of clarity (namely, the "unspecified component" issue), it had to rely on the parties' submissions in this respect. In the absence of any such indication, it was not for the party alleging a breach of its right to be heard to prove that there had been no such facts or indications (see R 15/11). Any doubts remaining on whether a decision under review was based upon facts and considerations on which the parties had had an opportunity to comment must be solved to the affected party's benefit (see R 2/14).

For these reasons, the Enlarged Board concluded that the "unspecified components objection" had not been discussed during appeal proceedings and its use in the written decision had therefore come as a surprise to the petitioner.

As in the appeal case underlying R 2/14, a broader objection had been discussed during appeal proceedings in the present case but not the specific aspect encompassed by the broader objection that turned out to be decisive for the case. In such cases, the "grounds" as referred to in Art. 113(1) EPC may have a more specific meaning than a broader objection like "lack of clarity" or "insufficiency of disclosure". In the present case, it was irrelevant that the broader clarity objection had been discussed. The critical aspect, namely the question of which components needed to be protected, had not been discussed during the appeal proceedings and the board's conclusion on this aspect had come as a surprise to the petitioner.

The "unspecified components objection" which had not been discussed during the appeal proceedings eventually was the reason for the board's finding that the patent was invalid. The Enlarged Board concluded that a fundamental violation of Art. 113(1) EPC had occurred. The decision under review was thus set aside and the proceedings before a board reopened..

On the latter, the Enlarged Board, referring to Art. 112a(5) and R. 108(3) EPC, explained that the board responsible for the reopened proceedings was not automatically the board which had issued the decision underlying the review proceedings. Rather, the allocation of the reopened proceedings had to be determined in accordance with the business distribution scheme as applicable when the proceedings were reopened.

In R 19/23 beantragte der Antragsteller unter anderem wörtlich, die zu überprüfende Entscheidung der Beschwerdekammer in Disziplinarangelegenheiten aufzuheben und die Wiedereröffnung des Verfahrens vor der zuständigen Beschwerdekammer anzuordnen.

Die Große Beschwerdekammer (nachfolgend "GBK") erklärte, dass sie die Auffassung des Antragstellers, wonach die GBK gemäß Art. 112a EPÜ für die Überprüfung von Entscheidungen der Beschwerdekammer in Disziplinarangelegenheiten (nachfolgend "BKD") zuständig sei, nicht teilt. Vielmehr folgte sie der in der Entscheidung D 3/20 zum Ausdruck gebrachten Auffassung, dass ein Beschwerdeführer, der sich gegen eine Entscheidung des Sekretariats oder der Prüfungskommission wendet, keine Möglichkeit hat, eine "Große Beschwerdekammer in Disziplinarangelegenheiten" anzurufen und der dahingehende Antrag des Beschwerdeführers daher als unzulässig zu verwerfen ist.

Der GBK zufolge teilte sich das Vorbringen des Antragstellers in der schriftlichen Antwort in Vorbereitung auf die mündliche Verhandlung und während der mündlichen Verhandlung in zwei Argumentationslinien.

- Vom Verwaltungsrat gesetztes "Sekundärrecht" könne das von den Vertragsstaaten des EPÜ erlassene Primärrecht nicht "verdrängen, aufheben oder umgehen".

- Die Anwendbarkeit von Art. 112a EPÜ auf Entscheidungen der BKD sei auch im Hinblick auf die Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte (nachfolgend "EGMR") zu Art. 6 (1) der Europäische Konvention zum Schutz der Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten (nachfolgend "EMRK") geboten.

Die GBK merkte an, dass die Nennung der Beschwerdekammern ohne Beschränkung auf ganz bestimmte, im EPÜ vorgesehene Beschwerdekammern in Art. 112a EPÜ und ohne ausdrücklichen Ausschluss der BKD nicht als Hinweis auf eine Geltung dieser Vorschrift für alle Kammern, einschließlich der BKD, angesehen werden könne. Die GBK erinnerte ferner daran, dass der Gesetzgeber des EPÜ 2000 die BKD nicht in den mit "Beschwerdekammern" überschriebenen Art. 21 EPÜ aufgenommen hat. Zur Zuständigkeit der GBK verweise Art. 22 (1) a) im Hinblick auf Art. 112 und Art. 22 (1) c) bezüglich Art. 112a EPÜ aber auf die "Beschwerdekammern" und damit auf die in Art. 21 genannten Kammern und folglich nicht auf die BKD..

In Bezug auf die erste Argumentationslinie des Antragstellers kam die GBK zu dem Schluss, dass die Prüfungsvorschriften (d.h. Vorschriften über die europäische Eignungsprüfung für zugelassene Vertreter, Ausführungsbestimmungen hierzu, Ergänzende Verfahrensordnung der Beschwerdekammer in Disziplinarangelegenheiten und Teil IV der Vorschriften in Disziplinarangelegenheiten von zugelassenen Vertretern) als autonomes Recht kein Sekundärrecht im Verhältnis zum EPÜ als Primärrecht in dem Sinne darstellen, dass sie dazu dienen würden, die Ziele des EPÜ unmittelbar zu verwirklichen. Damit verbleibe es bei der mangelnden Anwendbarkeit von Art. 112a (und 112) EPÜ auf – und damit der mangelnden Zuständigkeit der GBK für – Verfahren vor der BKD.

Betreffend die zweite Argumentationslinie des Antragstellers befand die GBK, dass die BKD zwar Art. 113 (1) EPÜ anwenden muss, deren zutreffende Anwendung aber nicht der Überprüfung durch die GBK nach Art. 112a EPÜ unterliegt. Nach der Rechtsprechung des EGMR zu Art. 6 (1) EMRK müsse in Streitigkeiten betreffend zivilrechtliche Rechte und Pflichten eine einzige gerichtliche Instanz vorgesehen werden. Diese sei mit der BKD gegeben. Mit der Schaffung von Art. 112a EPÜ sei der Gesetzgeber also über das von Art. 6 (1) EMRK geforderte Maß sogar hinausgegangen, sodass die Nichtanwendung von Art. 112a EPÜ bezüglich Art. 113 (1) EPÜ keinen rechtlichen Bedenken begegne (s. R 10/20).

Im Gesamtergebnis verwarf die GBK den auf Art. 112a (2) c) EPÜ wegen Verletzung des Rechts auf rechtliches Gehör gestützten Überprüfungsantrag als offensichtlich unzulässig.

In G 2/24 the Enlarged Board ("EBA") answered the referred questions as follows: "After withdrawal of all appeals, appeal proceedings may not be continued with a third party who intervened during the appeal proceedings in accordance with Article 105 EPC.

The intervening third party does not acquire an appellant status corresponding to the status of a person entitled to appeal within the meaning of Article 107, first sentence, EPC..

The EBA found the referral admissible. It held that the referral concerned an aspect of fundamental importance and the final decision on the appeal hinged on the answer to the referred questions. It explained that while Art. 21 RPBA allows for the further development of the case law and grants boards ample discretion for referral, in view of the legislative intent of Art. 112 EPC to ensure a uniform application of the law, a board was expected to substantiate why it considers an earlier ruling to have been superseded by a subsequent change in the law, there to be potential gaps in its reasoning or the existence of a new factual or procedural situation. The EBA took note of the referring board’s criticism of G 3/04.

The EBA concluded that the findings of G 3/04 continue to apply. None of the provisions relevant to the referral (i.e. Art. 99(1), 105 and 107 EPC) had been amended in a substantive manner after G 3/04 had been issued.

The EBA reaffirmed that appeal proceedings are of a judicial nature and the appeal is designed as a remedy on facts and law for parties to proceedings before the administrative departments of the EPO with the aim of eliminating an "adverse effect" of the impugned decision. The scope of the appeal proceedings is primarily determined by the decision under appeal, the appellant’s requests submitted with the notice of appeal and the statement of grounds of appeal, and, in inter partes proceedings, the submissions of the other party or parties in reply to the appellant’s statement of grounds of appeal. The appeal is not an ex officio procedure but depends on the appellant to initiate, determine the scope of, and conclude it within that party’s power of disposal, in accordance with the principle of party disposition.

The EBA further held that a party entitled to appeal within the meaning of Art. 107, first sentence, EPC is only the person who formally participated in the proceedings before the administrative department that issued the impugned decision, unless a third party’s entitlement to participate in those proceedings had been ignored due to procedural error or incorrect application of law. An adverse effect within the meaning of this provision only exists if a decision falls short of the request of a party to the proceedings or deviates from it without their consent. Any other "negative " or "disadvantageous " impact or effect on a third party does not fulfil the legal threshold.

On interventions by third parties, the EBA stated that the exceptional nature of this legal remedy inherently precludes an extensive interpretation and application thereof. An intervener at appeal cannot procedurally benefit from any status in the preceding administrative proceedings and becomes a party as of right. Intervention at appeal needs to fit into the legal and procedural framework of the boards of appeal as the first and final judicial instance in proceedings under the EPC. The principle of party disposition, the binding nature of the parties’ requests and the prohibitions of ruling ultra petita and reformatio in peius limit the option for procedural action of all involved in appeal proceedings, including interveners. Parties to appeal proceedings as of right do not have a legal status independent of the appeal. Awarding an intervener such status would require an explicit legal provision in the EPC.

Therefore, if the sole or all appeals are withdrawn, the proceedings end with regard to all substantive issues for all parties involved and cannot be continued with an intervener at the appeal stage or any other non-appealing party.

In T 0417/22 an intervention had been filed in August 2024. The intervener had stated that the grounds filed with their intervention constituted grounds for both opposition and appeal. In May 2025, opponent 1 and the patent proprietor withdrew their appeals. The intervener's final main request was that the board stay the proceedings and wait for the outcome of referral G 2/24. The first auxiliary request was that the board refer the same question on the status of the intervener to the Enlarged Board of Appeal (hereinafter referred to as "EBA"). The second auxiliary request was that the board remit the case to the opposition division for further prosecution. The patent proprietor's final main substantive request was that the proceedings be terminated by application of the principles derivable from G 3/04.

The board examined the procedural options available to it. In this context, the board emphasised that there was a pending appeal that the board needed to decide on, even if the decision may only concern the admissibility of the appeal. According to the board, even if it were to grant the patent proprietor’s request and decide to follow the interpretation given by G 3/04, it could not close the proceedings without issuing a formal decision..

Furthermore, the board agreed with the referring board of T 1286/23 that the guiding decision G 3/04 may require revision. The board found that while it was procedurally straightforward for it to make a referral to the EBA for the purpose of reviewing G 3/04, pursuant to Art. 21 RPBA, in view of pending referral G 2/24, the board had an additional option. Rather than referring the case itself, the board could stay the proceedings until the outcome of pending referral G 2/24 is known. The board observed that, despite the lack of an explicit legal basis, staying the proceedings appeared to be a reasonable and pragmatic solution given that the board's own referral would cause more problems without achieving any procedural benefit. It also noted that the case law recognised the stay of the proceedings as a viable procedural option for a board in the event of a pending referral. Furthermore, the board was not aware of any case law that categorically denied the procedural possibility of staying the appeal proceedings as a matter of principle, nor had the parties pointed to any such case law.

The board stated that if it deemed it justified to revise a decision or opinion of the EBA under Art. 112 EPC, and if the referral was expected to address the same legal issues that the board would refer to the EBA, then staying the proceedings offered significant procedural advantages over the board's own referral under Art. 112(1) EPC and Art. 21 RPBA. Therefore, the board concluded that, under the right circumstances, staying proceedings in view of an already pending referral was a legitimate alternative to the board's own referral. As such, it was implicitly covered by Art. 21 RPBA as a legally correct procedure where a board intended to deviate from an interpretation of the EPC given in an earlier decision or opinion of the EBA.

Accordingly, the board held that it effectively had the three procedural options discussed during the proceedings. The board could issue a decision without delay on the basis of the principles derivable from G 3/04, thereby effectively dismissing the intervener's appeal as inadmissible and terminating the substantive proceedings. Alternatively, the board could make a further referral to seek a change to the interpretation of the law given in G 3/04. Further, the board could stay the proceedings until the pending referral G 2/24 answered the question of whether and how an intervener joining the appeal proceedings may obtain appellant status within the meaning of Art. 107 EPC. As neither the parties nor the board itself favoured the board's own referral, there was no need to discuss in detail all the conditions for such a referral. Instead, the board had to choose between staying the proceedings and applying G 3/04 unreservedly. For this, it was sufficient for the board to establish that a hypothetical referral would fulfil the requirements of Art. 112(1)(a) EPC for essentially all the reasons provided in the referring decision T 1286/23, given the relevant similarities between the cases.

After having provided reasons for deviating from G 3/04, the board stated that it saw no convincing substantive argument supporting the patent proprietor's proposition that the case before the board would be less suitable for the board's own referral than the case underlying the decision T 1286/23. Upon weighing up the interests of the parties, the board concluded that it was more equitable to stay the proceedings, which resulted in limited disadvantages for both parties, but did not affect their substantive position in the opposition proceedings. The appeal proceedings were thus stayed until the proceedings in referral G 2/24 are terminated.

In case T 0745/23 the board had summoned the parties to oral proceedings on the EPO premises. The respondent had requested that the oral proceedings be held by videoconference. The appellant had requested, in response, that the oral proceedings be held in person, or, alternatively, that the board refer to the Enlarged Board the following questions:.

"1. Is the conduct of oral proceedings as a videoconference in appeal proceedings outside a general emergency situation without the consent of the parties in accordance with the provisions of the EPC.

2. If yes, on which criteria should the discretion be exercised if a Board of Appeal decides on its own motion to hold oral proceedings as a videoconference pursuant to Art. 15a(1) RPBA against the request of a party?.

In the communication under Art. 15(1) RPBA, the board had found the case in hand suitable for being heard by videoconference. The appellant had not responded to this communication, and hence, according to the board, had not objected to the board’s intention to grant the respondent’s request for a videoconference. Therefore, the board had changed the venue of the oral proceedings to videoconference.

At the oral proceedings, the appellant argued that Art. 15a RPBA did not define the criteria for exercising the board’s discretion. This gave rise to different practices and legal uncertainty. Since, according to G 1/21, oral proceedings in person were the gold standard, there could be doubt as to whether Art. 15a RPBA was actually in line with the EPC.

The board disagreed. Art. 15a RPBA provided the board with the discretion to decide to hold oral proceedings pursuant to Art. 116 EPC by videoconference if the board considered it appropriate to do so, either upon a party's request or of its own motion. Its scope was general and not limited to a pandemic situation. In G 1/21, the Enlarged Board had expressly acknowledged that oral proceedings in the form of a videoconference were oral proceedings within the meaning of Art. 116 EPC. The board failed to see how Art. 15a RPBA as such violated any EPC provisions governing the fair conduct of proceedings and the right to be heard.

Furthermore, the board stated that it interpreted the discretionary power set out in Art. 15a RPBA within the framework of decision G 1/21. This decision had not excluded videoconference oral proceedings a priori, but had set certain limitations and restrictions, especially when a party did not give its consent. The board exercised its discretion in view of the particular circumstances of the case and of the reasons provided by each party in support of their opposing requests as to the format. Thus, also the party not consenting to a videoconference should provide some reasons as to why it considered that videoconference, in the case in hand, was not suitable or why the party was otherwise disadvantaged. In the case in hand, the appellant, however, had not submitted any objective or subjective reason why the case in hand should not be heard by videoconference. In the absence of any further submissions by the appellant regarding the format of the oral proceedings, the board had had no reason to (again) change the format of the oral proceedings.

The board rejected the appellant’s request for referral. The first question proposed for referral had already been answered by the Enlarged Board in section C.5 of G 1/21. This section undoubtedly had a general character, despite the judgement essentially being limited to the pandemic (as also acknowledged in T 2432/19). The board held that in the case in hand, it failed to identify a departure from the teaching of G 1/21, and thus a need to (again) refer the first question in order to decide the present case. The posed question thus did not warrant a referral, which would otherwise be of theoretical interest only.

With regard to the second question proposed for referral, the board found that any answer to it depended on the specific case and providing anything more than general instructions would risk compromising the principle of judicial discretion. The board held that, for this reason alone, it could not be regarded as a point of law suitable for being referred to the Enlarged Board.

In R 12/23 the Enlarged Board of Appeal (hereinafter referred to as "EBA") summarised the petitioner’s assertions concerning procedural deficiencies regarding the ground for petition mentioned in Art. 112a(2)(c) in conjunction with Art. 113(1) EPC as follows.

(i) the petitioner had had no opportunity during the oral proceedings to argue on the standard applied by the board in the written decision.

(ii) the board had neglected the "gold standard" as one of two alternative approache.

- in the decision, the board had applied only the "essentiality test" and not also the "gold standard" thereby contravening R 2/14 an.

- the board had provided no opportunity to discuss the "gold standard", during the oral proceedings; an.

(iii) the decision was not sufficiently reasoned on the "gold standard" or on the "essentiality test".

The EBA found that the first alleged procedural deficiency was obviously unfounded, because it was in direct contradiction with the petitioner’s own conclusion which made it clear that the discussion in the oral proceedings had been "identically" mirrored in the written decision.

On the second alleged procedural deficiency, the EBA stated that it could not find that the board had obviously not applied the "gold standard" due to the fact that it may also have examined the criteria of the "essentiality test". The EBA had to rely on the board’s declaration that it had applied the "gold standard", given that the EBA was prevented from scrutiny of the application of the law, i.e. whether the board had applied the "gold standard" in an incorrect manner.

The EBA considered whether the R 2/14 rationale would at all apply to the case in hand and concluded that in R 2/14 it had been held that the board would have needed to address (three) alternative factual approaches to assessing sufficiency of disclosure. In the case in hand, however, the (two) approaches in question were legal approaches. Having opted for one of them and thus having determined the law, the board was under no obligation to apply the facts of the case to an alternative legal approach..

In this regard, the EBA noted that a board deciding on a case must establish the facts and apply the law to them. If a party puts forward several alternative sets of facts in order to support a specific finding of law, then the board must assess whether any of these sets support that finding and may only reject the suggested finding once it has concluded that none of the sets of facts justifies it. The EBA emphasised that there is no need to discuss alternative legal approaches, as distinguished from factual approaches, in the decision, because the board determines the law, in particular the correct legal approach. However, even though this had not been necessary, the board in the case in hand had still applied both approaches, i.e. the "gold standard" and the "essentiality test"..

The finding that the requirement to discuss alternative approaches set out in R 2/14 did not apply in this case presupposed that the board had given the party an opportunity to provide its comments on the correct legal approach. The petitioner itself stated that this had been the case. If, during the oral proceedings, the petitioner had considered that the board should not apply the "essentiality test" under the guise of the "gold standard", then it should have alerted the board to its view. The EBA concluded that there had been no violation of the petitioner’s right to be heard with respect to the second asserted procedural deficiency.

Concerning the third asserted procedural deficiency, the EBA recalled the criteria laid down in R 8/15 and R 10/18. It held that in line with point 1 of the Catchword of R 8/15, the board had addressed submissions it had identified as being relevant, in the reasons for the decision. The question was whether the board had also substantively considered those submissions as also required in point 1 of that Catchword. The EBA held that this had been the case and thus considered the third asserted procedural deficiency clearly unfounded.

The EBA concluded that the petition for review was clearly unallowable, since none of the three asserted fundamental deficiencies constituted a violation of the right to be heard.

Der Antrag auf Überprüfung in R 7/22 wurde darauf gestützt, dass die zu überprüfende Entscheidung in mehrfacher Hinsicht mit einem schwerwiegenden Verfahrensmangel behaftet sei, und – ebenfalls in mehrfacher Hinsicht – ein schwerwiegender Verstoß gegen Art. 113 EPÜ vorliege.

Bei der Prüfung der Begründetheit des Überprüfungsantrags bezüglich der geltend gemachten Verfahrensmängel gemäß Art. 112a (2) d) EPÜ erinnerte die Große Beschwerdekammer (GBK) daran, dass die in R. 104 EPÜ nicht genannten Verfahrensmängel nicht als schwerwiegende Verfahrensmängel im Sinne des Art. 112a (2) d) EPÜ gelten. Die Antragstellerin hatte sich aber weder auf das Übergehen eines Antrags auf mündliche Verhandlung (R. 104 a) EPÜ) noch eines sonstigen relevanten Antrags im Verfahren (R. 104 b) EPÜ) berufen. Dementsprechend betrachtete die GBK den Überprüfungsantrag bezüglich dieser geltend gemachten Verfahrensmängel als offensichtlich unbegründet.

Im Rahmen der Prüfung der Begründetheit des Überprüfungsantrags im Hinblick auf die geltend gemachten Verfahrensmängel nach Art. 112a (2) c) EPÜ befasste sich die GBK mit den beanstandeten Verstößen gegen Art. 113 (1) EPÜ im Zusammenhang mit der angekündigten mündlichen Verhandlung in Präsenz und derer tatsächlicher Durchführung als Videokonferenz. Dabei betonte die GBK unter anderem Folgendes:

In G 1/21 hat die GBK entschieden, dass die Durchführung einer mündlichen Verhandlung als Videokonferenz grundsätzlich mit dem Recht auf rechtliches Gehör vereinbar ist, und in R 12/22 hat die GBK das ausführlich dargestellt. Im vorliegenden Fall hatte die Antragstellerin sich darauf beschränkt zu rügen, die im Fall G 1/21 gesetzten, sehr engen Voraussetzungen für die Durchführung einer mündlichen Verhandlung als Videokonferenz hätten nicht vorgelegen. Sie hatte keine konkreten Umstände behauptet, wodurch ihr die Ausübung ihres Rechts auf rechtliches Gehör im Beschwerdeverfahren verweigert wurde. Für die GBK waren auch keine derartigen Umstände ersichtlich. Eine allgemeine Beanstandung zu Beginn der Verhandlung, die Voraussetzungen für die Durchführung der mündlichen Verhandlung als Videokonferenz seien nicht gegeben, genügt aus den vorgenannten Gründen (wonach eine mündliche Verhandlung in Form einer Videokonferenz grundsätzlich mit dem Recht auf rechtliches Gehör vereinbar ist) nicht. Damit liegt in der Durchführung der mündlichen Verhandlung als Videokonferenz offensichtlich kein Gehörsverstoß.

Darüber hinaus befand die GBK, dass anders als im Falle der Ermessensausübung beim Thema Zulassung, eine unzutreffende Ermessensausübung zugunsten der Durchführung einer mündlichen Verhandlung als Videokonferenz mangels Einfluss auf das Recht auf rechtliches Gehör keinen Verstoß gegen dieses Recht begründen kann, wenn – wie hier – ein konkreter Mangel der Videokonferenz während derselben nicht behauptet worden war. Die Beteiligten waren im Übrigen zur Frage der Durchführung der mündlichen Verhandlung als Videokonferenz gehört worden, so dass auch insofern kein Gehörsverstoß vorlag.

In Bezug auf die durch die Antragstellerin geltend gemachten Mängel in der Begründung der zu überprüfenden Entscheidung verwies die GBK auf die in R 3/15, R 8/15, R 8/19, R 10/20 und R 12/22 formulierten relevanten Grundprinzipien. Sie erinnerte unter anderem daran, dass eine widersprüchliche Begründung nur dann beanstandet werden kann, wenn die Widersprüche gleichbedeutend damit sind, dass die Kammer das Vorbringen in den Entscheidungsgründen nicht behandelt und dieses objektiv betrachtet entscheidend für den Ausgang des Falles war. Ebenso wie die objektiv entscheidende Bedeutung für den Ausgang des Falles sich aufdrängen muss, muss sich auch aufdrängen, dass die widersprüchliche Begründung gleichbedeutend ist mit einer Nicht-Begründung, indem sie beispielsweise völlig konfus ist (R 12/22).

Zum Argument der Antragstellerin, die Begründungsmängel seien für den Fachmann augenfällig, befand die GBK, dass es sich bei der relevanten Person, der eklatante Begründungsmängel ins Auge springen müssen, um den Durchschnittsleser und nicht den Fachmann handelt.

Der Antrag auf Überprüfung wurde teilweise als offensichtlich unzulässig und im Übrigen als offensichtlich unbegründet verworfen.

In G 1/24 the Enlarged Board ("EBA") considered the points of law referred to it by Technical Board of Appeal 3.2.01 in T 439/22 of 24 June 2024. The first question was whether Art. 69(1), second sentence, EPC and Art. 1 of the Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69 EPC are to be applied to the interpretation of patent claims when assessing the patentability of an invention under Art. 52 to 57 EPC. The second question concerned whether the description and figures are to be consulted when interpreting the claims to assess patentability and, if so, whether this may be done generally or only if the person skilled in the art finds a claim to be unclear or ambiguous when read in isolation. The third and final question was whether a definition or similar information on a term used in the claims, which is explicitly given in the description, can be disregarded when interpreting the claims to assess patentability and, if so, under what conditions.

The EBA confirmed that the departments of the EPO were required to interpret patent claims when assessing the patentability of an invention under Art. 52 to 57 EPC. As regards Question 1, the EBA held that there was no clear legal basis, in terms of an article of the EPC, for claim interpretation when assessing patentability. Article 69 EPC and Art. 1 of the Protocol were arguably only concerned with infringement actions and therefore were not entirely satisfactory as a basis for claim interpretation when assessing patentability. Article 84 EPC could also be criticised as an alternative legal basis as it addresses the content of the patent application and is formal in nature without providing guidance on how to interpret claims. It only sets out an instruction to the drafter of what needs to be in the claims and an instruction to the EPO to determine whether the claims meet that purpose. The EBA considered, however, that there was an existing body of case law of the Boards of Appeal which applied the wording of the aforementioned provisions in an analogous way to the examination of patentability under Art. 52 to 57 EPC, and from which the applicable principles of claim interpretation could be extracted.

The EBA further held it a settled point in the case law of the Boards of Appeal that the claims are the starting point and the basis for assessing the patentability of an invention under Art. 52 to 57 EPC.

As regards Question 2, the EBA stated that the description and any drawings must always be consulted when interpreting the claims, and not just in the case of unclarity or ambiguity. In adopting this position, the EBA rejected the case law of the Boards of Appeal that sees no need to refer to the descriptions and drawings when interpreting a claim, unless the claim is unclear or ambiguous. It found that this case law was contrary to the wording, and hence the principles, of Art. 69 EPC. It was also contrary to the practice of both the national courts of the EPC contracting states and the UPC. Moreover, from a logical point of view, the finding that the language of a claim is clear and unambiguous was an act of interpretation, not a preliminary stage to such an interpretative act.

Question 3 was held inadmissible by the EBA, which considered it to be encompassed by Question 2.

The EBA also referred to the harmonisation philosophy behind the EPC and noted that the case law of the UPC Court of Appeal on claim interpretation appeared to be consistent with the above conclusions. It further highlighted the importance of the examining division carrying out a high quality examination of whether a claim fulfils the clarity requirements of Art. 84 EPC, and stated that the correct response to any unclarity in a claim was amendment.

The order by the EBA in G 1/24 reads as follows: "The claims are the starting point and the basis for assessing the patentability of an invention under Articles 52 to 57 EPC. The description and drawings shall always be consulted to interpret the claims when assessing the patentability of an invention under Articles 52 to 57 EPC, and not only if the person skilled in the art finds a claim to be unclear or ambiguous when read in isolation."

In R 12/21 prüfte die Große Beschwerdekammer (GBK), ob die Kammer entsprechend dem seitens der Antragstellerin geltend gemachten sechsten bis achten Verfahrensmangel gegen das Recht auf rechtliches Gehör verstoßen hatte (Art. 112a (2) c) i.V.m. Art. 113 (1) EPÜ). Diese Mängel betrafen die Nichtzulassung des Hilfsantrags. Die Nichtzulassung des Hilfsantrags wurde in der angefochtenen Entscheidung auf zwei Gründe kumulativ gestützt: Fehlen der Voraussetzungen von Art. 12 (2) VOBK 2007 und eine prima facie fehlende Neuheit des Gegenstands von Anspruch 1 des Hilfsantrags.

Die GBK merkte an, dass zur Frage der Zulassung neuen Vorbringens in einem Teil der Rechtsprechung der GBK zu Art. 112a EPÜ verlangt wird, dass der Beteiligte zu dessen Zulassung (lediglich) ausreichend zu hören ist, nach einem anderen Teil der Rechtsprechung ist darüber hinaus die Ausübung des Ermessens im Rahmen der Zulassung nicht nur auf Willkür, sondern auch auf offensichtliche Unrichtigkeit zu überprüfen (R 6/20). Der GBK zufolge stellte sich vorliegend bereits die Frage, ob die Antragstellerin ausreichend gehört worden war, und darüber hinaus ggf., ob die zutreffenden Rechtsgrundlagen für die Ausübung des Ermessens zu Grunde gelegt und das Ermessen damit nicht offensichtlich unrichtig angewandt worden war. Nur bei positiver Beantwortung beider Fragen könne der Überprüfungsantrag unbegründet sein.

Da die GBK die erste Frage negativ beantwortete und der Überprüfungsantrag aus diesem Grund bereits Erfolg hatte, kam es auf die zweite Frage nicht an. In der Entscheidung der GBK wurde daher lediglich die Frage des ausreichenden Gehörs der Antragstellerin im Hinblick auf die Nichtzulassung des Hilfsantrags vor dem Hintergrund der geltend gemachten fehlenden Möglichkeit, zur prima facie-Neuheit Stellung zu nehmen, erörtert. Den Vortrag der Antragstellerin verstand die GBK dahingehend, dass diese sich bei der Erörterung der Zulassung des Hilfsantrags 1 während der mündlichen Verhandlung nicht zum Aspekt, auf den sich die Kammer in der Entscheidungsbegründung stützte, hatte äußern dürfen, nämlich dazu ob der "hinzugefügte Schritt […] prima facie die Neuheit gegenüber D2 herstellt und damit dem Anspruch zu einer prima facie Gewährbarkeit als Zulassungskriterium unter Art. 13 (1) VOBK 2007 verhilft".

Wenn die Kammer, so die GBK, der Auffassung gewesen wäre, die technische Debatte zum hinzugefügten Merkmal in Anspruch 1 des Hilfsantrags sei bereits im Rahmen des Hauptantrags vollumfänglich geführt worden und eine weitere Debatte im Rahmen des Hilfsantrags überflüssig, hätte die Kammer die Patentinhaberin auf eben diese Auffassung hinweisen und ihr Gelegenheit zur Stellungnahme geben müssen. Dies folge bereits aus dem Wortlaut von Art. 113 (1) EPÜ, wonach Entscheidungen des EPA nur auf Gründe gestützt werden dürfen, zu denen die Beteiligten sich äußern konnten.

Die GBK kam zu dem Schluss, dass in Ermangelung des vorgenannten ausdrücklichen Ansprechens die Antragstellerin erst der schriftlichen Entscheidung entnehmen konnte, dass die Kammer die Nichtzulassung auch auf eine fehlende prima facie-Neuheit des Gegenstands von Anspruch 1 gestützt hatte. Daher sei der Patentinhaberin auch eine diesbezügliche Rüge nach R. 106 EPÜ nicht möglich gewesen. Sie sei damit daran gehindert gewesen, ihrer grundsätzlich bestehenden Pflicht nachzukommen, von sich aus im Verfahren ihre Interessen aktiv wahrzunehmen.

Im Umstand, dass die Kammer die prima facie-Neuheit des Gegenstands von Anspruch 1 des Hilfsantrags bei der Debatte über die Ausübung des Zulassungs-Ermessens im Rahmen von Art. 13 (1) VOBK 2007 nicht ausdrücklich angesprochen hatte und dazu nicht hatte vortragen lassen, sah die GBK einen schwerwiegenden Verstoß gegen das Recht auf rechtliches Gehör der Patentinhaberin (Art. 113 (1) EPÜ). Es könne nämlich nicht von vornherein ausgeschlossen werden, dass die Ermessensentscheidung im Falle eines Ansprechens und damit einhergehend der Gelegenheit zur Stellungnahme zur prima facie-Neuheit des Gegenstands von Anspruch 1 des Hilfsantrags anders ausgefallen gewesen wäre.

In T 2116/22 the interpretation of the terms "coating" and "coated" in claim 1 of the main request was relevant to assess novelty.

The appellants-patent proprietors argued that these terms had to be interpreted taking into account the whole patent. The skilled person would have understood the coating step and the thrombin-coated gelatin granules defined in the claims as being limited respectively to a process as specified in paragraph [0014] of the patent and to thrombin coated gelatin granules prepared thereby.

The board observed that the wording of the claim did not restrict the coating step to the specific coating conditions mentioned in paragraph [0014] of the patent. While the limitation of the final product being a "dry and stable" hemostatic composition may imply some limitations on the process steps, these encompassed any process features resulting in a dry and stable product such as indeed the ones described in paragraph [0014] of the patent but also any other process features providing a dry and stable product. The board further noted that the term "coating" or "coated" had a clear meaning in the field of pharmaceutical preparations and corresponded to the application of a material to the surface of a pharmaceutical solid product. This was usually done by applying the coating material as a solution or suspension to the pharmaceutical solid product and evaporating the vehicle. Paragraph [0014] of the patent did not provide a different definition of the term "coating" or "coated" than the one commonly accepted in the art. The description provided first a description of the process in broad terms as in claim 1 before describing more specific embodiments and preferred features, such as in paragraph [0014]. Whether read alone or in the light of the entire description, the meaning of the coating step or the coated product remained the same.

In the context of the discussion regarding the interpretation of the terms "coating" and "coated", the appellants-patent proprietors had requested that the board stay the proceedings in view of the pending referral G 1/24.

The board stated that the provisions in the EPC concerning a stay of proceedings following a referral to the Enlarged Board only concerned the referring board (Art. 112(3) EPC). There was, however, no legal basis in the EPC nor in the Rules of Procedure of the Boards of Appeal requiring that any other board stay its proceedings to await the outcome of the proceedings before the Enlarged Board. The decision whether or not to stay the proceedings in such cases was thus a discretionary one.

According to the board, the strict approach taken in T 166/84, namely to stay the proceedings whenever the outcome of the proceedings depended entirely on the outcome of the referral, had been applied by some boards (e.g. T 426/00, T 1875/07 and T 1044/07). However, it had also been put into question for lack of a legal basis, and considered not to apply to proceedings before the Boards of Appeal (e.g. T 1473/13 and T 1870/16). The board was of the view that a strict application of the approach taken in T 166/84 would in effect deny a board its discretion as to whether to stay the proceedings. The discretion was however the inevitable consequence of the fact that there was no legal basis for requiring a board that had not referred the relevant questions to the Enlarged Board to stay the proceedings. Moreover, the outcome of the referral G 1/24 was not decisive for the decision in the case at hand.

The board decided not to stay the proceedings in view of the pending referral G 1/24 and concluded that claim 1 of the main request was not novel. During the course of the oral proceedings, the appellants-patent proprietors filed an objection under R. 106 EPC. The board reiterated that the decision to stay the proceedings remained a discretionary one. The appellants-patent proprietors had had ample opportunities to present their comments on the issue of a stay of the proceedings, so that no violation of their right to be heard occurred (Art. 113(1) EPC). Moreover, the outcome of the referral G 1/24 was not decisive for the decision in the present case, including on novelty of the main request. Therefore, the board dismissed the objection under R. 106 EPC.