C. Einspruchsverfahren

In T 1398/23 entschied die Kammer, dass die Nichtzulassung des Hilfsantrags 2 durch die Einspruchsabteilung fehlerhaft war..

Die Einspruchsabteilung hatte den Antrag als verspätet angesehen, da er nach Ablauf der Frist nach R. 116 (1) EPÜ eingereicht worden war. "Um die Fairness des Verfahrens zu garantieren", prüfte sie daher, ob die Patentinhaberin den Antrag früher hätte einreichen können. Die Einspruchsabteilung stellte ferner fest, dass Hilfsantrag 14 rechtzeitig vor der Frist gemäß R. 116 (1) EPÜ eingereicht worden war, und dass der neu eingereichte Hilfsantrag 2 fast identisch zu Hilfsantrag 14 war, mit dem Unterschied, dass die Ansprüche 6 bis 10 aufrechterhalten wurden..

Aufgrund dieser Konstellation, kam die Einspruchsabteilung zu dem Schluss, dass die Patentinhaberin keinen Grund gehabt hatte, einen neuen Antrag mit zusätzlichen Ansprüchen einzureichen. Eine Änderung der Strategie einer Partei, die unabhängig vom Verfahrensverlauf ist, sei keine gültige Begründung für ein spätes Vorbringen. Der Hilfsantrag 2 hätte spätestens kurz vor Ablauf der Frist gemäß R. 116 (1) EPÜ eingereicht werden müssen und wurde daher von der Einspruchsabteilung gemäß Art. 114 (2) EPÜ nicht ins Verfahren zugelassen.

Die Kammer kam jedoch zu dem Schluss, dass die Einspruchsabteilung die Ausgangslage unzutreffend ermittelt hatte. Maßgeblich war der Kammer zufolge, dass die Einsprechende am letzten Tag der Frist gemäß R. 116 (1) EPÜ erstmals einen Einwand unter Art. 54 (1) EPÜ in Bezug auf das Dokument D2 erhoben hatte und die Einspruchsabteilung in der mündlichen Verhandlung von ihrem Ermessen Gebrauch machte, diesen neuen Einwand zum Verfahren zuzulassen, auf dessen Basis der beanspruchte Gegenstand des Hauptantrags und des Hilfsantrags 1 dann als nicht neu angesehen wurden. Hilfsantrag 14 war hingegen eingereicht worden, bevor der Einspruchsabteilung der Einwand fehlender Neuheit im Hinblick auf D2 überhaupt bekannt war. Hilfsantrag 14 war ersichtlich ein Versuch, die davor erhobenen Einwände der Einsprechenden zu beheben bzw. der vorläufigen Meinung der Einspruchsabteilung Rechnung zu tragen. Dies bedeutet, dass Hilfsantrag 14 nicht als Reaktion auf den neuen Einwand unter Art. 54 (1) EPÜ im Hinblick auf D2 angesehen werden durfte. Entgegen der Auffassung der Einspruchsabteilung war Hilfsantrag 14 daher nicht Teil der Ausgangslage, die bei der Bestimmung der durch die Einreichung von Hilfsantrag 2 bewirkten Änderung zu berücksichtigen war.

Ausgehend davon, dass ein neuer Einwand unter Art. 54 (1) EPÜ erst am letzten Tag der Frist nach R. 116 (1) EPÜ erhoben worden war, dieser erst in der mündlichen Verhandlung durch die Einspruchsabteilung zum Verfahren zugelassen worden war und dann zur Ablehnung der Neuheit des beanspruchten Gegenstands führte, war die Einreichung eines neuen Hilfsantrags in der mündlichen Verhandlung als rechtzeitige und angemessene Reaktion zu bewerten. In diesem Falle lag die Zulassung des neuen Hilfsantrags 2 nicht im Ermessen der Einspruchsabteilung, sondern der Hilfsantrag 2 musste zugelassen werden.

Auch wenn Hilfsantrag 2 im Vergleich zu Hilfsantrag 14 nur zusätzliche Ansprüche aufweist, kann das Recht der Patentinhaberin, auf einen neuen Einwand mit einem neuen Anspruchssatz (Hilfsantrag 2) zu reagieren, nicht durch einen Anspruchssatz (Hilfsantrag 14) erschöpft werden, der sich bereits vor Einreichung des Einwands im Verfahren befand.

Da die Entscheidung der Einspruchsabteilung, den Hilfsantrag 2 nicht zuzulassen, fehlerhaft war, war die angefochtene Entscheidung aufzuheben. Die Kammer hob die angefochtene Entscheidung auf und verwies die Angelegenheit zur weiteren Entscheidung an die Einspruchsabteilung zurück (Art. 111 (1) EPC, Art. 11 VOBK).

In T 1469/24, the appellant-proprietor contested the admissibility of the opposition, arguing that the opponent had not been correctly identified, so that the requirements of Art. 99(1) and R. 76(2) EPC were not met. They argued that the opponent, Mr N.N., was the representative of one of the subsidiaries of the group of companies against which the proprietor had initiated infringement proceedings before the UPC, and which, in turn, had initiated a central revocation action against the contested patent at the UPC in reaction to the infringement proceedings. Mr N.N. had therefore not been the real opponent, but had acted as a straw man for the group. The real opponent thus avoided being identified as the party challenging the patent. This was a misuse of the opposition procedure, which was intended to allow genuine opponents to challenge patents in a transparent manner. Consequently, the use of a straw man in this case was a clear attempt to circumvent the law by abuse of due process. In addition, according to the proprietor, the straw man, being a patent attorney, did not have a legitimate interest in the outcome of the opposition proceedings.

The board observed that, in an opposition in which the person named as opponent is acting on behalf of a third party, decision G 3/97 identifies two cases where the law is circumvented by abuse of process: 1) if the opponent is acting on behalf of the proprietor, 2) if the opponent is acting on behalf of a client in the context of activities which, taken as a whole, are typically associated with professional representatives, without possessing the relevant qualifications required by Art. 134 EPC. The board found that neither of these cases applied here..

The board indicated it was aware that these two cases did not constitute an exhaustive list. Nevertheless, G 3/97 sets out some further considerations as to what is not considered a circumvention of the law by abuse of process. For instance, in point 3.2.1 of the Reasons, the Enlarged Board stated that "Though the patent proprietor may have an economic interest in finding out who is trying to attack his patent, such an interest is not legally protected by the legislative arrangements for the opposition procedure". In the present case, even if the group of companies involved in the infringement action had actually avoided being identified, this would not have constituted an attempt to circumvent the law by abuse of due process within the meaning of decision G 3/97..

Moreover, the board recalled the Enlarged Board’s observation in G 3/97 that since the EPC legislator explicitly designed the opposition procedure as a legal remedy in the public interest, which is open to any person, it cannot be required that the opponent has an interest in the revocation of the patent. Consequently, the board held that it was irrelevant in the present case whether the opponent Mr N.N. had a genuine personal interest in the outcome of the opposition proceedings.

The board found that, while G 3/97 and G 4/97 may not explicitly state that any opposition by a straw man is admissible, they essentially conclude that an opposition filed by a straw man on behalf of an anonymous party is not objectionable merely because the opponent is acting as a straw man. In particular, the Enlarged Board held that an abuse of process needs not be assumed in those cases where the third party instructing the presumed straw man could have filed an opposition itself. The board recalled that G 3/97 and G 4/97 do not state that the opposition division would be required to investigate ex officio whether any of the identified situations that could be considered an abuse of process might be present and concealed by the formally named opponent. On the contrary, the burden of proof is borne by the person alleging that the opposition is inadmissible. The board did not see any such evidence in the file.

The board concluded that the requirements of Art. 99(1) and R. 76(2) EPC were met and that the appeal must be dismissed.

In T 1403/24 the appellant (patent proprietor) contested the admissibility of the opposition filed by opponent 2. It argued that opponent 2 was acting on behalf of opponent 1 or opponent 3. In the appellant’s view, this followed from the citation of document D24 in the notice of opposition by opponent 2, because D24 concerned the non-public infringement complaint by the patent proprietor against opponent 1 and opponent 3 in Germany. Moreover, opponent 2 had previously represented a member of the same company group to which opponent 1 belonged in the opposition against the parent patent. Furthermore, the notices of opposition filed on the same day by opponent 2 and opponent 3 included large sections of identical language. As explained in T 9/00, it would be an abuse of procedure for one opponent to file two oppositions. Therefore, according to the appellant, the filing of the opposition by opponent 2 on behalf of opponent 1 or opponent 3 represented an attempt to circumvent the law, which was in view of the considerations in G 3/97 and G 4/97 not admissible.

The board observed that in contrast to the situation in T 9/00, opponent 2 was a distinct legal person from opponent 1 and opponent 3. According to decisions G 3/97 and G 4/97, an opposition filed on behalf of a third party was inadmissible if the involvement of the opponent was to be regarded as circumventing the law by abuse of process, in particular if the opponent was acting on behalf of the patent proprietor or on behalf of a client without possessing the relevant qualifications required by Art. 134 EPC. The decisions G 3/97 and G 4/97 explicitly concluded that a circumvention of the law by abuse of process did not arise purely because a professional representative was acting in its own name on behalf of a client and that the burden of proof regarding the circumvention of the law by abuse of process was to be borne by the party alleging that the opposition was inadmissible.

The board held that, given the shared interest among opponents in revoking the patent, it was not uncommon for them to exchange documents and coordinate their submissions during opposition proceedings. Therefore, the citation of document D24 by opponent 2, and the presence of similar or identical passages in the notices of opposition filed by opponents 2 and 3, did not establish that opponent 2 acted on behalf of opponent 1 or opponent 3. The appellant had thus not provided convincing evidence that the opposition filed in the name of opponent 2 was filed on behalf of opponent 1 or opponent 3 to circumvent the law by abuse of process. Accordingly, the board confirmed the admissibility of the opposition filed by opponent 2.

In T 866/24, during the oral proceedings before the board, the opponent (respondent) submitted that the unclear features underlying the amendments made to claim 1, which were based on the patent description, were building up on corresponding unclear formulations taken from dependent claim 6 as granted. Raising an objection under Art. 84 EPC against unclear features stemming from granted dependent claims should, in the opponent’s view, be admissible under such circumstances.

The board agreed, in principle, with the opponent's concerns. According to the board’s perception, there was a recent tendency to examine dependent claims less and less with respect to clarity in examination proceedings despite the fact that their full examination under Art. 84 EPC was not considered "unrealistic" in G 3/14, point 32 of the Reasons. Such a full examination was even expressly encouraged by the Enlarged Board in G 1/24, point 20 of the Reasons (i.e. highlighting "the importance of the examining division carrying out a high quality examination of whether a claim fulfils the clarity requirements of Article 84 EPC"). The board noted that the justification for such leniency may be found in the assumption that the protection conferred by a granted patent is defined only by the independent claims. Where dependent claims are subsequently added to an independent claim in the course of opposition proceedings, opponents are ultimately faced with unclear claim features which, as in the present case, were deemed to have been examined for clarity, although de facto they had not been. Nonetheless, they could not be objected to under Art. 84 EPC due to the conclusions of G 3/14.

The board observed that this result was unsatisfactory, as an independent claim with unclear features leaves much to the readers' imagination. It added that unclear features tend to elude a sensible comparison with the prior art. Furthermore, since opponents may not anticipate with certainty which claim construction will be adopted by the board or a court in infringement proceedings, they may feel obliged to put forward different lines of argumentation for all of the different potential interpretations. In the board’s view, categorically barring opponents in such cases from raising clarity objections under Art. 84 EPC causes undue complexities in the discussion on novelty and inventive step, to the detriment not only of opponents but also of the opposition divisions and the boards of appeal.

In T 989/23 auxiliary request 17, filed with the statement of grounds of appeal, had first been filed in the opposition proceedings on the final date set under R. 116 EPC. The opposition division had decided that this auxiliary request was not open for examination as to its admissibility since it had been filed within the set time limit. Auxiliary request 17 was not considered by the opposition division since a higher-ranking auxiliary request was found allowable. The appellant-opponent requested that auxiliary request 17 not be admitted into the appeal proceedings, arguing that the division had misunderstood its discretionary powers.

In view of the line of case law holding that submissions admitted by the opposition division could not be excluded from consideration on appeal (e.g. T 487/16, T 1768/17, T 617/16, T 26/13, T 989/23, T 1568/12, T 2603/18, T 3201/19) the board first addressed the extent of its power of review. It explained that like an opposition division's decision to disregard late-filed submissions, a decision to admit such submissions into the opposition proceedings was a discretionary procedural decision which formed part of the opposition division's final decision on the merits of an opposition. A decision to admit late-filed submissions adversely affected the party contesting their admittance (in view of a possible adverse decision on appeal based on the admitted submissions, T 1549/07). Therefore, a board had the power to review an opposition division's procedural decision to take into consideration submissions filed late in opposition proceedings. Otherwise, the parties' right to a judicial review of an essential part of the opposition division's decision would be denied. Moreover, on appeal, a board would be compelled to accept a legal and factual framework, even if it is based on an erroneous exercise of discretion. As a consequence, requests, facts or evidence that had been admitted into opposition proceedings could be disregarded on appeal if the opposition division's decision suffered from an error in the use of discretion (T 1209/05, T 1652/08, T 1852/11, T 2197/11, T 572/14, T 341/15, T 326/22, T 776/17). The board thus had the power and duty to review the opposition division's decision to admit auxiliary request 17 into the opposition proceedings.

The board held that the filing of requests for amendment of the patent was governed by Art. 123(1) EPC, which gave the opposition division the discretionary power not to admit new requests for amendment (e.g. T 755/96, OJ 2000, 174; T 980/08, T 1178/08, T 966/17, R 6/19, T 256/19, R 11/20). The exercise of this discretion had to take account of the following: In inter-partes proceedings, each party had to be given equal opportunity to present their case and a fair chance to respond to new matter raised by the other party or parties or by the opposition division. Both the opposition division and the parties had to observe the principle of good faith (T 669/90, OJ 1992, 739; T 201/92). To expedite the proceedings and implement the principle of fairness towards the other party or parties, each party had to submit all facts, evidence, arguments and requests for amendments relevant to their case as early and completely as possible (T 326/87, OJ 1992, 522; T 430/89; T 951/91, OJ 1995, 202). This case law had been developed mainly in the context of Art. 114(2) EPC, pertaining to facts and evidence. Nevertheless, in view of the principles set out above, the rationale of this case law also applied to a patent proprietor's requests for amendment of the patent (e.g. T 582/08). Whether amended sets of claims should be considered in opposition proceedings or not did not merely depend on their filing within the time limit under R. 116 EPC, but also on the specific circumstances of the case (see also T 364/20). Consequently, the opposition division erred in denying that it had discretionary power to disregard auxiliary request 17. As a consequence, this procedural decision did not establish that auxiliary request 17 was "admissibly raised" in opposition proceedings.

The board agreed with the opponent that the filing of additional sets of amended claims (including auxiliary request 17) on 23 January 2023 was not a diligent and appropriate reaction to the opponent's submissions filed on 14 April 2022 and reiterated on 2 September 2022, or to the opposition division's communication of 30 May 2022. Since part of the defences submitted by the proprietor was not able to overcome the board’s conclusions on lack of inventive step and a later filed part raised new issues, the board did not admit auxiliary request 17 into the appeal proceedings.

In T 412/24 the appellant (patent proprietor) had contested the admissibility of the (first) opposition relying on the following points concerning the (first) opponent: (i) the opponent's professional representative could not represent the company since he was simultaneously managing the legal entity he represented; (ii) the identity of the opponent could not be unequivocally determined; (iii) the opponent could not act as such because carrying out activities reserved to professional representatives without the necessary qualifications circumvented the principles of representation; and (iv) the opponent's change of name affected the admissibility of the opposition.

Concerning the representation, Mr N, the representative of the (first) opponent, a French company in the form initially of a société simplifiée unipersonnelle (SASU) then of a société à responsabilité limitée (SARL), was the president of the SASU and also a professional representative.

The board stated that – contrary to the proprietor’s allegations – Art. 133 and 134 EPC together with R. 152 EPC and the Decision of the President of the EPO of 12 July 2007 on the filing of authorisations (OJ SE 3/2007, 128) constituted a complete and self-contained set of rules on representation in proceedings established by the EPC. A legal person having its seat in an EPC contracting state is not obliged to be represented by a professional representative (Art. 133(1) EPC). Furthermore, persons whose names appear on the list of professional representatives are entitled to act in all proceedings established by the EPC (Art. 134 EPC). A legal person having its seat in an EPC contracting state can act in proceedings before the EPO through its legal representatives. At the time the opposition was filed, Mr N in his capacity as president of the SASU was entitled to represent the SASU since under French law (Art. L. 227 Commercial Code) he was entitled to act on behalf of the legal person in all circumstances. As a professional representative, Mr N would have been entitled to act not only as the president of the SASU, but also as a professional representative appointed by that legal person.

For the sake of completeness, the board explained why neither the references to French and German law, nor the reference to general principles under Art. 125 EPC could lead to the conclusion that the company was prevented from appointing Mr N as its professional representative before the EPO. At the oral proceedings before the board, the appellant referred to the order of UPC_CoA_563/2024. The board noted that the conclusion in that case rested on the specific provisions of the UPCA, in particular Art. 48(1) UPCA (mirroring Art. 19 of the Statute of the CJEU) and R. 8(1) UPCA, which require that both natural and legal persons be represented. The CJEU had identified as one of the objectives of mandatory representation in CJEU proceedings ensuring that the representative of a legal person is sufficiently distant from the party represented (C-515/17 P and C-561/17 P). According to the board, however, even if this were regarded as a general principle of the EPC contracting states, it could not be transposed to the EPC framework. Principles of procedural law under Art. 125 EPC may be invoked to fill gaps, but not to modify the EPC framework. Introducing a corollary of the prohibition of self-representation into a system that expressly allows it would however amount to such a modification.

On the identity of the opponent, the board held that the opposition was clearly filed on behalf of SARL Cabinet NÜ. The only uncertainty, based on the submissions of the proprietor itself, concerned whether Mr N was representing the opponent as a European patent attorney or in his capacity as the president of that company. Nonetheless, this alleged ambiguity could not raise any doubt about the identity of the opponent. As regards the change of the opponent’s name, the board observed that there had been no change of the identity of the opponent.

The alleged circumvention of the law was also rejected. The board noted that this would occur if a person not entitled to act as a professional representative performed all the activities typically carried out by professional representatives while assuming the role of a party, in order to circumvent the prohibition on unqualified representation, but Mr N was a qualified professional representative.

In line with T 1893/22, which related to the earlier application, the board concluded that the (first) opposition was admissible. The appeal was dismissed.

In T 1065/23, claim 10 of the first auxiliary request, which became the main request, defined a pea protein extract obtainable by the method of claims 1 to 9..

The board noted that the method of claim 1 was characterised by a step in which a precipitated pea protein contained in a slurry having a pH of 4.0 to 5.8 was subjected to a specific heat treatment. As shown in Examples 2 and 3 of the opposed patent, pea protein extracts subjected to this step had a significantly lower nitrogen solubility index, gel strength and viscosity than those which were heated at a different pH or were kept at the claimed pH but were not subjected to the claimed heating step. Moreover, Examples 4 and 5 showed that protein extracts obtained by the claimed method, which had these physicochemical properties, had better wine-fining and baking properties. For example, they allowed a reduction of the water content in the dough used to prepare biscuits, while preserving or even improving sensory properties.

Opponent 2 argued among other things that claim 10 had to be rejected because its product-by-process format was, as such, not allowable. The claimed product could be described by specific features defining e.g. its properties. Citing decision T 150/82 and section F-IV, 4.12 of the Guidelines, opponent 2 submitted that the product-by-process format could only be used if it was impossible to claim/define the product other than in terms of a process of manufacture. It argued that, assuming that the product obtainable by the method of claim 1 had low solubility, gel strength and viscosity, these parameters could and should have been used to define that product. Hence, the criteria for drafting a product-by-process claim were not fulfilled, and claim 10 should not be allowed.

The board did not agree with these conclusions. It held that the mere fact that claim 10 was drafted as a product-by-process, despite the fact that the claimed product could be satisfactorily defined by reference to its composition, structure or other testable parameter, is not a ground for opposition set out in Art. 100 EPC. The issue could be, at most, one of a lack of clarity. Section F-IV, 4.12 of the Guidelines mentioned by opponent 2 indeed related to the requirement of clarity. Furthermore, decision T 150/82 related to an appeal against the refusal of a patent application and not to an appeal concerning an opposition filed against a granted patent. Consequently, this decision was not applicable.

For these reasons, the board held that considering that claim 10 was a granted claim, its format could not be objected to on the ground that it was drafted in the product-by-process format or that it lacked clarity (G 3/14).

In der angefochtenen Entscheidung in der Sache T 2108/22 wurde der damalige erste Hilfsantrag (jetziger Hauptantrag) nicht zum Verfahren zugelassen, "da er keine notwendige und zweckmäßige Antwort auf einen Einspruchsgrund sei (R. 80 EPÜ)". Der Anspruch 1 des Hilfsantrags 1 wurde im Vergleich zum erteilten Anspruch 1 mit zwei unterschiedlichen Alternativen eingeschränkt. Es war unstrittig zwischen den Parteien, dass jede der beiden Alternativen A und B des Anspruchs 1 für sich alleine betrachtet durch Hinzufügung von Merkmalen so geändert wurde, dass sie jeweils dem Erfordernis der R. 80 EPÜ genügte..

Nach Ansicht der Kammer, ergibt sich die Gesamtwirkung einer Änderung, die sich aus mehreren Einzeländerungen zusammensetzt, nicht nur aus der Summe der Wirkungen der Einzeländerungen für sich einzeln betrachtet, sondern es ist auch zu berücksichtigen, wie sich die Einzeländerungen im Zusammenhang mit dem insgesamt geänderten Anspruchssatz auswirken. Im vorliegenden Fall besteht diese Gesamtwirkung u.a. auch darin, dass anstelle eines einzigen unabhängigen Anspruchs, der eine einzige Erfindung definiert, nun zwei Alternativen A und B in dem Anspruch definiert sind, die zwei unabhängigen Ansprüchen entsprechen. Das Vorhandensein als solches von zwei Alternativen in Anspruch 1 erfüllt keine der Anforderungen, die nach der Rechtsprechung an eine Änderung im Einklang mit R. 80 EPÜ zu stellen sind, und stellt daher einen Verstoß gegen R. 80 EPÜ dar.

Die Kammer kam zu dem Schluss, dass die Hinzufügung einer einzigen der beiden, den beanspruchten Gegenstand einschränkenden ODER-Alternativen, z.B. Alternative A, zum erteilten unabhängigen Anspruch 1 als ausreichende und abschließende Reaktion auf einen Neuheitseinwand zu werten sei. Diese Änderung entspreche dem Erfordernis der R. 80 EPÜ. Die Hinzufügung der Merkmale der zweiten Alternative B, die inhaltlich komplett unterschiedlich von der ersten Alternative A ist, kann jedoch nicht dazu beitragen, den Neuheitseinwand zu beseitigen, der zur Hinzufügung der ersten Alternative A geführt hat. Die Hinzufügung der Alternative B zum geänderten Anspruch 1 mit der Alternative A könne also nicht durch einen Einspruchsgrund veranlasst sein (R. 80 EPÜ), sondern nur durch den von der Patentinhaberin vorgebrachten Wunsch nach einem "angemessenen breitestmöglichen [Schutz]". Eine Änderung mit dem Ziel des Erreichens des größtmöglichen Schutzumfangs ist jedoch nicht im Einklang mit dem Erfordernis der R. 80 EPÜ..

Eine zweite Alternative in Anspruch 1 führt zu einer erhöhten Komplexität des Verfahrens, zu einer Verzögerung des Verfahrens bei Zurückverweisung an die Einspruchsabteilung, zur weiteren Bearbeitung und zu einer Verschlechterung der Verfahrensökonomie. Die Einsprechende forderte daher eine ausgewogene und faire Abwägung zwischen ihrem eigenen und dem Begehren der Patentinhaberin.

Die Kammer kam unter Berücksichtigung des Umstands, dass die Hinzufügung eines oder mehrerer unabhängiger Ansprüche nach R. 80 EPÜ nicht ausdrücklich zulässig ist, und unter Abwägung der gegenläufigen Interessen der Beteiligten zu dem Schluss, dass der Anspruch 1 mit zwei Alternativen gegen die Vorschrift der R. 80 EPÜ verstößt.

Die Patentinhaberin zitierte mehrere Entscheidungen der Beschwerdekammern (z.B. T 937/00, T 181/02, T 263/05, T 428/12), wonach die Patentinhaberin ein Recht auf größtmöglichen Schutz habe und daher das Ersetzen eines einzigen unabhängigen Anspruchs durch mehrere unabhängige Ansprüche zulässig sei. Die Kammer überzeugte dieses Argument nicht. Keine der von der Patentinhaberin zitierten Entscheidungen der Beschwerdekammern besagt, dass eine Änderung eines Anspruchs, die darin besteht, einen einzigen unabhängigen Anspruch durch mehrere unabhängige Ansprüche zu ersetzen, in jedem Fall nach R. 80 EPÜ zulässig ist. Vielmehr besteht in der Rechtsprechung der Beschwerdekammern ein allgemeiner Konsens darüber, dass "jeder Fall für sich genommen betrachtet werden muss" (T 263/05).

In T 733/23 the opposition division had concluded that there had been insufficient evidence to prove that the data sheets D2, D4, and D7 to D9 had been made available to the public before the filing date. Rather than concluding that, as a result of the data sheets not being considered state of the art under Art. 54 EPC, the subject-matter of the claims was novel, the opposition division decided not to admit them into the opposition proceedings. The board concluded that not admitting these data sheets, filed in due time, constituted a substantial procedural violation (see details as from point 4 of the Reasons including discussion on D19, an affidavit).

The board, in support of its decision, presented some key considerations on public availability of advertising brochures and data sheets, as well as the standard of proof to be applied. The board stated that when a document was clearly intended to be publicly distributed, as was the case with advertising or commercial brochures, the absence of a specific publication or distribution date, a situation quite common in this type of document, was not in itself sufficient to conclude that the document did not constitute prior art. As with any other type of evidence, the key question was not whether the exact date of publication could be determined, but whether it could be established that the relevant subject-matter was made available to the public before the priority or filing date.

Data sheets often represent an intermediate case between internal documents and advertising brochures. Where no publication date is present, the board held it should first be assessed whether the document was intended for public distribution. If so, additional sources must be examined to establish whether the relevant subject-matter was publicly accessible before the patent’s filing or priority date. Here, the opposition division had failed to provide a reasoned decision on public availability, giving no weight to the dates printed on their front pages.

As to the standard of proof, the present board concurred with the position in T 1138/20 that there is only one standard of proof: the deciding body must be convinced, based on the underlying circumstances.

According to the present board, this did not imply that all cases were to be treated identically, as in practice the degree of proof required to establish credibility (i.e. to persuade the board) might vary depending on the specific circumstances. In other words, it was not the standard of proof that adjusted with the circumstances, but rather the credibility of the arguments made by the different parties. For example, when the evidence was exclusively controlled by one party, any gaps in the relevant information might significantly undermine that party's credibility. Conversely, when the information was equally accessible to both parties but only one party submitted evidence, merely raising doubts might not be sufficient to challenge the credibility.

In the present case, the conclusions of the opposition division suggested that the standard of proof "up-to-the-hilt" was applied to determine the public availability of the data sheets. Even if the board agreed that different standards should be applied, this would not be justified in the case in hand, as the relevant information to prove the public availability of the data sheets was not within the exclusive sphere of the appellant (opponent). In this instance, the relevant information would more likely be within the sphere of the patentee. Therefore, there was no basis for applying the strict standard of "up-to-the-hilt" or for questioning the credibility of the appellant (opponent) solely on the grounds that some information was missing.

The patentee argued that, when in doubt, the patent should be upheld. The board disagreed. Fact-finding boiled down to a binary exercise: either something had been proven, or it had not. In addition, there was no presumption of patent validity in proceedings meant to re-assess the validity of this very patent.