C. Procédure orale

The petition in R 16/23 concerned decision J 6/22 with which the Legal Board of Appeal (the "Legal Board") rejected the petitioner's request for re-establishment of rights and rejected the appeal as inadmissible. The petitioner argued that the Legal Board had failed, contrary to Art. 116 EPC, to arrange for the holding of oral proceedings requested by the petitioner, which represented a fundamental procedural defect within the meaning of Art. 112a(2)(d) EPC and R. 104(a) EPC. Furthermore, the decision was based on grounds or evidence on which the petitioner had not had any opportunity to comment, representing a fundamental violation of Art. 113(1) EPC within the meaning of Art. 112a(2)(c) EPC. The petitioner submitted, inter alia, that the conclusions in the decision under review that procedural economy had been a justification for denying the petitioner's right to an oral hearing were contrary to the established case law of the Boards of Appeal.

The Enlarged Board of Appeal (the "EBA") as composed under R. 109(2)(b) EPC held that, according to the wording of Art. 116 EPC, the aspect of expediency referred only to the first alternative, where oral proceedings take place at the EPO's own initiative. Thus, the department concerned with a request for oral proceedings made by a party to the proceedings had no discretion over whether oral proceedings take place.

The EBA also recalled that the right to request oral proceedings included the right for the party requesting them merely to present orally what it had already submitted in writing (see R 3/10). It held that Art. 116(1) EPC, taking into account the purpose of this provision, was thus intended to ensure that a party was entitled, upon request, to make oral submissions prior to a decision which adversely affected that party.

The EBA agreed with the decision under review in that the case law of the Boards of Appeal had established that, in specific situations which may be considered as covered by the wording of Art. 116(1) EPC, a decision taken without prior oral proceedings despite a request for oral proceeding having been made could be considered as not being in conflict with that provision. It found, however, that the situation underlying the decision under review did not fall under any of the categories established in the case law.

Furthermore, the EBA saw no indication that a dynamic interpretation could lead to the conclusion that Art. 116(1) EPC left room for weighing up, on the one hand, the petitioner's right to present the case orally before the adverse decision had been taken and, on the other hand, aspects relating to the expeditious conduct of the appeal proceedings, legal certainty or the prospects of success of the petitioner's appeal, or to a conclusion that the Legal Board had not been obliged to arrange for the holding of oral proceedings requested by the petitioner. The EBA was not persuaded that the considerations relied upon in the decision under review could lead to the result that the requested oral proceedings had not been mandatory under Art. 116(1) EPC, nor that the petitioner's right to oral proceedings could be balanced against considerations relating to the requirement of timely legal certainty or procedural economy.

The EBA concluded that the Legal Board's failure to arrange for the holding of the oral proceedings had been contrary to Art. 116 EPC and, in view of this, a fundamental procedural defect under Art. 112a(2)(d) EPC had occurred.

According to the EBA, in the case underlying the petition for review, the issues in relation to which oral proceedings had been requested and the final decision had been linked. Hence, the procedural defect of not arranging for the holding of oral proceedings, contrary to Art. 116 EPC, had been a fundamental one within the meaning of Art. 112a(2)(d) EPC in conjunction with R. 104(a) EPC. To arrive at this conclusion, the EBA, in particular, did not have to additionally assess whether the outcome of the decision under review could or would have been different if the procedural defect of not arranging for the holding of oral proceedings had not occurred. According to the EBA, this approach was in line with the case law of the Boards of Appeal, including the EBA (R 3/10).

As a fundamental procedural defect under Art. 112a(2)(d) EPC in conjunction with R. 104(a) EPC had been established, the petition for review was considered allowable. According to the EBA the further ground for the petition (fundamental violation of Art. 113(1) EPC) did not need to be addressed. The decision under review was set aside and the proceedings before the board re-opened.

Die mündliche Verhandlung vor der Kammer in T 77/23 fand in Abwesenheit der Beschwerdegegnerin (Patentinhaberin) statt. Vor der mündlichen Verhandlung hatte sie schriftlich hilfsweise beantragt, die Angelegenheit zur Behandlung der Hilfsanträge 2, 4 und 6 bis 8 an die Einspruchsabteilung zurückzuverweisen. Weiter hilfsweise hatte sie beantragt, das Patent in geänderter Fassung auf der Grundlage der Ansprüche eines der Hilfsanträge 1 bis 8 aufrechtzuerhalten.

Die Kammer beschloss, die Angelegenheit aus verfahrensökonomischen Gründen nicht an die erste Instanz zurückzuverweisen. Sie hatte zwar in ihrer Mitteilung gemäß Art. 15 (1) VOBK zur Zurückverweisung der Angelegenheit auf Basis der Hilfsanträge 2, 4 und 6 bis 8 an die erste Instanz nicht explizit Stellung genommen. Dennoch sah sie trotz Abwesenheit der Beschwerdegegnerin in der mündlichen Verhandlung das rechtliche Gehör der Beschwerdegegnerin aus den im Folgenden dargelegten Gründen hierzu für gewahrt an.

Die Kammer hatte in ihrer Mitteilung zu allen Hilfsanträgen Stellung genommen. Der Kammer zufolge wäre es unangemessen, zu den Hilfsanträgen Stellung zu nehmen, und dann die Angelegenheit zurückzuverweisen, da die Kammer mit ihrer vorläufigen Meinung die Einspruchsabteilung beeinflussen würde. Somit musste die Beschwerdegegnerin davon ausgehen, dass die Kammer ihrem Antrag auf Zurückverweisung an die erste Instanz nicht nachkommen würde..

Darüber hinaus hatte die Beschwerdegegnerin durch das Fernbleiben von der mündlichen Verhandlung von sich aus auf ihr rechtliches Gehör in dieser Hinsicht verzichtet. Der Kammer zufolge sollte somit die Beschwerdegegnerin von der getroffenen Entscheidung (keine Zurückverweisung) weder überrascht sein, noch ist ihr rechtliches Gehör diesbezüglich verletzt.

Zum weiteren hilfsweise gestellten Antrag der Beschwerdegegnerin, das Patent in geänderter Fassung aufrechtzuerhalten, stellte die Kammer fest, dass jeweils Anspruch 1 der Hilfsanträge 1-8 nicht neu gegenüber der Lehre des Dokuments E1 ist. Der Kammer war bewusst, dass der Einwand mangelnder Neuheit des Anspruchs 1 des Hilfsantrags 8 gegenüber dem Dokument E1 erstmalig in der mündlichen Verhandlung vor der Kammer erhoben wurde. Die Kammer konnte jedoch aus den im Folgenden erläuterten Gründen keine Verletzung des rechtlichen Gehörs der in der mündlichen Verhandlung abwesenden Beschwerdegegnerin erkennen.

Der schriftliche Vortrag beider Parteien zum Hilfsantrag 8 war im schriftlichen Beschwerdeverfahren kurz gehalten worden. Folglich musste die Beschwerdegegnerin damit rechnen, dass eine bis dato nicht erfolgte ausführliche Diskussion zur Neuheit und erfinderischen Tätigkeit erstmalig in der mündlichen Verhandlung geführt werden würde. Darüber hinaus hatte die Kammer in der Mitteilung gemäß Art. 15 (1) VOBK vorgetragen, dass sie die höherrangigen Hilfsanträge 1 bis 7 wegen mangelnder Neuheit gegenüber dem Dokument E1 für nicht gewährbar erachtet. Da Anspruch 1 des Hilfsantrags 8 auf Anspruch 1 des Hilfsantrags 6 basiert, musste die Beschwerdegegnerin der Kammer zufolge damit rechnen, dass, falls Hilfsantrag 8 in der mündlichen Verhandlung behandelt wird, bei der Neuheitsprüfung auch der Unterschied zum Dokument E1 herausgearbeitet werden würde. Somit kann es für die Beschwerdegegnerin nicht überraschend sein, dass der entsprechende Angriff erstmalig in der mündlichen Verhandlung vor der Kammer diskutiert wurde. Nach Ansicht der Kammer ergab sich dies aus einer logischen Fortführung der Prüfung geänderter Ansprüche auf ihre Gewährbarkeit.

Die Kammer betonte, dass eine erstmalige Beurteilung in der mündlichen Verhandlung der Neuheit oder erfinderischen Tätigkeit des beanspruchten Gegenstands gegenüber den im Verfahren diskutierten Druckschriften, welche allerdings nur zu höherrangigen Anträgen diskutiert worden waren, somit eine der mündlichen Verhandlung fernbleibende Partei nicht überraschen kann.

Darüber hinaus kam die Kammer zum Schluss, dass es nicht möglich sein sollte, dass die Beschwerdegegnerin durch ihre Abwesenheit den Umfang möglicher Einwände wesentlich vorgibt und durch ihr Fernbleiben mögliche Einwände exklusiv auf die des schriftlichen Verfahrens beschränkt. Wäre dies zutreffend, könnte die abwesende Partei wesentlich den Verlauf der mündlichen Verhandlung mitbestimmen, sodass der eigentliche Sinn einer mündlichen Verhandlung durch die Abwesenheit einer Partei ad absurdum geführt werden könnte.

In T 483/23 wies die Patentinhaberin (Beschwerdegegnerin) zu Beginn der mündlichen Verhandlung vor der Kammer darauf hin, dass die mündliche Verhandlung nicht im öffentlichen Online-Kalender der mündlichen Verhandlungen der Beschwerdekammern eingetragen war. Die Öffentlichkeit habe sich daher nicht darüber informieren können, dass in der vorliegenden Sache am 19. März 2025 eine mündliche Verhandlung stattfinden würde. Zur Öffentlichkeit gehöre nicht nur die "interessierte Öffentlichkeit", die sich ohnehin für den vorliegenden Fall interessiere und daher möglicherweise durch die Online-Akte über den Termin der mündlichen Verhandlung informiert worden sei, sondern "jedermann".

Der Patentinhaberin zufolge hat die "allgemeine Öffentlichkeit" mangels der erforderlichen Information nicht an der mündlichen Verhandlung teilnehmen können, da die mündliche Verhandlung auch nicht gesondert am Eingang des Gebäudes in Haar angekündigt worden war (sondern nur gemeinsam mit vier weiteren mündlichen Verhandlungen der Patentinhaberin) und nicht einmal am Eingang zum Verhandlungssaal ausgeschildert gewesen war. Dies stelle einen Verstoß gegen den Öffentlichkeitsgrundsatz dar, der Teil des Rechts auf rechtliches Gehör nach Art. 113 (1) EPÜ sei, wonach das Verfahren unter der Kontrolle der Öffentlichkeit stattfinden müsse. Dieses wichtige rechtliche Erfordernis sei nicht dadurch erfüllt, dass der Termin der mündlichen Verhandlung in der öffentlichen Online-Akte zu finden gewesen sei. Der Öffentlichkeit könne nicht zugemutet werden, sich durch alle anhängigen Akten "durchzuklicken", um festzustellen, dass am 19. März 2025 eine mündliche Verhandlung in der vorliegenden Sache stattfinde.

Die Kammer teilte die Ansicht der Patentinhaberin nicht. Sie betonte, dass der Verhandlungstermin für die Öffentlichkeit problemlos in der Online-Akte einsehbar gewesen sei. Der Kammer zufolge wurde man am Empfang im Gebäude der Verhandlungssäle auf den Saal verwiesen, in dem diese Verhandlung stattfand. Durch die Einstellung des Verhandlungstermins in die Online-Akte habe die Öffentlichkeit ausreichend die Möglichkeit gehabt, sich über die Durchführung der Verhandlung zu informieren, insbesondere darüber, dass die Verhandlung am 19. März 2025 stattfindet. Dies allein genüge nach Einschätzung der Kammer dem Grundsatz der Öffentlichkeit. Nach Auffassung der Kammer sei die Aufnahme eines entsprechenden Hinweises in den Online-Kalender der mündlichen Verhandlungen der Beschwerdekammern keine Voraussetzung für die Wahrung des Grundsatzes der Öffentlichkeit der mündlichen Verhandlungen gewesen.

Dementsprechend wies die Kammer den Einwand der Verletzung des Öffentlichkeitsgrundsatzes der Patentinhaberin zurück. Mit Verweis auf dieselbe Begründung wies die Kammer auch den Einwand der Patentinhaberin zurück, mit dem diese einen Verfahrensmangel nach R. 106 EPÜ wegen eines schwerwiegenden Verstoßes gegen Art. 113 EPÜ aufgrund einer Verletzung des Öffentlichkeitsgrundsatzes beanstandete.

In T 1841/23 the board had accelerated the appeal proceedings due to parallel infringement proceedings before the Unified Patent Court. The board summoned the parties to oral proceedings to be held on 11 December 2024. According to its preliminary opinion, the patent was most likely to be revoked on the ground of added subject-matter. A notice of intervention was filed ca. three weeks before the arranged oral proceedings and the patent proprietor quickly requested their postponement. By communication of 26 November 2024 the board invited the proprietor and opponent 1 to file observations on the notice of intervention by 4 December 2024. Oral proceedings were held on 11 December 2024 as originally scheduled.

According to the board, the proprietor's argument, in effect invoking the right to be heard, that two weeks was an insufficient period to fully respond to the notice of intervention, had no bearing on the question of the date for oral proceedings as governed by Art. 15(2) RPBA. The same applied to its complaint that new arguments were put forward in the notice of intervention, and that the discussion had developed into an intertwined tripartite debate. As the proprietor's core concern was the right to be heard, and since oral proceedings served to protect that very right by providing another opportunity for parties to present their comments, the continuation of the oral proceedings before the board did not adversely affect the parties to the appeal proceedings.

The board also disagreed with the proprietor's suggestion, invoking decision T 1961/09, that continuing the oral proceedings before the board could only be fair to the proprietor if the intervener did not make any submissions at all. The implications of an intervention filed shortly before the arranged oral proceedings had to be determined on a case-by-case basis. In the board’s view, there seemed to be no appreciable disagreement between the two boards in methodological terms. In the present case, unlike the one underlying T 1961/09, the notice of intervention did not raise any further objections or new issues, but only argued on old topics.

The board then moved on to the added subject-matter objections against the patent and concluded that all claim requests were unallowable under Art. 123(2) EPC. After the board reached this conclusion but before any decision was announced, the proprietor submitted a written objection under R. 106 EPC.

The board observed that the proprietor's right to be heard was at the heart of the R. 106 objection. At issue was the decision to revoke the patent because recurring feature F3 was not originally disclosed, thus contravening Art. 123(2) EPC. The board noted that this ground and evidence had been around since the beginning of the opposition proceedings, and the evidence was entirely by the proprietor's own hand. It could not agree with the proprietor's view, namely that any late-refining or further developing of the arguments on the same old ground and evidence would raise concerns with respect to the right to be heard. The board recalled that a first indication of what the board found particularly relevant in this case had already been given in the preliminary opinion, in which the added-matter objection was one of merely two substantive objections addressed. The notice of intervention was evidently never considered relevant as a basis for the decision on the appeal, since an objection being most likely prejudicial to the opposed patent's maintenance was already in the proceedings. The proprietor could not have been taken by surprise by the grounds and evidence forming the basis of the present decision. Moreover, the proprietor had an opportunity to present its comments on them.

While an admissible intervention was to be treated as an opposition (Art. 105(2) EPC), its filing shortly prior to the oral proceedings before a board did not generally excuse the proprietor, and in particular it did not hand them a voucher for more time. Its concrete implications for opposition appeal proceedings were rather to be determined on a case-by-case basis, under the provisions of the EPC and the RPBA. Nor were opposition appeal proceedings designed to serve as a placeholder for tactical considerations in parallel proceedings for infringement. They were rather an existential challenge to the title, on the basis of which enforcement was pursued in the infringement proceedings, and parameters such as legal certainty and procedural economy were also involved. Any difficulties for the proprietor in drafting auxiliary requests that also provided the best scope of protection, considering the ongoing infringement proceedings, were not a reason to delay the opposition appeal proceedings.

For these reasons, which also translated into a lack of "special reasons" under Art. 15(6) RPBA, the board did not refrain from deciding on the appeal on a ground for opposition that appeared also in the notice of intervention. As a result, the objection submitted by the proprietor under R. 106 EPC was dismissed.

In T 1874/23 the board refused the request for re-establishment of rights and, as a consequence, rejected the appeal as inadmissible. The appellant’s request for oral proceedings was found to be obsolete.

The board recalled R. 136(1) EPC and noted that it corresponded to the principle of "Eventualmaxime" under which the request for re-establishment of rights must state all grounds for re-establishment and means of evidence without the possibility of submitting these at a later stage. Only if this requirement for immediate and complete substantiation within the time limit has been fulfilled, it might be permissible to complement the facts and evidence in later submissions, and provided that they do not extend beyond the framework of the previous submissions (e.g. J 19/05). According to the board, this was not the case for the request for re-establishment in the proceedings at hand. As a consequence, no further procedural steps were permissible, notably no further communication by the board and no appointment of oral proceedings. Neither would serve any legitimate purpose. It was not the purpose of oral proceedings in the context of proceedings for re-establishment to give the appellant a (further) chance to substantiate their factual assertions or to provide evidence despite the absence of factual assertions (e.g. J 11/09).

The board stated that it was undisputed that the right to oral proceedings as guaranteed by Art. 116(1) EPC was a cornerstone of proceedings before the EPO. The jurisprudence of the boards generally even followed the assumption of an "absolute" right to oral proceedings upon request as a rule, without room for discussion by the board, and without considering the speedy conduct of the proceedings, equity or procedural economy. However, even this "absolute" right to oral proceedings upon a party's request was subject to inherent restrictions by the EPC and procedural principles generally recognised in the contracting states of the EPO (Art. 125 EPC and J 6/22). Limits to the "absolute" right to oral proceedings had also been recognised in the jurisprudence of the boards (e.g. G 2/19, T 1573/20). Moreover, the boards' jurisprudence had repeatedly emphasised that the requirement of timely legal certainty, in particular in the context of intellectual property rights, was also recognised as a fundamental principle of the EPC. The parties' rights to a fair hearing within a reasonable time, in the context of the RPBA, had also been explicitly underlined by the boards' jurisprudence. In summary, where, as in the present case, oral proceedings served no legitimate purpose, the need for legal certainty in due time trumped and even prevented a board from appointing oral proceedings (J 6/22).

As to the interpretation of Art. 116(1) EPC, the board noted that the jurisprudence of the boards had reiterated the importance of a "dynamic" interpretation of the EPC in light of its object and purpose. In this context, the board referred, among others, to the development of the case law of the ECtHR on Art. 6(1) ECHR, where the ECtHR had also identified occasions where oral proceedings could or even should be dispensed with in pursuit of a party's right to a fair trial. In the board’s view, a literal interpretation of Art. 116(1) EPC conflicted with the legislature's aims when oral proceedings would serve no purpose and thus only prolong proceedings to no one's avail. A literal interpretation of Art. 116(1) EPC thus had to make way for a dynamic and evolutive understanding instead, in light of the provision's object and purpose. The very purpose of Art. 116(1) EPC could be summarised as providing for the essential right to be heard in oral proceedings only in so far as these served a legitimate purpose and thus did not run counter to the need for legal certainty in due time, as a further essential element of a fair trial for all parties.

The board concluded that, at least in the specific circumstances of the case in hand, legal certainty in due time, just as procedural economy, as further essential cornerstones of a fair trial, had to prevail (for essentially the same circumstances see J 6/22). In light of the principles of a fair trial and legal certainty in due time, there was no absolute right to oral proceedings under all circumstances (J 6/22). No oral proceedings had to be appointed in re-establishment proceedings where the "Eventualmaxime" principle would deprive oral proceedings of its very function as a further cornerstone of a fair trial and even run counter to it.

In T 1544/22 the patent proprietor (respondent) submitted a letter, relating inter alia to auxiliary request 2, only two working days before the oral proceedings. They argued that this letter was a direct response to the board's preliminary opinion, which deviated from the impugned decision. According to the patent proprietor, the arguments presented in the letter only elaborated in more detail arguments that had already been presented before. Its aim was to facilitate discussing these arguments during the oral proceedings. Even if the letter had not been filed, its content could have been presented and discussed orally during the oral proceedings. The appellant (opponent 2) took the view that the letter contained a completely new set of arguments, which constituted an amendment to the patent proprietor's appeal case. This amendment would have necessitated contacting a technical expert, which was not possible due to the extremely late submission of the letter.

The board concurred with the patent proprietor that the part of the letter referring to auxiliary request 2 related to arguments considered in the decision under appeal and submitted by the patent proprietor during the written phase of the appeal proceedings (with its reply to the grounds of appeal of opponent 2). In fact, the patent proprietor had already addressed the issues explained in the letter, namely the technical effect of a certain feature and how it was advantageous over the prior art. The late-filed letter merely elaborated these arguments in more detail, as submitted by the patent proprietor. The board held that such a refinement of previously submitted arguments which further illustrated a party's position had to be allowed, especially when, as in the case at hand, the refinement of arguments concerned points where the board's preliminary opinion differed from the impugned decision. Otherwise, the parties could only repeat their arguments put forward in the statement of grounds of appeal and the reply thereto. The board agreed with T 247/20 that oral proceedings, to which the parties had an absolute right under Art. 116 EPC, would serve no purpose if such refinements were not allowed.

The board concluded that the arguments discussed in the late-filed letter relating to auxiliary request 2 were not new arguments and did not represent a fresh case, contrary to opponent 2's submissions. Instead, they concerned further refinements of arguments already addressed in the impugned decision (Art. 12(2) RPBA) and previously presented during the appeal proceedings (Art. 12(3) RPBA). Thus, they did not constitute an amendment to the appeal case as referred to in Art. 12(4), 13(1) and (2) RPBA. Therefore these (very late) submissions had to be considered in the case at hand.

However, the board also stressed that the preliminary opinion of the board had been communicated to the parties more than four months prior to the oral proceedings. Given that the letter in question had been submitted/received in practical terms only two days before the oral proceedings (i.e. on Monday 3 February 2025), the board agreed with opponent 2 that it had been filed extremely late. In addition, the board was of the opinion that the patent proprietor could and should have presented the arguments contained in the late-filed letter earlier in the proceedings. By submitting late-filed arguments with such a high level of detail at such a short notice – two days before the oral proceedings – the patent proprietor had unfairly put opponent 2 in an unnecessarily unfavourable position.

In view of this particular situation, the board had given opponent 2 the opportunity to request an adjournment of the oral proceedings and indicated that it was favourably disposed towards such a request. After opponent 2 had not requested an adjournment of the oral proceedings but preferred to continue them, the board did not consider it necessary to discuss the original accusation of abuse of procedure submitted by this party.