IV. PROCÉDURES DEVANT LES INSTANCES DU PREMIER DEGRÉ

T 1176/24 was an appeal against the examining division’s decision not to admit the main request under R. 137(5) EPC.

The sole independent claim 1 of the main request was a combination of original claim 90 (with reference to original claim 1) and the features of original claim 93. The examining division had agreed with the competent search division that the common concept between original claim 1 and original claim 93 was the friction coefficient increasing treatments, which was known from D1. Since this concept was known, it could not serve as a single general inventive concept, so that the original application did not fulfil the requirement for unity of invention under an a posteriori analysis. Furthermore, the applicant had not paid the requested additional search fee in time and the invention of original claim 93 had therefore not been searched. The examining division had concluded that claim 1 of the main request related to unsearched subject-matter which did not combine with the originally claimed group of inventions to form a single general inventive concept.

The board, however, was of the view that the examining division had erred in its application of R. 137(5) EPC by merely finding that original claim 93 did not meet the requirements of unity when assessed a posteriori. This criterion was irrelevant in the context of the case at hand when applying R. 137(5) EPC.

The board recalled that, according to well-established case law, R. 137(5) EPC did not apply when the applicant has not paid the search fee in respect of a non-unitary invention relating to the originally filed claims. Furthermore, the examining division had not established whether the features of original claim 93 as basis of the amendment to claim 1 of the main request could be subordinated to the original general inventive idea underlying original claim 90 with reference to original claim 1. The subject-matter of claim 1 of the main request as well as the subject-matter of original claim 90 were directed to a threaded fastener, i.e. an assembly of a nut or a stud-head and a reaction washer for receiving counter torque generated due to tightening or loosening of the threaded fastener. The feature added by original claim 93 related to a further and more specific implementation of the interplay between the nut or stud-head and the reaction washer in defining a bond that connects said elements and breaks at or prior to a predetermined pre-torque.

The board was therefore convinced that claim 1 of the main request merely constituted a restriction to a particular embodiment of the subject-matter as claimed in the original claim 90 (with reference to original claim 1) and could be subordinated to the original general inventive idea. This applied as well if the general inventive idea relating to original claim 90 (with reference to original claim 1) was to be seen in an improvement in the friction between the workpiece and the reaction washer, as it was defined by the examining division. In this context, the board pointed to the features of original claim 93, which established a connection between the breaking point of the connection between the nut/stud-head and the reaction washer in dependence of the existent friction forces.

The board concluded that claim 1 of the main request did not fulfil the conditions required for the application of R. 137(5) EPC and that the examining division’s decision not to allow the amended claims under that provision was incorrect.

In its decision, the board stressed that a supplementary search concerning the aspects arising from original claim 93, then reflected in claim 1 of the main request, would be in accordance with due process should the examining division deem it necessary. Moreover, such supplementary search appeared to be highly appropriate in the light of the examining division's findings.

In T 561/23 wies die Kammer darauf hin, dass es laut Rechtsprechung der Beschwerdekammern grundsätzlich zulässig ist, einen erteilten unabhängigen Anspruch, der im Einspruchsverfahren als nicht neu oder nicht erfinderisch angesehen wurde, durch mehrere unabhängigen Ansprüche zu ersetzen, sofern diese jeweils auf Gegenstände gerichtet sind, die bereits in den erteilten abhängigen Ansprüchen definiert waren.

Der Hilfsantrag XIb' wurde während der mündlichen Verhandlung vor der Kammer eingereicht, nachdem die Kammer im Verlauf der Diskussion ihre vorläufige Auffassung geändert hatte. Die Kammer hielt dies für eine angemessene Reaktion der Patentinhaberin auf den Verfahrensverlauf und entschied, den Antrag gemäß Art. 13(2) VOBK in das Beschwerdeverfahren zuzulassen.

Die Kammer stellte zunächst fest, dass Anspruch 1 dieses Antrags auf Anspruch 1 des Hilfsantrags I basiert, und dahingehend geändert wurde, dass mindestens eines der Merkmale (a) und (b) erfüllt sein muss. Diese Merkmale entsprachen den Alternativen (c) und (d) des im Beschwerdeverfahren zurückgezogenen Hilfsantrags III. Sie gingen auf den erteilten abhängigen Anspruch 7 bzw. auf die letzte Alternative des erteilten abhängigen Anspruchs 12 zurück. Damit definierte Anspruch 1 im Grunde zwei unabhängige Ansprüche. Der erteilte unabhängige Anspruch 1 wurde im Einspruchsverfahren als nicht neu im Sinne von Art. 54(3) EPÜ angesehen. Die Kammer erachtete es daher für zulässig, diesen durch mehrere unabhängige Ansprüche zu ersetzen, die unterschiedliche, bereits in den erteilten abhängigen Ansprüchen definierte Ausführungsformen betreffen. Zudem waren die Ansprüche 7 und 12, auf denen die Alternativen (a) und (b) beruhen, in der erteilten Fassung als parallel zu Anspruch 1 abhängige Ansprüche formuliert. Damit entsprach die vorliegende Situation der Kammer zufolge der in T 181/02 beschriebenen Ausnahme, in der eine erhöhte Anzahl unabhängiger Ansprüche durch die Einspruchsgründe veranlasst sein kann.

Demgegenüber stellt die von der Einspruchsabteilung herangezogene Entscheidung T 1138/02 nach Ansicht der Kammer eine Einzelfallentscheidung dar, der generell nicht zu folgen ist. Die Kammer führte aus, dass R. 80 EPÜ lediglich verlangt, dass eine Änderung durch einen Einspruchsgrund veranlasst ist, d. h. darauf abzielt, einen solchen Einwand auszuräumen und damit den Widerruf des Patents zu vermeiden. Aus der fehlenden Neuheit von Anspruch 1 kann sich zwar ein Einwand mangelnder Einheitlichkeit ergeben. Mangelnde Einheitlichkeit stellt jedoch keinen Einspruchsgrund dar. Zudem hat die Patentinhaberin im Einspruchsverfahren nicht die Möglichkeit, unterschiedliche Erfindungen durch Teilanmeldungen weiterzuverfolgen. Die Kammer befand daher, dass unter diesen Umständen kein Anlass besteht, die Patentinhaberin zu verpflichten, zwischen mehreren parallel zu Anspruch 1 abhängigen Ansprüchen auszuwählen.

Die Kammer stellte ferner klar, dass auch die Verwendung von "und/oder"-Formulierungen in abhängigen Ansprüchen der Vereinbarkeit von Hilfsantrag XIb' mit R. 80 EPÜ nicht entgegenstand. Eine "und/oder"-Formulierung kann zwar dazu führen, dass mögliche Rückzugspositionen im erteilten Anspruchssatz schwer vorhersehbar sind und Fragen hinsichtlich der ursprünglichen Offenbarung aufwerfen. Solche Fragen betreffen jedoch gegebenenfalls Art. 84 oder Art. 123(2) EPÜ und sind für die Beurteilung nach R. 80 EPÜ ohne Bedeutung.

Auch hinsichtlich des Anspruchs 12 folgte die Kammer der Argumentation der Beschwerdeführerin. Dieser Anspruch betraf ein Fenster mit einem Jalousiesystem entsprechend Anspruch 1 des Hilfsantrags I, welches dem Jalousiesystem der erteilten Ansprüche 1, 2 und 4 entsprach. Die vorgenommenen Änderungen bestanden lediglich darin, dass Merkmale, die zuvor durch Verweis auf andere Ansprüche einbezogen waren, nun ausdrücklich im Anspruch wiedergegeben werden.

Die Kammer gelangte daher zu dem Ergebnis, dass die im Hilfsantrag XIb' vorgenommenen Änderungen durch die Einspruchsgründe veranlasst waren und den Anforderungen der R. 80 EPÜ entsprechen. Die Angelegenheit wurde an die Einspruchsabteilung zur weiteren Prüfung zurückverwiesen.

In T 528/25 the appeal was directed against the decision of the examining division to reject the European patent application, since none of the requests on file contained a designation of the inventor that met the requirements of Art. 81 and R. 19 EPC. In J 8/20 the Legal Board of Appeal had dismissed an appeal against the refusal by the Receiving Section of the parent application, in which the applicant had intended to designate the artificial intelligence machine "DABUS" as inventor.

In the case at hand, the board first considered the legal framework regarding the designation of an inventor in the context of inventions made by using artificial intelligence (AI) as well as the reasons provided in J 8/20 (and J 9/20). The board concluded that, in principle, the designation of an inventor under the EPC is also possible for inventions developed using AI.

In the main request, the appellant had designated himself as the inventor in EPO Form 1002. However, in the Addendum to this form he had stated that "A machine called "DABUS" conceived of the present invention" and that the appellant was "not an inventor under traditional criteria", because "in the case of the present invention, the machine only received training in general knowledge in the field and proceeded to independently conceive of the invention and to identify it as novel and salient. If the training Dr Thaler provided DABUS had been given to a person, that person would meet inventorship criteria as inventor. In the present case, DABUS was not created to solve any particular problem, was not trained on any special data relevant to the present invention, and the machine rather than a person identified the novelty and salience of the present invention." The board held that the statements presented in EPO Form 1002, on the one hand, and in the Addendum, on the other, did not contain a clear and unambiguous designation of the inventor as required under Art. 81 EPC and R. 19 EPC. The formulations in the Addendum did not merely supplement the statement in EPO Form 1002 with information that the invention was devised by using an AI-machine, but rather called into question the statement in EPO Form 1002 that the appellant should be formally indicated as the (only) inventor. Therefore, the main request was not allowable.

The first and second auxiliary requests included the following information in the Addendum:

"A machine called "DABUS" had been caused to conceive of the present invention

Dr Thaler had caused a specific machine called DABUS to conceive of the invention disclosed and claimed in this European patent application. Dr Thaler owns DABUS, built DABUS, trained DABUS, and used DABUS. In the present case, DABUS was not created to solve any particular problem, was not trained on any special data relevant to the present invention, and DABUS identified the novelty and salience of the present invention. (...)"

The board noted that the decisive question was how the appellant's declarations as a whole were to be formally understood. In light of the explanations in the Addendum, it could not be established clearly and beyond doubt in the context of the formal examination under Art. 81 EPC and R. 19 EPC that (only) the appellant was to be designated as inventor.

Likewise, the board found that the third auxiliary request was not allowable under Art. 81 EPC and R. 19 EPC. This request comprised only EPO Form 1002 with the following wording: "Stephen L. Thaler der die künstliche Intelligenz DABUS dazu veranlasst hat, die Erfindung zu generieren." The board noted that EPO Form 1002 was to be used in cases where the applicant was not the (sole) inventor, i.e. where R. 19(1), second sentence, EPC applied. While this use of this form might be unobjectionable if only the name of the applicant appears, the use of EPO Form 1002 together with the statement "der die künstliche Intelligenz Dabus dazu veranlasst hat, die Erfindung zu generieren" made the designation of inventor unclear and inconsistent. The board further noted that the present case differed from the factual situation underlying the decision of the German Federal Court of Justice of 11 June 2024 (BGH X ZB 5/22), in which a corresponding wording on the form was accepted. The form "Erfinderbenennung", on which the German case was based, generally also applies if the applicant himself is the sole inventor. Furthermore, it was expressly added by filling in on page 2 of the form the statement that "Erfinder ist Anmelder", i.e. the inventor is the applicant.

The fourth auxiliary request was not admitted into the appeal proceedings according to Art. 13(2) and 12(6) RPBA, and the board dismissed the appeal.

In T 691/24, the board had to address the issue of the late filing of claim requests in opposition proceedings and whether the first instance had exercised its discretion correctly in not admitting them. The main request and the first auxiliary request were filed during the oral proceedings before the opposition division (as auxiliary request 9a1 and 9b, respectively) and were not admitted into the opposition proceedings for being late-filed and non-convergent (main request) and for having been filed "without prior authorisation" (first auxiliary request).

In the appeal proceedings, the patent proprietor contested the finding that the requests had been late-filed, arguing that they had been submitted in response to an objection under Art. 123(2) EPC that had been newly raised during the second oral proceedings before the opposition division, after it had departed from its previous preliminary opinion. The patent proprietor further argued that the opposition division should have applied the criterion of "prima facie allowability" instead of the "convergence criterion".

The board held that the requests had indeed been filed late, as they had not been submitted within the time limit set by the invitation under R. 79(1) EPC issued following opponent 2’s notice of intervention. The board stated that the opposition division had the discretion pursuant to Art. 123(1) EPC in conjunction with R. 81(3), 79(1) and/or 116(2) EPC not to admit them (R 6/19, T 256/19). This discretion existed independently of the provisions of R. 116 EPC and of whether the opposition division deviated from its provisional opinion (T 966/17). Nor could such a deviation as such justify an automatic admittance of a claim request (T 868/20, T 847/20). A positive preliminary opinion on auxiliary request 9a – already admitted into the proceedings at the opposition division's discretion – could not guarantee per se the admittance of a further filing of claim requests. Nor did such a positive opinion "reset" the application of the "convergence criterion".

As regards the use of the "convergence criterion" by the opposition division, the board noted that it is a well-established criterion that may legitimately be used by a first-instance department when exercising its discretion on the admittance of late-filed claim requests. The board agreed that the present main request was not convergent with auxiliary requests 5 and 6 and that the opposition division had indeed the discretion to use this criterion to not admit "auxiliary request 9a1", i.e. the present main request, into the opposition proceedings. The patent proprietor had noted that the criterion of "prima facie allowability" was used when considering admittance of other claim requests during the first-instance proceedings instead of the "convergence criterion". The board stated that the question of consistency in the application of criteria selected from the opposition division’s legal toolbox when assessing admittance had little bearing on whether, in the present case, the opposition division rightly relied upon a particular criterion in relation to a particular claim request.

The board accepted that the "convergence criterion" represents only an "indicator" that procedural economy may be affected and that whether this is actually the case depends on the circumstances of a particular case. However, in the present case, the opposition division indicated precisely in view of which higher-ranking claim request the then "auxiliary request 9a1" did not converge and why this claim request went in a different direction, i.e. which features were in fact replaced. Hence, the implications for procedural economy were therefore considered and balanced. As a consequence, the opposition division did not use the "convergence criterion" in an unreasonable or erroneous way when disregarding the present main request..

With respect to the first auxiliary request, and the opposition division’s decision not to allow it, the board found that there is no legal basis in the EPC for making a party’s submissions subject to prior approval by the deciding body and that the limitation to one further request – ex ante and without any consideration as to their substance – was arbitrary. The board therefore acknowledged that this constituted a procedural, though not substantial, violation, since the auxiliary request, being a continuation of the main request, must likewise be "non-convergent".

Consequently, the board did not admit the main request and the first auxiliary request into the appeal proceedings (Art. 12(6), first sentence, RPBA).

In case T 2615/22, the parent application of the contested patent was filed on 10 March 2015, i.e. more than twelve months after the filing dates of the priority applications P1 and P2. Upon a request for re-establishment of rights by the then applicant of the parent application, the Receiving Section decided on 14 January 2016 to restore the priority period.

The opponent-appellant argued that the patent was not entitled to the priority of P1 and P2. It considered that the Receiving Section was not competent to take that decision and that it did not correctly apply the all-due-care criterion in its decision. It contended this decision in the application proceedings should be set aside in the opposition appeal proceedings.

The present board did not see any reason to deviate from T 1482/21 (relating to the patent granted on the parent application) according to which the Receiving Section was competent to take the decision of 14 January 2016, and that this decision was final and that this prevented other departments of the EPO such as an opposition division or a technical board of appeal which decide on questions of priority in other, subsequent proceedings from reviewing and overturning the Receiving Section's decision. In accordance with these conclusions, the present board agreed that the opposition division had to acknowledge the Receiving Section's decision to grant the request for re-establishment of rights in respect of the priority period.

As to whether a positive decision of the Receiving Section on re-establishment of rights was open for review in subsequent opposition/appeal proceedings, the board did not consider convincing the opponent’s arguments. As set out in T 1482/21 if the Receiving Section grants a request for re-establishment of rights in respect of the priority period, the applicant is not adversely affected under Art. 107 EPC. As the applicant is the only party to the proceedings before the Receiving Section, a favourable decision on such a request is not appealable and becomes final immediately..

The nature of opposition proceedings and the case law on res judicata were discussed in detail during the oral proceedings before the board. The board recalled that opposition proceedings are not designed to be a continuation of examination proceedings (G 3/14). This also meant that, legally speaking, opposition proceedings must not be understood as any kind of appeal proceedings in relation to the proceedings before the Receiving Section and the examining division. Accordingly, an opposition division does not have the power to review and set aside a procedural decision taken in these proceedings. Opposition is not a legal remedy in the classical sense and it does not have the effect of transmitting the case to a superior tribunal. Not all possible irregularities in an application can be reviewed in opposition proceedings, not even all substantive ones, but only those which are listed as grounds for opposition in Art. 100 EPC. An examination of the same substantive patentability requirements – which qualify as grounds for opposition – may be undertaken by different departments in different proceedings, and there is indeed no binding effect in that regard. The Receiving Section's decision on re-establishment of rights does not concern the assessment of a substantive requirement which qualifies as a ground for opposition. It concerned a purely procedural matter decided in ex parte proceedings in the then applicant's favour.

The fact that a purely procedural matter may have ramifications on whether a patent exists, does not change its qualification as a procedural matter. This may result in a patent coming into existence which may otherwise not have been granted. Nevertheless, such possible irregularities in the patent grant procedure do not qualify as a ground for opposition and therefore cannot be reviewed in opposition proceedings or subsequent opposition/appeal proceedings.

In T 1398/23 entschied die Kammer, dass die Nichtzulassung des Hilfsantrags 2 durch die Einspruchsabteilung fehlerhaft war..

Die Einspruchsabteilung hatte den Antrag als verspätet angesehen, da er nach Ablauf der Frist nach R. 116 (1) EPÜ eingereicht worden war. "Um die Fairness des Verfahrens zu garantieren", prüfte sie daher, ob die Patentinhaberin den Antrag früher hätte einreichen können. Die Einspruchsabteilung stellte ferner fest, dass Hilfsantrag 14 rechtzeitig vor der Frist gemäß R. 116 (1) EPÜ eingereicht worden war, und dass der neu eingereichte Hilfsantrag 2 fast identisch zu Hilfsantrag 14 war, mit dem Unterschied, dass die Ansprüche 6 bis 10 aufrechterhalten wurden..

Aufgrund dieser Konstellation, kam die Einspruchsabteilung zu dem Schluss, dass die Patentinhaberin keinen Grund gehabt hatte, einen neuen Antrag mit zusätzlichen Ansprüchen einzureichen. Eine Änderung der Strategie einer Partei, die unabhängig vom Verfahrensverlauf ist, sei keine gültige Begründung für ein spätes Vorbringen. Der Hilfsantrag 2 hätte spätestens kurz vor Ablauf der Frist gemäß R. 116 (1) EPÜ eingereicht werden müssen und wurde daher von der Einspruchsabteilung gemäß Art. 114 (2) EPÜ nicht ins Verfahren zugelassen.

Die Kammer kam jedoch zu dem Schluss, dass die Einspruchsabteilung die Ausgangslage unzutreffend ermittelt hatte. Maßgeblich war der Kammer zufolge, dass die Einsprechende am letzten Tag der Frist gemäß R. 116 (1) EPÜ erstmals einen Einwand unter Art. 54 (1) EPÜ in Bezug auf das Dokument D2 erhoben hatte und die Einspruchsabteilung in der mündlichen Verhandlung von ihrem Ermessen Gebrauch machte, diesen neuen Einwand zum Verfahren zuzulassen, auf dessen Basis der beanspruchte Gegenstand des Hauptantrags und des Hilfsantrags 1 dann als nicht neu angesehen wurden. Hilfsantrag 14 war hingegen eingereicht worden, bevor der Einspruchsabteilung der Einwand fehlender Neuheit im Hinblick auf D2 überhaupt bekannt war. Hilfsantrag 14 war ersichtlich ein Versuch, die davor erhobenen Einwände der Einsprechenden zu beheben bzw. der vorläufigen Meinung der Einspruchsabteilung Rechnung zu tragen. Dies bedeutet, dass Hilfsantrag 14 nicht als Reaktion auf den neuen Einwand unter Art. 54 (1) EPÜ im Hinblick auf D2 angesehen werden durfte. Entgegen der Auffassung der Einspruchsabteilung war Hilfsantrag 14 daher nicht Teil der Ausgangslage, die bei der Bestimmung der durch die Einreichung von Hilfsantrag 2 bewirkten Änderung zu berücksichtigen war.

Ausgehend davon, dass ein neuer Einwand unter Art. 54 (1) EPÜ erst am letzten Tag der Frist nach R. 116 (1) EPÜ erhoben worden war, dieser erst in der mündlichen Verhandlung durch die Einspruchsabteilung zum Verfahren zugelassen worden war und dann zur Ablehnung der Neuheit des beanspruchten Gegenstands führte, war die Einreichung eines neuen Hilfsantrags in der mündlichen Verhandlung als rechtzeitige und angemessene Reaktion zu bewerten. In diesem Falle lag die Zulassung des neuen Hilfsantrags 2 nicht im Ermessen der Einspruchsabteilung, sondern der Hilfsantrag 2 musste zugelassen werden.

Auch wenn Hilfsantrag 2 im Vergleich zu Hilfsantrag 14 nur zusätzliche Ansprüche aufweist, kann das Recht der Patentinhaberin, auf einen neuen Einwand mit einem neuen Anspruchssatz (Hilfsantrag 2) zu reagieren, nicht durch einen Anspruchssatz (Hilfsantrag 14) erschöpft werden, der sich bereits vor Einreichung des Einwands im Verfahren befand.

Da die Entscheidung der Einspruchsabteilung, den Hilfsantrag 2 nicht zuzulassen, fehlerhaft war, war die angefochtene Entscheidung aufzuheben. Die Kammer hob die angefochtene Entscheidung auf und verwies die Angelegenheit zur weiteren Entscheidung an die Einspruchsabteilung zurück (Art. 111 (1) EPC, Art. 11 VOBK).

In T 712/25 la demande initiale de brevet contenait une page 1/1 de dessin comprenant un unique dessin dénommé figure 1. La division d'examen avait soulevé des objections d'activité inventive et de clarté à l'encontre des revendications de la demande telle que déposée, sans soulever aucune objection concernant le dessin. En réponse à ces objections, le requérant a déposé le 2 février 2022 des revendications modifiées. Dans sa notification au titre de la règle 71(3) CBE, la division d'examen a fait référence à la description et aux revendications, mais pas au dessin. Il ressortait par ailleurs de cette notification que seule la page 53 de la description avait été supprimée et il n'était pas mentionné que le dessin aurait également été supprimé. Le requérant a indiqué dans son courrier du 23 décembre 2024 que son accord à la délivrance du brevet était conditionné à l'inclusion dans le texte de la page de dessin telle que déposée lors de l'entrée en phase régionale..

La chambre a rappelé que, conformément à la règle 71(5) CBE, le requérant est réputé avoir approuvé le texte qui lui a été communiqué en vertu de la règle 71(3) CBE s'il acquitte les taxes requises et produit les traductions dans le délai fixé dans ladite règle. Selon la jurisprudence issue de la décision T 1003/19 (voir aussi T 1823/23, T 1224/24 et T 387/25), cette conséquence juridique de la règle 71(5) CBE ne s'applique que lorsque le texte communiqué au requérant est identique au texte sur la base duquel la division d'examen a l'intention de délivrer le brevet, comme le prévoit la règle 71(3) CBE, et reflète la "volonté réelle" de la division d'examen. Le texte auquel il est fait référence dans une notification au titre de la règle 71(3) CBE correspond en principe à la requête du requérant et à l'intention de la division d'examen. Toutefois, quand tel n'est pas le cas, la division d'examen ne pouvant statuer sur une demande de brevet européen que sur la base du texte présenté ou accepté par le requérant (art. 113(2) CBE), celle-ci n'est autorisée à suggérer de sa propre initiative que des modifications mineures qu'elle peut raisonnablement attendre du requérant, et il est d'usage de les indiquer non seulement dans le "Druckexemplar" annexé à la notification au titre de la règle 71(3) CBE, mais également dans cette notification. Plus précisément, dans l'affaire T 1003/19, il a été estimé que le retrait de toutes les pages de dessin représentant un mode de réalisation de l'invention ne pouvait être accepté par le requérant, d'autant plus que la description faisait toujours référence aux dessins et que leur suppression n'avait pas été indiquée comme modification dans la notification au titre de la règle 71(3) CBE dans le champ prévu à cet effet. Il a également été statué dans ce sens dans les affaires T 1823/23 et T 387/25, qui concernaient également un cas où les dessins avaient été omis de la notification au titre de la règle 71(3) CBE, ainsi que dans l'affaire T 1224/24 concernant l'omission de 48 des 52 pages de dessin.

La chambre a souligné que la page de dessin 1/1 faisait partie de la demande WO 2020/128200 A1 et était encore présente dans la demande lors de l'entrée en phase régionale. Elle était cependant absente du "Druckexemplar" et de la notification au titre de la règle 71(3) CBE. Si le requérant avait été informé de la suppression de la page 53 de la description, il ne l'avait pas été de celle de la page de dessin. L'absence de la page de dessin n'était par ailleurs pas cohérente avec les références faites à la figure 1 dans les pages de la description destinées à la délivrance du brevet. Selon la chambre, la division d'examen n'avait certainement pas l'intention d'omettre la page de dessin sans raison, en l'absence d'objections soulevées à son encontre, sans en informer le requérant et sans supprimer les références correspondantes dans la description, ce d'autant plus que le requérant avait déjà signalé cette absence et n'avait donné son accord au texte destiné à la délivrance du brevet que sous réserve que la page de dessin soit incluse. Par conséquent, la division d'examen n'a pas communiqué le texte sur la base duquel elle avait l'intention de délivrer le brevet..

La chambre a considéré que, conformément aux décisions T 1003/19, T 1823/23, T 1224/24 et T 387/25, la conséquence juridique prévue à la règle 71(5) CBE ne s'appliquait pas en l'espèce, la notification envoyée ne satisfaisant pas aux exigences de la règle 71(3) CBE. Le texte sur la base duquel le brevet a été délivré n'étant pas conforme à la requête du requérant, il n'a pas été fait droit aux prétentions du requérant au sens de l'art. 107 CBE. Toutes les autres conditions prévues à la règle 101(1) CBE étant remplies, le recours était recevable..

La chambre a estimé que la division d’examen a commis un vice substantiel de procédure et, dans les circonstances de l’espèce, qu’il était équitable de rembourser la taxe de recours.

In T 1469/24, the appellant-proprietor contested the admissibility of the opposition, arguing that the opponent had not been correctly identified, so that the requirements of Art. 99(1) and R. 76(2) EPC were not met. They argued that the opponent, Mr N.N., was the representative of one of the subsidiaries of the group of companies against which the proprietor had initiated infringement proceedings before the UPC, and which, in turn, had initiated a central revocation action against the contested patent at the UPC in reaction to the infringement proceedings. Mr N.N. had therefore not been the real opponent, but had acted as a straw man for the group. The real opponent thus avoided being identified as the party challenging the patent. This was a misuse of the opposition procedure, which was intended to allow genuine opponents to challenge patents in a transparent manner. Consequently, the use of a straw man in this case was a clear attempt to circumvent the law by abuse of due process. In addition, according to the proprietor, the straw man, being a patent attorney, did not have a legitimate interest in the outcome of the opposition proceedings.

The board observed that, in an opposition in which the person named as opponent is acting on behalf of a third party, decision G 3/97 identifies two cases where the law is circumvented by abuse of process: 1) if the opponent is acting on behalf of the proprietor, 2) if the opponent is acting on behalf of a client in the context of activities which, taken as a whole, are typically associated with professional representatives, without possessing the relevant qualifications required by Art. 134 EPC. The board found that neither of these cases applied here..

The board indicated it was aware that these two cases did not constitute an exhaustive list. Nevertheless, G 3/97 sets out some further considerations as to what is not considered a circumvention of the law by abuse of process. For instance, in point 3.2.1 of the Reasons, the Enlarged Board stated that "Though the patent proprietor may have an economic interest in finding out who is trying to attack his patent, such an interest is not legally protected by the legislative arrangements for the opposition procedure". In the present case, even if the group of companies involved in the infringement action had actually avoided being identified, this would not have constituted an attempt to circumvent the law by abuse of due process within the meaning of decision G 3/97..

Moreover, the board recalled the Enlarged Board’s observation in G 3/97 that since the EPC legislator explicitly designed the opposition procedure as a legal remedy in the public interest, which is open to any person, it cannot be required that the opponent has an interest in the revocation of the patent. Consequently, the board held that it was irrelevant in the present case whether the opponent Mr N.N. had a genuine personal interest in the outcome of the opposition proceedings.

The board found that, while G 3/97 and G 4/97 may not explicitly state that any opposition by a straw man is admissible, they essentially conclude that an opposition filed by a straw man on behalf of an anonymous party is not objectionable merely because the opponent is acting as a straw man. In particular, the Enlarged Board held that an abuse of process needs not be assumed in those cases where the third party instructing the presumed straw man could have filed an opposition itself. The board recalled that G 3/97 and G 4/97 do not state that the opposition division would be required to investigate ex officio whether any of the identified situations that could be considered an abuse of process might be present and concealed by the formally named opponent. On the contrary, the burden of proof is borne by the person alleging that the opposition is inadmissible. The board did not see any such evidence in the file.

The board concluded that the requirements of Art. 99(1) and R. 76(2) EPC were met and that the appeal must be dismissed.

In T 1403/24 the appellant (patent proprietor) contested the admissibility of the opposition filed by opponent 2. It argued that opponent 2 was acting on behalf of opponent 1 or opponent 3. In the appellant’s view, this followed from the citation of document D24 in the notice of opposition by opponent 2, because D24 concerned the non-public infringement complaint by the patent proprietor against opponent 1 and opponent 3 in Germany. Moreover, opponent 2 had previously represented a member of the same company group to which opponent 1 belonged in the opposition against the parent patent. Furthermore, the notices of opposition filed on the same day by opponent 2 and opponent 3 included large sections of identical language. As explained in T 9/00, it would be an abuse of procedure for one opponent to file two oppositions. Therefore, according to the appellant, the filing of the opposition by opponent 2 on behalf of opponent 1 or opponent 3 represented an attempt to circumvent the law, which was in view of the considerations in G 3/97 and G 4/97 not admissible.

The board observed that in contrast to the situation in T 9/00, opponent 2 was a distinct legal person from opponent 1 and opponent 3. According to decisions G 3/97 and G 4/97, an opposition filed on behalf of a third party was inadmissible if the involvement of the opponent was to be regarded as circumventing the law by abuse of process, in particular if the opponent was acting on behalf of the patent proprietor or on behalf of a client without possessing the relevant qualifications required by Art. 134 EPC. The decisions G 3/97 and G 4/97 explicitly concluded that a circumvention of the law by abuse of process did not arise purely because a professional representative was acting in its own name on behalf of a client and that the burden of proof regarding the circumvention of the law by abuse of process was to be borne by the party alleging that the opposition was inadmissible.

The board held that, given the shared interest among opponents in revoking the patent, it was not uncommon for them to exchange documents and coordinate their submissions during opposition proceedings. Therefore, the citation of document D24 by opponent 2, and the presence of similar or identical passages in the notices of opposition filed by opponents 2 and 3, did not establish that opponent 2 acted on behalf of opponent 1 or opponent 3. The appellant had thus not provided convincing evidence that the opposition filed in the name of opponent 2 was filed on behalf of opponent 1 or opponent 3 to circumvent the law by abuse of process. Accordingly, the board confirmed the admissibility of the opposition filed by opponent 2.

In T 866/24, during the oral proceedings before the board, the opponent (respondent) submitted that the unclear features underlying the amendments made to claim 1, which were based on the patent description, were building up on corresponding unclear formulations taken from dependent claim 6 as granted. Raising an objection under Art. 84 EPC against unclear features stemming from granted dependent claims should, in the opponent’s view, be admissible under such circumstances.

The board agreed, in principle, with the opponent's concerns. According to the board’s perception, there was a recent tendency to examine dependent claims less and less with respect to clarity in examination proceedings despite the fact that their full examination under Art. 84 EPC was not considered "unrealistic" in G 3/14, point 32 of the Reasons. Such a full examination was even expressly encouraged by the Enlarged Board in G 1/24, point 20 of the Reasons (i.e. highlighting "the importance of the examining division carrying out a high quality examination of whether a claim fulfils the clarity requirements of Article 84 EPC"). The board noted that the justification for such leniency may be found in the assumption that the protection conferred by a granted patent is defined only by the independent claims. Where dependent claims are subsequently added to an independent claim in the course of opposition proceedings, opponents are ultimately faced with unclear claim features which, as in the present case, were deemed to have been examined for clarity, although de facto they had not been. Nonetheless, they could not be objected to under Art. 84 EPC due to the conclusions of G 3/14.

The board observed that this result was unsatisfactory, as an independent claim with unclear features leaves much to the readers' imagination. It added that unclear features tend to elude a sensible comparison with the prior art. Furthermore, since opponents may not anticipate with certainty which claim construction will be adopted by the board or a court in infringement proceedings, they may feel obliged to put forward different lines of argumentation for all of the different potential interpretations. In the board’s view, categorically barring opponents in such cases from raising clarity objections under Art. 84 EPC causes undue complexities in the discussion on novelty and inventive step, to the detriment not only of opponents but also of the opposition divisions and the boards of appeal.

In T 989/23 auxiliary request 17, filed with the statement of grounds of appeal, had first been filed in the opposition proceedings on the final date set under R. 116 EPC. The opposition division had decided that this auxiliary request was not open for examination as to its admissibility since it had been filed within the set time limit. Auxiliary request 17 was not considered by the opposition division since a higher-ranking auxiliary request was found allowable. The appellant-opponent requested that auxiliary request 17 not be admitted into the appeal proceedings, arguing that the division had misunderstood its discretionary powers.

In view of the line of case law holding that submissions admitted by the opposition division could not be excluded from consideration on appeal (e.g. T 487/16, T 1768/17, T 617/16, T 26/13, T 989/23, T 1568/12, T 2603/18, T 3201/19) the board first addressed the extent of its power of review. It explained that like an opposition division's decision to disregard late-filed submissions, a decision to admit such submissions into the opposition proceedings was a discretionary procedural decision which formed part of the opposition division's final decision on the merits of an opposition. A decision to admit late-filed submissions adversely affected the party contesting their admittance (in view of a possible adverse decision on appeal based on the admitted submissions, T 1549/07). Therefore, a board had the power to review an opposition division's procedural decision to take into consideration submissions filed late in opposition proceedings. Otherwise, the parties' right to a judicial review of an essential part of the opposition division's decision would be denied. Moreover, on appeal, a board would be compelled to accept a legal and factual framework, even if it is based on an erroneous exercise of discretion. As a consequence, requests, facts or evidence that had been admitted into opposition proceedings could be disregarded on appeal if the opposition division's decision suffered from an error in the use of discretion (T 1209/05, T 1652/08, T 1852/11, T 2197/11, T 572/14, T 341/15, T 326/22, T 776/17). The board thus had the power and duty to review the opposition division's decision to admit auxiliary request 17 into the opposition proceedings.

The board held that the filing of requests for amendment of the patent was governed by Art. 123(1) EPC, which gave the opposition division the discretionary power not to admit new requests for amendment (e.g. T 755/96, OJ 2000, 174; T 980/08, T 1178/08, T 966/17, R 6/19, T 256/19, R 11/20). The exercise of this discretion had to take account of the following: In inter-partes proceedings, each party had to be given equal opportunity to present their case and a fair chance to respond to new matter raised by the other party or parties or by the opposition division. Both the opposition division and the parties had to observe the principle of good faith (T 669/90, OJ 1992, 739; T 201/92). To expedite the proceedings and implement the principle of fairness towards the other party or parties, each party had to submit all facts, evidence, arguments and requests for amendments relevant to their case as early and completely as possible (T 326/87, OJ 1992, 522; T 430/89; T 951/91, OJ 1995, 202). This case law had been developed mainly in the context of Art. 114(2) EPC, pertaining to facts and evidence. Nevertheless, in view of the principles set out above, the rationale of this case law also applied to a patent proprietor's requests for amendment of the patent (e.g. T 582/08). Whether amended sets of claims should be considered in opposition proceedings or not did not merely depend on their filing within the time limit under R. 116 EPC, but also on the specific circumstances of the case (see also T 364/20). Consequently, the opposition division erred in denying that it had discretionary power to disregard auxiliary request 17. As a consequence, this procedural decision did not establish that auxiliary request 17 was "admissibly raised" in opposition proceedings.

The board agreed with the opponent that the filing of additional sets of amended claims (including auxiliary request 17) on 23 January 2023 was not a diligent and appropriate reaction to the opponent's submissions filed on 14 April 2022 and reiterated on 2 September 2022, or to the opposition division's communication of 30 May 2022. Since part of the defences submitted by the proprietor was not able to overcome the board’s conclusions on lack of inventive step and a later filed part raised new issues, the board did not admit auxiliary request 17 into the appeal proceedings.

In T 412/24 the appellant (patent proprietor) had contested the admissibility of the (first) opposition relying on the following points concerning the (first) opponent: (i) the opponent's professional representative could not represent the company since he was simultaneously managing the legal entity he represented; (ii) the identity of the opponent could not be unequivocally determined; (iii) the opponent could not act as such because carrying out activities reserved to professional representatives without the necessary qualifications circumvented the principles of representation; and (iv) the opponent's change of name affected the admissibility of the opposition.

Concerning the representation, Mr N, the representative of the (first) opponent, a French company in the form initially of a société simplifiée unipersonnelle (SASU) then of a société à responsabilité limitée (SARL), was the president of the SASU and also a professional representative.

The board stated that – contrary to the proprietor’s allegations – Art. 133 and 134 EPC together with R. 152 EPC and the Decision of the President of the EPO of 12 July 2007 on the filing of authorisations (OJ SE 3/2007, 128) constituted a complete and self-contained set of rules on representation in proceedings established by the EPC. A legal person having its seat in an EPC contracting state is not obliged to be represented by a professional representative (Art. 133(1) EPC). Furthermore, persons whose names appear on the list of professional representatives are entitled to act in all proceedings established by the EPC (Art. 134 EPC). A legal person having its seat in an EPC contracting state can act in proceedings before the EPO through its legal representatives. At the time the opposition was filed, Mr N in his capacity as president of the SASU was entitled to represent the SASU since under French law (Art. L. 227 Commercial Code) he was entitled to act on behalf of the legal person in all circumstances. As a professional representative, Mr N would have been entitled to act not only as the president of the SASU, but also as a professional representative appointed by that legal person.

For the sake of completeness, the board explained why neither the references to French and German law, nor the reference to general principles under Art. 125 EPC could lead to the conclusion that the company was prevented from appointing Mr N as its professional representative before the EPO. At the oral proceedings before the board, the appellant referred to the order of UPC_CoA_563/2024. The board noted that the conclusion in that case rested on the specific provisions of the UPCA, in particular Art. 48(1) UPCA (mirroring Art. 19 of the Statute of the CJEU) and R. 8(1) UPCA, which require that both natural and legal persons be represented. The CJEU had identified as one of the objectives of mandatory representation in CJEU proceedings ensuring that the representative of a legal person is sufficiently distant from the party represented (C-515/17 P and C-561/17 P). According to the board, however, even if this were regarded as a general principle of the EPC contracting states, it could not be transposed to the EPC framework. Principles of procedural law under Art. 125 EPC may be invoked to fill gaps, but not to modify the EPC framework. Introducing a corollary of the prohibition of self-representation into a system that expressly allows it would however amount to such a modification.

On the identity of the opponent, the board held that the opposition was clearly filed on behalf of SARL Cabinet NÜ. The only uncertainty, based on the submissions of the proprietor itself, concerned whether Mr N was representing the opponent as a European patent attorney or in his capacity as the president of that company. Nonetheless, this alleged ambiguity could not raise any doubt about the identity of the opponent. As regards the change of the opponent’s name, the board observed that there had been no change of the identity of the opponent.

The alleged circumvention of the law was also rejected. The board noted that this would occur if a person not entitled to act as a professional representative performed all the activities typically carried out by professional representatives while assuming the role of a party, in order to circumvent the prohibition on unqualified representation, but Mr N was a qualified professional representative.

In line with T 1893/22, which related to the earlier application, the board concluded that the (first) opposition was admissible. The appeal was dismissed.

In case T 0387/25 the patent proprietors had appealed the examining division's decision to grant a patent because the drawings had been omitted in the supporting documents indicated in the communication pursuant to R. 71(3) EPC.

The board noted that in the present case the drawings clearly formed part of the application as originally filed, and also of the application documents on which the European regional phase was to be based. The appellants explicitly maintained the "drawings as presently on file" in their submissions during examination proceedings when filing amended claims. They never agreed to the omission of the drawings, and in particular did not expressly agree to the text intended for grant in the communication pursuant to R. 71(3) EPC. This distinguishes the present case from the situations underlying T 2277/19 and T 2864/18.

Following decisions T 2081/16, T 1003/19, T 408/21, T 1823/23 and T 1224/24, the board held that the legal consequence outlined in R. 71(5) EPC (the deemed approval of the notified text) did not apply in the present case. According to the board, it is not sufficient that an applicant, having received a communication formally referring to R. 71(3) EPC, pays the required fee and files the required translations. The legal consequence of R. 71(5) EPC only arises if the communication sent also complies with the substantive requirements of R. 71(3) EPC, i.e. it actually contains the text in which the examining division intends to grant the patent, on the basis of the documents filed by the applicant, possibly supplemented by individual marked amendments..

The present board noted that the strict approach to the mechanism of R. 71 EPC advocated in T 265/20, in which the competent board did not follow the approach taken in T 1003/19 and T 2081/16, was not applied in the later decisions T 408/21, T 1823/23 and T 1224/24. In addition, the circumstances of the case at hand differed even more from the situation underlying T 265/20. In the present case, the appellants had in fact brought the relevant error, i.e. the omission of all the drawing sheets by the EPO – over which they had no influence – to the EPO's attention when it first occurred. In this case, the formalities officer's reply led them to understand that the drawing sheets would be taken into account in the event of a B1 publication. It followed that the decision to grant was based on an application in a text which was neither submitted nor agreed by the applicants, so the requirements of Art. 113(2) EPC had not been complied with. Hence, the board decided that the appeal was admissible and the decision under appeal was to be set aside.

According to the board, it has been established case law since T 1003/19 that an examining division's error in compiling the documents intended for grant in a communication under R. 71(3) EPC that makes a clearly unintentional omission of part of the documents proposed by the applicant for grant as indicated in the applicant's last request can still be corrected if the applicant files an appeal against the subsequent grant of the patent within the time limit under Art. 108 EPC, at least if the applicant did not explicitly consent to the incorrect compilation. T 265/20 did not support that case law; but this remained a single decision and was not followed by other boards..

The board held that the present decision did not deviate from G 1/10. It found that a referral to the Enlarged Board of Appeal was not required either to ensure uniform application of the law or to align the case law and Guidelines (see points 3.1 to 3.9.5 of the Reasons).

The board noted that the Guidelines, e.g. in H-VI, do not properly distinguish between cases where a mistake was already contained in an applicant's request or was explicitly approved by an applicant, and cases like the one at hand: where an examining division, by mistake and unintentionally, deviated from the appellant's latest request when listing the documents intended for grant in a communication under R. 71(3) EPC and this was neither pointed out to the applicant nor explicitly acknowledged by it. However, a divergence between the Guidelines and the case law of the boards is not necessarily a reason for a referral to the Enlarged Board. Rather, Art. 20(2) RPBA assumes that under normal circumstances it is enough to state sufficient grounds to enable the decision to be readily understood, such that the Guidelines may be adapted where necessary.

In T 1065/23, claim 10 of the first auxiliary request, which became the main request, defined a pea protein extract obtainable by the method of claims 1 to 9..

The board noted that the method of claim 1 was characterised by a step in which a precipitated pea protein contained in a slurry having a pH of 4.0 to 5.8 was subjected to a specific heat treatment. As shown in Examples 2 and 3 of the opposed patent, pea protein extracts subjected to this step had a significantly lower nitrogen solubility index, gel strength and viscosity than those which were heated at a different pH or were kept at the claimed pH but were not subjected to the claimed heating step. Moreover, Examples 4 and 5 showed that protein extracts obtained by the claimed method, which had these physicochemical properties, had better wine-fining and baking properties. For example, they allowed a reduction of the water content in the dough used to prepare biscuits, while preserving or even improving sensory properties.

Opponent 2 argued among other things that claim 10 had to be rejected because its product-by-process format was, as such, not allowable. The claimed product could be described by specific features defining e.g. its properties. Citing decision T 150/82 and section F-IV, 4.12 of the Guidelines, opponent 2 submitted that the product-by-process format could only be used if it was impossible to claim/define the product other than in terms of a process of manufacture. It argued that, assuming that the product obtainable by the method of claim 1 had low solubility, gel strength and viscosity, these parameters could and should have been used to define that product. Hence, the criteria for drafting a product-by-process claim were not fulfilled, and claim 10 should not be allowed.

The board did not agree with these conclusions. It held that the mere fact that claim 10 was drafted as a product-by-process, despite the fact that the claimed product could be satisfactorily defined by reference to its composition, structure or other testable parameter, is not a ground for opposition set out in Art. 100 EPC. The issue could be, at most, one of a lack of clarity. Section F-IV, 4.12 of the Guidelines mentioned by opponent 2 indeed related to the requirement of clarity. Furthermore, decision T 150/82 related to an appeal against the refusal of a patent application and not to an appeal concerning an opposition filed against a granted patent. Consequently, this decision was not applicable.

For these reasons, the board held that considering that claim 10 was a granted claim, its format could not be objected to on the ground that it was drafted in the product-by-process format or that it lacked clarity (G 3/14).

In der angefochtenen Entscheidung in der Sache T 2108/22 wurde der damalige erste Hilfsantrag (jetziger Hauptantrag) nicht zum Verfahren zugelassen, "da er keine notwendige und zweckmäßige Antwort auf einen Einspruchsgrund sei (R. 80 EPÜ)". Der Anspruch 1 des Hilfsantrags 1 wurde im Vergleich zum erteilten Anspruch 1 mit zwei unterschiedlichen Alternativen eingeschränkt. Es war unstrittig zwischen den Parteien, dass jede der beiden Alternativen A und B des Anspruchs 1 für sich alleine betrachtet durch Hinzufügung von Merkmalen so geändert wurde, dass sie jeweils dem Erfordernis der R. 80 EPÜ genügte..

Nach Ansicht der Kammer, ergibt sich die Gesamtwirkung einer Änderung, die sich aus mehreren Einzeländerungen zusammensetzt, nicht nur aus der Summe der Wirkungen der Einzeländerungen für sich einzeln betrachtet, sondern es ist auch zu berücksichtigen, wie sich die Einzeländerungen im Zusammenhang mit dem insgesamt geänderten Anspruchssatz auswirken. Im vorliegenden Fall besteht diese Gesamtwirkung u.a. auch darin, dass anstelle eines einzigen unabhängigen Anspruchs, der eine einzige Erfindung definiert, nun zwei Alternativen A und B in dem Anspruch definiert sind, die zwei unabhängigen Ansprüchen entsprechen. Das Vorhandensein als solches von zwei Alternativen in Anspruch 1 erfüllt keine der Anforderungen, die nach der Rechtsprechung an eine Änderung im Einklang mit R. 80 EPÜ zu stellen sind, und stellt daher einen Verstoß gegen R. 80 EPÜ dar.

Die Kammer kam zu dem Schluss, dass die Hinzufügung einer einzigen der beiden, den beanspruchten Gegenstand einschränkenden ODER-Alternativen, z.B. Alternative A, zum erteilten unabhängigen Anspruch 1 als ausreichende und abschließende Reaktion auf einen Neuheitseinwand zu werten sei. Diese Änderung entspreche dem Erfordernis der R. 80 EPÜ. Die Hinzufügung der Merkmale der zweiten Alternative B, die inhaltlich komplett unterschiedlich von der ersten Alternative A ist, kann jedoch nicht dazu beitragen, den Neuheitseinwand zu beseitigen, der zur Hinzufügung der ersten Alternative A geführt hat. Die Hinzufügung der Alternative B zum geänderten Anspruch 1 mit der Alternative A könne also nicht durch einen Einspruchsgrund veranlasst sein (R. 80 EPÜ), sondern nur durch den von der Patentinhaberin vorgebrachten Wunsch nach einem "angemessenen breitestmöglichen [Schutz]". Eine Änderung mit dem Ziel des Erreichens des größtmöglichen Schutzumfangs ist jedoch nicht im Einklang mit dem Erfordernis der R. 80 EPÜ..

Eine zweite Alternative in Anspruch 1 führt zu einer erhöhten Komplexität des Verfahrens, zu einer Verzögerung des Verfahrens bei Zurückverweisung an die Einspruchsabteilung, zur weiteren Bearbeitung und zu einer Verschlechterung der Verfahrensökonomie. Die Einsprechende forderte daher eine ausgewogene und faire Abwägung zwischen ihrem eigenen und dem Begehren der Patentinhaberin.

Die Kammer kam unter Berücksichtigung des Umstands, dass die Hinzufügung eines oder mehrerer unabhängiger Ansprüche nach R. 80 EPÜ nicht ausdrücklich zulässig ist, und unter Abwägung der gegenläufigen Interessen der Beteiligten zu dem Schluss, dass der Anspruch 1 mit zwei Alternativen gegen die Vorschrift der R. 80 EPÜ verstößt.

Die Patentinhaberin zitierte mehrere Entscheidungen der Beschwerdekammern (z.B. T 937/00, T 181/02, T 263/05, T 428/12), wonach die Patentinhaberin ein Recht auf größtmöglichen Schutz habe und daher das Ersetzen eines einzigen unabhängigen Anspruchs durch mehrere unabhängige Ansprüche zulässig sei. Die Kammer überzeugte dieses Argument nicht. Keine der von der Patentinhaberin zitierten Entscheidungen der Beschwerdekammern besagt, dass eine Änderung eines Anspruchs, die darin besteht, einen einzigen unabhängigen Anspruch durch mehrere unabhängige Ansprüche zu ersetzen, in jedem Fall nach R. 80 EPÜ zulässig ist. Vielmehr besteht in der Rechtsprechung der Beschwerdekammern ein allgemeiner Konsens darüber, dass "jeder Fall für sich genommen betrachtet werden muss" (T 263/05).

In T 733/23 the opposition division had concluded that there had been insufficient evidence to prove that the data sheets D2, D4, and D7 to D9 had been made available to the public before the filing date. Rather than concluding that, as a result of the data sheets not being considered state of the art under Art. 54 EPC, the subject-matter of the claims was novel, the opposition division decided not to admit them into the opposition proceedings. The board concluded that not admitting these data sheets, filed in due time, constituted a substantial procedural violation (see details as from point 4 of the Reasons including discussion on D19, an affidavit).

The board, in support of its decision, presented some key considerations on public availability of advertising brochures and data sheets, as well as the standard of proof to be applied. The board stated that when a document was clearly intended to be publicly distributed, as was the case with advertising or commercial brochures, the absence of a specific publication or distribution date, a situation quite common in this type of document, was not in itself sufficient to conclude that the document did not constitute prior art. As with any other type of evidence, the key question was not whether the exact date of publication could be determined, but whether it could be established that the relevant subject-matter was made available to the public before the priority or filing date.

Data sheets often represent an intermediate case between internal documents and advertising brochures. Where no publication date is present, the board held it should first be assessed whether the document was intended for public distribution. If so, additional sources must be examined to establish whether the relevant subject-matter was publicly accessible before the patent’s filing or priority date. Here, the opposition division had failed to provide a reasoned decision on public availability, giving no weight to the dates printed on their front pages.

As to the standard of proof, the present board concurred with the position in T 1138/20 that there is only one standard of proof: the deciding body must be convinced, based on the underlying circumstances.

According to the present board, this did not imply that all cases were to be treated identically, as in practice the degree of proof required to establish credibility (i.e. to persuade the board) might vary depending on the specific circumstances. In other words, it was not the standard of proof that adjusted with the circumstances, but rather the credibility of the arguments made by the different parties. For example, when the evidence was exclusively controlled by one party, any gaps in the relevant information might significantly undermine that party's credibility. Conversely, when the information was equally accessible to both parties but only one party submitted evidence, merely raising doubts might not be sufficient to challenge the credibility.

In the present case, the conclusions of the opposition division suggested that the standard of proof "up-to-the-hilt" was applied to determine the public availability of the data sheets. Even if the board agreed that different standards should be applied, this would not be justified in the case in hand, as the relevant information to prove the public availability of the data sheets was not within the exclusive sphere of the appellant (opponent). In this instance, the relevant information would more likely be within the sphere of the patentee. Therefore, there was no basis for applying the strict standard of "up-to-the-hilt" or for questioning the credibility of the appellant (opponent) solely on the grounds that some information was missing.

The patentee argued that, when in doubt, the patent should be upheld. The board disagreed. Fact-finding boiled down to a binary exercise: either something had been proven, or it had not. In addition, there was no presumption of patent validity in proceedings meant to re-assess the validity of this very patent.

In T 1224/24 the appeal was directed against the decision of the examining division to grant a European patent on the basis of the application documents indicated in the communication under R. 71(3) EPC dated 13 December 2023.

This communication had not indicated that the text intended for grant differed from the applicant's request regarding the drawings. Furthermore, no prior communication from the examining division had proposed amendments to the drawings filed by the applicant, or contained any comments on them. All communications had stated that, for the figures, the examination was carried out on the amended drawing sheets 1/4-4/4 as filed upon entry into the regional phase before the EPO. However, the file contained no explicit approval from the applicant for the removal of the remaining 48 originally filed drawings. It appeared that neither the members of the examining division nor the appellant had realised that several of the original drawing sheets were omitted and only the amended drawing sheets 3/52, 28/52, 37/52 – renumbered 1/4-4/4 – were considered by the examining division.

In accordance with T 1003/19, T 1823/23 and T 2081/16, the board held that the legal consequence set out in R. 71(5) EPC could only apply if the communication under R. 71(3) EPC reflected the examining division's intention regarding the application documents on which the patent was to be granted. This conclusion was drawn from the unambiguous wording of R. 71(3) EPC, which uses the verb "intends", clearly indicating the intention of the examining division. Deemed approval under R. 71(5) EPC could only occur after a text compliant with R. 71(3) EPC had been communicated to the applicant. R. 71(5) EPC is not a stand-alone provision. Simply paying the fee and filing translations does not trigger deemed approval regardless of the communicated text's content. The text must conform to R. 71(3) EPC, to which R. 71(5) EPC refers, and align with the examining division's intention regarding the application documents that form the basis for granting the patent. Otherwise, the subsequent fee payment and translation filing remain ineffective.

The board further stated that R. 71(6) EPC allows the applicant to request reasoned amendments or corrections to the communicated text. However, this provision applies only to texts communicated in accordance with R. 71(3) EPC, which reflect the examining division's intention regarding the application documents that form the basis for granting the patent. This specifically addresses situations where the communication refers to the correct documents intended for grant, but these documents contain clerical mistakes or inaccuracies that the applicant wishes to rectify, or the applicant is not satisfied with the amendments explicitly proposed by the examining division to the text they submitted. However, if the communicated text does not reflect the examining division's intention for granting the patent, neither the absence of a correction or amendment request under R. 71(6) EPC, nor the payment of the fee and filing of translations under R. 71(5) EPC will have any legal consequence. The board found that this conclusion did not only align with the clear wording of R. 71(3) EPC, but also safeguarded the applicant from being seriously prejudiced by the impossibility to request corrections under R. 140 EPC (see G 1/10).

The decision under appeal was based on a text that had neither been submitted nor had been agreed upon by the applicant. Therefore, the decision did not comply with Art. 113(2) EPC and the board set it aside.

The board was aware of T 265/20, where the board in charge did not follow the approach taken in T 1003/19 and T 2081/16 and ultimately dismissed the appeal. However, according to the present board, T 265/20 did not represent diverging case law, as the circumstances in that case were different.

The request for reimbursement of the appeal fee had been withdrawn by the appellant. The board on its own did not consider reimbursement equitable, despite the substantial procedural violation affecting the decision under appeal (R. 103(1)(a) EPC). The board pointed out that the applicant had had several opportunities during the examination proceedings to identify the error regarding the drawing sheets.